Atheous

[MindOverMatter2]

In general I’d agree with this.
I don’t think it matters what moral theory you adopt, given atheism, the suffering wrought by non-sentient forces isn’t the kind of thing which could be justified.

How do you know that if you don’t know what good is?

 

[In_Spiration]

I’m quite surprised that this argument has received virtually no attention yet. To me (and I might just be being presumptuous here) the silence is a concession.

Proud bastard that I am (though with a superficial concern for your doxastic safety), normally, I’d say I’ll be damned to pass such a blatant challenge onto anyone else. to let it perhaps remain unmet. But on the other hand, I rarely have sufficient time for Catholic Answers these days, and an incomplete stab just might inadvertently convert your self-congratulatory conclusion from a presumption to a deductive proof. Still, my recent readings of logic-averse Po-Mos has now got me positively friendly toward objectively-minded atheists; and indeed I have been meaning to learn about Bayesian reasoning due to, among other things, a blossoming interest in the nature of probability and my occasional reading of these guys. So transparently I’ll attempt to test the water with such a cleverly-disclaimed air of unique reluctance that any prior probability which you once may have attached to another failed dodge-response (see: empther, ThereWasADream, Trishie) may thus be avoided. Hence I probe:

What are your thoughts on this summary of C.S. Peirce’s treatment of Bayesian reasoning and probability? (If I follow through with my dive into uncertainty/probability/belief, I think I’d want to begin with this guy, as I like a lot of his writing on abduction.)

Peirce came ever more clearly to see that there are three distinct and mutually incommensurable measures of imperfection of certitude. Only one was probability. The other two he called “verisimilitude” (or “likelihood”) and “plausibility”. Each of the three measures was associated with one of his types of argument. Probability he associated with deduction. Verisimilitude he associated with induction. And plausibility he associated with abduction. Let us look more closely at each of these three distinct measures of uncertainty.

By the time Peirce wrote on probability, the concept and its calculus were well over two hundred years old. The probability calculus itself had become more or less standardized by Peirce’s time, and indeed Peirce’s own axioms for the calculus are more or less the same that Kolmogoroff gives for his “elementary theory of probability.” By contrast with the calculus, the philosophical theory of the meaning of probability was hotly disputed. Two sides to the dispute existed. There were the subjectivists, or “conceptualists,” as Peirce designated them. These believed that probability was a measure of the strength of belief actually accorded to a proposition or a measure of the degree of rational belief that ought to be accorded to a proposition. Among the defenders of this sort of view, Augustus de Morgan and Adolphe Quetelet were major figures. And there were the objectivists, or “materialists,” as Peirce designated them. These believed that probability was a measure of the relative frequency with which an event of some specific sort repeatedly happened. John Venn was a major defender of this sort of view. Pierre Simon Laplace had spoken sometimes in a subjectivist way, sometimes in an objectivist way; but his arguments basically depended on a subjectivist interpretation of probability.

Peirce vigorously attacked the subjectivist view of de Morgan and others to the effect that probability is merely a measure of our level of confidence or strength of belief. He allowed that the logarithm of the odds of an event might be used to assess the degree of rational belief that should be accorded to an event, but only provided that the odds of the event were determined by the objective relative frequency of the event. In other words, Peirce suggested that any justifiable use of subjectivism in connection with probability theory must ultimately rest on quantities obtained by means of an objectivist understanding of probability.

 

[In_Spiration]

Along with his attack on a subjectivist account of probability, Peirce also attacked the use of what came to be called the method of “inverse probabilities” as a way of solving the problem of induction. In the process, he also excoriated the theoretical work, in this connection, of de Morgan and Adolphe Quetelet (the Belgian criminologist and early user of statistical analysis in sociology). Induction, as we have seen, Peirce counted as an inference from sample to population. The method of inverse probabilities offers itself as a way of calculating the (conditional) probability that a population has a trait in a certain proportion given that a sample drawn from that population has the trait in that proportion. It proposes to calculate this conditional probability by applying the so-called “Bayes’s Theorem” in order to express it in terms of the (inverse conditional) probability that the sample has the trait in the crucial proportion given that the population has the trait in the crucial proportion. In the expression of the first conditional probability in terms of the second conditional probability, however, there occur certain quantities, known as the “Bayesian prior probabilities.” What Peirce pointed out is that there is no way to assign any quantities in a rational fashion to the requisite Bayesian prior probabilities. The appearance that one does have a reason for assigning particular quantities results only from an illicit substitution of subjective probabilities for the needed objectivist probabilities. What the user of the method of inverse probabilities does is to equate complete lack of information about something with the claim that all possibilities must have equal probabilities. This equation was called “the principle of insufficient reason” in the nineteenth century; John Maynard Keynes later named it “the principle of indifference.” This principle is, however, completely irrational without a dependence on a subjectivist account of probability. What we need, however, is objective probabilities, and so we have no reason for assigning any particular values to the Bayesian prior probabilities. Only “if universes were as plenty as blackberries,” wrote Peirce, would the analysis of de Morgan and Quetelet make any sense.

