Blachernae, Florence, Filioque, Causality

[Cavaradossi]

. In his disputes against Eunomius, however, it should be clear that Gregory of Nyssa, like Saint Basil, holds that the essence of God cannot be named:For when we gather, as it were, into the form of a name the conception of any subject that arises in us, we declare our concept by words that vary at different times, not making, but signifying, the thing by the name we give it. For the things remain in themselves as they naturally are, while the mind, touching on existing things, reveals its thought by such words as are available. And just as the essence of Peter was not changed with the change of his name, so neither is any other of the things we contemplate changed in the process of mutation of names. And for this reason we say that the term “Ungenerate” was applied by us to the true and first Father Who is the Cause of all, and that no harm would result as regards the signifying of the Subject, if we were to acknowledge the same concept under another name. For it is allowable instead of speaking of Him as “Ungenerate,” to call Him the “First Cause” or “Father of the Only-begotten,” or to speak of Him as “existing without cause,” and many such appellations which lead to the same thought; so that Eunomius confirms our doctrines by the very arguments in which he makes complaint against us, because we know no name significant of the Divine Nature. We are taught the fact of Its existence, while we assert that an appellation of such force as to include the unspeakable and infinite Nature, either does not exist at all, or at any rate is unknown to us. Let him then leave his accustomed language of fable, and show us the names which signify the essences, and then proceed further to divide the subject by the divergence of their names. But so long as the saying of the Scripture is true that Abraham and Moses were not capable of the knowledge of the Name, and that “no man has seen God at any time ,” and that “no man has seen Him, nor can see,” and that the light around Him is unapproachable, and "there is no end of His greatness "—so long as we say and believe these things, how like is an argument that promises any comprehension and expression of the infinite Nature, by means of the significance of names, to one who thinks that he can enclose the whole sea in his own hand! For as the hollow of one’s hand is to the whole deep, so is all the power of language in comparison with that Nature which is unspeakable and incomprehensible.

Gregory of Nyssa is quite clear that no name can name the divine essence. He also makes clear from this passage below that the energies of God do not reflect the being of God, rather they reflect an attribute considered in the essence of God: As, then, when we say “He is a judge,” we conceive concerning Him some operation of judgment, and by the “is” carry our minds to the subject, and are hereby clearly taught not to suppose that the account of His being is the same with the action, so also as a result of saying, “He is generated (or ungenerate),” we divide our thought into a double conception, by “is” understanding the subject, and by “generated,” or “ungenerate,” apprehending that which belongs to the subject. As, then, when we are taught by David that God is “a judge,” or “patient,” we do not learn the Divine essence, but one of the attributes which are contemplated in it, so in this case too when we hear of His being not generated, we do not by this negative predication understand the subject, but are guided as to what we must not think concerning the subject, while what He essentially is remains as much as ever unexplained. So too, when Holy Scripture predicates the other Divine names of Him Who is, and delivers to Moses the Being without a name, it is for him who discloses the Nature of that Being, not to rehearse the attributes of the Being, but by his words to make manifest to us its actual Nature.

Further, he expresses the Catholic teaching quite succinctly: “while we confess the invariable character of the nature, we do not deny the difference in respect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we apprehend that one Person is distinguished from another—by our belief, that is, that one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause; and again in that which is of the Cause we recognize another distinction. For one is directly from the first Cause, and another by that which is directly from the first Cause; so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without doubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of being Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirit from His relation by way of nature to the Father.”

This passage contains another mistranslation. Nowhere at all in that passage does Gregory of Nyssa mention a first cause; he in fact only writes ‘first’. The passage should be translated as:For one is directly from the First and the other is through the one who is directly from the First with the result that the Only-begotten remains the Son and does not negate the Spirit’s being from the Fathers since the middle position of the Son both protects His distinction as Only-begotten and does not exclude the Spirit from His natural relation to the Father.

In Greek: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ προσεχῶς έκ τοῦ πρώτου [notice, it only says first, not ‘first cause’], τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ προσεχῶς έκ τοὺ πρώτου, ὥστε καὶ τὸ Μονογενὲς ἀναμφίβολον ἐπὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ μένειν, καὶ τὸ έκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα μὴ άμφιβάλλειν, τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ μεσιτείας καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ Μονογενὲς φυλαττούσης, καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τῆς φυσικῆς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα σχέσεως μὴ άπειργούσης.

