Being!

[belorg]

And everything would also be not possible… which is why it is better to just say that nothing would make sense.

Yes, of course. And that’s why any sort of cosmology must at least make sense. nd that’s why

 

[belorg]

Pantheism actually has a broad spectrum of definitions. Its a slippery fish. True, one of the most common instances of pantheistic thought is the idea that God is both physical and non-physical, is the universe and transcendent of it.

Panentheism, Linux.

But one can also say that God is the being or issness of the universe but is not the nature of it. This is supported by the fact that change is a fundamental aspect of physical things and therefore at present is the sum total of actualised potential. The act of reality is therefore not intrinsic to the nature of physics because you cannot get the act of reality out of mere potential. Also given that out of nothing comes nothing, there has to be a nature that is the act of reality itself and therefore is not in and of itself a conjoining of act and potential. It has to be a timeless and perfect act of reality.

Thus you can say that everything is in God without saying that everything is the nature of God.

You have arrived at the same contradiction again, Linux. You are claiming that God is Pure Esse (isness) and also conjoined esse. That cannot be both true, unless you posit two dinstinct ontological states: one of Pure “isness” and one of conjoined “isness”, but going from one state to another is a change, and it does not matter whether this chabge is temporal or not. It means that the isness of God has a potentiality to be conjoined and that this potentiality can be actualized or not, depending on God’s free will.
But the Thomist God has no potential, so He is either necessarily conjoined or necessarily non-conjoined.

 

[Linux]

Panentheism, Linux.

You have arrived at the same contradiction again, Linux. You are claiming that God is Pure Esse (isness) and also conjoined esse. That cannot be both true, unless you posit two dinstinct ontological states: one of Pure “isness” and one of conjoined “isness”, but going from one state to another is a change, and it does not matter whether this chabge is temporal or not. It means that the isness of God has a potentiality to be conjoined and that this potentiality can be actualized or not, depending on God’s free will.
But the Thomist God has no potential, so He is either necessarily conjoined or necessarily non-conjoined.

Thanks for the correction on panentheism. I wrote while in a tired state.

There is no contradiction. You are assuming that to express the capacity or power of something necessarily involves the idea of going from one actual state to a potential one. That is true of physics. But not necessarily true of a perfect non-physical act of reality. There is never a “state” or time where God has not created the universe, thus God never changes from one actual state to a potential one. A perfect will which perfectly reflects its nature does not have to change because his will is a perfect reflection of his perfect knowledge of his perfect nature. Only an imperfect act of knowing ones true nature requires change, since it requires a development in understanding in order to have the fullness of knowledge before it can act on that knowledge. For God his act and will are simultaneous and one.

Out of nothing comes nothing. Thus there has to be a perfect and thus unchanging act of intrinsic reality which timelessly creates the space-time continuum. Our understanding of how this is the case is irrelevant since a perfect unchanging act of reality (something that is not in itself a conjoining of act and potential) has to exist in order to account for the existence of contingent objects, since contingent objects cannot rationally be claimed to be their own act of reality. Its not rationally negotiable. All of this has been explained already. At best you can only point out an apparent contradiction, but you cannot claim it to be a real contradiction for the reasons I just explained. Sure, it presents an epistemological puzzle, but to remove that which is fundamental to the existence of contingent objects (a perfect act of reality) would make reality fundamentally irrational since contingent beings would certainly be impossible.

 

[belorg]

Thanks for the correction on panentheism. I wrote while in a tired state.

There is no contradiction. You are assuming that to express the capacity or power of something necessarily involves the idea of going from one actual state to a potential one. That is true of physics. But not necessarily true of a perfect non-physical act of reality. There is never a “state” or time where God has not created the universe, thus God never changes from one actual state to a potential one.

Of course there is a state where God has not created the universe. Otherwise the creation of the universe would be necessary.

A perfect will which perfectly reflects its nature does not have to because that will is a perfect reflection of its perfect knowledge of its perfect nature.

That has nothing to do with it. What is imporatnt is that God is sen as the creator of the universe, which means there is an ontological state at which God is sans the universe. And I do not mean a temporal state.

