Blachernae, Florence, Filioque, Causality

[mardukm]

Dear Cavaradossi,

Surely you should know that the affirmation of things being done through the Son is not just a teaching of the Fathers, but that it is derived from the Scriptural affirmation that all things are made through the Son. But the Scriptural affirmation that all things are made through the Son obviously cannot apply to the Holy Spirit, since the Holy Spirit is uncreated. The property of things being done through the Son, in this case, does not apply to the procession of the Holy Spirit, which happens according to nature, but only to the progression and manifestation of the Spirit, which are both according to energy. Otherwise, it would be an admission that the Holy Spirit is a creature, having been created by the Son.

I do recall St. Basil writing about this exact same issue. He upbraids the Pneumatomachi for using the Catholic teaching that the Spirit is through the Son to conclude that the Spirit is a creature of the Son. But I don’t recall St. Basil thereby denying the principle that the Spirit is “through the Son,” as you apparently do. Do you know the passage to which I’m referring? (sorry I don’t have my NPNF books here in the Philippines with me).

You keep saying filioque means that the Spirit receives the divine nature from the Son. That is not consistent with Eastern theology.

Yes, as the principle of being “through,” not the principle of being “from” (i.e., as Source). Are you making that distinction? From our past discussions, it was not clear that acknowledge this very important distinction.

I’ve met Roman Catholics who think that the Eucharist is symbolic. So what?

Only that the EO teaching is not sufficiently clear and authoritative on this matter and allows these novel ideas to creep up. On the other hand, even if some RC’s think the Eucharist is symbolic, Catholics can always point to the clear, authoritative Catholic teaching to correct those opinions (more often than the Orthodox can, IMO).

This reasoning is fallacious, because you build your case on the untrue assumption that the simplicity of God can only have one meaning (that is, the Thomistic meaning). The simplicity of God has been understood in multiple ways, even in the West. Duns Scotus, for example, believed that the divine attributes were formally distinct from each other and from the essence of God (a formal distinction was the same type of distinction that Scotus used to distinguish between the Trinitarian persons). Your argument does not hold because even Western Scholastics (ones who were never condemned of heresy) considered that there could be distinctions within God which are not mere conceptual distinctions. If even Western Scholastics could come to such a conclusion, why would you find it so incredible to think that the Eastern Fathers had a similar understanding of God?

I don’t know about Western Scholastics. The only one I’ve studied to any appreciable extent is St. Thomas. I’m coming from an Oriental perspective, and these matters are not really given much thought but left in Mystery in the Oriental Tradition. The Oriental Tradition has not had the opportunity to investigate these questions as the Latins and Easterns have. As an Oriental, I don’t know of any other distinction within the Godhead except the distinction of Persons.

After dragging out the original quote from the Apodictic Treatises, it seems that the only verb he uses is ‘to be’. The translator made a bad choice in using the verb ‘proceeds’. To translate it very literally, he wrote something along the lines of: "The Holy Spirit is Christ’s, because [Christ is] God, both according to energy and according to essence. But on the one hand, according to essence and according to hypostasis, [the Holy Spirit] is His [Christ’s], but not from Him, and on the other hand, according to energy, [the Holy Spirit] is both His and from Him.

At any rate, this quotation still illustrates what I wished to point out, that the idea of the Holy Spirit receiving the divine nature from the Father and the Son is not compatible with Palamas in general, since his tenor is that the Holy Spirit is in no way from the Son according to essence and hypostasis.

Granted. But the filioque does not teach that the Spirit is FROM the Son according to essence and hypostasis. It only teaches that the Spirit is THROUGH the Son according to essence. Recall the Synod of Blarchanae which condemned the proposal of equating the terms “from” and “through.” In distinction, the Council of Florence equated the terms “and” and “through.” The focus of the Latin theology on the matter has always been the Son’s hypostatic property of being “through,” and never claimed for the Son the hypostatic property of being “from.”

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[mardukm]

ST. BASIL ON THE SON BEING THE HYPOSTATIC PRINCIPLE OF BEING “THROUGH” IN THE GODHEAD
(Passages from St. Basil’s “On the Holy Spirit”)

the natural Goodness and the inherent Holiness and the royal Dignity extend from the Father through the Only-begotten to the Spirit. Thus there is both acknowledgment of the hypostases and the true dogma of the Monarchy is not lost…For us is sufficient the order prescribed by the Lord. He who confuses this order will be no less guilty of transgressing the law than are the impious heathen.

He is called good, as the Father is good, and He who was begotten of the Good is good, and to the Spirit His goodness is essence.

[The pneumatomachi] must be taught that the Spirit is spoken of together with the Lord in precisely the same manner in which the Son is spoken of with the Father. The name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is delivered in like manner, and, according to the co-ordination of words delivered in baptism, the relation of the Spirit to the Son is the same as that of the Son to the Father. And if the Spirit is co-ordinate with the Son, and the Son with the Father, it is obvious that the Spirit is also co-ordinate with the Father.

That the internal, divine, and eternal relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Father is through the Son is a unanimous teaching of the Fathers. If you want me to give quotes from other Fathers, East and West, let me know, but give me some time (as I don’t have my usual resources here in the Philippines).

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

Dear Cavaradossi,

I do recall St. Basil writing about this exact same issue. He upbraids the Pneumatomachi for using the Catholic teaching that the Spirit is through the Son to conclude that the Spirit is a creature of the Son. But I don’t recall St. Basil thereby denying the principle that the Spirit is “through the Son,” as you apparently do. Do you know the passage to which I’m referring? (sorry I don’t have my NPNF books here in the Philippines with me).

I do not deny that the Spirit is through the Son. I am denying a certain interpretation of that affirmation. Just as to say that homoousion understood as being homohypostatic would be incorrect, so I disagree with your interpretation of ‘through’.

Yes, as the principle of being “through,” not the principle of being “from” (i.e., as Source). Are you making that distinction? From our past discussions, it was not clear that acknowledge this very important distinction.

Yes, there is a very specific understanding of what it means to proceed (ἐκπορεύω) through the Son (that is, the energetic manifestation of the Holy Spirit). Your idea that the Spirit receives the divine nature through the Son is unclear at best, and not consistent with our theology at worst. What do you mean by receive the essence through the Son? If you mean the manifestation of the Spirit from the Son, according to essence, then why not just say that instead? If you mean that the Spirit receives the divine nature through the an instrumental mediation of the Son, then this is not consistent with our theology which holds that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, through the Son. The Father is the only source of the hypostatic existence of the Spirit, in which the divine essence is contemplated (enhypostatized) by virtue of no other person but the Father.

