Being!

[belorg]

First, God is not the only necessary being. He is the only being whose necessity isn’t derived (and of course this depends somewhat on your definitions because Aquinas is concerned with an ontological necessity rather than a strictly logical necessity, though that is also true–using possible worlds stuff can be misleading).
Second, using ontological analysis will only give us a state where God and creation exist. To do what you’re doing would be to subject a categorically atemporal being to time, however the much you protest that you do no such thing.
Third, for your reasoning to be valid, keeping it atemporal as you say you do, you would have to say that it is not possible for changing reality to exist at all. Why? Because you keep insisting that you are doing ontological analysis that is irrelevant to time. If that were the case, there would be nothing you could exclude from reality, which would mean that state 1 is all of reality, including anything temporal, past present and future. Now you say state 1 is immutable… ergo no other state is possible.
Ontological analysis is not being done here. Rather, logical analysis that is subjecting a categorically atemporal being under temporal considerations.

I think the fruitful thing to do here is to critique Aquinas’ 1st Way and find an ambiguous term, a false premise, or an invalid step of reasoning. Please: I am always interested in hearing the critiques of others on Aquinas’ arguments for the existence of God.

Whether God is ontologically necessary (basically an impressive sounding term for a brute fact) or logically necessary or whether there can be other necessary beings (teher are pretty solid Thomist arguments against this BTW) is not relevant.
What is relevant is that
1 God is immutable (basic Thomism)
2 God is the creator of everything (Catholic doctrine- Nicene Creed)
2 A world with only God (wG) is a possible world. (from 2)
3 wG is immutable. (from 1 and 2)
4 wG cannot possible change (from 3)
5 the actual world (wA) is changing (observation)
6 wA is possibly changed
7 every possible world is possibly changed (from 6 and S5 axiom)
8 wG can possibly change
9 God can possibly change (which contradicts 1)

conclusion: if the actual world is changing, God cannot be immutable

 

[belorg]

I would say, further to your statement, that unless he can metaphysically demonstrate that potency can become actual by itself, then he has to accept that the first cause exists and cannot possibly be in and of itself a conjoining of existence and potency.

I do not have to demonstrate anything , Linux. I can just say I don’t know.
I am not the one making a positive claim, all I claim here is that positing some immutable being as the ontolgical basis for changing reality has unsurmountable problems.
Suppose I did this (and I know, you will never admit it, but let’s suppose this FTSOTA), then it does not matter whether I have a better alternative or not. If I tell you there is something wrong with your car, would you also ask me to demonstrate that my own car is OK?

But FYI, I do not believe potency and act are really distinct, so there is no ‘potency that can become actual.’ Potency IS actual

 

[john_doran]

Whether God is ontologically necessary (basically an impressive sounding term for a brute fact) or logically necessary or whether there can be other necessary beings (teher are pretty solid Thomist arguments against this BTW) is not relevant.
What is relevant is that
1 God is immutable (basic Thomism)
2 God is the creator of everything (Catholic doctrine- Nicene Creed)
2 A world with only God (wG) is a possible world. (from 2)
3 wG is immutable. (from 1 and 2)
4 wG cannot possible change (from 3)
5 the actual world (wA) is changing (observation)
6 wA is possibly changed
7 every possible world is possibly changed (from 6 and S5 axiom)
8 wG can possibly change
9 God can possibly change (which contradicts 1)

conclusion: if the actual world is changing, God cannot be immutable

how does (3) follow from (1) and (2)? (either (2) - your numbering is off…)

and (3) and (7) are contradictories.

but that is as may be: it looks to me like what you’re calling “change” is something like Cambridge change, which is the kind of change that, say, the pyramids of giza undergo when i get up from my desk and walk to the kitchen to get coffee - i.e. something like a relational change. and this isn’t (traditionally) the kind of change that god is said not to be able to undergo.

 

[belorg]

how does (3) follow from (1) and (2)? (either (2) - your numbering is off…)

3 follows from 1 and 2 and 2 (I added a premsie for clarity’ sake but forgot to change the numbering) becasue God comprises the whole of reality in wG. That is implied in 2 (the second 2 that is)

and (3) and (7) are contradictories.