Reading the distinction between first cause and second cause into that passage, where it never mentions a second cause or first cause at all would be quite a stretch.

 

[Cavaradossi]

I had that in mind (“the Spirit is from God the Father and, for that matter, from the Son, being poured forth essentially from both, that is to say, from the Father through the Son”), but I was simultaneously thinking of a larger context. E.g., in his Commentary on Joel: “For, in that the Son is God, and from God according to essence (for He has had His birth from God the Father), the Spirit is both proper to Him and in Him and from Him, just as, to be sure, the same thing is understood to hold true in the case of God the Father Himself.”

And in his Thesaurus: “Thus, Paul knows no difference of essence between the Son and the Holy Spirit, but because the Spirit exists from Him and in Him by essence, He calls Him by the name of Lordship.”

Neither of these teaches that the Holy Spirit receives essence from the Son. Both teach that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, because the Spirit belongs to the Son by virtue of the Son’s consubstantiality with the Father.

Of course, that Pope St. Cyril uses "from " in terms of subsistence should not be taken to mean that the Son is Source of the Holy Spirit, but merely as intermediary, with the Father being the sole Source (a concept you acknoweldge), as the Council of Florence exhorted.

What I’ve read from EO apologetics indicates it is not just in the translation, but something is added to the texts to support the EO position - namely, the distinction of Essence from Energy within the Godhead. This distinction displays itself in the rhetoric “that refers to the energetic manifestation only.” Anywhere the Fathers refer to the progression or even procession of essence from the Father through the Son to the HS, EO have to make this “clarification.” But why? To me the “clarification” is given only because the natural and most obvious meaning of these statements taken on their own without benefit of “clarification” tends to support the Catholic position.

I quoted these two paragraphs together to make a point. Your reading too runs into this same problem. It requires a “clarification” that ἐκ is not equivalent to being source. But too this runs against the “natural and most obvious meaning” of these statements. I got into this discussion with Ghosty a while back. The most obvious meaning of a statement often runs contrary to the faith. When we see, for example, that the Son is called by Paul, “the firstborn of creation,” are we to conclude that the Son is a creature, as the most obvious reading suggests? When we see that Jesus says in the Gospel of John that, “the Father is greater than I,” are we to assume that the Father is greater than the Son in all respects, as the most plain reading of the passage would suggest? See then what absurdity it is to argue or insist upon interpreting things according to their “natural and most obvious meaning?” Furthermore, what is most natural to one person is not most natural to another person, so how can an appeal then to such a concept be given any weight?

To argue that the “most natural meaning” (which in reality is itself an interpretation which takes advantage of many interpretive clues and glosses which are not self-evident) benefits a certain position is therefore completely meaningless. The test of whether an interpretation can be correct is rather its consistency with the patristic condition as a whole. And so we must test a particular interpretation of St. Cyril’s statements for consistency with the tradition as a whole.

That being said, I find that this particular interpretation here is weak, because if, the statement is meant to be understood as meaning that the Spirit receives the divine nature from the Son, then how can the Son be said not to participate in the Spirit’s hypostatic coming into existence, since, as the Fathers taught, hypostasis refers to both the hypostatic characteristics and essence of something considered as a whole (as confirmed by the Council of Blachernae)?

Furthermore, such an interpretation does little to explain why in the case of verbs like ἐκχέω and πρόειμι, St. Cyril used the prepositions ἐκ and διά interchangeably, but in the case of the verb ἐκπορεύω, St. Cyril only used the preposition ἐκ with reference to the Father. If we were to admit that the Fathers were concerned with source and not cause, then St. Cyril’s careful distinction between verbs would be entirely undone! What is the difference between ἐκχέω and ἐκπορεύω with respect to source? Does not the presence of the preposition ἐκ in both verbs give the same implication that whatever is poured out (ἐκχέω) or made to come out (ἐκπορεύω) comes from something as source? Yet when it is understood that the dispute is over causality, and not source, then the distinction between the verbs makes sense, because verbs related to the verb πορεύω all have a causal implication attached to them, while χέω and εἶμι, have no causal implication. This is why it is acceptable to say that the Spirit progresses and is poured out both from and through the Son, but why it is unacceptable to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, because to use ἐκπορεύω with ἐκ implies that the Son has a causal role, whereas using ἐκ with the verbs πρόειμι and ἐκχέω does not.

