Being, Good, and Evil

[polytropos]

Well, I said I was done, but you draw me in with your provocative posts.

With the sex example, of course, one could say that pleasure was indeed intended for the sexual act. What they would maintain is not proven is that it is immoral to separate the pleasure from the procreative aspect, just as I’m arguing that it’s not obviously (or, in fact, is obviously not) immoral to separate some of the secondary uses from a car, from its intended primary use. If you never use the car to drive, for the simple reason that you have no interest in doing so (but you just like to sit in it and listen to music), that is entirely valid.

There are a few things at work here. First, it is common to use man-made objects as examples because they are familiar and have clear functions, but there is definitely a distinction in Thomism between nature and artifacts. So our car analogy is expected to be limited in some sense in that the form of a car is imposed contingently by humans, while (on a full philosophical analysis) the forms of human beings and other elements of nature are not created by anyone equal to human beings in any way. So in the more comprehensive metaphysical view, the reappropriation of parts of an artifact is not egregious, since iron and rubber do not have the natural ends to be a part of a car anyway.

I would also note that the natural end of the intellect is to know truth, and since the will proceeds from the intellect, one ought to direct one’s will towards the truth. Knowing the truth entails learning the forms of things, including other human beings and oneself. In a very legal sense, one might claim that there are limitations to what we know, or, as you say, “would maintain [that it] is not proven . . . that it is immoral to separate the pleasure from the procreative act.” But on a more metaphysical, natural-law approach, one would not indulge in something simply because it has not been proven that it is bad.

On a more evolutionary view, sex is pleasurable only in order to lead to procreation. While non-procreative sexual acts also are generally pleasurable, it would be evident that the purpose of sex is procreation and that sex for non-procreative reasons is indeed a privation. Male and female are also, in very obvious ways, compatible.

Homosexuality is certainly a departure from what is normal and common, even if it has a genetic basis, so there seems to be little in my view that would suggest that the default natural law position would be in favor of it.

There is more that could be said but, again, I’m not too keen on making this a topic about homosexuality, natural law, or even moral goodness in particular.

What I would say is that the God you describe sounds like the sort of God who would necessarily say, “you have freedom but you do not have the moral right to use anything in nature, or your body, for anything but its intended purpose.” For this God that is not human, and does not have any moral responsibilities, it is not clear to me that he imposes *any moral obligations. * But that we, human beings, impose moral obligations on each other, is something about which I agree.

He does not really impose moral obligations in the sense that He is sitting in the sky and comes up with a list of do’s and don’t’s. Rather, we have moral obligations as a result of what we are qua human beings (and God has kindly reminded us, at times, what those moral obligations are). What the intellect is capable of grasping is that using our bodies for their intended purposes is the proper end; we do not need God to tell us to do that, and indeed it is something we ought to do regardless of how God feels about it. (I am being facetious. God does not have emotions and can only will what is good for us.)

Moral goodness is just another type of goodness. A morally good human better instantiates the ideal form of human being. (We’ll note that, although God has no moral obligations because He has no form and has nothing above Him, Jesus, as man, did have moral obligations, and so we do have an example of a morally perfect human being.)

Now, one might say, “Okay, who cares? Why should I better instantiate my human form?” A very good question. And the reason is that, on a similar philosophical analysis, we find that the human soul (the substantial form of human beings) is immaterial and, indeed, eternal. As such, forming the intellect and will to their proper ends is very important indeed, and we know, even without recourse to revelation, that doing so could have substantial consequences.

 

[Portofino]

That’s a very important point about an afterlife Otherwise, the observation that God created us with freedom would mean that we’re pretty much free to act in whatever ways are possible to us–as, indeed, we were created with the ability to do so, and no higher power will ever prevent us from doing so. This would not mean that actions don’t have natural consequences (cause and effect); nonetheless, freedom would have no strings attached.

Re: artificacts, the irony is that the naturalist posits that man-made artifacts exhibit more intentionality and conscious purpose than does nature itself (this idea of “blind nature”). So it’s obvious why they would feel that nature imposes no moral obligations on them, and that they are free to rework nature in any way that is possible to them (so they cut down the tree and carve out a boat; or they chip off pieces of granite and use it for building; and this would apply, as well, to the more “human” reasons – as opposed to purely natural reasons – why one engages in sexual expression).