Only that the EO teaching is not sufficiently clear and authoritative on this matter and allows these novel ideas to creep up. On the other hand, even if some RC’s think the Eucharist is symbolic, Catholics can always point to the clear, authoritative Catholic teaching to correct those opinions (more often than the Orthodox can, IMO).

The Orthodox teaching of the energetic manifestation of the Holy Spirit is completely clear. All one needs to do is read the Synod of Blachernae or Gregory Palamas.

Granted. But the filioque does not teach that the Spirit is FROM the Son according to essence and hypostasis. It only teaches that the Spirit is THROUGH the Son according to essence. Recall the Synod of Blarchanae which condemned the proposal of equating the terms “from” and “through.” In distinction, the Council of Florence equated the terms “and” and “through.” The focus of the Latin theology on the matter has always been the Son’s hypostatic property of being “through,” and never claimed for the Son the hypostatic property of being “from.”

Yes, the synod of Blachernae condemned equating the terms from and through in specific instances. But the very list of condemnations they issue completely restricts the meaning of proceeding through to the economic manifestation, and rules out the Spirit deriving its being either from or through the Son:To the same, who affirm that the Paraclete, which is from the Frather, has its existence through the Son and from the Son, and who again propose as proof the phrase “the Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son.” In certain texts [of the Fathers], the phrase denotes the Spirit’s shining forth and manifestation. Indeed, the very Paraclete shines form and is manifest eternally through the Son, in the same way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun’s rays; it further denotes the bestowing, giving, and sending of the Spirit to us. It does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through Him and from Him. You will not find any support from the Synod of Blachernae for your position.

I will get to those quotes you posted by St. Basil later.

God bless.

 

[Cavaradossi]

Sorry, I just noticed that I wrote that the Synod of Blachernae restricts the meaning of procession through to economic manifestation. I have not had enough coffee today. That should read eternal manifestation.

 

[mardukm]

Sorry, I just noticed that I wrote that the Synod of Blachernae restricts the meaning of procession through to economic manifestation. I have not had enough coffee today. That should read eternal manifestation.

THanks!

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[mardukm]

If you mean the manifestation of the Spirit from the Son, according to essence, then why not just say that instead?

This is very close to what I mean, but there is still the question of your making a distinction between Essence and Energy within the Godhead, which I don’t see any of the Fathers doing. Essence and Energy cannot be distinguished within the Godhead. If you do, then your theology causes the Spirit to have two Sources, one for His Essence (the Father), and one for His Energy (the Son).

If you mean that the Spirit receives the divine nature through the an instrumental mediation of the Son, then this is not consistent with our theology which holds that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, through the Son.

Your statement here is inconsistent. To admit that the the Spirit proceeds through the Son is equivalent to saying that the Son has the hypostatic property of instrumental mediation.

The Father is the only source of the hypostatic existence of the Spirit, in which the divine essence is contemplated (enhypostatized) by virtue of no other person but the Father.

I agree with this, though it may not be apparent to you. Perhaps a study of a statement from Blacharnae will help clarify matters:

To the same, who say that the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and who cannot conceive the Father as the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit — giving it existence and being — except through the Son; thus according to them the Son is united to the Father as joint-cause and contributor to the Spirit’s existence.

I think you are imposing on the Synod Fathers of Blacharnae a scholastic mindset that simply was not there. The Latins distinguished between causes. To the Synod Fathers, however, cause is cause, with no distinction. In short, the Synod was only condemning the idea of the Son as “First Cause” (please allow scholastic language for the moment) - either separately or together with the Father. Hence, the Synod’s explicit condemnation of equating the terms “from” and “through.” To the Synod Fathers, “from” is attached to idea of “First Cause,” and using “through” in the sense of “from” was the idea that they were condemning.

Blacharnae was simultaneously condemning the ideas that (1)the Son is a distinct principle without principle of the Spirit, and (2) the Son is principle without principle together with the Father of the Spirit.

But that is not what the Latins teach. At Florence, the Latins clearly distinguished the Father alone as First Cause, the only Principle without Principle, something the Latins have always professed (see St. Maximos).

According to the theology of filioque, the Father alone is the Principle without Principle, the Source of both the Hypostasis and the Essence of the Spirit. The Essence is mediated through the Son, the Son not thereby becoming a Principle without Principle, either distinctly or together with the Father, but solely as the mediating principle.

Let me express this in a different way, admittedly non-theological and mundane. Here is the Catholic understanding in these mundane terms:
There is hypostasis (person) and there is ousia (essence). Person A “makes” Person B and Person C. Person A fills Person B with Person A’s essence; Person A also fills Person C with Person A’s essence through Person B.

What Blacharnae was condemning was altogether different. In these same mundane terms, what the Synod was condemning was:
Person A and Person B “make” Person C. Person A and Person B transmit their essence to Person C.

The Orthodox teaching of the energetic manifestation of the Holy Spirit is completely clear. All one needs to do is read the Synod of Blachernae or Gregory Palamas.

It may be that these individual EO who keep saying that the manifestation is merely economic or temporal do not have enough knowledge. Or maybe they do have enough knowledge but feel that EO ecclesiological principles grants them the right to hold and perpetuate these novel opinions since they have not been dogmatically condemned by an Ecumenical Council. But this thread is not about ecclesiological principles.

You will not find any support from the Synod of Blachernae for your position.

I am not trying to find support from the Synod of Blarchanae. All I’m saying is that Blacharnae does not actually condemn the Catholic position.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

This is very close to what I mean, but there is still the question of your making a distinction between Essence and Energy within the Godhead, which I don’t see any of the Fathers doing.

That is essentially an argument from silence, which is specious. What I also do not see the Greek Fathers doing is talking at all about distinctions within the Godhead. Your whole language of distinctions is essentially a scholastic gloss on the Eastern Fathers, who did not use such language. Not once, for example, have I ever seen the Eastern Fathers speak of the Trinitarian persons as ‘real (or formal if you are a Scotist) distinctions within the Godhead’ (this is indeed something certain Orthodox theologians find problematic, because the Godhead is considered in the persons, not the other way around). For this reason, your argument falls flat, because you are attempting to read a conceptual framework not used by the Fathers onto the Fathers, and then on top of that, attempting to use an untenable argument from silence.

Essence and Energy cannot be distinguished within the Godhead. If you do, then your theology causes the Spirit to have two Sources, one for His Essence (the Father), and one for His Energy (the Son).

Surely that is not the case. From the unknowable essence, enhypostatized in each hypostasis, proceeds the energies. And the energies are always worked in a particular order, from the Father, through the Son and in the Holy Spirit, which is why the Spirit is properly said to be manifest through the Son. The allowance for ‘from’, in this case, is because the meanings of ‘from’ and ‘through’ can overlap (and indeed, the anathematism of Blachernae does not anathematize saying that ‘from’ and ‘through’ can have the same meaning, but only anathematizes saying that they always have the same meaning in Theology). Hence, while it is acceptable to say either that the Spirit progresses from the Son, like St. Cyril wrote, as well as through the Son (because in this instance, to progress through and to progress from carry the same non-causal meaning), it is only acceptable to say that the Spirit proceeds through the Son, because the verb for proceed has a causal implication which when used with from would ascribe causality to the Son.

