B
bslorence
Guest
I hope it’s ok to jump in on this thread at this point even though I’m new to the thread and to CAF. I’ve read the entire thread last and I’d like to thank kbachler for his persistence because it’s really forced me to think. I wonder if I could make an attempt at answering his question. I probably won’t say anything new but maybe I can pull a few ideas together and express them in a slightly new way.
It seems like there are two related but quite distinct moral questions that a couple can ask themselves, that are overlapping somewhat in this thread: the first is: “Is it better for us to attempt to postpone conception this cycle, or should we let come what may?” The second question is: “Does this particular act of sex meet the requirements of morality; i.e., is it ‘truly human’?” (Gaudium et Spes).
In my understanding, the Church proposes that, for sex to be ‘truly human’ it must be performed in a manner that is consistent with all of its purposes. The Church reflects on the reality of sex – on what sex is – and derives from that reflection some particular guidance as to how we ought to approach sex.
Thus, among other things, a couple must engage in sex in a manner that is formally capable of procreation. I would think that this is a binding principle on all married couples, even if they themselves are incapable of procreation (because of pregnancy, infertility, menopause, or whatever) – the point is not so much that the sex needs to make a baby, or that the couple even needs to want a baby, as that it needs to be the kind of sex that could make a baby, because again, when we look at what sex is, we can draw particular conclusions about the form it ought to take when we engage in it.
Or to put it more bluntly: among other things, sex is for making babies. This is clear because the whole oint of sex, on the biological level, is the transmission of sperm in the general direction of an egg. So in order for an act of sex to be morally licit, then among other things it must be performed in a way that transmits sperm in the general direction of an egg – or at least in a way that would transmit sperm in the general direction of an egg if both were present – and the couple must avoid interposing any hindrance to this transmission. In other words, they must allow sex to keep its own form.
Whereas to use ABC is to intend that a particular act of sex be incapable of making babies, i.e., that it be something other than what it is so that it will not achieve one of its intrinsic purposes. To my mind this is the definition of immorality – using something in a way that contradicts its real purpose, as best we can discern that purpose from revelation and from observing the natural world. This sort of active contradiction is morally distinct from using sex for only some of its many purposes, as for example when a couple has sex when the wife is pregnant.
In other words, the act of sex can still be consistent with all of the purposes of sex without achieving all of them. Whereas it becomes inconsistent with at least one of its purposes when the couple formally alters the act or their bodies with the intention of blocking procreation (Pope John Paul II argued that contraceptive sex is also inconsistent with the unitive purpose of sex, but that’s a discussion unto itself.)
I guess what’s at issue, then, is whether a couple who uses NFP also has sex in a manner that is inconsistent with the procreative purpose of sex, at least insofar as they are using NFP to avoid conception (it’s been pointed out, although only briefly, that NFP is also used by couples who are struggling with infertility, so as to order their sex life *toward * conception).
And it’s easy to be distracted here by that other big marriage questions: i.e., “when should we have another baby, if at all?”. But the Church offers only very general guidance on that question and plainly teaches that it’s the responsibility of each married couple to answer this question for themselves – assuming a general acceptance of the basic connection between marriage and children. See in particular Gaudium et Spes paragraphs 50-51: vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html
Thus there can be no objection to NFP simply on the grounds that it can be used to avoid conception, because it is often morally licit for a married couple to avoid conception, and only God and that couple know when this avoidance is appropriate and when it isn’t.
Meanwhile ever discrete act of sex that the NFP-using couple engages in respects the intrinsic connection between sex and procreation, because the act adopts the form of sex that is capable of procreation.
Altering the timing of sex so as to avoid conception leads us into that other moral question, because the timing of sex, while certainly related to the sex itself, is extrinsic to the act. The discrete act of having sex at at an infertile time cannot possibly be immoral in and of itself, or else we would all be required to have sex only when we knew that conception was likely to result – and well, that’s absurd (I hope I’m not begging the question at this point but I’ve been thinking about this too long to tell, so let me know if it sounds circular).