Only an imperfect act of knowing ones true nature requires change, since it requires a development in understanding in order to have the fullness of knowledge before it can act on that knowledge.

I am not talking about knowledge.

Our understanding of how this is the case is irrelevant since a perfect unchanging act of reality (something that is not in itself a conjoining of act and potential) has to exist in order to account for the existence of contingent objects, since contingent objects cannot rationally be claimed to be their own act of reality.

Well, here you admit that a prefct unchanging act has to exist. So non-conjoined being is an ontologucal state and my objection stands.
And do not confurse ‘contingent’ with ‘dependent’. Contingent things can be independent.

All of this has been explained already. At best you can only point out an apparent contradiction, but you cannot claim it to be a real contradiction for the reasons I just explained. Sure, it presents an epistemological puzzle, but to remove that which is fundamental to the existence of contingent objects (a perfect act of reality) would make reality fundamentally irrational since contingent beings would certainly be impossible.

Contingent beings are, by definition, possible. That’s what contingent means: existing in some, but not all, possible worlds. So, you are wrong. There is nothing fundamental to the existence of contingent beings.
Besides, nowhere do I remove anything fundamental. There is no contradiction in saying that reality is fundamentally changeable, but there is a contradcition in saying that reality is fundamentally immutable, because we observe a changing reality, and unless that is an illusion, it is unaccounted for on your concept of fundamental being.

 

[Linux]

1. That which is a conjoining of act and potential cannot be its own cause.
2. Therefore that which is its cause cannot be a conjoining of act and potential.
3. Thus the cause has to be by default a pure and perfect act of reality, and therefore having no inherent potential and is thus not changing.
4. Change is a fundamental aspects of physical things.
5. Change is a conjoining of act and potential and thus cannot be its own cause.
6. Physical reality is not its own cause.
7. Therefore that which is its cause cannot be a conjoining of act and potential.
8. Thus the cause has to be by default a pure and perfect act of reality, and therefore having no inherent potential and is thus not changing.

 

[Linux]

Of course there is a state where God has not created the universe. Otherwise the creation of the universe would be necessary.

You are ignoring everything I said. I can only conclude that you are trolling. This will be my last post to you.

So non-conjoined being is an ontologucal state and my objection stands.
And do not confurse ‘contingent’ with ‘dependent’. Contingent things can be independent.

No your objection does not stand for the reasons I gave and you ignored. And contingent does mean ontologically dependent insofar as we are talking about possible natures or possible beings or possible states that have become actual at some point. They are all dependent or contingent on an act of reality (that is not itself a conjoining of act and potential; not contingent or dependent) in-order for their natures be something.

Contingent beings are, by definition, possible. That’s what contingent means: existing in some, but not all, possible worlds. So, you are wrong. There is nothing fundamental to the existence of contingent beings.

:banghead: Possible does not mean actual. Possibility does not necessitate actuality. Possibility is meaningless without there being a reality in which possibilities can become actual. You cannot get something from nothing. These are not difficult things to understand. But you are free to entertain your irrationality if it will help you to remain in denial.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…There is no contradiction. You are assuming that to express the capacity or power of something necessarily involves the idea of going from one actual state to a potential one. That is true of physics. But not necessarily true of a perfect non-physical act of reality. There is never a “state” or time where God has not created the universe, thus God never changes from one actual state to a potential one…

Am I missing his counter arguments somewhere in the thread?

 

[belorg]

1. That which is a conjoining of act and potential cannot be its own cause.
2. Therefore that which is its cause cannot be a conjoining of act and potential.
3. Thus the cause has to be by default a pure and perfect act of reality, and therefore having no inherent potential and is thus not changing.
4. Change is a fundamental aspects of physical things.
5. Change is a conjoining of act and potential and thus cannot be its own cause.
6. Physical reality is not its own cause.
7. Therefore that which is its cause cannot be a conjoining of act and potential.
8. Thus the cause has to be by default a pure and perfect act of reality, and therefore having no inherent potential and is thus not changing.

2 does not folow from 1, which makes this argument logically invalid.