 

[Cavaradossi]

Btw, how is saying “the essence of the Spirit progresses from the Son” different in intent from saying “the Spirit essentially progresses from the Son?” especially given the context of everything else St. Cyril taught as stated above.

There is a difference between saying that the Spirit progresses from the Son essentially and saying that the Spirit receives essence from the Son, in that the former establishes that the Spirit has the property of issuing forth from the divine nature and therefore from the Son by virtue of the Son’s consubstantiality with the Father (this is why the Spirit is “no stranger to the essence of the Son”), while the latter would be to say that the Son gives the Spirit Its ontological content and consubstantiality with the Father.

This is at first glance altogether strange to me as an Oriental. It is obviously a development of doctrine within the Eastern Tradition. I do not understand it nor accept it. But, as a Catholic and Oriental, I adhere to the paradigm that as long as these distinctions between Traditions do not become “rigid” (i.e., “dogmatic”), then peace and unity will ensue.

But for the sake of discussion, I am wondering if St. Palamas is here distinguishing the three realities in the same way that the three Persons are able to be distinguished. It doesn’t seem that way since he includes the reality of the Trinity as a distinct “reality.”

Duns Scotus is the one who does that, arguing that the persons of the trinity are formally distinct from each other and formally distinct from the essence, and that the divine attributes are formally distinct from each other, formally distinct from the divine nature, and formally contained within the divine nature. Gregory Palamas is simply distinguishing between the divine nature, the three persons, and uncreated energies, as three different realities of God. All three are different and not completely identical in the common sense of the word (as opposed to the specialized sense that Duns Scotus and other scholastics used the term identical).

Though I do not know what the difference is, that apparent difference is the only thing that prevents me from accusing St. Palamas of heresy for proposing five Gods within the Godhead (which is the perception some Orientals have of the Eastern theology).

Who are these some? I would be curious to see which Oriental Orthodox theologians make this accusation.

The underlined portion is confusing. Are you saying the energy is not of the essence, yet naturally proceeds from the essence?

I am saying that energy and essence are not the same, but essence is typically understood as being prior to energy, which is why energy is sometimes known as the “innate movement of a substance” or some other fanciful (if not somewhat meaningless) definition. My statement that energy may be enhypostatized in hypostases which do not have the corresponding essence is completely concerned with soteriology. In fact the strongest arguments for the distinction between essence and energy are the soteriological arguments made by the Fathers. A common example found almost universally in the Fathers is that of iron and fire. The iron, by passing through the fire, becomes fire by participation (that is by energy), while retaining its nature as iron and not becoming fire by nature. Denying the essence-energies distinction would mean that when we partake of the divine nature, rather than being deified by the energies of the divine nature, we actually would take on the divine nature itself and become Gods by nature. This is where the insistence that the essence-energies distinction is just how we conceptualize God falls apart. Either essence and energy are distinct, or we become gods not by grace but by nature, or we do not obtain any true deification at all, but only participate in a created elevation of our nature. The third option is unsatisfactory for the same reason why Arianism was unsatisfactory: just as we cannot be saved by a created savior, so too must the gifts which the uncreated savior gives us be uncreated and God. The second option should obviously be unsatisfactory for the reason that there is only one God, and also because the insistence of the catholic faith is that the deified saints are to be venerated, not worshippied, because they are gods by grace, not Gods by nature. We are left then only with the first option, that energy and essence must be distinct, or else our entire salvation would be false.

It seems you are saying “Energy flows from the Hypostasis which has Essence.”

Energy is the innate movement of a substance, as St. John of Damascus defines it in his Orthodox Faith 2.23. Energy is from substance, and it subsists, along with the substance, in the hypostasis.

My position is “Energy flows from the Essence which has Hypostasis.”