Thus the immoral act of an NFP-using couple, if any, would not be the sex, it would be the decision to unjustly postpone another conception (assuming they had discerned that there was no appropriate reason to wait, but decided to wait anyway).
It seems like there are two related but quite distinct moral questions that a couple can ask themselves, that are overlapping somewhat in this thread: the first is: “Is it better for us to attempt to postpone conception this cycle, or should we let come what may?” The second question is: “Does this particular act of sex meet the requirements of morality; i.e., is it ‘truly human’?” (Gaudium et Spes).
In my understanding, the Church proposes that, for sex to be ‘truly human’ it must be performed in a manner that is consistent with all of its purposes. The Church reflects on the reality of sex – on what sex is – and derives from that reflection some particular guidance as to how we ought to approach sex.
Thus, among other things, a couple must engage in sex in a manner that is formally capable of procreation. I would think that this is a binding principle on all married couples, even if they themselves are incapable of procreation (because of pregnancy, infertility, menopause, or whatever) – the point is not so much that the sex needs to make a baby, or that the couple even needs to want a baby, as that it needs to be the kind of sex that could make a baby, because again, when we look at what sex is, we can draw particular conclusions about the form it ought to take when we engage in it.
Or to put it more bluntly: among other things, sex is for making babies. This is clear because the whole oint of sex, on the biological level, is the transmission of sperm in the general direction of an egg. So in order for an act of sex to be morally licit, then among other things it must be performed in a way that transmits sperm in the general direction of an egg – or at least in a way that would transmit sperm in the general direction of an egg if both were present – and the couple must avoid interposing any hindrance to this transmission. In other words, they must allow sex to keep its own form.
Whereas to use ABC is to intend that a particular act of sex be incapable of making babies, i.e., that it be something other than what it is so that it will not achieve one of its intrinsic purposes. To my mind this is the definition of immorality – using something in a way that contradicts its real purpose, as best we can discern that purpose from revelation and from observing the natural world. This sort of active contradiction is morally distinct from using sex for only some of its many purposes, as for example when a couple has sex when the wife is pregnant.
In other words, the act of sex can still be consistent with all of the purposes of sex without achieving all of them. Whereas it becomes inconsistent with at least one of its purposes when the couple formally alters the act or their bodies with the intention of blocking procreation (Pope John Paul II argued that contraceptive sex is also inconsistent with the unitive purpose of sex, but that’s a discussion unto itself.)
I guess what’s at issue, then, is whether a couple who uses NFP also has sex in a manner that is inconsistent with the procreative purpose of sex, at least insofar as they are using NFP to avoid conception (it’s been pointed out, although only briefly, that NFP is also used by couples who are struggling with infertility, so as to order their sex life *toward * conception).
And it’s easy to be distracted here by that other big marriage questions: i.e., “when should we have another baby, if at all?”. But the Church offers only very general guidance on that question and plainly teaches that it’s the responsibility of each married couple to answer this question for themselves – assuming a general acceptance of the basic connection between marriage and children. See in particular Gaudium et Spes paragraphs 50-51: vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html
Thus there can be no objection to NFP simply on the grounds that it can be used to avoid conception, because it is often morally licit for a married couple to avoid conception, and only God and that couple know when this avoidance is appropriate and when it isn’t.
Meanwhile ever discrete act of sex that the NFP-using couple engages in respects the intrinsic connection between sex and procreation, because the act adopts the form of sex that is capable of procreation.
Altering the timing of sex so as to avoid conception leads us into that other moral question, because the timing of sex, while certainly related to the sex itself, is extrinsic to the act. The discrete act of having sex at at an infertile time cannot possibly be immoral in and of itself, or else we would all be required to have sex only when we knew that conception was likely to result – and well, that’s absurd (I hope I’m not begging the question at this point but I’ve been thinking about this too long to tell, so let me know if it sounds circular).
Thus the immoral act of an NFP-using couple, if any, would not be the sex, it would be the decision to unjustly postpone another conception (assuming they had discerned that there was no appropriate reason to wait, but decided to wait anyway).