 

[belorg]

You are ignoring everything I said. I can only conclude that you are trolling. This will be my last post to you.

No your objection does not stand for the reasons I gave and you ignored. And contingent does mean ontologically dependent insofar as we are talking about possible natures or possible beings or possible states that have become actual at some point. They are all dependent or contingent on an act of reality (that is not itself a conjoining of act and potential; not contingent or dependent) in-order for their natures be something.

:banghead: Possible does not mean actual. Possibility does not necessitate actuality. Possibility is meaningless without there being a reality in which possibilities can become actual. You cannot get something from nothing. These are not difficult things to understand. But you are free to entertain your irrationality if it will help you to remain in denial.

Since you fail to understand my objection, it is probably a good idea that you leave this discussion for the time being.
As for your accusation of trolling. If everybody who happens not to agree with you is a troll, you are going to meet lots of trolls.I advise you to become a bit less self-centered. that would be a very Christian thing to do.
Your last paragraph says it all: you simply have no idea what you are talking about.
So, just go and study a bit, one day you might be up to it.

 

[belorg]

Am I missing his counter arguments somewhere in the thread?

Probably, because it definitely is there. But seeing it requires an open mind, which both Linux and you seem to lack at this moment. But, I guess there is still hope.

 

[Linux]

Since you fail to understand my objection, it is probably a good idea that you leave this discussion for the time being.
As for your accusation of trolling. If everybody who happens not to agree with you is a troll, you are going to meet lots of trolls.I advise you to become a bit less self-centered. that would be a very Christian thing to do.
Your last paragraph says it all: you simply have no idea what you are talking about.
So, just go and study a bit, one day you might be up to it.

 

[belorg]

So, you lied about your previous post being your last to me. Isn’t lying a grave sin?

 

[Linux]

2 does not folow from 1, which makes this argument logically invalid.

This is why i called you a troll, because you do not give a rational explanation for why you call something invalid. You merely assert it. The more somebody does this, the more likely it is that they have no interest in a rational discussion and only intend to annoy people.

For the sake of everybody else 2 does follow from 1 if you understand my argument in the context of what makes a thing real (Existential Cause) as opposed to secondary causes which are all a conjoining of act and potential and are therefore not that which makes a thing real. They are causes in a different sense.

1. That which is the conjoining of act and potential is not its own cause of existence, regardless of how many there are. The reasons have been well explained.
2. Therefore that which is the cause of its existence is not itself a conjoining of act and potential.

 

[Linux]

So, you lied about your previous post being your last to me. Isn’t lying a grave sin?

Changing your mind is not a grave sin. Trolling however is a sin.

 

[Shike]

I am fully aware of the Aristotelean notion of change and why it cannot apply to the Aristotelean First Mover, but the conclusion is not that this Prime Moveer needs a special kind of acting without changing, but that the very notion of such a Ptime Mover is incoherent, which is why the majority of comtemporary philosophers, atheists but also lots of theists, reject Aristotle in that respcet.

Numbers are irrelevant. And also, if I were a betting man I’d say you are blowing a lot of smoke and that you have no numbers.

Then your position is clarified, you must reject Aquinas’ 1st Way. It does not prevent you, however, from understanding the argument (which includes the conclusion that God cannot change). And it most certainly does not justify the following remark of yours:

What I mean is that if we take your line of reasoning, that unless we can prove that applying a force is impossible without change, every cosmological argument is useless, because we can claim everything that is not proven logically impossible.

Moving on…

It is not a demonstration by the standards of contemporary philosophy.

It is most certainly logically valid and each premise is true, if that’s what you’re getting at. And that seems to meet the modern criteria just fine.

Then, by all means, show that there is no contradiction, because asserting it, as you have been doing so far, is not so big an accomplishment.

Usually the way it goes is someone presents a contradiction and another attempts to disarm it. Think very carefully about what you just said and what you are asking me to do. Perhaps you should re-read the exchanges so far in this thread. Anyways, there are various levels of detail one can go into, depending on how humble and patient the other party is. I’ll give it again:

1. The definition of change is the reduction of potency to act, or, good enough for present purposes, change requires an aspect of receptivity.
2. The argument from Aquinas’ 1st Way gives the sound conclusion that there is a Being that is Pure act, or the source of all potency to act reductions.
3. Therefore change cannot apply to such a Being.