It’s true that, per an evolutionary view, those who considered intercourse so horrible that they refused engage in it, wouldn’t have left behind offspring. Those who found pleasure in it engaged in it, and ended up leaving offspring. In evolutionary terms, I would imagine that the pleasure of sex was “settled” long before homo sapiens came onto the scene; it would have been an inheritance of a much “earlier” mammalian species.

The main point of disagreement is, of course, over whether “evolutionary advantage”–and, therefore, the linking of pleasure and procreation–should be construed as a moral obligation not to separate them, even though separating them is easily done (and this works both ways–someone who derived no pleasure from sex (say, a gay man or a man not attracted to his partner) could still engage in it, as part of the conscious will to procreate).

But think of a roller coaster, or a scary movie–what gratifies people about riding a roller coaster, or watching a scary movie, has to do with probably very “ancient wiring” having to do with fight or flight. One is, indeed, flirting with danger; one is experiencing the pleasure of what was originally a survival mechanism, namely the need to “pump it up” and respond vigorously to imminent danger. The rush of adrenaline and endorphins – providing a natural painkiller and even a burst of euphoria, a thrill–would, I would imagine, have originally served the purpose not only for energizing us and readying us for action, but also masking any imminent physical injury (where there is imminent danger, there may be imminent pain, and pleasure-inducing chemicals would enable you to be less sensible to injury–swimming for your life, despite having had a shark take a bite out of your leg; yet you may hardly feel the pain, in that moment). Even when you stub your toe, for example, I believe that endorphins are released; and in strenuous exercise, as well. Yet with a roller coaster or a scary movie, you are taking advantage of this evolutionary wiring for the sheer fun of it. You are tricking your body, in a way, just to “feel good.” Yet your body normally only releases such adrenaline, or endorphins, in the presence of pain or of clear and present danger, as a self-defense mechanism of sorts.

Music, the appreciation of a sunset–some scientists, I believe, refer to these as “evolutionary bonuses.” In fact, few care whether appreciating beauty serves or served an evolutionary purpose, or not. Perhaps one of the purposes it served was to procure enough happiness for the individual so that the individual did not commit suicide! All forms of pleasure would thus serve a survival purpose, inducing one to take the trouble to stay alive

And the love that women (and not just women) have for baby animals, for puppies and kittens–well, as one commentator put it, they are --from an evolutionary perspective-- like “furry babies” to us. But that is purely accidental, a kind of “bonus” for the reaction we have towards human babies.

So non-procreative sexual expression, for the sheer pleasure of it, would not be clearly wrong to such people. And, again, if the pleasure was a survival advantage, vis-a-vis procreation, this would not per se enjoin a moral obligation not to appreciate the pleasure as an end in itself. In fact, one could argue – and has argued – it’s one of the things that makes us human (enjoying gratuitous beauty; gratuitous pleasure). There would always be debate as to whether, “gratuitous beauty and gratuitous pleasure are normally great, but some forms of pleasure are not permitted to be gratuitous.” In the end analysis, the follow-up question would be, “by whom?” and the answer “by nature” would not be convincing, unless one was not always positing, “ultimately, by God.”

I appreciate that, definitely – if nature does not have a God behind it, that enjoins moral conformity with certain natural laws, then nature alone (if nature were, indeed, blind) could not get the job done. Of course, there would be still be argument from those who say that God intended us to transcend nature, in many respects (thus, we’re not bound to the ground, we can also soar to the heavens, in flying machines, and even leave this earth (the ancients might have considered that a great hubris and attempt to violate the earthbound environment which was obviously human beings’ intended habitat; only gods belong in the skies, as per the cautionary tale of Icarus). And then there are those, of course, who say that God must have created homosexuality in nature for a reason… Just as God may have created Downes children for a reason (one could say that Downes is based on a state of “privation”, but I’m sure many Christians would argue that God had a message for humanity, in bringing Downes children into the world).

 

[Portofino]

p.s. my apologies, I know it’s off topic, but it also occurred to me that some make the argument that nature only wants you to stay alive…so you can produce offspring. Therefore, if you do not produce offspring before you die, you did not fulfill the role that nature had assigned to you. Therefore, lifelong celibacy is unnatural (not unnatural for a human child, but unnatural for a human adult who has undergone puberty). So these debates seem very possible; in some ways, one is meant to conform to nature; in other ways, to transcend it. What the “juste milieu” is, the right measure, not too much and not too little, or the right way and the wrong way, is of course debatable!