In rejecting Bayesianism and the method of inverse probabilities, Peirce argued that in fact no probability at all can be assigned to inductive arguments. Instead of probability, a different measure of imperfection of certitude must be assigned to inductive arguments: verisimilitude or likelihood. In explaining this notion Peirce offered an account of hypothesis-testing that is equivalent to standard statistical hypothesis-testing. In effect we get an account of confidence intervals and choices of statistical significance for rejecting null hypotheses.

I suppose I’m mostly curious to know whether you definitely object to any of the above, and whether you take your argument(s) to neatly fit into any of Peirce’s distinct varieties on uncertain argumentation. Due to the ultimate reliance on presumably subjectively-rooted expectations, my prima facie judgment is that this method classifies as abduction. I suspect this apparent objectivity of the “probability” you find may in fact only be a consequence of your subtly adopting a subjective prior, particularly re: unjustified and/or (full/partial) inscrutable suffering relative to a/theism. I’ll need to clarify/narrow down this broad assessment more, of course, and hopefully I’ll do so; however, you’re free to self-criticize in the event you see anything above that you haven’t previously considered which you think might be significant. No, really, I won’t mind.

[Heads-up: My day off work is Monday; so if I don’t get around to a response then, it’s probably going to be a while 'til I get another legitimate shot.]

 

[In_Spiration]

OK, briefly, one quick thought. Let’s assume your Hypo-Syllogism is sound in the following way:

1. 
   *]F → F =True]
   *]F → T =True]
   *]F → T =True]
   
   In this case, atheism is necessarily false, in light of the fact that the truth of (1) depends on the falsity of atheism, since, of course, if (1) runs as [T → F], then the conditional is false and the first premise fails. And you couldn’t opt for (1) as [F → T] either, because that also renders atheism false from the get-go. Therefore, your only option is if (1) checks out as [T → T], to prevent your syllogism from tripping right out of the gates; and our only choice is apparently either what I give above or else a full ticket of Fs. Now, and I hope I’m not being to vague at this point, doesn’t a lot of this hinge on the consequent of (1)? Maybe more than your posts would indicate, that is, if theism entails no unjustified suffering?

 

[Perplexity]

Proud bastard that I am (though with a superficial concern for your doxastic safety), normally, I’d say I’ll be damned to pass such a blatant challenge onto anyone else. to let it perhaps remain unmet.

I like this guy

What are your thoughts on this summary of C.S. Peirce’s treatment of Bayesian reasoning and probability?

&

Peirce vigorously attacked the subjectivist view of de Morgan and others to the effect that probability is merely a measure of our level of confidence or strength of belief.

&

What Peirce pointed out is that there is no way to assign any quantities in a rational fashion to the requisite Bayesian prior probabilities. The appearance that one does have a reason for assigning particular quantities results only from an illicit substitution of subjective probabilities for the needed objectivist probabilities.

It seems to me like Peirce is saying there is this thing, ‘probability’, and it isn’t a measure of our level of confidence or strength of belief. But, so long as there is a measure of our level of confidence or strength of belief, I don’t mind whether it’s called probability or not.

I can’t think of why objectivist probabilities are needed to calculate the Bayesian terms, the fact that many think they’re not is why subjectivist Bayesianism is the dominant form today (perhaps it was different then?). The article does state:

“In other words, Peirce suggested that any justifiable use of subjectivism in connection with probability theory must ultimately rest on quantities obtained by means of an objectivist understanding of probability.”

However, without any elaboration as to why we should agree with Perice’s suggestion, it just seems like an idea to chew on but not a reason to doubt subjectivist Bayesianism.

So, I’d reply to this by saying I have no reason to think such a substitution is necessary or preferable, and therefore don’t feel any epistemic discomfort from this objection to the rationality of these numerical assignments.

OK, briefly, one quick thought. Let’s assume your Hypo-Syllogism is sound in the following way:

F → F =True]
F → T =True]
F → T =True]

I’d say these valuations are true in the case of the theist. They look a little different for an atheist, or so I believe:

T → T =True]
T → T =True]
T → T =True]

In this case, atheism is necessarily false, in light of the fact that the truth of (1) depends on the falsity of atheism, since, of course, if (1) runs as [T → F], then the conditional is false and the first premise fails. And you couldn’t opt for (1) as [F → T] either, because that also renders atheism false from the get-go.

Hmm, modality is tricky business. I don’t think it follows from the falsity of atheism, which the theist must affirm, that atheism is necessarily false. Since there is no such modal operator in the argument, all that’s being affirmed is its falsity (by the theist).

Therefore, your only option is if (1) checks out as [T → T], to prevent your syllogism from tripping right out of the gates; and our only choice is apparently either what I give above or else a full ticket of Fs. Now, and I hope I’m not being to vague at this point, doesn’t a lot of this hinge on the consequent of (1)? Maybe more than your posts would indicate, that is, if theism entails no unjustified suffering?