If you understand points 1 and 2, then you will see how 3 follows. Whether or not you think they are true is another question.

Now the floor is open to you, or, preferably someone else to ask respectful questions in the hope of understanding something one didn’t before.

 

[belorg]

This is why i called you a troll, because you do not give a rational explanation for why you call something invalid. You merely assert it. The more somebody does this, the more likely it is that they have no interest in a rational discussion and only intend to annoy people.

It would be much more impressive if, instead of just insulting me, you actually had something substantial to say.

For the sake of everybody else 2 does follow from 1 if you understand my argument in the context of what makes a thing real (Existential Cause) as opposed to secondary causes which are all a conjoining of act and potential and are therefore not that which makes a thing real. They are causes in a different sense.

1. That which is the conjoining of act and potential is not its own cause of existence, regardless of how many there are. The reasons have been well explained.

1. Therefore that which is the cause of its existence is not itself a conjoining of act and potential.

I really do not see why this would not be obvious to everyone that this is a non-sequitur, but for the sake of anybody here who is a little bit open minded, and also for your own sake, I’ll explain why .
I’ll put it in bold

Nobody in this thread, is arguing that something is the cause of its own existence and I am most certainly not making this claim and AFAIK, no serious Catholic philosopher would even claim that God is the cause of His own existence.
So, not only doesn’t 2 follow from 1, 2 on its own is a completely incoherent phrase.

Now, either you present a serious argument, or you do as you promised and stop replying to me.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…What is imporatnt is that God is sen as the creator of the universe, which means there is an ontological state at which God is sans the universe. And I do not mean a temporal state.

P1. God is sen as the creator of the universe
C1. Which means there is an ontological state at which God is sans the universe…And I do not mean a temporal state.

What basis do you have to claim that the creative act requires there to be a state at which creation does not exist? There is nothing from which to infer this but your own empirical experience of a reality where “states” are defined by some set of factors that are sequentially manifest.

On the other hand G-d, as being, occupies all points that exist simultaneously. There is no sequence of states from that vantage point. A G-ds eye view seems to be a singularity hierarchic in necessity and contingency. This does not mean that the universe is logically necessary because the universe can fail to exist without logical contradiction resulting.

It seems then that your objection is fallaciously non sequitur and incredulous.

 

[belorg]

Changing your mind is not a grave sin. Trolling however is a sin.

Participating in trolling is a grave sin too, which seems to be what you are doing.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Probably, because it definitely is there. But seeing it requires an open mind, which both Linux and you seem to lack at this moment. But, I guess there is still hope.

If you have a counter argument then please post it for me and everyone else to see.

 

[Linux]

It would be much more impressive if, instead of just insulting me, you actually had something substantial to say.

I really do not see why this would not be obvious to everyone that this is a non-sequitur, but for the sake of anybody here who is a little bit open minded, and also for your own sake, I’ll explain why .
I’ll put it in bold

Nobody in this thread, is arguing that something is the cause of its own existence and I am most certainly not making this claim and AFAIK, no serious Catholic philosopher would even claim that God is the cause of His own existence.
So, not only doesn’t 2 follow from 1, 2 on its own is a completely incoherent phrase.

Now, either you present a serious argument, or you do as you promised and stop replying to me.

Now you have resorted to making a straw-man of my argument. I never said that God is the cause of his own existence.

For the sake of everybody else 2 does follow from 1 if you understand my argument in the context of what makes a potential thing real (Existential Cause) as opposed to secondary causes which are all a conjoining of act and potential and are therefore not that which makes a possible thing real because they were mere potential to begin with. They are causes in a different sense.

1. That which is the conjoining of act and potential is not its own cause of existence, regardless of how many there are. The reasons have been well explained.
2. Therefore that which is the cause of its existence is not itself a conjoining of act and potential.