That’s the whole point.

but that is as may be: it looks to me like what you’re calling “change” is something like Cambridge change, which is the kind of change that, say, the pyramids of giza undergo when i get up from my desk and walk to the kitchen to get coffee - i.e. something like a relational change. and this isn’t (traditionally) the kind of change that god is said not to be able to undergo.

My whole argument is set out to show that in order for God to create something, He must change and not in a Cambridge sense. Cambridge change is a change in relation due to the fact that the other partner in the relation changes. If my daughter has a baby, I will be “changed” into a grandfather, but that would be a Cambridge change.
But in the case of God creating ex nihilo, there can be no Cambridge change because there is no other partner in the relation

 

[john_doran]

3 follows from 1 and 2 and 2 (I added a premsie for clarity’ sake but forgot to change the numbering) becasue God comprises the whole of reality in wG. That is implied in 2 (the second 2 that is)

but how does it follow? certainly not deductively, not without additional premises. for example:

2’ - a possible world with only one constituent has all of the properties of that constituent.

but why should anyone believe that?

consider a possible world, w*, at which only one red, spherical, plastic ball exists. 2’ then entails the following propositions:

p - w is red
*
p’ - w is spherical

p’’ - w* is plastic

*each of which is absurd, since possible worlds are simply (possible) states of affairs, and states of affairs are neither colored, shaped, nor possessed of atomic structure.

do you have some other way of making the entailment of 3 go through?

That’s the whole point.

fair enough. but (7) does not, in fact, follow from (6) and S5.

this is S5: ◊A→□◊A

which means “if A is true at one possible world, then A is true at every possible world”.

but in your syllogism, A is just (6): “wA is actually changed”, which, with S5, only allows you to conclude the following:

7’ - it is true in every possible world that wA is actually changed

which is straightforwardly not equivalent to (7), and your argument doesn’t go through.

But in the case of God creating ex nihilo, there can be no Cambridge change because there is no other partner in the relation

so what change is there in me - to my being - when a positron-antipositron pair spontaneously irupts from the quantum vacuum into the atmosphere of ganymede and then annihilates itself? that would seem to me to be the textbook case of Cambridge change: there was just me; then there were two virtual particles 10.3 light minutes from me; then there was just me again.

but even if you’re right, it doesn’t follow that there must be a substantive change in god - what would it be? how would the sudden coming-to-be of the universe involve any change in god? to his very being?

it seems far more plausible to suppose that there must be another kind of incidental change - call it Cambridge2 change.

 

[Linux]

I do not have to demonstrate anything , Linux. I can just say I don’t know.

Its true that wilful ignorance is an option for everybody. However, potential natures or states cannot come out of nothing. Therefore despite your wilful ignorance there has to be an immutable first cause insofar as the fact that existence is necessarily the ground of all possibility or potency, and also because the first cause cannot be in and of itself a conjoining of act and potency since that would require a cause as well.

The fact that you cannot understand how God creates without changing is irrelevant, because all potential natures or states or potency in itself has to be logically accounted for.

 

[Linux]

Its true that wilful ignorance is an option for everybody. However, potential natures or states cannot come out of nothing. Therefore despite your wilful ignorance there has to be an immutable first cause insofar as the fact that existence is necessarily the ground of all possibility or potency, and also because the first cause cannot be in and of itself a conjoining of act and potency since that would require a cause as well.

The fact that you cannot understand how God creates without changing is irrelevant, because all potential natures or states or potency in itself has to be logically accounted for.

The actuality of any and all potential-natures or states or potency in itself has to be accounted for by an act that is not any of those things.

 

[belorg]

but how does it follow? certainly not deductively, not without additional premises. for example:

*2’ - a possible world with only one constituent has all of the properties of that constituent.*but why should anyone believe that?

A possible world with only one constituent has no other things that can have these properties. So it does follow.

consider a possible world, w*, at which only one red, spherical, plastic ball exists. 2’ then entails the following propositions:

p - w is red
*
p’ - w is spherical*

p’’ - w* is plastic

each of which is absurd, since possible worlds are simply (possible) states of affairs, and states of affairs are neither colored, shaped, nor possessed of atomic structure.