Hmm, I’d say for the theist, (1)'s consequent doesn’t matter much since she must deny (1)'s antecedent. So long as that’s false, the conditional is true. For the atheist, I’d say (1)'s consequent does matter; but, I believe the atheist must accept it as true so I believe the argument punches out on either world-view. I hope I didn’t miss any points you wanted a response to. Thanks for the well-thought out reply! Looking forward to your response.

 

[tdgesq]

I’m going to attempt to show that the following argument is a sound deductive argument (logically valid with true premises)

1. If atheism is true, then unjustified suffering occurs.

Let me be more explicit. (1) consists of two distinct propositions: (1a) “Atheism is true” and (1b) “unjustified suffering occurs.” The theist will certainly claim that (1a) is false. He will also claim that (1b) is false. It is only when these discrete propositions are combined into the form of a conditional proposition that an (apparent) paradox arises with respect the the truth of the entire conditional.

But, as a theist you must say the antecedents of both (1) and (2) are false. Therefore, by the very truth-conditions of material conditionals, you must accept (1) and (2) as true.

This is technically correct, but potentially misleading. Let’s take (1) again, this time splitting it into its components (1a) and (1b). To declare (1a) as false is to recast the proposition as (1a’) “atheism is false.” To declare (1b) as false is to recast the proposition as (1b’) “unjustified suffering does not occur.” Now if we combine (1a’) and (1b’) into a conditional we get (1’) “if atheism is false then unjustified suffering does not occur.” Obviously the conditional (1’) is true.

Similarly, if (1) “atheism is true” (declared false) then “unjustified suffering occurs” (declared false), then indeed the conditional proposition (1) is true. But what you seem to be suggesting is that by the theist accepting that (1) is true, he also must accept that (1a) and (1b) are true. This is not the case. While the truth value of the entire conditional must be affirmed, the discrete antecedent and consequent may/must be still denied. So the theist gladly accepts (1) as a true conditional proposition precisely because if the proposition “atheism is true” is false then “unjustified suffering occurs” is false. You seem to forget that the theist can claim both the antecedent and the consequent false.

Btw, I am not denying the antecedent or affirming the consequent by this argument. That would only be accurate if I claimed “not p, therefore q” or “q, therefore p.” That is not the form of my argument.

 

[Perplexity]

But what you seem to be suggesting is that by the theist accepting that (1) is true, he also must accept that (1a) and (1b) are true. This is not the case.

I agree that it is not the case that the theist must accept (1)'s antecedent and consequent because he must accept (1) as a conditional. The intention is that at the end of the argument, the theist must convert and accept (1a); but, when the theist first approaches the argument, she must deny (1a). [and also (1b), etc.]

 

[sjh331]

Hi, everyone!

I majored in math in college, so I just had to jump in on the happy proof fun times.

Perplexity, I may be missing something here, but I don’t see why a theist can’t accept (3). It’s possible for the conditional to be valid even if (or precisely because) the precedent condition never arises.

It’s like saying, “If the elephant in my bathroom wears a dress, I am a weasel.” The only way I could show that to be false is to show a T → F situation. But my bathroom is waaaaay too small for an elephant, so that will never happen. Thus, the conditional is technically true. But the conditional being true does not show that the precedent is true. It just shows that if the precedent ever does occur, then the antecedent will occur, too.

In the same way, (3) may be a valid conditional, but that in itself does not show that atheism is true.

As a side-note, I’ll add my thoughts on proofs of (a)theism in general. I majored in math in college, but I did so with the intention of going to medical school. So I’ve studied and worked in both mathematics and other sciences. My realization has been this: different disciplines require different types of evidence. No one tries to prove germ theory by writing out a mathematical proof, and no one tries to prove Riemann’s hypothesis by conducting an experiment. Of course, logical thinking plays a role in the biological sciences. But biology has too many variables to use proofs; quite a few perfectly logical hypotheses have been proven wrong by experiment.
That doesn’t mean math contradicts biology or vice versa. It just means they have different domains.

Theology is a different beast from science, because it deals with questions about something (God) that, if God exists, will almost certainly not be completely sensible to us. (If we understand everything God does, then how is He God? God, by definition, transcends us.) For that reason, I’ve tried to give up any line of reasoning that hinges on a statement like "If there were a God, He would… " or “If there were a God, He would not…” It assumes God has no variables we failed to account for, which is a faulty premise if we’re talking about a God who is God (as opposed to a god who is basically like a person but nicer). When I think about God, my most common mistakes come from making God too small or too much like me when He is very much neither of those things.

Hope this makes sense! Best wishes to you in your ponderings!