According to the fathers, it is the self-subsistence hypostasis which has essence, not the other way around. It is only the hypostasis which subsists in itself, in which essence may be found. St. John of Damascus confirms this teaching of the fathers in the Philosophical Chapters 42:Now, one should know that substance which is devoid of form does not subsist of itself, nor does an essential difference, nor a species, nor an accident. It is only the hypostases, the individuals, that is, that subsist of themselves, and in them are found both the substance and the essential differences, the species and the accidents… For this reason the term hypostasis has been properly applied to the individual, since in the hypostasis the substance, to which the accidents have been added, actually subsists. It should rather be said that energy is the movement of a nature, and both subsist in the hypostasis.

 

[Vico]

It must have taken hours to write those seven posts.

 

[Cavaradossi]

Understood. I would point you to the concerns of Sts. Maximos, Photius, Mark of Ephesus about the monarchy of the Father to get an understanding of my pov about Cause as Source from the Eastern perspective. The Official Clarification on Filioque also mentions that this was the overweening concern of the Easterns. Most of all, I would direct you to the proem of the Tomos which sets the tone of the entire work: "And someone [Beccus] dares to declare in our midst that the Spirit also proceeds ekporeusai] from the Son, just as it does, indeed, from the Father. The use of the term ekporeusai demonstrates that the main concern here is the property of the Father as Source or Origin.

But you have provided no justification for restricting the meaning of the term cause in theology to meaning only source. The proof you provide are all passages which could be read in either way.

I am reading it in the context of other Eastern sources about their concern for the Monarchy of the Father as Source of the Trinity. This is the only way to read “Cause” in the context of the filioque issue.

But again, the Eastern Fathers all spoke of the Monarchy in terms of cause, not source. Just asserting that the concerns over the Monarchy of the Father should be read as being over source, is not a good justification for doing so. I could equally make the claim that the Eastern Fathers really understood the Monarchy of the Father in terms of pink elephantness, and that since the Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son violates the Father’s unique hypostatic property as pink elephant, the filioque therefore violates the Monarchy of the Father, and that furthermore, since the fathers did not ever deny that their use of the term cause in theology was concerned with the unique pink elephantness of the Father, my claim would be true because it is difficult if not impossible to falsify. But this is of course faulty logic because just because a claim is difficult to falsify, that does not make it true.

Here is another excerpt from the Tomos: “the all-Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; and we confess that it has its existence from the Father, and that it prides itself — exactly as the Son Himself does — in the fact that the same [Father] is essentially the cause of its being. And we know and believe that the Son is from the Father, being enriched in having the Father as His cause and natural principle, and in being consubstantial and of one nature with the Spirit, which is from the Father. Even so, He is not, either separately or with the Father, the cause of the Spirit.”
If, as you propose, the Synod understood the distinction between first cause and second cause, surely they would have made that evident in the Tomos. But here we see that the term “cause” is only understood in one sense - in the sense that the Father is cause. And the only way the Father is “cause” is as “source.”

But again, there is no justification for this redefinition. In fact, the historical evidence would be against you here, because at this point in time, the study of Aristotle had been revived as basic formative education (Palamas, for example, had studied Aristotle thoroughly in his youth). Surely, having studied Aristotle, they would have understood cause to have multiple senses, since the matter of something can be said to be its material cause, even though it is not its final cause or formal cause. Their decision to leave the word cause unqualified should suggest that they wished to condemn all meanings of the word.

 

[Cavaradossi]

I disagree. The argument is maintained if Cause is understood as “source,” or at least the idea that there is only one type of “cause” (i.e., in the way that the Father is “cause”). The first part criticizes the idea that the Son is a “participant” in the Father’s causality of the Holy Spirit. But we know that the Father’s causality can only mean one thing - i.e., as Source. The entire argument hinges not upon different types of cause, but rather the equivalence of the causality of the Father and the Son in the existence of the HS. You cannot excise the Tomos from the context of the Eastern Fathers’ general concern for the Monarchy of the Father. A second cause (or agency) dependent on the First Cause does not threaten the Monarchia; only an equivalent cause has the capacity to do this. I think you know this full well, given your rhetoric about the agency of the Son as pertains the Energy. So I am at a loss to understand your resistence to recognize that “cause” means “source” in the context of the filioque debate.