Your statement here is inconsistent. To admit that the the Spirit proceeds through the Son is equivalent to saying that the Son has the hypostatic property of instrumental mediation.

No, because to have an instrumental role as a mediator in the procession of the Holy Spirit would be to ascribe causality to the Son. The Son’s role in the Spirit’s emanation into being is not in any way causal, nor does the Son mediate the Spirit’s emanation into being. What the Son mediates is the Spirit’s energetic manifestation.

I agree with this, though it may not be apparent to you. Perhaps a study of a statement from Blacharnae will help clarify matters:

To the same, who say that the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and who cannot conceive the Father as the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit — giving it existence and being — except through the Son; thus according to them the Son is united to the Father as joint-cause and contributor to the Spirit’s existence.

I think you are imposing on the Synod Fathers of Blacharnae a scholastic mindset that simply was not there. The Latins distinguished between causes. To the Synod Fathers, however, cause is cause, with no distinction. In short, the Synod was only condemning the idea of the Son as “First Cause” (please allow scholastic language for the moment) - either separately or together with the Father. Hence, the Synod’s explicit condemnation of equating the terms “from” and “through.” To the Synod Fathers, “from” is attached to idea of “First Cause,” and using “through” in the sense of “from” was the idea that they were condemning.

You are the one imposing scholastic distinctions on the Synod Fathers, not me. But as interesting as your argument is, that the Son can be called a second cause rather than a first cause (or initial cause), the Synod of Blachernae condemns this:To the same, who state that, in reference to the creation of the world, the phrase “through the Son” denotes the immediate cause, as well as the fact that it denies the Son the right to be creator and cause of things made “through Him.” That is to say, in theology proper [the Study of the Trinity itself], even if the Father is called the initial cause of the Son and the Spirit, He is also “through the Son,” the cause of the Spirit. Accordingly, the Son cannot be separated from the Father in the procession of the Spirit. By saying such things, they irrationally join the Son to the Father in the causation of the Spirit. In reality, even if the Son, like the Father, is creator of all things made “through Him,” it does not follow that He is also the Spirit’s cause, because the Father is the projector of the Spirit through Him; nor, again, does it follow that, because the Father is the Spirit’s projector “through the Son,” He is through him, the cause of the Spirit. For the formula “through the Son” here denotes the manifestation and illumination, and not the emanation of the Spirit into being.

Blacharnae was simultaneously condemning the ideas that (1)the Son is a distinct principle without principle of the Spirit, and (2) the Son is principle without principle together with the Father of the Spirit.

Untrue, see the above. The Synod condemns any sort of causality, whether initial or immediate which is ascribed to the Son.

 

[Cavaradossi]

According to the theology of filioque, the Father alone is the Principle without Principle, the Source of both the Hypostasis and the Essence of the Spirit. The Essence is mediated through the Son, the Son not thereby becoming a Principle without Principle, either distinctly or together with the Father, but solely as the mediating principle.

This runs contrary to the fourth anathematism of the Synod of Blachernae, which states that: [The phrase “The Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son,”] does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through Him and from Him. The Spirit does not receive the divine nature through the Son, as the Spirit does not receive its being through the Son.

Let me express this in a different way, admittedly non-theological and mundane. Here is the Catholic understanding in these mundane terms:
There is hypostasis (person) and there is ousia (essence). Person A “makes” Person B and Person C. Person A fills Person B with Person A’s essence; Person A also fills Person C with Person A’s essence through Person B.

What Blacharnae was condemning was altogether different. In these same mundane terms, what the Synod was condemning was:
Person A and Person B “make” Person C. Person A and Person B transmit their essence to Person C.

This understanding of hypostasis runs contrary to how the Synod of Blachernae defines the term hypostasis. The Council clearly states that hypostasis denotes both the hypostatic characteristics and the essence together, not just the hypostatic characteristics:The essence which is accompanied by individual characteristics… according to the great Maximus, denotes the hypostasis. But also, according to the great Basil, because he too defines hypostasis as that which describes and brings to mind what in each thing is common, and which cannot be described by means of individual characteristics which appear in it.Accordingly, the divinity of the Holy Spirit is not the Holy Spirit’s by virtue of its manifestation through the Son, but it is the Spirit’s by virtue of the Spirit’s hypostatic emanation into being from the Father alone.

It may be that these individual EO who keep saying that the manifestation is merely economic or temporal do not have enough knowledge. Or maybe they do have enough knowledge but feel that EO ecclesiological principles grants them the right to hold and perpetuate these novel opinions since they have not been dogmatically condemned by an Ecumenical Council. But this thread is not about ecclesiological principles.

Then why speculate openly about these things, if you only intend to shut down the discussion before it can take place? Normally I would not respond a statement like this, since it is indeed off-topic, but there are people who read these public postings and could become gravely misinformed by such whimsical musings on Orthodoxy, which have little basis in how the Orthodox faith is practiced. People are not free to believe in just anything they want in Orthodoxy, so long as it has not been condemned. That is a mentality which is absolutely foreign to Orthodoxy. I honestly am incredulous that you would even think that this could possibly be true of Orthodoxy.

 

[mardukm]

That is essentially an argument from silence, which is specious.

I think you might misnderstand what an argument from silence is. An argument from silence is an attempt to draw a conclusion when there is absolutely no evidence available. But It is not an argument from silence when an alternative conclusion is positively present - to wit, the Fathers only use the language of Essence/Energy in relation to the Economy. They never use it to attempt to describe the internal reality of the Godhead as you do. So we should follow the Fathers in what they positively do. That’s not an argument from silence.

What I also do not see the Greek Fathers doing is talking at all about distinctions within the Godhead. Your whole language of distinctions is essentially a scholastic gloss on the Eastern Fathers, who did not use such language.

Using language to express ideas is not a scholastic gloss. It is just human.

Surely that is not the case. From the unknowable essence, enhypostatized in each hypostasis, proceeds the energies. And the energies are always worked in a particular order, from the Father, through the Son and in the Holy Spirit, which is why the Spirit is properly said to be manifest through the Son. The allowance for ‘from’, in this case, is because the meanings of ‘from’ and ‘through’ can overlap (and indeed, the anathematism of Blachernae does not anathematize saying that ‘from’ and ‘through’ can have the same meaning, but only anathematizes saying that they always have the same meaning in Theology).