 

[In_Spiration]

Perplexity:

In Spiration:

F → F =True]
F → T =True]
F → T =True]

I’d say these valuations are true in the case of the theist. They look a little different for an atheist, or so I believe:

T → T =True]
T → T =True]
T → T =True]
…]
I don’t think it follows from the falsity of atheism, which the theist must affirm, that atheism is necessarily false. Since there is no such modal operator in the argument, all that’s being affirmed is its falsity (by the theist).

Yeah, I didn’t realize I picked a bad choice of word there until after the post had already been submitted. Simply a matter of carelessness on my part, though. I wasn’t intending to assert that atheism is necessarily false on the basis of a mere assumption in a hypothetical. Most regrettably my bad.

Perplexity:

In Spiration:

Therefore, your only option is if (1) checks out as [T → T], to prevent your syllogism from tripping right out of the gates; and our only choice is apparently either what I give above or else a full ticket of Fs. Now, and I hope I’m not being to vague at this point, doesn’t a lot of this hinge on the consequent of (1)? Maybe more than your posts would indicate, that is, if theism entails no unjustified suffering?

Hmm, I’d say for the theist, (1)'s consequent doesn’t matter much since she must deny (1)'s antecedent. So long as that’s false, the conditional is true. For the atheist, I’d say (1)'s consequent does matter; but, I believe the atheist must accept it as true so I believe the argument punches out on either world-view. I hope I didn’t miss any points you wanted a response to. Thanks for the well-thought out reply! Looking forward to your response.

Yes, you’re right. The theist indeed seems unavoidably bound to the truth of (3) as a result of his not being able to deny the truth of either (1) or (2) – to be specific, because he has to reject the antecedents of each, and that renders both true according to the standard logic re: material conditionals. Damn.

I should disclaim that I don’t pretend to be sufficiently qualified for anything very professional in terms of probability theory or even just the jargon for standard practices in academic philosophy of religion. Because I’ll largely just be trying to maintain a minimally adequate handle of this style of philosophy, I won’t be addressing your points with the precision needed for a lot of meaningful progress. So bear with me. (If only you hadn’t made that lousy challenge! Moving on…) I suppose where I would want to object would be at your claim that inscrutable suffering would be surprising given theism. You insist that we conceive of a prior theistic state of affairs, before creation, and note how increasingly surprising things become as more and more specificity is added. I wonder how subjective this is supposed to be; to be honest, this appears to be a subjective judgment about the inherent plausibility of an objective state of affairs to which we aren’t legitimately able to assign any prior probability due to the fact of our current existence. I’m not entirely sure how one might deem either the subjective or objective probability of inscrutable suffering given the existence of God.

On one hand, He’s supposed to be in possession of the traditional “omni-properties”, so the introduction of any evil at all should perhaps be very shocking. But on the other hand, I might argue thus: the existence of any distinct creation at all, anything not-God, necessitates the introduction of lesser degrees of – or, essential participations in – His maximal goodness. And so the objective likelihood of unexplained evil/suffering may not really be low at all, objectively speaking (for instance, from God’s omniscient perspective), especially in light of the existence of creatures possessing finite minds (which fittingly cannot grasp the entirety of a gap between infinite knowledge/goodness and finite knowledge/goodness, as the difference between infinity and any finite quantity is infinite). Continuing along the same line, emphasizing the inevitability of inferior, divinity-lacking, creatures who by nature bear substantial degrees of ignorance/weakness/imperfection, the occurrence of inscrutable suffering could potentially be quite plausibly predictable.

Also, I think your definition of inscrutable suffering is in need of explanation. The whole notion that inscrutable suffering lacks/calls for explanation suggests that every occurrence of suffering truly does, or should have, a known moral justification. Except, if in reality there is none, then surely one would have trouble arguing that there’s any curious disparity between what *is *and what ought to be, i.e., assuming that any prescription requires the genuine possibility of its opposite being the case, that *ought *always and objectively implies can. Therefore, I suspect there may be meaningful tension between any affirmation of atheism along with this presupposed justification requirement that’s arguably attached to a bare, “intuitive” suggestion re: what’s onto-/epistemologically “due” in certain identifiable cases.

I’m honestly pretty unclear about the assumed evil nature of phenomena such as pain and suffering. Considering the potential implications of your syllogism, I’d say you owe at least a brief elaboration on that subject in particular relation to the probability you invoke. In other words, overall, how important do you think a firm grasp on the nature of suffering is to this proof? How logically significant would you think a strong theodicy could be, if at all? What if pain and suffering are in fact good? Or do you deem these questions largely irrelevant to the final success/failure of your logic?

 

[In_Spiration]

At this point, you may have picked up on a latent, general hesitancy on my part to apply analytical methods liberally to God (or, maybe more appropriately, our God-concept). I’ll still attempt to avoid any ambiguous retreat into “the mystical being of Divinity”, at least insofar as I think it’s possible before one’s merely describing only his internal logical/conceptual framework.