The state of affairs here is just the plastic ball, so, the possible world includes the property red, plastic and spherical and no other properties.

fair enough. but (7) does not, in fact, follow from (6) and S5.

this is S5: ◊A→□◊A

which means “if A is true at one possible world, then A is true at every possible world”.

but in your syllogism, A is just (6): “wA is actually changed”, which, with S5, only allows you to conclude the following:

7’ - it is true in every possible world that wA is actually changed

which is straightforwardly not equivalent to (7), and your argument doesn’t go through.

One aspect of S5 is :if possibly p, then necessarily possibly p
my 6 says “wA is possibly changed” (possibly p)
my 7 says “every possible world is possibly changed” (necessarily possibly p)
so it does follow from S5.
I do not know where you got your version of S5, but at first glance “if A is true at one possible world, then A is true at every possible world”.seems to be wrong.

so what change is there in me - to my being - when a positron-antipositron pair spontaneously irupts from the quantum vacuum into the atmosphere of ganymede and then annihilates itself? that would seem to me to be the textbook case of Cambridge change: there was just me; then there were two virtual particles 10.3 light minutes from me; then there was just me again.

Did you cause this fluctuation, john? And more importantly, did you cause this fluctuation to occur from absolutely nothing?

but even if you’re right, it doesn’t follow that there must be a substantive change in god - what would it be? how would the sudden coming-to-be of the universe involve any change in god? to his very being?

If the universe just popped into existence from nothing, without any cause, there would not be any change in God. But that is not the scenario we are discussing. We are discussing some kind of active paticipation from God in the occurrence of the universe from nothing.

it seems far more plausible to suppose that there must be another kind of incidental change - call it Cambridge2 change.

Why don’t you just call it change and forget about immutable beings? It seems that would be the most plausible thing to do.

 

[belorg]

Its true that wilful ignorance is an option for everybody. However, potential natures or states cannot come out of nothing. Therefore despite your wilful ignorance there has to be an immutable first cause insofar as the fact that existence is necessarily the ground of all possibility or potency, and also because the first cause cannot be in and of itself a conjoining of act and potency since that would require a cause as well.

The fact that you cannot understand how God creates without changing is irrelevant, because all potential natures or states or potency in itself has to be logically accounted for.

Haven’t you read my reply, Linux? Even though I do not have to demonstarte anything I actually explained what my position is. Now you can assert whatever you like, but if you have no argument I do not have to nelive your assertions.
I’ll spell it out for you: there is no proof that “states of potency” need any sort of outside cause for them to change. on the contary: teher are reason to believe this is definitely not the case. There isn’t even any reason to suppose that there is anything “actual” at all. Everything seems to be potency. And there is no contradiction in that.

 

[Shike]

Whether God is ontologically necessary (basically an impressive sounding term for a brute fact) or logically necessary or whether there can be other necessary beings (teher are pretty solid Thomist arguments against this BTW) is not relevant.

It is for your learning and others. Two errors, here:
A) Brute facts are very different than necessary beings. Brute facts are just true with no reason why. A necessary being, even a necessary being whose necessity isn’t derived, does indeed have a reason why it exists. Basically, the two are about as different as it gets.
B) There are solid arguments for why there can’t be more than one necessary being whose necessity isn’t derived from another. But there are NO solid arguments for saying there can’t be many necessary beings.

1 God is immutable (basic Thomism)
2 God is the creator of everything (Catholic doctrine- Nicene Creed)
2 A world with only God (wG) is a possible world. (from 2)
3 wG is immutable. (from 1 and 2)
4 wG cannot possible change (from 3)
5 the actual world (wA) is changing (observation)
6 wA is possibly changed
7 every possible world is possibly changed (from 6 and S5 axiom)
8 wG can possibly change
9 God can possibly change (which contradicts 1)