I can see this rationale working only if one does not distinguish the Essence from the Energy within the Godhead, but only economically. If one distinguishes Essence and Energy within the Godhead, then “two sources” is the natural outcome of such a paradigm.

Hence, while it is acceptable to say either that the Spirit progresses from the Son, like St. Cyril wrote, as well as through the Son (because in this instance, to progress through and to progress from carry the same non-causal meaning), it is only acceptable to say that the Spirit proceeds through the Son, because the verb for proceed has a causal implication which when used with from would ascribe causality to the Son.

Sorry, St. Cyril specifically wrote that it is the substance of the Spirit that progresses (proienia/procedit) through the Son. No amount of Eastern redefinition or doctrinal development is going to change the obvious meaning of what St. Cyril wrote.

You are the one imposing scholastic distinctions on the Synod Fathers, not me. But as interesting as your argument is, that the Son can be called a second cause rather than a first cause (or initial cause), the Synod of Blachernae condemns this:

The Synod is not recognizing the distinction between “first cause” and “second cause” at all, at least not in the way the Latins understand it. To Latins, a “second cause” is DEPENDENT on the “first cause.” But the Synod Fathers did not have this proper understanding of what the Latins meant by “first cause” and “second cause,” (and neither apparently did Beccus). Nothing in the excerpt you provided indicates that they understood this definition of “first cause” and “second cause.” What the Synod was condemning was merely the inclusion of “through Him” into the meaning of First Cause (or simply “cause”). In other words, the Synod was condemning the idea that the Father was dependant on the Son to be the First Cause (or simply “cause”) of the Holy Spirit. But that is almost the exact opposite of what the Latins mean by “first cause” and “second cause” (wherein the “second cause” is the one dependant on the “first cause”). I thought you caught that from the Blacharnae excerpt I cited in the previous post, but I guess not. Let me repeat it here:
thus according to them the Son is united to the Father as joint-cause and contributor to the Spirit’s existence.

The idea Blacharnae was condemning was the idea that the Son contributed to the Spirit’s hypostasis and essence of the Spirit as First Cause (or simply “cause”). But that is not what the Catholic Church teaches. The Catholic teaching is that the hypostasis and essence has its SOLE origin from the Father ALONE. The Son does not “contribute” to this, nor does the Father need the Son in order to have the hypostatic property of “First Cause” of the Spirit. Nevertheless, the Essence flows from the Father (being the sole “First Cause” or origin of the Essence) to the Holy Spirit through the Son.

It is you who are imposing the scholastic distinction on the Fathers of Blacharnae by pretending that they understood the scholastic distinction between “first cause” and “second cause.”

Untrue, see the above. The Synod condemns any sort of causality, whether initial or immediate which is ascribed to the Son.

The Synod was only condemning what it understood to mean by “causality,” which is different from what the Latins understood it to be. What the Synod meant by “cause” is actually “First Cause” in Latinese. The Synod was not condemning the Latin idea that the Son is “second cause,” but rather the idea that the Father was dependent on the Son in order to be the First Cause of the Holy Spirit.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[mardukm]

This runs contrary to the fourth anathematism of the Synod of Blachernae, which states that: [The phrase “The Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son,” does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through Him and from Him. The Spirit does not receive the divine nature through the Son, as the Spirit does not receive its being through the Son.

There is no contrariness if the Synod understood “through the Son” in this context to refer to the Son as an independent First Cause of the Holy Spirit or as a contributor to the hypostatic property of the Father as First Cause of the Holy Spirit. In either case, it does not touch upon the actual Catholic teaching.

This understanding of hypostasis runs contrary to how the Synod of Blachernae defines the term hypostasis. The Council clearly states that hypostasis denotes both the hypostatic characteristics and the essence together, not just the hypostatic characteristics:The essence which is accompanied by individual characteristics… according to the great Maximus, denotes the hypostasis. But also, according to the great Basil, because he too defines hypostasis as that which describes and brings to mind what in each thing is common, and which cannot be described by means of individual characteristics which appear in it.

That’s fine.

Accordingly, the divinity of the Holy Spirit is not the Holy Spirit’s by virtue of its manifestation through the Son,

I agree, but perhaps not for the same reasons as you do.

but it is the Spirit’s by virtue of the Spirit’s hypostatic emanation into being from the Father alone.

Here’s where we disagree. Hypostasis is denoted by both hypostatic characteristics (otherwise called Energy from the economic perspective) and the Essence together, as you admit. Yet this did not stop St. Palamas from distinguishing between an energetic procession from the Son and an essential procession in which the Son apparently does not participate. So you have no problem distinguishing the Energy from the Hypostasis, yet distinguishing between the Essence and the Hypostasis is impossible? Please explain.

Of course, there is also the fact that many Fathers both East and West taught that the essence is from the Father to the Spirit through the Son.

Then why speculate openly about these things

Just an afterthought.

I honestly am incredulous that you would even think that this could possibly be true of Orthodoxy.

It’s just my experience from debating with EO over the years. Thank you for your (name removed by moderator)ut on the matter.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[mardukm]

Eastern apologists are fond of saying “the Son does not participate in the causality of the Holy Spirit,” but I’ve never actually seen or heard them define what “causality” means in this context. From my own readings of late medieval Eastern Fathers, “causality” refers always in some way to origination.

This is different from the Latin concept of “causality” (which is, btw, identical to the original Greek concept utilized by the early medieval Fathers such as the Cappadocians and St. John Damascene). According to this more primordial concept, “causality” is not restricted to the idea of origination, but can refer simply to anything prior in relation to another. In this paradigm, “First Cause” alone denotes origination, while other causes in the same context do not. But this original Greek way of thinking became “scholasticism” in the Latin school of theology, a paradigm that the late medieval Eastern Fathers apparently had already rejected as being too wordly or pagan by the time of Beccus.

Let me illustrate with the example of the fountain, river and lake. The Latins would distinguish the fountain as the origin, with the river being the intermediary, of the lake. The Latin phrenoma would say the fountain is the “first cause,” and the river the “second cause.” Modern Easterns, on the other hand would not seem to make this distinction. The Eastern phrenoma would simply regard the fountain and river together as the origin/cause of the lake.

I think therein lies the cause of the misunderstanding of filioque from the prespective of many Easterns. When Latins apply the word “cause” to the Son, most Easterns will immediately understand this to mean that the Son in some way is the ORIGIN of the Holy Spirit (either that the Son contributes to the origin of the Spirit as a distinct Cause, or that the Son contributes to the hypostatic property of the Father as Origin/Cause of the Spirit). But “cause” in the Latin mind does not necessarily refer to origination, and it is only in this other sense that the Latins apply the term “cause” to the Son. (Admittedly, what complicates matters is that Latins will sometimes use the term “origin” interchangeably with causes other than the First Cause. But it is sufficient to note that “origin” in this use merely refers to any antecedent principle, not necessarily a formal source, and is always distinguished from “THE origin” *.)

