Being!

[warpspeedpetey]

The Christian position that holds that existence is God but God is not existence is indeed false bt contradiction.

I’ve never heard of that. Nor does it infer from the standard definitions of the terms we are using. I don’t understand from what set of premises you are inferring that conclusion.

Panentheism means that contingent beings are part of God…

Contingent beings=non contingent being? Isn’t that a contradiction? G-d is not contingent. How could contingent beings be part of Him?

…panentheism leads to a lot of undesired consequenses.

Like what?

Thomists aren’t…

Isn’t this argument based on the same contradiction induced by the conflation of differing ontological natures as above?

An existing object that is red exists and on top of that has a property redness, that is distibnct from its esse. God’s esse is pure in that it hyas no separate properties. Therfore, every existing thing, apart from God, has impure existence.

Is this another example of conflation? You must be aware of the ontological distinction of beings. Is there some argument against it of which I am unaware?

 

[belorg]

The biggest assertion I have ever seen you make. It is relevant, since your argument required a before and an after in-order to work. Change is something which is only true of physical things. If God is not physical, and his being is simultaneous with his creative act, then your argument falls flat on its very large hairy face because a perfect act does not need to change. Why? Because physical laws don’t apply to God and thus time does not effect God.

So there…

If my argument requires a before end after then causation itself requires a before and after.

As for asserting, you are doing a very good job at it. “Change is physical and non-physical things do not require it” is just about the worst case of special pleading I have ever encountered. If you have no other arguments, I see no need to discuss this any further with you.

 

[belorg]

I’ve never heard of that. Nor does it infer from the standard definitions of the terms we are using. I don’t understand from what set of premises you are inferring that conclusion.

What do you mean you’ve never heard of that? You were the one suggesting this position.

Contingent beings=non contingent being? Isn’t that a contradiction? G-d is not contingent. How could contingent beings be part of Him?

I haven’t got the slightest idea, but since you are a panentheist, you undoubtedly have one.

Like what?

Like the fact that God rewards/punishes parts of Himself for things they, being parts of a whole that transcends them , are not responsible fior. Among other things.

Isn’t this argument based on the same contradiction induced by the conflation of differing ontological natures as above?

No

Is this another example of conflation? You must be aware of the ontological distinction of beings. Is there some argument against it of which I am unaware?

If there is an ontological distinction of beings, we are not talking panentheism, wspetey.

 

[belorg]

Change as defined in the context relevant to aristotelian-thomistic philosophy of nature and metaphysics is the reduction of potency to act (or potentiality to actuality). Exercising a power to create something doesn’t necessarily have to undergo such a reduction in the agent, although any example from the material world will have such a feature.
The gist of all this: at the very least, there is no contradiction with having an Unmoved Mover (Unchanged Changer) within the relevant philosophical contexts that also creates.
In further other words: Aquinas and many other philosophers are not stupid and you are not the first to proffer such an objection.

Of course I am the first one to proffer such objection, but either there is change or there is no change. Claiming that there is some being who can do lots of things without changing is special pleading and has no place in a philosophical discussion.
In my reply to Lunux, I was talking about a clear distinction between unconjoined actuality and conjoined actuality (not of any ‘before’ or ‘afeter’ BTW. If they are distinct, creation is a change. If they are not, everything is always and necessarily in a state of conjoined actuality, which means there is no disntinction between God and His creation, which is pantheism.
There is no contradiction in a universe popping into existence with all fine-tuning required to sustain life-forms in it either, but if I prefer to use more substantial arguments than that one.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…If there is an ontological distinction of beings, we are not talking panentheism, wspetey.

What is the reason that panentheism is incompatible with such an ontological distinction?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…If they are distinct, creation is a change. If they are not, everything is always and necessarily in a state of conjoined actuality, which means there is no disntinction between God and His creation, which is pantheism.

Necessity and Contingency are distinctions that do not require change thus G-d and creation can be distinct whether or not creation is a change.

 

[Shike]

Of course I am the first one to proffer such objection, but either there is change or there is no change. Claiming that there is some being who can do lots of things without changing is special pleading and has no place in a philosophical discussion.

That’s the conclusion of a series of arguments based in aristotelian-thomistic philosophy of nature and metaphysics–you may of course take it or leave it. Just accept that a Thomist has a very very specific definition of the word change, one that doesn’t quite line up with yours, or at the least doesn’t allow you to use the concept in the way that you do.

In my reply to Lunux, I was talking about a clear distinction between unconjoined actuality and conjoined actuality (not of any ‘before’ or ‘afeter’ BTW. If they are distinct, creation is a change. If they are not, everything is always and necessarily in a state of conjoined actuality, which means there is no disntinction between God and His creation, which is pantheism.

I think this time around the merry-go-round (we have talked past each other before on this subject, not to mention since then I have picked up a little more understanding) I will say that you are correct insofar as you talk about creation the effect and its side of the relation towards God. If this doesn’t make sense to you, it’s probably the case that you have too broad of a notion of change and that you are talking past the Scholastics.

There is no contradiction in a universe popping into existence with all fine-tuning required to sustain life-forms in it either, but if I prefer to use more substantial arguments than that one.