 

[belorg]

Anyone who believes expertise in being cruel and selfish is not misplaced is either mentally unbalanced or morally retarded. Do you disagree? If so why?

I agree, but according to you, my morality is merely a preference. So I am in no position to say whether or not an expertise in selfishness and cruelty is good or bad.

 

[belorg]

You did not cause the gap; you did not put what is not there, there.

Yes I did put what is not there there. I put all the bricks there and I did not put bricks here. The result was a gap. Are you seriously suggesting that God ‘forgetting’ to put something ‘there’ means that He is not responsible for not putting it there?

 

[Bahman]

Originally Posted by sealoch View Post
You are still leaping to god is good. There is no reason a god can’t be neutral or bad as well.

Could you please elaborate why neutral and evil God could not exist?

 

[Qoeleth]

I wish I had such knowledge of languages. No, that is a quotation from an online “Etymological dictionary.” I would presume that most of the authors have a doctorate in linguistics, something which I cannot claim for myself.

Again, I wish I could take the credit for that. To tell you the truth, I had long assumed that “God” and “good” were cognates and had been disappointed, myself, to read that this was chalked up to coincidence. It was a pet notion of mine (nor was it the only Germanic word that I found significantly similar — Freund (friend) and Freude (joy) was another).

Of course, the Germanic languages are just one language family, so even if God and good were cognates in those languages, they certainly are not in the Slavic or Romance branches of Indo-European (Deus – God; bonus – good; malus – bad). In those languages where they really and truly are not cognates – with no dispute – this does not in itself cast doubt on whether God is good!

And these Germanic tribes were pagans, after all, so the God they were talking about would have been their pre-Christian designation for the supreme being… And what I did find of great interest is that the word was a neuter noun, in pre-Christian Germanic times; then, after the encounter with Christianity, it was changed to a masculine noun, to match the Judeo-Christian conception of God as a He.

Proving that the first cause is a He would be a quite difficult undertaking, though Philosophically, there are no grounds for use of the pronoun He (the great mother could have given birth to the universe). Obviously, use of the pronoun He is a product of Judeo-Christian revelation, not pure philosophical reasoning.

I am certainly not an expert in linguistics, but the point I am making is that there are few certainties. We have a sizable (but not huge) corpus of Anglo-Saxon, most of the New Testament in Gothic, and a single long poem in Old Saxon, a few things in Old High German. The Old Norse stuff is not really that “Old”, but rather contemporaneous with Middle English.

The idea of “God” and "good’ being related is only a theory- a fairly improbable one, I admit, but it cannot be categorically dismissed.

 

[Portofino]

Could you please elaborate why neutral and evil God could not exist?

It relies on other premises, in particular the belief that evil is privation (the absence of something). Since God is pure actuality, lacking in nothing, then God cannot be evil.

The further conclusion drawn, that God cannot create evil, doesn’t make sense to me. What God created was an imperfect creation, where evil is thus possible. Therefore, God is the author of the mechanisms of all of creation (in other words, God created a world where privation is possible). But I’m not convinced that evil is privation (the absence of good and only the absence of good), to begin with, so I cannot even get to the conclusion “God cannot be evil.” I believe that evil is the absence of good is perspective-dependent; change one’s perspective, and one could say that good as the absence of evil (“I harbor you no ill will; I bury the hatchet; I let go of my resentment and animosity”).

Anyway, here is how Aquinas expresses evil as the absence of something, and thus as something incompatible with the fullness of God:

. . . As the term good signifies ‘perfect being’, so the term evil signifies nothing else than ‘privation of perfect being’. In its proper acceptance, privation is predicated of that which is fitted by its nature to be possessed, and to be possessed at a certain time and in a certain manner. Evidently, therefore, a thing is called evil if it lacks a perfection it ought to have.