Of course, we still need to address the decree from Florence:

"**the holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, and has his essence and his subsistent being from the Father together with the Son, and proceeds from both eternally as from one principle and a single spiration. We declare that when holy doctors and fathers say that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, this bears the sense that thereby also the Son should be signified, according to the Greeks indeed as cause, and according to the Latins as principle of the subsistence of the holy Spirit, just like the Father.

And since the Father gave to his only-begotten Son in begetting him everything the Father has, except to be the Father, so the Son has eternally from the Father, by whom he was eternally begotten, this also, namely that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.**"

Let’s break this down and permit me to present an explantion of (and possible resolution to) the issue in light of the difference in how Easterns and Latins understand “causality.” First, though, it must be admitted that the decree of Florence was unfairly couched in terms of the Latin phrenoma. In that light, its theological language would naturally be insufficient to expect immediate agreement from the Easterns at that time.

the holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, and has his essence and his subsistent being from the Father together with the Son
In light of the difference between the Eastern and Latin conceptions of “causality,” one can immediately see the Easterns would see this passage in a different light than Westerns. To Easterns, this passage would mean that the Father and Son together are the Origin/Source of the Spirit’s subsistence. To Latins, however, this passage would only mean that the Father is the Origin/Source, while the Son is the intermediary of the Spirit’s subsistence. This misunderstanding is evident in Mark of Ephesus’ Letter against the Union, where he objects that the Latins profess that the Son is the Cause and Source of the Holy Spirit. But the Latins did not do that. The Latins only professed that the Son is Cause, but did not profess that the Son is Source. The Decree explictly states that the Father is the Source (i.e., principle without principle) of both Son and Holy Spirit.

CONTINUED*

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

and proceeds from both eternally as from one principle and a single spiration.
Again, the Easterns would perceive this statement differently from the Westerns. First, one should note that the term for “proceeds” here is procedit in Latin, but it would have been translated and read as ekporeusai (instead of proienai, which would have been the correct translation) in Greek - that can only breed misunderstanding. Secondly, it should be noted that “cause” and “principle” are not equivalent terms in Latin. I suspect that Easterns misunderstood “cause” and “principle” to be equivalent terms (as is evident from Beccus’ confession at the Synod of Blacharnae). In that light, this passage would easily be interpreted by Easterns to mean that the Father and Son together form one Cause/Source of the Holy Spirit, a notion condemned by Blacharnae. But such an interpretation would be incorrect. In the Latin phrenoma, the one principle consists of a First Cause (the Origin/Source who is the Father) and a secondary Cause (the intermediation of the Son). So according to the Latin teaching, there is one principle of the procession, a principle consisting of a First Cause/Source (the Father) and a second, intermediary cause (the Son); the Latins are not teaching that there is one Cause/Source of the procession consisting of Father and Son together.

We declare that when holy doctors and fathers say that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, this bears the sense that thereby also the Son should be signified, according to the Greeks indeed as cause, and according to the Latins as principle of the subsistence of the holy Spirit, just like the Father.
Despite the prospective misunderstanding borne of the translation of “proceeds,” this passage actually evinces a certain common understanding when it equates the Greek “cause” with the Latin “principle.” As explained above, the Latin “principle” can be inclusive of first and second causes, while the Greek “cause” does the same. However, it is still prone to misunderstanding because the Latin “principle” is not indeed equivalent to the Greek “cause” - whereas the Latin “principle” distinguishes first cause (as source/origin) from second cause within its definition, the Greek “cause” subsumes both first and second causes within its definition as source/origin. So whereas Latins would see in this passage the Son as principle “just like the Father” because both the Father and Son are included in the concept of “principle” (while distinguishing their unique roles in that one principle), the Easterns would only see in this statement a claim that the Son is another Frist Cause/Source of the Spirit.

And since the Father gave to his only-begotten Son in begetting him everything the Father has, except to be the Father, so the Son has eternally from the Father, by whom he was eternally begotten, this also, namely that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.
On the surface, this statement seems to indicate that the Son shares in the hypostatic property of the Father as First Cause/Origin. However, it should be noted that the term for “proceeds” here is not ekporeusai but procedit. So in the Latin mind, this statement does not refer to the Son being the ORIGIN of the Spirit. However, when it was translated to Greek, ekporeusai (instead of proienai) was no doubt utilized in place of procedit, which was a mistake and simply served to perpetuate the misunderstanding.

WIth all this potential misunderstanding, one has to wonder why the Eastern Fathers at Florence ever signed on to it. I suspect it was because the Eastern Fathers had the benefit of immediate explanations from the Latin Fathers and theologians. Unfortunately, all other Easterns were not privy to these discussions, and, the Florence Decree being unfairly couched in terms reflective only of the Latin phrenoma, it was bound to be rejected by the East.

At this point, let us address the Tomos of Blachernae. In light of everything written above in explanation of the Latin teaching on filioque, let’s see if Blachernae actually condemned the Latin teaching on filioque. Let’s analyze Beccus’ confession and the propositions condemned by Blachernae.

(1) Beccus’ confession: I said, for example, that the Holy Spirit has, as cause of its personal existence, the Father and the Son, and that this doctrine was in harmony with the formula which declares that the ‘Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.’ In the final analysis, this means that the Spirit has two causes, and that both the direct and the remote principles of causation were implied. That is, the Son is as much the cause of the existence of the Spirit as the meaning of the preposition “through” allows…Additionally, I said that the Father and the Son [together] constitute a single cause of the Spirit from whom, as from one principle and source, the Spirit has its being…the formula ‘the Spirit proceeds through the Son’ in no way renders the Son, either separately or with the Father, the cause of the Spirit because, according to the dubious and absurd view of certain individuals, the Son and the Father constitute the one cause and unique principle of the Spirit.
From Beccus’ confession, it is evident that his understanding of filioque was not identical to the Latin teaching. Beccus subsumed the first and second causes into one cause and source. This is different from the Latin teaching that only the first cause is source, while the second cause is intermediary. Also notice that Beccus seems to prefectly equate “cause” and “principle,” which was a mistake.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

(2) 3rd Proposition: To the same, who say that the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and who cannot conceive the Father as the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit — giving it existence and being — except through the Son; thus according to them the Son is united to the Father as joint-cause and contributor to the Spirit’s existence. This, they say, is supported by the phrase of Saint John of Damascus, “the Father is the projector through the Son of the manifesting Spirit.” This, however, can never mean what they say, inasmuch as it clearly denotes the manifestation — through the intermediary of the Son — of the Spirit, whose existence is from the Father. For the same John of Damascus would not have said — in the exact same chapter — that the only cause in the Trinity is God the Father, thus denying, by the use of the word “only,” the causative principle to the remaining two hypostases. Nor would he have, again, said elsewhere, “and we speak, likewise, of the Holy Spirit as the ‘Spirit of the Son,’ yet we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son.” For both of these views to be true is impossible.
The CC does not teach that “the Father is the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit except through the Son” as if the Father was dependent on the Son to be the First Cause/Source. It teaches that the Father is the First Cause/Source of the Hypostasis and Essence of the Spirit, and the Son is the intermediary of the Essence of the Father to the Spirit, an Essence that within the Godhead cannot be distinguished from the Energy. This condemnation has nothing to do with the teaching of the CC.