Anyway, I haven’t had time to get into any of the Peirce stuff. I get the impression I’d have to study-up for that. Hence, in the spirit of keeping things interesting without a definite refutation of one of your premises, I’ve conjured up a little counter-argument for you:

First, break the three distinct sub-propositions of your schema into

(a) [Atheism is true];
(b) [Some unjustified suffering occurs]; and
(c) [Some inscrutable suffering occurs].

Fundamentally speaking, the final proof is effective due to (a)'s entailment of a (c) which would be unexpected given ~(a). Once this establishes (a) as E for the desired H, the rest of the proof seems to come down mostly to a matter of relative subjectivity, i.e., background, subjective plausibility, and the like. Accordingly, the general formula of this deduction shouldn’t be hard to tweak, i.e., in … other directions (THEISTIC directions!!!). So, I figured, a theist would not be very hard-pressed to substitute his own sub-props into (a), (b), and (c) and then proceed to apparently trap the atheist under a similar disadvantage. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I didn’t need a lot of time to come up with the following initial attempt.

OK, to begin, make

(a) [Theism is true];
(b) [God is the ultimate and necessary ground of all contingent beings]; and
(c) [Some contingent beings exist].

Run the same argument.

1. 
   *]If theism is true, then God is the ultimate and necessary ground of all contingent beings.
   *]If God is the ultimate and necessary ground of all contingent beings, then some contingent beings exist.
   *]Therefore, if theism is true, then some contingent beings exist.
   
   The theist can coast along with Ts for all sub-props, and therefore all premises as well, to get a sound argument. Then he likewise shows that (c) is evidence for (a) by giving reasons why (c) is, at the least, more likely given (a) than given ~(a), since the existence of any contingent beings would be very unexpected indeed if we were to, say, conceive of a prior state of atheistic nothingness and consider how unexpected and surprising the existence/introduction of anything not self-caused would truly be, especially contingent beings such as ourselves. Yet traditional theism maintains that that’s precisely just what did happen! In fact, now that I think about it further, given the existence of a creator God, the being of contingent creatures begins to make a lot more sense.
   
   How do you like that?

 

[You]

…
Now, the unjustified suffering I have in mind would be suffering caused by natural disasters etc. On atheism, there is nothing which could justify such suffering, [on]? any moral theory. Whereas on theism, God is in control of the universe, and these disasters only occur because he permits them to for the sake of some greater good. I don’t think it matters what moral theory you adopt, given atheism, the suffering wrought by non-sentient forces isn’t the kind of thing which could be justified.

I think you are making an assumption that God kills people for some greater good and that kind of killing is justified for that reason.

You are fairly ignoring the obvious fact that accidents happen in a dynamic world, whether they are small accidents or great natural disasters.

Here is what the God you are talking about ‘justifying’ suffering and death in accidents actually said about this very point you are raising;

Or those eighteen upon whom the tower fell in Siloe, and slew them: think you, that they also were debtors above all the men that dwelt in Jerusalem?

It seems to be your view that those 18 were indeed debtors above all men in Jerusalem, otherwise how else could God ‘justify’ killing them by allowing the tower to fall on them.
God is correcting your view, Perplexity, saying those men were not greater debtors than anyone else, that their deaths were not to serve a greater good nor were they a judgement on them nor were their deaths ‘justified’ by anything those men had done.

The only interest God had in the story of the deaths of the men at the tower of siloe was to warn those listening to him not to die like those men, without doing any penance. About sudden or accidental death, God makes the point that the death they die is not a judgement on them, nor are they greater debtors than anyone else, He advises only that everyone not be caught by sudden or unexpected death without any ‘penance’ to bring with them when they are called before God their Creator.

 

[JDaniel]

I think you are making an assumption that God kills people for some greater good and that kind of killing is justified for that reason.

You are fairly ignoring the obvious fact that accidents happen in a dynamic world, whether they are small accidents or great natural disasters.

Here is what the God you are talking about ‘justifying’ suffering and death in accidents actually said about this very point you are raising;

Or those eighteen upon whom the tower fell in Siloe, and slew them: think you, that they also were debtors above all the men that dwelt in Jerusalem?

It seems to be your view that those 18 were indeed debtors above all men in Jerusalem, otherwise how else could God ‘justify’ killing them by allowing the tower to fall on them.
God is correcting your view, Perplexity, saying those men were not greater debtors than anyone else, that their deaths were not to serve a greater good nor were they a judgment on them nor were their deaths ‘justified’ by anything those men had done.

The only interest God had in the story of the deaths of the men at the tower of siloe was to warn those listening to him not to die like those men, without doing any penance. About sudden or accidental death, God makes the point that the death they die is not a judgment on them, nor are they greater debtors than anyone else, He advises only that everyone not be caught by sudden or unexpected death without any ‘penance’ to bring with them when they are called before God their Creator.