I object because you have not provided any justification for reading the word cause in this way except for insisting that it should understood in this fashion, which is not a very good reason at all. You write, “You cannot excise the Tomos from the context of the Eastern Fathers’ general concern for the Monarchy of the Father,” but then don’t provide any evidence that the Eastern Fathers, when they wrote ‘cause’ understood it to mean only source. How absurd, for example, would it be to think that Maximus the Confessor, who sometimes even quoted Aristotle verbatim, did not understand the difference between types of causes, when he wrote that the Latins did not make the Son a cause of the Spirit? Reexamining the passage from that anathematism:To the same, who teach that the Father and the Son—not as two principles and two causes—share in the causality of the Spirit, and that the Son is as much a participant with the Father as is implied in the preposition “through.” According to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit’s cause, with the result that sometimes they believe and say that the Father is cause, and sometimes the Son. This being so, they introduce a plurality and a multitude of causes in the procession of the Spirit…See how they write, “according to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit’s cause?” And then they show that those who posit such a distinction therefore as a result, “introduce a plurality and multitude of causes in the procession of the Spirit?” What they are condemning here is not that the Son is a cause equal to the Father (something which they condemn elsewhere), but that the Son can be accounted as being a distinct cause, joining in the causality of the Father, but distinct by the strength of the prepositions (by which they mean through and from), which therefore makes the Son another cause and introduces a multiplicity of causes.

Cause as Source, which is identical to First Cause.

Yes, but why should I accept this gloss?

The Cappadocians have taught us that your proposal cannot be entertained. There is no justification for you to even propose that “the Son has all that the Spirit has except proceeding,” because that would violate the order of the Trinity according to the doxologies. St. Basil wrote, “For us is sufficient the order prescribed by the Lord. He who confuses this order will be no less guilty of transgressing the law than are the impious heathen.” I know you admitted this, but the fact that you propose it just for the sake of argument, as if such a proposition was even likely from the Catholic perspective, makes this exhortation proper.

This is not entirely true. The Cappadocians, because of the distinction between economy and theology only admitted that certain statements were more fitting than others. That statement is certainly unfitting, but it is not theologically untrue, insofar as it reflect the consubstantial unity of the Son and the Spirit. Furthermore, you have misread St. Basil here. In context, it is clear that he is arguing that the order given to us by the Church is not meant to be understood as an order of dignity and honor, such that the Holy Spirit is a third God, after the Son and the Father. Thus there is both acknowledgment of the hypostases and the true dogma of the Monarchy is not lost. They on the other hand who support their sub-numeration by talking of first and second and third ought to be informed that into the undefiled theology of Christians they are importing the polytheism of heathen error. No other result can be achieved by the fell device of sub-numeration than the confession of a first, a second, and a third God. For us is sufficient the order prescribed by the Lord. He who confuses this order will be no less guilty of transgressing the law than are the impious heathen.

Enough has been now said to prove, in contravention of their error, that the communion of Nature is in no wise dissolved by the manner of sub-numeration. Let us, however, make a concession to our contentious and feeble minded adversary, and grant that what is second to anything is spoken of in sub-numeration to it. Now let us see what follows. "The first man "it is said “is of the earth earthy, the second man is the Lord from heaven.” Again “that was not first which is spiritual but that which is natural and afterward that which is spiritual.” If then the second is subnumerated to the first, and the subnumerated is inferior in dignity to that to which it was subnumerated, according to you the spiritual is inferior in honour to the natural, and the heavenly man to the earthy.

 

[Cavaradossi]

Here we see the EO addition to the writings of the Fathers that I criticized in the last part of my previous post. I don’t know why you mention the economy here. The statements at issue (“the Son has all the Father has/receiving of the Father”; “the Spirit has all the Son has/receiving of the Son”) can indeed be interpreted as referring to the economy. However, the additional clauses “except to be the Father” and “except to be the Son” dictates that these are statements about theology proper - i.e., the eternal and internal hypostatic reality of the Godhead. The statements thus must include Essence.

The distinction between economy and theology is completely authentic to the Cappadocians. It is the entire basis for their argument against Eunomius, who broke the barrier between theology and economy by positing that our knowledge that God is unbegotten can be mapped back onto theology by claiming that the essence of God is unbegottenness.