(3) 4th Prop.: To the same, who affirm that the Paraclete, which is from the Frather, has its existence through the Son and from the Son, and who again propose as proof the phrase “the Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son.” In certain texts [of the Fathers], the phrase denotes the Spirit’s shining forth and manifestation. Indeed, the very Paraclete shines form and is manifest eternally through the Son, in the same way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun’s rays; it further denotes the bestowing, giving, and sending of the Spirit to us. It does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through Him and from Him. For this would mean that the Spirit has the Son as cause and source (exactly as it has the Father), not to say that it has its cause and source more so from the Son than from the Father; for it is said that that from which existence is derived likewise is believed to enrich the source and to be the cause of being.
Blachernae condemned the idea that the Son is “cause and source of the Spirit (exactly as it has the Father).” The CC indeed teaches that the Son is cause exactly as the Father is, but the CC does not teach that the Son is Source of the Spirit exactly as the Father is. The CC distinguishes between First Cause (i.e. Source) and Second Cause (mediation), as the early medieval Eastern Fathers did. Some might think that the Synod is here also condemning even the notion that the Son is cause, but it is obvious by the consistent conjunction with the term “source” that the term “cause” is here meant by Blachernae in the sense of what the Latins would call “First Cause.” The Latins have never assigned the property of “First Cause” (i.e. Source) to the Son.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

(4) 5th Prop. To the same, who say that the preposition “through” everywhere in theology is identical to the preposition “from” and, as a result, maintain that there is no difference in saying that the Spirit proceeds “through the Son” from saying that it proceeds “from the Son” — whence, undoubtedly, the origin of their idea that the existence and essence of the Spirit is from the Son. And they either infer a double or a single procession of origin, and join the Son to the Father according to this explanation of “cause,” both of which are beyond all blasphemy. For there is no other hypostasis in the Trinity except the Father’s, from which the existence and essence of the consubstantial [Son and Holy Spirit] is derived. According to the common mind of the Church and the aforementioned saints, the Father is the foundation and the source of the Son and the Spirit, the only source of divinity, and the only cause. If, in fact, it is also said by some of the saints that the Spirit proceeds “through the Son,” what is meant here is the eternal manifestation of the Spirit by the Son, not the purely [personal] emanation into being of the Spirit, which has its existence from the Father. Otherwise, this would deprive the Father from being the only cause and the only source of divinity, and would expose the theologian [Gregory of Nazianzus] who says “everything the Father is said to possess, the Son, likewise, possesses except causality” as a dishonest theologian.
Blachernae condemned the idea of equating “from” and “through” in the context of the procession. But the CC has never done this (though Beccus probably did, another indication that what Beccus taught was not the teaching of the Latins). Instead, as explicitly affirmed at Florence, the CC equates the terms “and” and “through.” Thus, the monarchy of the Father is preserved in the filioque, because “from” is predicated of the Father alone. It should be noted that there are some Fathers who utilize “from” with respect to the Son. However, Florence affirmed that this is never done to indicate that the Son is First Cause/Source, but only in the context of the Son having received from the Father who alone is First Cause/Source (Florence Decree - “The Latins asserted that they say the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not with the intention of excluding the Father from being the source and principle of all deity, that is of the Son and of the holy Spirit, nor to imply that the Son does not receive from the Father, because the holy Spirit proceeds from the Son…”).

(5) Sixth Proposition: To the same, who contend that the unique essence and divinity of the Father and the Son is the cause of the Spirit’s existence — an idea which no one who has ever had it in his mind has either expressed or considered making public. For the common essence and nature is not the cause of the hypostasis; nor does this common essence ever generate or project that which is undivided; on the other hand, the essence which is accompanied by individual characteristics does, and this, according to the great Maximus, denotes the hypostasis. But also, according to the great Basil, because he too defines the hypostasis as that which describes and brings to mind what in each thing is common, and which cannot be described by means of individual characteristics which appear in it. Because of this, the indivisible essence always projects something indivisible (or generates the indivisible that generates), in order that the created may be [simultaneously] the projector as well as the projected; the essence of the Father and the Son, however, is one, and is not, on the whole, indivisible.
I’m not certain at all about the source of this rhetoric. I’ve never seen it in any Magisterial documents of the CC, so we can simply set it aside as a condemnation of a personal opinion of Beccus and whatever private theologians from whom he heard it. It has nothing to do with the teaching of the CC. Interestingly, and very unfortunately, just because this was condemned by Blachernae, many EO automatically and wrongly assume that this is what the CC teaches. These EO can search high and low but will never find such statements from any dogmatic document of the Catholic Church.

(6) Seventh Proposition: To the same, who teach that the Father and the Son — not as two principles and two causes — share in the causality of the Spirit, and that the Son is as much a participant with the Father as is implied in the preposition “through.” According to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit’s cause, with the result that sometimes they believe and say that the Father is cause, and sometimes the Son. This being so, they introduce a plurality and a multitude of causes in the procession of the Spirit, even though this was prohibited on countless occasions.
It is dramatically evident here that Blachernae conceived of “cause” only in terms of source (or what Latins would call “first cause”) and did not (or could not) distinguish or conceive of what the Latins meant by “first cause” and “second cause.” With that limited conceptualization of “cause,” Blachernae condemned (and rightly so) the idea that the Son shares with the Father the property of being “first cause” or, alternatively, that the Son is an independent “first cause.” This is very likely indeed what Beccus taught, for which he was rightly condemned. But it does not touch upon the teaching of the CC, because this is not what the CC has ever taught or teaches.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

(7) Eighth Proposition: To the same, who stoutly maintain that the Father by virtue of the nature — not by virtue of the hypostasis — is the Holy Spirit’s cause; the result is that they necessarily proclaim the Son as cause of the Spirit, since the Son has the same nature as the Father. At the same time, they fail to see the absurdity that results from this. For it is necessary first that the Spirit be the cause of someone, for the simple reason that it has the same nature as the Father. Secondly, the number of the cause increases, since as many hypostases as share in nature must, likewise, share in causality. Thirdly, the common essence and nature is transformed into the cause of the hypostasis, which all logic — and, along with this, nature itself — prohibits.
The CC has never taught this. I’ve never read anywhere in the Magisterial documents of the Catholic Church that it is the Essence that is the cause of the Hypostases. Perhaps it is an inference from something else taught in the LCC, but I do not understand at all the wondrous mental gymnastics necessary to draw such a conclusion from anything the LCC teaches about the Trinity. Perhaps one of our Eastern brethren can explain it. For now, I can comfortably say that this condemnation does not apply at all to the teaching of the CC on filioque.