conclusion: if the actual world is changing, God cannot be immutable

This is an argument that could use some cleaning up.
A) Your conclusion is not quite correct. If you find a contradiction than you can deny any or all of the premises. Why do you reject premise 1 only? Your argument does not support such a step.
B) Premise 2(1) is unnecessary. You could keep the argument on philosophical grounds by using, say, Aquinas’ 1st Way. One of its implications is that God is the creator of all.
C) Premise 2(2) does not follow from 2(1). This is mainly because you do not block the possibility that creation is necessary (I’m not saying I agree with such a position, I’m just saying you leave a hole here).
D)After 3, you should insert a space and start another argument. 3 is a conclusion. Of course you can use 3 as one of the premises for a new argument. Doing this allows you to be more precise and allows others to see what you are trying to do more clearly.
E) 3 follows from 2 because you are not allowing, by definition, any other entity to be a part of wG, not because of any insight into Divine immutability (I just want to make that clear).
F) 4 and 5 look good to me!
G) I’m not exactly sure on what 6 means. Do you mean to say that the actual world can be changed? Please help (for the rest of the argument I will assume this is what you mean).
H) Does 7 mean that every possible world can be changed? I see no reason to conclude this. It doesn’t follow from 5 and 6. I’ll just stop here, for now.

What is really nice is your presentation in premise/conclusion form (even with my critiques on the form). It is truly a breathe of fresh air in this discussion. Thank you.

 

[Shike]

john duran seems to have a good point about giving the attributes of objects within a world to the world itself. If you want to play the formal logic game, it might be a good idea to have a helper premise to show what you are trying to do.

 

[belorg]

It is for your learning and others. Two errors, here:
A) Brute facts are very different than necessary beings. Brute facts are just true with no reason why. A necessary being, even a necessary being whose necessity isn’t derived, does indeed have a reason why it exists. Basically, the two are about as different as it gets.
B) There are solid arguments for why there can’t be more than one necessary being whose necessity isn’t derived from another. But there are NO solid arguments for saying there can’t be many necessary beings.

For your learning and others, an ontologically necssary being is a being that if it exists cannot not exist. theer is nothing that suggests any reason for why it exisst in the first place. So an ON being is, without further argumention, logically contingent, which makes it a brute fact.
And yes, there can be other necssary beings whoese necessity is derived from the one underived necessary beings, but as I said, this is not relevant

This is an argument that could use some cleaning up.
A) Your conclusion is not quite correct. If you find a contradiction than you can deny any or all of the premises. Why do you reject premise 1 only? Your argument does not support such a step.

I know my argument needs cleaning up.
And yes, I could also reject 2.

B) Premise 2(1) is unnecessary. You could keep the argument on philosophical grounds by using, say, Aquinas’ 1st Way. One of its implications is that God is the creator of all.

Yes, I could do that.

C) Premise 2(2) does not follow from 2(1). This is mainly because you do not block the possibility that creation is necessary (I’m not saying I agree with such a position, I’m just saying you leave a hole here).

True, I wouild have to insert some extra premises.

D)After 3, you should insert a space and start another argument. 3 is a conclusion. Of course you can use 3 as one of the premises for a new argument. Doing this allows you to be more precise and allows others to see what you are trying to do more clearly.

OK

E) 3 follows from 2 because you are not allowing, by definition, any other entity to be a part of wG, not because of any insight into Divine immutability (I just want to make that clear).

Since there is nothing in Catholic doctrine nor in Thomism that precludes this possibility, I am allowed to insert this premise. But it is shorthand for " therer are no other beings there and God is immutable" so it is also based on insight into DI.

F) 4 and 5 look good to me!
G) I’m not exactly sure on what 6 means. Do you mean to say that the actual world can be changed? Please help (for the rest of the argument I will assume this is what you mean).

Yes, it means that is possible that the actual world changes.

H) Does 7 mean that every possible world can be changed? I see no reason to conclude this. It doesn’t follow from 5 and 6. I’ll just stop here, for now.

It follows using S5. Something that is possible in one PW is possible in every PW. Chnage is possible in wA therefore change is possible in every PW, including wG

What is really nice is your presentation in premise/conclusion form (even with my critiques on the form). It is truly a breathe of fresh air in this discussion. Thank you.

Hopefully this will clarify my position a bit.