You wrote, “The statements at issue (“the Son has all the Father has/receiving of the Father”; “the Spirit has all the Son has/receiving of the Son”),” but this does not at all seem like a proper paraphrase of original passage which was disputed, which was this line from Gregory the Theologian, “but if all that the Father has belongs likewise to the Son, except Causality; and all that is the Son’s belongs also to the Spirit, except His Sonship.” Notice what is notably absent from the passage—any teaching on who receives what from whom, and by virtue of whom. In fact, the inference you try to draw from this passage runs contrary to St. Basil’s warning not to draw such conclusions from the Trinitarian ordering of names.

Huh? You just affirmed what I have been saying all along - that the point of criticism was the equalization of the Son with the Father’s hypostatic characteristic of causality (i.e., not as “Second Cause,” but as THE Cause or “First Cause”/Source).

No, because the unique hypostatic characteristic of the Father is Causality, not Source, not First Cause, but Causality, as the Eastern Fathers unanimously taught.

No it doesn’t, and you already admitted as much. If you admit that the agency of the Son in the Energetic procession does not interfere with the Father’s monarchia as the Cause/Source of Energy, how can you now claim that the agency of the Son in the Essential procession interferes with the Father’s monarchia as the Cause/Source of Essence?

Again, what justifies redefining cause in this fashion? The Eastern Fathers always associated causality with the Father alone. Why should I believe in your assertion? Why should I not instead believe that causality means causality?

 

[mardukm]

From Cyril’s Thesaurus 18: Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ, φύσεως δὲ τὸ γεννᾷν. Φύσις δὲ καὶ ἐνἐργεια οὐ ταθτόν· οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γεννᾷν τὸ ποιεῖν ταθτὸν ἔσται. St. Cyril of Alexandria, like his predecessor St. Athanasius recognized, that essence and energy cannot be the same.

Agreed, they are not the same, but this is not identical to saying that they can be ontologically distinguished within the Godhead. It is a great mystery, which I will explain.

The Argument, according to Gregory of Nyssa, is that there must be some ontological distinction between the essence (the being) of God, and the names of God (which describe either the energies of God, or what God is not). Otherwise, to say that God is the Creator is to say that creation is the essence of God, and to say that God is the designer is would be to say that the essence of God is design. The names of God do not name the essence.

No, his argument is not to make an ontological distinction between essence and energy within the Godhead. There is a distinction, but it is not ontological. Let’s analyze his argument. His entire refutation is based on the premise that Eunomius believed “because the Father’s being is simple, it must be reckoned nothing else but unbegottenness, since it is said to be unbegotten.” As “Unbegottenness” is an attribute of the God, just like “Creation” and “Design,” then if one says that God’s Essence is “nothing else but” Unbegottenness, then it is (by an argumentum ad absurdum) consistent to say that God’s Essence is “nothing else but” Design, or “nothing else but” Creation", etc., etc. But that would lead to the absurdity that God’s Essence is either divided or there are multiple Essences predicated by these attributes (much like the Greeks had assigned distinct personified deity to attributes such as Love, Strife, War, Discord, etc.).

From an epistomological standpoint, while it is valid and orthodox to say (as St. Basil did) that “Goodness is Essence,” it would not be correct to say “Essence is Goodness,” in the sense that it would make Essence “nothing else but” Goodness. The Catholic and Orthodox Truth is that God’s Love is Essence, God’s Justice is Essence, God’s Mercy is Essence, etc., etc., etc. God’s Essence is ALL these (in distinction from Eunomius’ position of assigning Essence to one particular attribute), but - a great Mystery indeed - He is nevertheless one in Essence and One in Energy.

When have I said otherwise?

Again, when did I say in this thread that God is composed?

When you utilize the distinction between Energy and Essence to conclude that the Energy ekpoereusai through the Son, yet deny that the Essence ekporeusai through the Son (for the verb ekporeusai refers to nothing more nor less than ontological origin), then you imply that God is a composite being.

I need to go, but I will return in a few hours to reply to the rest of your posts.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

No, his argument is not to make an ontological distinction between essence and energy within the Godhead. There is a distinction, but it is not ontological. Let’s analyze his argument. His entire refutation is based on the premise that Eunomius believed “because the Father’s being is simple, it must be reckoned nothing else but unbegottenness, since it is said to be unbegotten.” As “Unbegottenness” is an attribute of the God, just like “Creation” and “Design,” then if one says that God’s Essence is “nothing else but” Unbegottenness, then it is (by an argumentum ad absurdum) consistent to say that God’s Essence is “nothing else but” Design, or “nothing else but” Creation", etc., etc. But that would lead to the absurdity that God’s Essence is either divided or there are multiple Essences predicated by these attributes (much like the Greeks had assigned distinct personified deity to attributes such as Love, Strife, War, Discord, etc.).