From this, he concludes that God cannot be evil, nor could God create evil. Yet I think that words are misleading us here. Who could deny that, “God created a world where evil (i.e., privation) is possible.” Make of that what you will

I don’t blame those who posit that one would expect a universe that is a “chip off the old block” (of a perfect, absolutely good being) to be perfect and absolutely good, in turn. An omnipotent creator could certainly create a world that was not a “faded facsimile” of itself, lacking its own perfection.

Vis-a-vis earth, though, this takes us even further away from purely philosophical reasoning, and into the realm of revelation… I’m assuming the answer is that God wanted to create us with freedom, because freedom is an intrinsic good. Only in an imperfect world – where evil is possible – could freedom exist.
But yes, in the final analysis, God is not evil but created a world in which evil is possible, thus – in an indirect sense, but not in a direct sense – was the First Cause of a world in which imperfection and evil (the privation of goodness) plays itself out.

It’s unclear whether there are other worlds where apple do not fall so far from the tree, and where the perfection of creation matches the perfection of the creator. Although there would be no evidence for such world, they could – in principle – easily exist. After all, to an omnipotent God, all things are possible, including a world not lacking in any perfection. But wait, such a world is posited – it is called heaven.

Why two realm are necessary (one imperfect, the other perfect) ultimately depends on revelation, as I pointed out above. Otherwise it would always be a paradox as to why this world is not heaven. And that is precisely where the purely philosophical argument doesn’t add up, in the eyes of critics. Revelation has to inform the argument (but for those who do not accept revelation regarding the existence of heaven – with heaven being precisely what one would expect to be the creation of a perfect being – the logic regarding a perfect being creating an imperfect here-and-now, is still unsatisfying).

 

[tonyrey]

Anyone who believes expertise in being cruel and selfish is not misplaced is either mentally unbalanced or morally retarded. Do you disagree? If so why?

If it is entirely subjective - as you contend - it must be merely a preference.

So I am in no position to say whether or not an expertise in selfishness and cruelty is good or bad.

In that case you are in no position to say anything is good or bad:

De gustibus non est disputandum

So why bother to discuss the subject? Do you think you may be mistaken?

 

[Portofino]

If it is entirely subjective - as you contend - it must be merely a preference.
In that case you are in no position to say anything is good or bad:

De gustibus non est disputandum

So why bother to discuss the subject? Do you think you may be mistaken?

To ground objectively morality, one can only state one’s axioms as self-evident (“we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal”). From the perspective of those who do not accept those axioms to be self-evident, one is begging the question.

It is true that the same would apply to someone who posited 2+2=4 as a self-evident axiom. If someone doesn’t have the internalized rational wiring to grasp this, no further proof of 2+2=4 could be provided, and so it would appear that that one was begging the question (2+2 = 4 because 2+2=4).

Morality, unfortunately, is not as universally grasped as simple arithmetic; most everyone can agree on simple arithmetic (even criminals know how to count money!) whereas there is comparatively less agreement on morals. Whether via an innate moral sense, though, or via certain commonalities in human nature, most people would agree that, if you saved someone from drowning – and they cried for help – yet they repaid you by knocking you over the head and stealing all of your money, an injustice would have been committed. Likewise, an injustice would have been committed if you never did anything to them that would justify the provocation of aggression (“what did I ever do to you?” can be a powerful argument, though not to everyone without exception).

We do have a foundation to build on, pragmatically speaking, it’s just not as hard a foundation as simple arithmetic, nor as inexorably constant in its operations.

 

[tonyrey]

To ground objectively morality, one can only state one’s axioms as self-evident (“we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal”). From the perspective of those who do not accept those axioms to be self-evident, one is begging the question.

The very fact that we are reasoning implies that we believe reasoning is valuable and that we should be reasonable. Otherwise we are being inconsistent. Why bother to reason if it gets us nowhere?

If we deny that the truth is valuable we are contradicting ourselves. What is the point of making any assertions (including the assertion that the truth is not valuable) if they are all valueless?

 

[Portofino]

Regarding the question of whether a perfect, wholly good God thus willed the creation of an imperfect world in which evil and privation is possible, the ultimate answer is “yes.” Indirectly, God created the preconditions for the both the potential (via human free will) and the actual (via nature) manifestation of evil in the world. There is no way around this. If the creator had wanted create this world as a mirror image of heaven (or as identical with heaven, heaven being a realm of perfection and goodness) then He would have; but He did not. Of course, says the Thomist, he had his reasons for doing so, for not making this world as perfect as He Himself (which He could surely have done). In layman’s terms, that Adam was capable of choosing evil meant that God was the ultimate cause of the ability of Adam to choose evil. Thus, God is not the cause of the corruption of human beings, but of the corruptibility of human beings.