 

[belorg]

john duran seems to have a good point about giving the attributes of objects within a world to the world itself. If you want to play the formal logic game, it might be a good idea to have a helper premise to show what you are trying to do.

That’s probably true. My argument definitely needs refining, I’ll try to rework in if I find the time.

 

[john_doran]

A possible world with only one constituent has no other things that can have these properties. So it does follow.

no, i’m afraid it doesn’t. is the proposition “there is a red plastic ball on the table” red and plastic also?

look, a possible world is just a maximally consistent state of affairs or set of propositions, and is so far forth not the sort of thing that can have the properties of the things that are “in” the world. more specifically, possible worlds (and states of affairs and propositions and…) are abstract objects, and can’t have the properties of concrete objects like plastic balls or god.

what’s more, even if you were in the neighbourhood of correctness here, there seems to be no principled way to motivate an identity between a state of affairs and one constituent, but not two or more constituents - there’s certainly nothing about the concept of “possible world” which entails the identity that you’re claiming.

but if a possible world has all of the properties of all of its constituents, then a possible world can have contradictory properties, which is absurd.

The state of affairs here is just the plastic ball, so, the possible world includes the property red, plastic and spherical and no other properties.

“includes”, perhaps, but does not “have” or “possess”. unfortunately, you need the wG to have the property “being immutable”, which it does not.

One aspect of S5 is :if possibly p, then necessarily possibly p
my 6 says “wA is possibly changed” (possibly p)
my 7 says “every possible world is possibly changed” (necessarily possibly p)
so it does follow from S5.

here is the argument stated precisely:

(A) possibly (wA is changed)

(B) if possibly (wA is changed) then necessarily (possibly (wA is changed))

(C) therefore necessarily (possibly (wA is changed))

and that is all that you can get from the conjunction of your (6) and S5; there is absolutely nothing that can be concluded about the mutability of all possible worlds, but only the mutability of wA.

and doesn’t it at any rate seem obvious that changeless worlds are possible? i mean, if what you’re saying is true, then the null world and any world with one, static object are impossible on strictly logical grounds, which seems obviously wrong.

I do not know where you got your version of S5, but at first glance “if A is true at one possible world, then A is true at every possible world”.seems to be wrong.

there aren’t “versions” of S5 - “if possibly p, then necessarily (possibly p)” just means “if p is true at one world, then p is true (at that world) in every possible world.”

what else could it mean?

Did you cause this fluctuation, john? And more importantly, did you cause this fluctuation to occur from absolutely nothing?

what does causation have to do with it? does the exercise of causal powers always have to involve the kind of substantial change that is prohibited by god’s immutability, traditionally understood?

when my skin causes dust-motes to be repelled, for example, do i change in my being or essence?

Why don’t you just call it change and forget about immutable beings? It seems that would be the most plausible thing to do.

personally i have no problem with that - i just think that:

(a) the change involved in god’s actualizing a possible world need not be substantial/essential; and

(b) that your modal argument for such “causal essentialism” fails.

 

[belorg]

no, i’m afraid it doesn’t. is the proposition “there is a red plastic ball on the table” red and plastic also?

No, because there is also a table, which is probably made of wood.

look, a possible world is just a maximally consistent state of affairs or set of propositions, and is so far forth not the sort of thing that can have the properties of the things that are “in” the world. more specifically, possible worlds (and states of affairs and propositions and…) are abstract objects, and can’t have the properties of concrete objects like plastic balls or god.

Then’s fine. I’ll refine my argument and say that in wG the proposition, “there is some other being” is false.

what’s more, even if you were in the neighbourhood of correctness here, there seems to be no principled way to motivate an identity between a state of affairs and one constituent, but not two or more constituents - there’s certainly nothing about the concept of “possible world” which entails the identity that you’re claiming.

Look, either it is possible for God to exist without any other beings, or it’s not.
The Catholic position that God is theh creator of everything seems to indicate that this is possible. I see no reason to think it is not possible. If you do, then you can state your objections of course.
But if you were to claim that God’s creation is necessary, you would have to face the consequences, which is that you reduce God to an automaton.

but if a possible world has all of the properties of all of its constituents, then a possible world can have contradictory properties, which is absurd.