You:

Actually, the problem he has is with the use of the word, “unjustified.” See the following:

THE WILL OF GOD
MADE AND GOVERNS ALL THINGS

1. God controls all events, whether good or bad
   How can God will or allow evil?
2. God does everything with supreme wisdom
   Trials and punishments are blessings from God and proof of His mercy
   Our trials are never greater than our strength to bear them - Trustful Surrender to Divine Providence, Fr. Jean Baptiste Saint-Jure

Isn’t it the tendency of people to anthropomorphize God to the extent they must in order to have some control over that which they cannot ever have control over? Does this make sense?

God bless,
jd

 

[Perplexity]

Yes, you’re right. The theist indeed seems unavoidably bound to the truth of (3) as a result of his not being able to deny the truth of either (1) or (2)

Implicitly, you’re committed to inscrutable suffering being evidence for atheism. That needn’t mean much though: you may just say, “Ok…so what? It’s not very strong evidence.”

You insist that we conceive of a prior theistic state of affairs, before creation, and note how increasingly surprising things become as more and more specificity is added. I wonder how subjective this is supposed to be; to be honest, this appears to be a subjective judgment about the inherent plausibility of an objective state of affairs to which we aren’t legitimately able to assign any prior probability due to the fact of our current existence.

The term we’re discussing can be paraphrased as: how much confidence would you have in q, if we assumed that p was the case? So, in asking how much confidence we’d have in the proposition that inscrutable suffering occurs, supposing that God exists, the only thing we’re supposing is God’s existence. We’re not supposing creation, etc. That’s the state of affairs I’m referring to: the supposition we’re making.

What about God’s existence leads us to expect inscrutable suffering? His existence (alone) would need to lead us to expect (i) him to create something, (ii) him to create sentient life (whether immediately, or through some process etc.) (iii) him to allow these beings to suffer, (iv) him to all their suffering to be inscrutable. There are nearly an infinite amount of possible combinations of details for each of (i)-(iv). Further, there are nearly an infinite amount of actions which God could do besides (i)-(iv). Given the incredible vastness of potential actions God could do, why should his existence lead us to expect (i)-(iv) rather than any other number of actions? I guess what I’m getting at is, even if this judgment is subjective, it seems plausible that we all would share this subjective judgment.

I’m not sure how priors would effect the term: P(Inscrutable suffering | Theism & Background Knowledge).

On one hand, He’s supposed to be in possession of the traditional “omni-properties”, so the introduction of any evil at all should perhaps be very shocking. But on the other hand, I might argue thus: the existence of any distinct creation at all, anything not-God, necessitates the introduction of lesser degrees of – or, essential participations in – His maximal goodness. And so the objective likelihood of unexplained evil/suffering may not really be low at all, objectively speaking (for instance, from God’s omniscient perspective), especially in light of the existence of creatures possessing finite minds.

It may be that the probability of inscrutable suffering, given Theism & Finite Minds [Skeptical Theism] is quite high, but how likely is it that God would create finite minds? It’s hard for me to see what about God’s existence would lead us to expect him to create anything at all, much less things of such specificity as finite minds (presumably embodied). Especially on Trinitarianism: given the existence of these three persons, why would God want to create anything which would only introduce more and more imperfection?

Continuing along the same line, emphasizing the inevitability of inferior, divinity-lacking, creatures who by nature bear substantial degrees of ignorance/weakness/imperfection, the occurrence of inscrutable suffering could potentially be quite plausibly predictable.

I agree, but I think it’s unlikely that God would create such beings, given theism.

Also, I think your definition of inscrutable suffering is in need of explanation. The whole notion that inscrutable suffering lacks/calls for explanation suggests that every occurrence of suffering truly does, or should have, a known moral justification. Except, if in reality there is none, then surely one would have trouble arguing that there’s any curious disparity between what *is *and what ought to be.

The definition is really just an application of the law of excluded middle: an instance of suffering is either justified or unjustified/scrutable or inscrutable.

I’m honestly pretty unclear about the assumed evil nature of phenomena such as pain and suffering. Considering the potential implications of your syllogism, I’d say you owe at least a brief elaboration on that subject in particular relation to the probability you invoke. In other words, overall, how important do you think a firm grasp on the nature of suffering is to this proof? How logically significant would you think a strong theodicy could be, if at all? What if pain and suffering are in fact good? Or do you deem these questions largely irrelevant to the final success/failure of your logic?

Considered in a vacuum we might say pain is useful. When we step into specific circumstances we can easily think of many in which it also contributes to our well-being more than it detriments it. However, there are just as many, easily conceived, scenarios in which suffering seems, prima facie, inscrutable. Just think of all the children who die of various cancers. What is the good which justifies their suffering? The theist and atheist may join hands at this point: we don’t know. Although the theist may claim “But, God does.”

A strong theodicy would only rebut my argument if it raised the probability of inscrutable suffering, given theism. But, the probability of such a theodicy is near 0. Theodicies are generally allowed to assume things which wouldn’t be allowed to be assumed here. For instance, the existence of sentient life and a universe which is permissive of that end. All these vast amounts of assumptions need to be shown probable first.