Aquinas does not seek to deny this, as per the below.

Article 2. Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?

Objection 1. It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (Isaiah 45:5-7): “I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil.” And Amos 3:6, “Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?”

Objection 2. Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (Article 1). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (2, 3; 6, 1,4), it follows that also every evil is from God.

Objection 3. Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, “God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being.”

I answer that, As appears from what was said (1), the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above (Question 4, Article 1). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said (1) that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above (22, 2, ad 2; 48, 2), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Samuel 2:6: “The Lord killeth and maketh alive.” But when we read that “God hath not made death” (Wisdom 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

Reply to Objection 1. These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.

Reply to Objection 2. The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.

Reply to Objection 3. The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.

 

[belorg]

If it is entirely subjective - as you contend - it must be merely a preference.
In that case you are in no position to say anything is good or bad:

De gustibus non est disputandum

So why bother to discuss the subject? Do you think you may be mistaken?

The problem is that you think you are in a position to say anything is good or bad, while in reality, just like me, you have to rely on a axiom.
So, for you to say that God is good is just an axiom.

 

[Portofino]

[Contains a clarification made to the post previously posted above]:

Regarding the question of whether a perfect, wholly good God thus willed the creation of an imperfect world in which evil and privation is possible, the ultimate answer is “yes.” Indirectly, God created the preconditions for the both the potential (via human free will) and the actual (via nature) manifestation of evil in the world. There is no way around this. If the creator had wanted create this world as a mirror image of heaven (or as identical with heaven, heaven being a realm of perfection and goodness) then He would have; but He did not. Of course, says the Thomist, he had his reasons for doing so, for not making this world as perfect as He Himself (which He could surely have done). In layman’s terms, that Adam was capable of choosing evil meant that God was the ultimate cause of the ability of Adam to choose evil. Thus, God is not the cause of the corruption of human beings, but of the corruptibility of human beings [He also created a natural order in which corruptibility and imperfection are not merely potential, but actual; Adam’s sin could not have created imperfections in all of non-human nature (e.g., a deformed chicken breaking out of an egg), so the only conclusion is that a. imperfection in nature was created by God to form a suitable environment within which humans could exercise free will; or b. imperfections in nature were imposed by God as punishment for Adam’s sin, thus natural evil was a penalty, imposed by God, for human evil].

Aquinas does not seek to deny this, as per the below.

Article 2. Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?

Objection 1. It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (Isaiah 45:5-7): “I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil.” And Amos 3:6, “Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?”

Objection 2. Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (Article 1). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (2, 3; 6, 1,4), it follows that also every evil is from God.

Objection 3. Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, “God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being.”

I answer that, As appears from what was said (1), the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above (Question 4, Article 1). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said (1) that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above (22, 2, ad 2; 48, 2), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Samuel 2:6: “The Lord killeth and maketh alive.” But when we read that “God hath not made death” (Wisdom 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

Reply to Objection 1. These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.

Reply to Objection 2. The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.

Reply to Objection 3. The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.

 

[Portofino]

Some notes on Aquinas’ contention that Being and Good are equivalent:

from the Summa Theologica:

"I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable–

This was the Aristotelian definition and also one that could have been agreed upon by Epicurus – good is what is desirable; pleasure is desirable; therefore, pleasure is good.
What Aquinas obviously would need to show is that not all that humans desire is good, thus not all that humans desire ought to be desirable. What humans desire that ought to be desired, versus what humans desire that ought not to be desired, requires a separate argument.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire."

Again, this comes from Aristotle and bears the mark of a very neutral, amoral definition of goodness, one that is rather similar in definition to “goodness is pleasure” (given that pleasure and desire are linked).

Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection.

This is experientially true, again in an amoral sense. A man who desires a beautiful woman would naturally desire the most beautiful woman conceivable, the perfect woman [this is beginning to remind me of Platonic Forms]. Desire naturally strives towards the best, the highest, the greatest degree [the summum bonum]. I wouldn’t agree that only what is perfect is desirable. I can still desire something that is imperfect, but which I deem to be “good enough” for my purposes. In fact, if I desire only what is perfect, I am condemning myself to be always disappointed.