(8) Ninth Proposition: To the same, who state that, in reference to the creation of the world, the phrase “through the Son” denotes the immediate cause, as well as the fact that it denies the Son the right to be creator and cause of things made “through Him.” That is to say, in theology proper [the study of the Trinity in itself], even if the Father is called the initial cause of the Son and the Spirit, He is also, “through the Son,” the cause of the Spirit. Accordingly, the Son cannot be separated from the Father in the procession of the Spirit. By saying such things, they irrationally join the Son to the Father in the causation of the Spirit. In reality, even if the Son, like the Father, is creator of all things made “through Him,” it does not follow that He is also the Spirit’s cause, because the Father is the projector of the Spirit through Him; nor, again, does it follow that, because the Father is the Spirit’s projector “through the Son,” He is, through Him, the cause of the Spirit. For the formula “through the Son” here denotes the manifestation and illumination [of the Spirit by the Son], and not the emanation of the Spirit into being. If this was not so, it would be difficult, indeed, even to enumerate the theological absurdities that follow.
Again, here, it is evident (especially in the underlined portion above) that Blachernae conceived of “cause” only in the limited sense of “source” (or “first cause” in Latinese), condemning the idea that the Son participates in the property of the Father as First Cause/Source. But, again, this is not what the CC has ever taught or teaches.

(9) Tenth Proposition: To the same, who declare that the Son is said to be the fountain of life in the same way that the Virgin Mother of God is said to be the fountain of life. The Virgin is so called because she lent living flesh to the only-begotten Word with a rational and intellectual soul, and became the cause of mankind born according to Christ. Similarly, those who understand life to be in the Holy Spirit will think of the Son as the fountain of life in terms of cause. Hence, their argument — from conclusions drawn of incongruous comparisons and examples — for the participation of the Son with the Father in the procession of the Spirit.
I’m not certain at all about the source of this rhetoric. I’ve never seen it in any Magisterial documents of the CC, so we can simply set it aside as a condemnation of a personal opinion of Beccus and whatever private theologians from whom he heard it. It has nothing to do with the teaching of the CC.

I hope the foregoing explanation has helped to clarify that the Latin teaching on filioque is not actually heretical, and that Blachernae did not actually condemn anything that was taught by Florence.

I would appreciate any comments and criticisms.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

Yes, I would like some sources that justify the way you interpret the concept of causality as meaning only ‘origin’ in the later Greek Fathers. Considering that the standard education for youths was the study of Aristotle (Palamas received such an education), it would be incredible to think that they would have understood the term cause in such a restricted sense. In addition, I have never once encountered any interpretive source which supports this opinion. Could you please cite some scholarly sources?

Secondly, I agree with you that the Cappadocians understand causality as a manner by which something can be said to be prior to something else. This unfortunately hurts your argument, however, because the most famous teaching of the Cappadocians is that the Son has all the Father has, except for causality. Since we both agree that the Cappadocians were aware of the distinction between different types of causes, we can only assume that Gregory the Theologian’s affirmation that the Son does not share in the Father’s causality means causality in all senses, since he was aware of the multiple senses of causality and chose to leave the term without qualification.

Furthermore, I must disagree with your reading of the ninth anathematism. To read cause as source would make the entire anathematism unnecessary. We already know by common sense that something being through but not from automatically disqualifies it from being the source of that which comes through it. Such a thing is so plainly obvious that it hardly warrants an anathema attached to its false counter-proposition. The more likely reading is that they are condemning the idea that the Son can be accounted a cause of the Spirit through interpreting the preposition ‘through’ to indicate that the Son has some agency (and thus causality) in the Spirit’s coming into being. This is why Gregory II qualifies that ‘through the Son’ in no way refers to the Spirit’s coming into being, but only to the manifestation, because the manifestation of the Spirit through the Son in no way allows for the Son to be understood as being cause of (in the sense of being prior to) the Holy Spirit.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

CONTINUED

(7) Eighth Proposition: To the same, who stoutly maintain that the Father by virtue of the nature — not by virtue of the hypostasis — is the Holy Spirit’s cause; the result is that they necessarily proclaim the Son as cause of the Spirit, since the Son has the same nature as the Father. At the same time, they fail to see the absurdity that results from this. For it is necessary first that the Spirit be the cause of someone, for the simple reason that it has the same nature as the Father. Secondly, the number of the cause increases, since as many hypostases as share in nature must, likewise, share in causality. Thirdly, the common essence and nature is transformed into the cause of the hypostasis, which all logic — and, along with this, nature itself — prohibits.
The CC has never taught this. I’ve never read anywhere in the Magisterial documents of the Catholic Church that it is the Essence that is the cause of the Hypostases. Perhaps it is an inference from something else taught in the LCC, but I do not understand at all the wondrous mental gymnastics necessary to draw such a conclusion from anything the LCC teaches about the Trinity. Perhaps one of our Eastern brethren can explain it. For now, I can comfortably say that this condemnation does not apply at all to the teaching of the CC on filioque.

(8) Ninth Proposition: To the same, who state that, in reference to the creation of the world, the phrase “through the Son” denotes the immediate cause, as well as the fact that it denies the Son the right to be creator and cause of things made “through Him.” That is to say, in theology proper [the study of the Trinity in itself], even if the Father is called the initial cause of the Son and the Spirit, He is also, “through the Son,” the cause of the Spirit. Accordingly, the Son cannot be separated from the Father in the procession of the Spirit. By saying such things, they irrationally join the Son to the Father in the causation of the Spirit. In reality, even if the Son, like the Father, is creator of all things made “through Him,” it does not follow that He is also the Spirit’s cause, because the Father is the projector of the Spirit through Him; nor, again, does it follow that, because the Father is the Spirit’s projector “through the Son,” He is, through Him, the cause of the Spirit. For the formula “through the Son” here denotes the manifestation and illumination [of the Spirit by the Son], and not the emanation of the Spirit into being. If this was not so, it would be difficult, indeed, even to enumerate the theological absurdities that follow.
Again, here, it is evident (especially in the underlined portion above) that Blachernae conceived of “cause” only in the limited sense of “source” (or “first cause” in Latinese), condemning the idea that the Son participates in the property of the Father as First Cause/Source. But, again, this is not what the CC has ever taught or teaches.