 

[Perplexity]

1. 
   *]If theism is true, then God is the ultimate and necessary ground of all contingent beings.
   *]If God is the ultimate and necessary ground of all contingent beings, then some contingent beings exist.
   *]Therefore, if theism is true, then some contingent beings exist.
   
   The theist can coast along with Ts for all sub-props, and therefore all premises as well, to get a sound argument. Then he likewise shows that (c) is evidence for (a) by giving reasons why (c) is, at the least, more likely given (a) than given ~(a), since the existence of any contingent beings would be very unexpected indeed if we were to, say, conceive of a prior state of atheistic nothingness and consider how unexpected and surprising the existence/introduction of anything not self-caused would truly be, especially contingent beings such as ourselves. Yet traditional theism maintains that that’s precisely just what did happen! In fact, now that I think about it further, given the existence of a creator God, the being of contingent creatures begins to make a lot more sense.
   
   How do you like that?

1. 
   Nice argument. I think this is, essentially, what discerning the issue is all about: weighing the evidences. There are inumerable arguments like the ones we’ve concocted. We simply have to keep weighing the scales. This is done by calculating the relevant posterior probability: P(H|E&K), taking that number, and making it H’s prior in the next evaluation.
   
   So, suppose the argument you propose here is the first argument for or against God I’ve ever discerned. Where T = Theism, C = Contingent beings exist, and K = Background knowledge. Assume that your argument cooks me up a P(T|C&K) of .85.
   
   If I were to then discern my argument, I’d say P(T|K)=0.85, doing the same with ~T, atheism. etc. etc. Through this process, we’re constantly discerning which is more probable, atheism or theism.
   
   The interesting thing is you’ll calculate a posterior differently depending on where you start. Should we begin with your argument, or mine? If we start with yours, we’ll be theists, if mine, we’ll be atheists. And so forth. Some have concluded from the problem of discerning where one should begin, that there’s no way to know who is ultimately right: we’ve merely calculated probabilities differently because we’ve taken different starting points. Just thought I’d mention that.
   
   As to the argument itself:
   1. If atheism is true, then there is at least one contingent fact.
   2. If there is at least one contingent fact, then at least one contingent being exists.
   3. Therefore, if atheism is true, then at least one contingent being exists.
   Theist’s evaluation:
   1. F → T = T
   2. T → T = T
   3. F → T = T
   Atheist’s evaluation:
   1. T → T = T
   2. T → T = T
   3. T → T = T

 

[JDaniel]

Implicitly, you’re committed to inscrutable suffering being evidence for atheism. That needn’t mean much though: you may just say, “Ok…so what? It’s not very strong evidence.”

Perplexity:

If “inscrutable suffering [is] evidence for atheism,” then “scrutable suffering is evidence for theism,” is what you’re saying, right? The adjective, “inscrutable” is not a stand-alone modifier. It has its hateful contrary: whatever is inscrutable at the moment may become scrutable later. That is the definition of “learning” - things are made scrutable through a process of knowledge acquisition and right reason.

Here, again, the question is: is atheism reasonable? And the answer is: it can’t be. For, it is the willing abstention from knowledge acquisition and right reason.

God bless,
jd

 

[Perplexity]

Perplexity:

If “inscrutable suffering [is] evidence for atheism,” then “scrutable suffering is evidence for theism,” is what you’re saying, right? The adjective, “inscrutable” is not a stand-alone modifier. It has its hateful contrary: whatever is inscrutable at the moment may become scrutable later. That is the definition of “learning” - things are made scrutable through a process of knowledge acquisition and right reason.

Here, again, the question is: is atheism reasonable? And the answer is: it can’t be. For, it is the willing abstention from knowledge acquisition and right reason.

God bless,
jd

Well, the argument doesn’t allow inscrutable suffering to be evidence for theism. That wouldn’t make sense given the definition of evidence I’m working with. I’m not sure what your last comment means nor how it’s relevant. I have no reason to think atheism is unreasonable.

 

[Perplexity]

Ok guys, this argument will not work. I didn’t see this at first but realized it last night. The entire argument banks on theism not entailing inscrutable suffering. If that’s the case, then the entire argument goes through smoothly. However, I realized, the theist can construct arguments much like my own to show that theism does entail inscrutable suffering. The result is that inscrutable suffering is no more probable on atheism than on theism, and therefore it’s certainly not evidence for atheism. etc. Here’s the example I thought of last night:

1. If theism is true, then suffering occurs.
2. If suffering occurs, then inscrutable suffering occurs.
3. Therefore, if theism is true, then inscrutable suffering occurs.

Check the truth-conditions yourself, the theist and atheist must accept the above as sound.

By the ramsey test, (3) translates as: P(Inscrutable suffering | Theism)=1.0. And with that, my argument goes up in flames

Progress!