Perhaps, but irrelevant.

“includes”, perhaps, but does not “have” or “possess”. unfortunately, you need the wG to have the property “being immutable”, which it does not.

I only need wG to include nothing that can change. That’s all.

here is the argument stated precisely:

(A) possibly (wA is changed)

(B) if possibly (wA is changed) then necessarily (possibly (wA is changed))

(C) therefore necessarily (possibly (wA is changed))

No, that is not true. If there is possibly a changing entity in wA there is possibly a changing entity in every possible world

and that is all that you can get from the conjunction of your (6) and S5; there is absolutely nothing that can be concluded about the mutability of all possible worlds, but only the mutability of wA.

You obviously do not understand S5.

and doesn’t it at any rate seem obvious that changeless worlds are possible? i mean, if what you’re saying is true, then the null world and any world with one, static object are impossible on strictly logical grounds, which seems obviously wrong.

I do not know if you are aware of it, but there is actually an argument against completely empty worlds based on S5.
And, more to the point, if a world with one static object (or even an emprty world) is possible, then, by s we can conclude that God (defined as a logically necssary being) is impossible. That would be a correct reversion of Plantinga’s famous modal ontological argument and it would be logically valid.

there aren’t “versions” of S5 - “if possibly p, then necessarily (possibly p)” just means “if p is true at one world, then p is true (at that world) in every possible world.”

what else could it mean?

If possibly p then necessarliy possibly p means that if p is possible in w1, then p is possible in every world. So, you are possible in every possible world, but you do not exist in every possible world.

what does causation have to do with it? does the exercise of causal powers always have to involve the kind of substantial change that is prohibited by god’s immutability, traditionally understood?

The problem with God’s immutablility is that He cannot non-substantially change.

when my skin causes dust-motes to be repelled, for example, do i change in my being or essence?

No, but you change, and since you are not a being whose essence is his existence, you can change without your essence changing. I can shave my beard, because my beard is not my essence. God’s does not have anything else but essence, so he cannot shave his beard (if He had one)

personally i have no problem with that - i just think that:

(a) the change involved in god’s actualizing a possible world need not be substantial/essential; and

Since God IS his essence and His existence, any change in God is essential.

(b) that your modal argument for such “causal essentialism” fails.

I do not think it does. And if you want to claim it does, you need a lot more arguments.

 

[john_doran]

No, that is not true. If there is possibly a changing entity in wA there is possibly a changing entity in every possible world

then please show me precisely what is wrong with the argument as i have articulated it: just saying it’s not true is unhelpful.

You obviously do not understand S5.

i can assure you that i do, but again, comments like this are spectacularly unhelpful: if you can demonstrate my specific ignorance, feel free.

i will rehearse the argument in more detail:

here is S5:

◊A→□◊A

here is your (6):

(6) wA is possibly changed

just to remove all doubt, here are S5 and (6) together:

(a) ◊*(6)→□◊(6)*

(b) ◊*(wA is possibly changed) →□◊(wA is possibly changed)*

which entails:

(c) □ ◊*(wA is possibly changed)*

but (c) just means:

(d) necessarily possibly “wA is possibly changed”

which in turn just means:

(e) the proposition “possibly, wA is possibly changed” is true in every possible world

here is your (7):

(7) every possible world is possibly changed

but (7) and (e) are not logically equivalent, and (e) does not entail:

(f) every possible world contains an entity that possibly changes

if you disagree, demonstrate either their equivalence, the entailment, or where and how the reasoning above goes wrong.

I do not know if you are aware of it, but there is actually an argument against completely empty worlds based on S5.
And, more to the point, if a world with one static object (or even an emprty world) is possible, then, by s we can conclude that God (defined as a logically necssary being) is impossible. That would be a correct reversion of Plantinga’s famous modal ontological argument and it would be logically valid.

valid, but not sound.

but at any rate, the existence of a null world is beside the point: by your argument, if there is a possible world with change, then it is logically necessary that every world changes, which, again, seems obviously wrong.