(9) Tenth Proposition: To the same, who declare that the Son is said to be the fountain of life in the same way that the Virgin Mother of God is said to be the fountain of life. The Virgin is so called because she lent living flesh to the only-begotten Word with a rational and intellectual soul, and became the cause of mankind born according to Christ. Similarly, those who understand life to be in the Holy Spirit will think of the Son as the fountain of life in terms of cause. Hence, their argument — from conclusions drawn of incongruous comparisons and examples — for the participation of the Son with the Father in the procession of the Spirit.
I’m not certain at all about the source of this rhetoric. I’ve never seen it in any Magisterial documents of the CC, so we can simply set it aside as a condemnation of a personal opinion of Beccus and whatever private theologians from whom he heard it. It has nothing to do with the teaching of the CC.

I hope the foregoing explanation has helped to clarify that the Latin teaching on filioque is not actually heretical, and that Blachernae did not actually condemn anything that was taught by Florence.

I would appreciate any comments and criticisms.

Blessings,
Marduk

Gad zooks, no wonder people just shrug their heads and walk away! All three Persons are God, whole and entire. It all sounds like much ado about nothing to me. There must be some underlying agenda to argue over that term all these centuries. Let the Greeks think what they want. Let the Latins think what they want. What one of the Persons does they all do, at least in relation to us and the universe, creation, etc. .

 

[ethereality]

Linus reminds me of something Thomas a Kempis says near the end of his Imitation of Christ, that it is foolish to try to dive too deeply into the mysteries of God. St. Francis of Assisi had similar disdain for a strong desire for book learning; likewise, St. Augustine regarding curiosity, that simplicity is good …

Not to undermine your efforts for unity, though: We must find a way to unite more fully the East and West, that we may be one as Jesus wishes in John 17.

 

[mardukm]

Yes, I would like some sources that justify the way you interpret the concept of causality as meaning only ‘origin’ in the later Greek Fathers. Considering that the standard education for youths was the study of Aristotle (Palamas received such an education), it would be incredible to think that they would have understood the term cause in such a restricted sense. In addition, I have never once encountered any interpretive source which supports this opinion. Could you please cite some scholarly sources?

Sorry I was not clear. I only meant that the late medieval Eastern Fathers interpret causality to refer to origination in the context of the filioque issue. I did not mean to imply anything else. As for proof, it is evident in the Tomos itself as well as Mark of Ephesus’ Letter against the Union. It is evident in the fact that the term “cause” is more often than not associated with the term “source” (i.e., “cause and source”) when criticism of the Latin filioque occurs; it is evident in the criticism of the idea that the Son is cause of “subsistence”; and it is most evident in the criticism that the Son contributes to the Father’s property as Source. The notion of causality in the context of the filioque debate from the Eastern perspective has always been about the Son being a separate Source in addition to the Father or about the Son as contributing or adding to the Father’s hypostatic property of being Source. Think about it - the basis of the whole Eastern criticism of filioque was the danger to the monarchy of the Father as sole Source. It wouldn’t make any sense for Easterns to be so concerned unless they perceived that the filioque somehow made the Son a Source equal to the Father.

Secondly, I agree with you that the Cappadocians understand causality as a manner by which something can be said to be prior to something else. This unfortunately hurts your argument, however, because the most famous teaching of the Cappadocians is that the Son has all the Father has, except for causality. Since we both agree that the Cappadocians were aware of the distinction between different types of causes, we can only assume that Gregory the Theologian’s affirmation that the Son does not share in the Father’s causality means causality in all senses, since he was aware of the multiple senses of causality and chose to leave the term without qualification.

Are you sure it is in ALL senses? I sense you are restricting “causality” to the issue of the Procession, but I seriously doubt that is what St. Gregory meant. I believe he rather intended “causality” to mean the causality of the Father within the Godhead, which is denoted by Him being “First Cause.” Besides, I rather think that Eastern apologists treat this phrase from St. Gregory out of context. Here is the entire context of the phrase:
“all that the Father has belongs likewise to the Son, except Causality; and all that is the Son’s belongs also to the Spirit, except His Sonship”

It’s obvious from the full context that “Causality” is a reference to the Father’s unique monarchy within the Trinity as Source, and nothing else (just as the Sonship is unique to the Son). Further, who here can deny, given the full context, that the Essence of the Spirit from the Father comes through the Son? Or do you suppose that by the term “all,” St. Gregory did not really mean “all?” Do you suppose that what St. Gregory really meant was “all except Essence?”

Furthermore, I must disagree with your reading of the ninth anathematism. To read cause as source would make the entire anathematism unnecessary. We already know by common sense that something being through but not from automatically disqualifies it from being the source of that which comes through it. Such a thing is so plainly obvious that it hardly warrants an anathema attached to its false counter-proposition.

Actually, the anathematism is directed specifically at the analogy being made with Creation. The argument went (as explicitly stated in the anathematism): “As the Son is Creator just as much as the Father is Creator even though Creation is made ‘through the Son,’ then the Son must be Source just as much as the Father is Source even though the Procession is said to be ‘through the Son.’” So the anathematism is directed specifically at the confutation of “through” and “from” as being equivalent, thereby making the Son equal with the Father in the Procession as Source. Yes, it is plainly obvious that “through” does not equate to “from,” but Blachernae was anathemizing Beccus’ pretention that “through” is indeed equivalent to “from,” thereby making the Son not merely a Second Cause (as the Latins teach), but actually equal to the Father as Source.

The more likely reading is that they are condemning the idea that the Son can be accounted a cause of the Spirit through interpreting the preposition ‘through’ to indicate that the Son has some agency (and thus causality) in the Spirit’s coming into being.

Read the analogy again. What is criticized is the equivalence of causality in the Father and Son.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

This is why Gregory II qualifies that ‘through the Son’ in no way refers to the Spirit’s coming into being, but only to the manifestation, because the manifestation of the Spirit through the Son in no way allows for the Son to be understood as being cause of (in the sense of being prior to) the Holy Spirit.

Yes, this was his solution. It did not dawn on him (or Beccus), however, that another solution was the idea of a 2nd cause as intermediary (not Source), which easily maintains the sole monarchy of the Father as Source.

Another thing to consider is that Beccus indeed confuted “through” and “from,” conceiving of the Son as an equal Source with the Father. So the Tomos was specifically only responding to the idea of the Son as an equal Cause (i.e. Source) to the Father. The Tomos did not touch upon the Latin teaching of the Son as “second cause” Who is not the Source because that was not the issue before them. They thought that Beccus was representing the teaching of the Latin Church, but he was not.

Blessings,
Marduk