I’m not sure I follow. There could be an eternal act of Creation by God and all the current scientific findings and historical data could be and have been the way of things.

Good luck.

 

[Shike]

Necessity and Contingency are distinctions that do not require change thus G-d and creation can be distinct whether or not creation is a change.

Well sort of… if creation the effect didn’t change (no reduction of potency to act) whether you talk about the creature’s side of the relation to God in the act of creation or some subsequent behavior, it would mean you would be talking about absolutely nothing, or that you were talking about Pure Act. Basically, the essence existence pair and the act potency pair run in tandem for any possible creation the effect.

 

[belorg]

That’s the conclusion of a series of arguments based in aristotelian-thomistic philosophy of nature and metaphysics–you may of course take it or leave it. Just accept that a Thomist has a very very specific definition of the word change, one that doesn’t quite line up with yours, or at the least doesn’t allow you to use the concept in the way that you do.

The Thomist does not have a very very specific definition of ‘change’. What the THomist means by change is exactly the same everyone else means by it. And that’s why I can e.g.shave my beard without essentially changing while God cannot. And that is why I can apply a force without changing while God can’t.

I think this time around the merry-go-round (we have talked past each other before on this subject, not to mention since then I have picked up a little more understanding) I will say that you are correct insofar as you talk about creation the effect and its side of the relation towards God. If this doesn’t make sense to you, it’s probably the case that you have too broad of a notion of change and that you are talking past the Scholastics.

I know that Thomists make a distinction between change ‘on the side of the creature’ or from the pov of the creature versus the side of the creator, but that is not what I am talking about. Conjoining something is a change on the side of the one who conjoins unless there is no possible ‘unconjoined’ state , but that would mean the conjoining isd necessary.

I’m not sure I follow. There could be an eternal act of Creation by God and all the current scientific findings and historical data could be and have been the way of things.

Good luck.

What I mean is that if we take your line of reasoning, that unless we can prove that applying a force is impossible without change, every cosmological argument is useless, because we can claim everything that is not proven logically impossible. Fact is, there are lots of reasons to believe that applying a force means change, and the only reason offered against this is a severe case of special pleading.

 

[Sair]

Change as defined in the context relevant to aristotelian-thomistic philosophy of nature and metaphysics is the reduction of potency to act (or potentiality to actuality). Exercising a power to create something doesn’t necessarily have to undergo such a reduction in the agent, although any example from the material world will have such a feature.
The gist of all this: at the very least, there is no contradiction with having an Unmoved Mover (Unchanged Changer) within the relevant philosophical contexts that also creates.
In further other words: Aquinas and many other philosophers are not stupid and you are not the first to proffer such an objection.

So this basically amounts to moving the goalposts when they are applied to God - change for any being is so, but change for God is not so. So there. It’s like children in the playground making up the rules of a game as they go along.

If you invent various philosophical contexts and the definitions to go with them, you can pretty much call anything what you want - it doesn’t actually have to make sense. This seems particularly easy if one divorces God from all possible physical constraints; yet strangely enough, there are still those who claim that God was limited in his options as far as creating a physical universe is concerned; and this claim is particularly apt to arise when theistic philosophers try to dance around the problem of evil. I’d say you can’t have it both ways, but if you’re in the business of making up philosophical contexts (ones that don’t have any basis in reality, apparently) then you can really say anything you like. Fiction is fun, isn’t it?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…the problem of evil…

The POE cannot be posited without committing the fallacy of incredulity. Simply because you cannot imagine the reasons why an omnibenevolent, omnipotent being would allow evil/suffering to exist does not mean an omniscient being does not have said reasons. As the information gap between the knowledge you possess and the knowledge that He possesses approaches infinity, your likelyhood of being wrong approaches 100%.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…Fact is, there are lots of reasons to believe that applying a force means change, and the only reason offered against this is a severe case of special pleading.

Your reasons are based on your empirical experience of the world. They are not reasons to believe that G-d is restricted by any other nature the way we are by the laws of physics.

If G-d is existence then it follows that G-d is equally present at any point that can be said to exist, whether it is the Congo in 50 million BC or Lunar Base 16alpha in 2385 AD. It follows from this premise that for G-d there is no past or future, there is no change whatsoever. Reality does not flow by G-d sequentially as it does for us. Cause and effect we see as a temporal distinctions are for G-d ontological distinctions because for Him everything is now.

 

[Sair]

The POE cannot be posited without committing the fallacy of incredulity. Simply because you cannot imagine the reasons why an omnibenevolent, omnipotent being would allow evil/suffering to exist does not mean an omniscient being does not have said reasons. As the information gap between the knowledge you possess and the knowledge that He possesses approaches infinity, your likelyhood of being wrong approaches 100%.

And the knowledge you - or anyone - possesses of the motivations of God is negligible, surely. What grounds do you have, really? You need at least as much incredulity to ignore the problem of evil as to take it seriously. You can’t know - although you may believe - that you’re not dealing with an exquisitely, perfectly evil deity. The evidence can go either way, depending on your interpretation (though as far as I can see, the evidence is much, much more convincing for an evil god, if there is a god at all).