If possibly p then necessarily possibly p means that if p is possible in w1, then p is possible in every world. So, you are possible in every possible world, but you do not exist in every possible world.

…which is exactly what i said, and what you are most definitely not saying in your argument.

here’s this last statement of yours redacted to include your (6):

If possibly “wA is possibly changed” then necessarily possibly "wA is possibly changed means that if “wA is possibly changed” is possible in w1, then “wA is possibly changed” is possible in every world. So, wA possibly changes in every possible world, but not every possible world changes.

which is not your (7).

The problem with God’s immutablility is that He cannot non-substantially change.

says you.

but if you believe that, then why bother with any kind of modal argument? this one is much more straightforward:

(1) god cannot change, either substantially or incidentally;

(2) any change in me involves an incidental (relational) change in god;

(3) i change;

(4) therefore god changes.

of course, as with your modal argument, (4) does NOT entail:

(5) therefore there is no god;

but rather:

(5’) therefore (there is no god) v ~(1)

personally, i’ll go with ~(1)…

 

[belorg]

then please show me precisely what is wrong with the argument as i have articulated it: just saying it’s not true is unhelpful.

It’s just an application of S5 “if possibly p then necessarily possibly p” means that if p is possible in w1 it is possible in every W.

i can assure you that i do, but again, comments like this are spectacularly unhelpful: if you can demonstrate my specific ignorance, feel free.

i will rehearse the argument in more detail:

here is S5:

◊A→□◊A

here is your (6):

(6) wA is possibly changed

just to remove all doubt, here are S5 and (6) together:

(a) ◊*(6)→□◊(6)*

(b) ◊*(wA is possibly changed) →□◊(wA is possibly changed)*

which entails:

(c) □ ◊*(wA is possibly changed)*

but (c) just means:

(d) necessarily possibly “wA is possibly changed”

which in turn just means:

(e) the proposition “possibly, wA is possibly changed” is true in every possible world

The proposition possibly p is changed in wA holds for p in wA, but the proposition p is necessarily possible means that p is possible in every world. And the second proposition follows by S5 from the first.

here is your (7):

(7) every possible world is possibly changed

but (7) and (e) are not logically equivalent, and (e) does not entail:

(f) every possible world contains an entity that possibly changes

if you disagree, demonstrate either their equivalence, the entailment, or where and how the reasoning above goes wrong.

If wA contains an entity that can possibly change then every world possibly conatins an entity that can possibly change. But wG as I defined it, cannot contain an entity that possibly changes.
And that’s the contradcition.

valid, but not sound.

If you admit that there is a possible world with one element X (which is not God) then you have admitted that God isn’t necessary. So, it is valid and its soundness depends on your admission.

but at any rate, the existence of a null world is beside the point: by your argument, if there is a possible world with change, then it is logically necessary that every world changes, which, again, seems obviously wrong.

That is not my argument. My argument is that if there is a possible wotld with chnage, then it is logically necessary that every world possibly changes.

…which is exactly what i said, and what you are most definitely not saying in your argument.

Sure I do.

here’s this last statement of yours redacted to include your (6):

which is not your (7).

“wA is possibly changed” means that it is possible that there is a changing entity in wA. Therefore, by S5 it must be possible that there is a changing entity in every W (a), including wG. But, if we go by Catholic doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, accompanied by the alleged immutability of God, then it is impossible that there is a changing entity in wG, which contradicts (a)

says you.

Says any Thomist that knows what he is talking about.
The Thomist concept of immutability means that God cannot change in any way.

but if you believe that, then why bother with any kind of modal argument? this one is much more straightforward:

(1) god cannot change, either substantially or incidentally;

(2) any change in me involves an incidental (relational) change in god;

(3) i change;

(4) therefore god changes.

Because I am not talking about relational changes. Me growing a beard is not a relational change, but it is not a substantila chnage either since my beard is not an essential property of me.

of course, as with your modal argument, (4) does NOT entail:

(5) therefore there is no god;

but rather:

(5’) therefore (there is no god) v ~(1)

My argument is that , contrary to the Thomist concept of God, there is no God that fits this concept.

personally, i’ll go with ~(1)…

Personally I’ll go with a Prime Mover that can change. Is seems that you do the same, so you are obviously not a Thomist.