 

[JDaniel]

Well, the argument doesn’t allow inscrutable suffering to be evidence for theism. That wouldn’t make sense given the definition of evidence I’m working with. I’m not sure what your last comment means nor how it’s relevant. I have no reason to think atheism is unreasonable.

Perplexity:

Perhaps it was late, or, perhaps you were tired, but, you need to re-read my post. I said, “scrutable suffering is evidence of theism.” There’s no “in” prefixed to the word.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

Ok guys, this argument will not work. I didn’t see this at first but realized it last night. The entire argument banks on theism not entailing inscrutable suffering. If that’s the case, then the entire argument goes through smoothly. However, I realized, the theist can construct arguments much like my own to show that theism does entail inscrutable suffering. The result is that inscrutable suffering is no more probable on atheism than on theism, and therefore it’s certainly not evidence for atheism. etc. Here’s the example I thought of last night:

1. If theism is true, then suffering occurs.
2. If suffering occurs, then inscrutable suffering occurs.
3. Therefore, if theism is true, then inscrutable suffering occurs.

Check the truth-conditions yourself, the theist and atheist must accept the above as sound.

By the ramsey test, (3) translates as: P(Inscrutable suffering | Theism)=1.0. And with that, my argument goes up in flames

Progress!

Perplexity:

While I accept that inscrutable suffering probably has occurred somewhere on this planet, there is, in my view, mitigation: God does not give us more than our strength can bear. So, while “I” may not understand the purpose for my own, or someone else’s, sufferings, that it is never more than our strengths can bear abounds. The refusal to permit this, as even a possibility, still leads us to the conclusion that “atheism is unreasonable.”

I don’t think that it is “inscrutable” suffering that is the proximate cause of atheism, rather, I think it is the confluence of unreasonable expectation: “that we mere mortals can know the mind of God” with the unreasonable prohibition of: “the possibility of sufficient mitigation.” This is what I consider to be unreasonable.

God bless,
jd

 

[In_Spiration]

I see this thread has mostly been resolved, but you’re still owed some sort of answer.

The term we’re discussing can be paraphrased as: how much confidence would you have in q, if we assumed that p was the case? So, in asking how much confidence we’d have in the proposition that inscrutable suffering occurs, supposing that God exists, the only thing we’re supposing is God’s existence. We’re not supposing creation, etc. That’s the state of affairs I’m referring to: the supposition we’re making.

What about God’s existence leads us to expect inscrutable suffering? . . .] Given the incredible vastness of potential actions God could do, why should his existence lead us to expect (i)-(iv) rather than any other number of actions? I guess what I’m getting at is, even if this judgment is subjective, it seems plausible that we all would share this subjective judgment.

To be honest, inscrutable suffering, given atheism alone, is arguably very implausible, since it presupposes the real existence of some suffering (in-/scrutable), which entails the presence of sentient beings; and I’d never expect or be confident in an hypothesis of the positive existence of anything whatsoever if all that’s known/given is the absence/negation of a positive, divine being. I’d certainly be less surprised by mere suffering given theism than given atheism, that is, if we’re ignoring any background knowledge. And, of course, once background knowledge is considered, then your argument about the surprising character of any creation, anything beyond God, at once becomes quite obviously problematic. In sum: ignoring background knowledge, theism is more plausible than atheism; meanwhile, considering background knowledge, it’s arguably a simple toss-up, hinging on the details of the background, which potentially favors either one of the two uncertain hypotheses.

The definition is really just an application of the law of excluded middle: an instance of suffering is either justified or unjustified/scrutable or inscrutable.

Regardless of what we’ve agreed to stipulate for definitions, I should add: I would define inscrutable suffering as suffering which stands in some fundamental need of justification/explanation. This definition entails a recognized degree of lacking, wanting, imperfection, or potential justice; and such privation of a positive value would be important, because it necessitates an affirmation of at least the potential for goodness, as well as the reality of a disparity, along with the implied denial of any potential nihilistic “explanation” (i.e., explaining-away, which would just render the suffering neither justified nor unjustified, neither scrutable nor inscrutable).

Considered in a vacuum we might say pain is useful. When we step into specific circumstances we can easily think of many in which it also contributes to our well-being more than it detriments it. However, there are just as many, easily conceived, scenarios in which suffering seems, prima facie, inscrutable. Just think of all the children who die of various cancers. What is the good which justifies their suffering? The theist and atheist may join hands at this point: we don’t know. Although the theist may claim “But, God does.”

Only a few suggestive questions: Why must every case of suffering be justified by serving some good in the first place? Can’t an instance of suffering “just happen”, or merely be, or be sufficiently explained without reference to a good, without presupposing any unresolved (i.e., ought-/yet-to-be-resolved) issue or puzzle attached to it, somehow crying out for further explanation? If not, are you sure the reason isn’t ultimately tied to anything pertinent, perhaps crucial, to whether or not theism is true?