 

[warpspeedpetey]

And the knowledge you - or anyone - possesses of the motivations of God is negligible, surely. What grounds do you have, really?

G-ds words.

You can’t know - although you may believe - that you’re not dealing with an exquisitely, perfectly evil deity. The evidence can go either way, depending on your interpretation.

Any attempt at judging G-ds actions runs into the fallacy of incredulity. What G-d says is good because He says it is so. There is no moral standard by which we can judge G-d. Of course that doesn’t stop most people from positing their moral views as something G-d should be accountable too.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

And the knowledge you - or anyone - possesses of the motivations of God is negligible, surely. What grounds do you have, really? You need at least as much incredulity to ignore the problem of evil as to take it seriously. You can’t know - although you may believe - that you’re not dealing with an exquisitely, perfectly evil deity. The evidence can go either way, depending on your interpretation (though as far as I can see, the evidence is much, much more convincing for an evil god, if there is a god at all).

Just out of curiosity, your signature implies that science addresses G-d. Let me ask. Which of the investigatory techniques composing the scientific method addresses metaphysical propositions? If you mean something like G-d of the Gaps, then isn’t the corollary an “Atheism of the Lands” to say that a scientific explanation disproves that G-ddidit? In other words, if we discover how a miracle occurred, it does not follow that G-d did not do it.

 

[belorg]

Your reasons are based on your empirical experience of the world. They are not reasons to believe that G-d is restricted by any other nature the way we are by the laws of physics.

My reasons are based on applying logic. If there are beings to which logic does not apply, then everything is possible and logical arguments for or against God make no sense at all.

If G-d is existence then it follows that G-d is equally present at any point that can be said to exist, whether it is the Congo in 50 million BC or Lunar Base 16alpha in 2385 AD. It follows from this premise that for G-d there is no past or future, there is no change whatsoever. Reality does not flow by G-d sequentially as it does for us. Cause and effect we see as a temporal distinctions are for G-d ontological distinctions because for Him everything is now.

None of this has any sort of relevance to what I said.

BTW, why do you write “G-d”? That seems Jewish yo me.

 

[Sair]

Just out of curiosity, your signature implies that science addresses G-d. Let me ask. Which of the investigatory techniques composing the scientific method addresses metaphysical propositions? If you mean something like G-d of the Gaps, then isn’t the corollary an “Atheism of the Lands” to say that a scientific explanation disproves that G-ddidit? In other words, if we discover how a miracle occurred, it does not follow that G-d did not do it.

You assume that metaphysical propositions are valid and worthwhile.

Scientific elucidation doesn’t rule God out, perhaps, but it does suggest that God is irrelevant and inconsequential. Why add a redundant layer of explanation?

 

[Linux]

So this basically amounts to moving the goalposts when they are applied to God - change for any being is so, but change for God is not so. So there. It’s like children in the playground making up the rules of a game as they go along.

If you invent various philosophical contexts and the definitions to go with them, you can pretty much call anything what you want - it doesn’t actually have to make sense. This seems particularly easy if one divorces God from all possible physical constraints; yet strangely enough, there are still those who claim that God was limited in his options as far as creating a physical universe is concerned; and this claim is particularly apt to arise when theistic philosophers try to dance around the problem of evil. I’d say you can’t have it both ways, but if you’re in the business of making up philosophical contexts (ones that don’t have any basis in reality, apparently) then you can really say anything you like. Fiction is fun, isn’t it?

Translation: *If you debunk atheism, I will just say that you’re making things up and then I don’t have to accept the things that theists keep proving over and over again. If they say that physics does not apply to that which is not physical I will simply pretend that it is not possible to analogously infer the non-physical without committing to physical constraints because my goal is to promote metaphysical naturalism in the false guise of science. I will keep distorting the context in which theists infer distinctions, so as to build a straw-man of their arguments. That’s easier than facing reality *

 

[Sair]

G-ds words.

Just so. Or perhaps I should say, ‘just-so’…

Any attempt at judging G-ds actions runs into the fallacy of incredulity. What G-d says is good because He says it is so. There is no moral standard by which we can judge G-d. Of course that doesn’t stop most people from positing their moral views as something G-d should be accountable too.

What a spectacular cop-out! Who needs thought when you have divine command? Because it makes perfect sense for a perfectly good and rational god to create rational beings in his own image and then deny them the use of reason in a few crucial areas…

 

[Sair]

Translation: If you debunk atheism, I will just say that you’re making things up and then I don’t have to accept the things that theists keep proving over and over again. If they say the physics does not apply to that which is not physical I will simply pretend that it is not possible to analogously infer the non-physical without committing to scientism.

You are a very, very long way from scratching the surface of atheistic philosophy, let alone debunking it.

First, you have to show that anything nonphysical actually exists. Precisely how do you infer it? And once you’ve inferred it, how do you demonstrate that what you’re inferring actually is nonphysical, not an artifact of wishful thinking combined with lack of evidence?

Once you’ve demonstrated the possibility of nonphysical entities, then you can get around to doing the proving with regard to any specific, nonphysical, supernatural entities such as gods or souls.

How is it not possible for you to see how your reasoning looks from the outside?