 

[john_doran]

It’s just an application of S5 “if possibly p then necessarily possibly p” means that if p is possible in w1 it is possible in every W.

yes, absolutely, p is possible in every possible world, but p, for you, is (6), which is “wA possibly changes”.

The proposition possibly p is changed in wA holds for p in wA, but the proposition p is necessarily possible means that p is possible in every world. And the second proposition follows by S5 from the first.

(emphasis mine)

what is the sentence on bold referring to?

“the proposition possibly p is changed in wA holds for p in wA” appears neither in my syllogism, nor in S5.

as i continue to point out, ***you ***said that (7) follows from (6)-and-S5. and if that’s true then p in (6)-plus-S5 will be:

“wA is possibly changed”.

p isn’t what is possibly changed (in wA): wA is what is possibly changed (in wA). and of course wA is possibly changed is true in every possible world.

If wA contains an entity that can possibly change then every world possibly conatins an entity that can possibly change. But wG as I defined it, cannot contain an entity that possibly changes.

no, that’s not right. at all.

as i say above, p is “wA is possibly changed”, and if that’s true, then S5 entails (and only entails) “necessarily (possibly (wA is possibly changed))”

and “necessarily (possibly (wA is possibly changed))”

is simply and straightforwardly not logically equivalent to:

“necessarily (possibly (every entity possibly changes))”

i mean, your (7) doesn’t even mention entities-in-worlds, and since S5 doesn’t introduce anything that isn’t in p, how could S5-plus-(7) entail anything about entities-in-worlds?

if you think that i’m wrong, and that there is a logical equivalence, then please show how, step by step.

if wA contains an entity that can possibly change then every world possibly conatins an entity that can possibly change

simply continuing to state that isn’t going to make it so.

until you can present a detailed description of the problem with my formal derivation, and an equally detailed formal derivation of your own in its support, then all we have here is you just posting something that reduces to “you’re wrong” in response to my posts.

i’ll leave this post as the one concerning the modal issues you raise, and address the rest in a subsequent post.

 

[john_doran]

Says any Thomist that knows what he is talking about.
The Thomist concept of immutability means that God cannot change in any way.

well, if you want to engage in an exegesis of the writings of aquinas, then cool: show me how aquinas’ understanding of god’s immutability excludes the possibility of cambridge change.

note: aquinas’ writings - i.e. from his actual writings, not what you have read about those writings in other books, or what you or other thinkers believe is the best definition of “immutability”.

if your principle concern is to show an inconsistency in the thought of aquinas, then let’s start with the thought of the man himself.

Because I am not talking about relational changes. Me growing a beard is not a relational change, but it is not a substantila chnage either since my beard is not an essential property of me.

a relational change is only one kind of incidental (red: non-substantial) change.

Personally I’ll go with a Prime Mover that can change. Is seems that you do the same, so you are obviously not a Thomist.

maybe i’m not - it will depend on the outcome of our discussion about thomas’ writings on divine immutability.

 

[belorg]

“the proposition possibly p is changed in wA holds for p in wA” appears neither in my syllogism, nor in S5.

I could add it if you like, but I was assuming this was obvious.
"The actual world (wA) is changing (observation)"entails that there is at least one entity in wA that is changing. We conclude that wA is changing on the basis of an observation of an entity (or even all entities) changing. So we could add a few premises

e.g.

A. There is an entity E in wA that is changing (observation)
B. There is possibly an entity E in wA that is possibly changing
C. by S5 : there is nessarily a possible entity that is possibly changing
D. In every possible world there is a possible entity E that can possibly change
E. in wG there is a possible entity that can possibly change(from D)
F. (from E) wG can possibly change.

necessarily (possibly (every entity possibly changes))

Is not what I claimed.

i mean, your (7) doesn’t even mention entities-in-worlds, and since S5 doesn’t introduce anything that isn’t in p, how could S5-plus-(7) entail anything about entities-in-worlds?

I thought that was obvious, but I have added a few premises.