**But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. **

True again; it would be perfect if the perfect woman actually existed. It would be perfect if the perfect world actually existed. The perfect woman, insofar as she does not actually exist, would not be the perfect woman.

Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (3, 4; 4, 1).

Here I think consensus unhinges. In fact, I’m reminded of the ontological argument for God’s existence (I can conceive of a perfect being; existence would have to an attribute of a perfect being; therefore God exists). I can conceive of the perfect woman – as an ideal form of beauty, and this would probably include a beauty that is incorruptible by the passage of time – but it’s unclear whether the perfect woman has been actualized, in reality. It would be perfect for her to exist, in actuality, but I don’t know that she does. The same with the perfect world – there’s a distinction between the ideal (potential), and the real (fully actualized).

“A thing is perfect insofar as it exists.” So does this mean that “existence exists” is perfect? Not necessarily. Cancer is not a perfection, yet cancer exists, so I could not say that existence and perfection is synonymous. Ugliness is not a perfection, yet ugliness exists, thus I cannot say that existence and perfection are by definition synonymous. Disease, famine, war, are imperfections, yet disease, famine, and war exist (have been actualized on this earth), thus I cannot see that existence, qua existence, is perfection. I suppose this all ties back to the argument that evil (what is imperfect) is actually privation, and does not participate in being.

To the contrary, I would maintain that what is imperfect is what is actualized on this earth, and that what is perfect exists only as a concept, as an ideal, as unrealized potential.

But if one accepts that evil is privation (thus, is something not actualized versus something that is actualized) and that God is pure actuality, I suppose one could find Thomas’ arguments more sensible.

That I do not desire what is evil to be actualized is true enough; but whether evil is actualized, nonetheless, is another question. If the latter, then something could not be said to be perfect, just because it has been actualized; nor could something be said not to be good, just because it is not perfect.

Thus some forms of being would be good/desirable, but some would not; and some forms of good/what is desirable (as conceptualized) have no being.

 

[tonyrey]

The problem is that you think you are in a position to say anything is good or bad, while in reality, just like me, you have to rely on a axiom.
So, for you to say that God is good is just an axiom.

You rely on your power of reason to draw conclusions. Is it merely an axiom to say reasoning is good?

 

[Bahman]

It relies on other premises, in particular the belief that evil is privation (the absence of something). Since God is pure actuality, lacking in nothing, then God cannot be evil.

Thank you very much for your extensive explanation. I think we can agree on the fact that the definition of evil God then depends on definition of evil which as you stated means lacking something. As you stated good can also be viewed as lack of evil so if one accept this definition then she/he could conclude that good God is nothing. Moreover you didn’t explain why neutral God could not exist.

 

[belorg]

You rely on your power of reason to draw conclusions. Is it merely an axiom to say reasoning is good?

Reasoning can be useful. That’s not an axiom.

 

[Bagheera]

Good is defined as the aspect of being as desirable.

A vacuous statement. “Desirable” by whom? “Desirable” for what purpose?

 

[Qoeleth]

The problem is that you think you are in a position to say anything is good or bad, while in reality, just like me, you have to rely on a axiom.
So, for you to say that God is good is just an axiom.

For what it’s worth, I sympathize heavily with Belorg’s position. I’ve always felt the world to be pretty much a disaster, a valley of tears, a fool’s playground, and an empty vanity, and not only more or less random, but actually quite evil, non tantum vanitas vanitatis, sed stercus stercoris.

When I was a child, I often though that God must be evil, although not Christ, of course. However, now I blame it all on the devil. Now, the devil is certainly not a ‘god’, but he is described by Paul as the ‘god of this world’ and by Christ as the ‘ruler of this world’. The power of the devil is, of course, an illusion, but, as I remind myself a thousand times a day, this whole world just an illusion. In fact, this view is not unorthodox, as it does not attribute to the devil any real power, just power over the illusion that is this world.

To Berlorg, the fact that you can judge a false god as evil means that you must somehow have some source or standard of Goodness. Your real argument seems to be with the devil, the ‘god of this world’, which is actually a sign of moral sense. Christ alone is the true image of God.