The logical conclusion of this is that no name of God can be applied to the essence in this manner, since it would imply that the essence is composed of parts. Then we are left only with affirmations of knowledge that the essence is certain things, but not what the essence is. St. John of Damascus restates this fundamental idea of the Cappadocians in his Orthodox Faith 1.9, when he writes:The divinity is simple and uncompounded. But, that which is composed of several different things is compounded. Consequently, should we say that the increate, unoriginate, incorporeal, immortal, eternal, good, creative, and the like are essential difference sin God, then, since He is composed of so many things, He will not be simple but compounded, which is impious to the last degree. Therefore, one should not suppose that any one of these things which are affirmed of God is indicative of what He is in essence. Rather, they show either what He is not, or some relation to some one of those things that are contrasted with Him, or something of those things which are consequential to His nature or operation

From an epistomological standpoint, while it is valid and orthodox to say (as St. Basil did) that “Goodness is Essence,” it would not be correct to say “Essence is Goodness,” in the sense that it would make Essence “nothing else but” Goodness. The Catholic and Orthodox Truth is that God’s Love is Essence, God’s Justice is Essence, God’s Mercy is Essence, etc., etc., etc. God’s Essence is ALL these (in distinction from Eunomius’ position of assigning Essence to one particular attribute), but - a great Mystery indeed - He is nevertheless one in Essence and One in Energy.

That directly contradicts St. Basil’s epistemology. From Against Eunomius 1.11:His [Eunomius’] argument is now exactly where he wants it to be. After dragging unbegotteness away from all other senses, he shoves it (so he thinks) into the substance itself and says concerning the God of the universe that “it must be unbegotten substance.” As for me, I too would say that the substance of God is unbegotten, but I would not say that unbegottenness is the substance.
For St. Basil, the difference is between a statement of knowing what it is, and knowing that it is. We know that the Essence is good, but not that goodness is the Essence of God, because the latter defines the essence or something contained within the essence, while the former says something true of the essence by way of conceptualization. Furthermore, this also would contradict St. John of Damascus, who writes in Orthodox Faith 1.9 The names ‘Good,’ ‘Just,’ ‘Holy,’ and the like are consequential to His nature and are not indicative of the essence itself.What could be a more clear passage than this, to demonstrate that it is inadmissible and contrary to the faith of the fathers to think that Justice, Goodness and Holiness are the essence of God?

When you utilize the distinction between Energy and Essence to conclude that the Energy ekpoereusai through the Son, yet deny that the Essence ekporeusai through the Son (for the verb ekporeusai refers to nothing more nor less than ontological origin), then you imply that God is a composite being.

This argument is inconsistent. Because you posit that the Holy Spirit receives hypostatic existence from the Father alone, and essential being from the Father through the Son, by the very form of your argument above, you also introduce composition into the Godhead, by holding that the hypostasis of the Spirit is not identical to the divine nature. This contradicts Thomas Aquinas, who wrote:Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (29, 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition.

Sum I, 39, i.Surely on account of this alone, the argument is inadmissible, because it refutes your own opinion on the procession of the Holy Spirit! And if one were to admit that there can indeed be multiple understandings of divine simplicity, perhaps in an attempt to salvage your opinion on the procession of the Holy Spirit from the above argument against me, then this too will nullify the argument from simplicity, because having admitted that there can be multiple understandings of simplicity, it becomes impossible to levy the accusation that I have introduced composition into God, since there would no longer be one agreed upon meaning for either simple or non-composite.

 

[mardukm]

The logical conclusion of this is that no name of God can be applied to the essence in this manner, since it would imply that the essence is composed of parts. Then we are left only with affirmations of knowledge that the essence is certain things, but not what the essence is. St. John of Damascus restates this fundamental idea of the Cappadocians in his Orthodox Faith 1.9, when he writes…

That directly contradicts St. Basil’s epistemology. From Against Eunomius 1.11…
For St. Basil, the difference is between a statement of knowing what it is, and knowing that it is. We know that the Essence is good, but not that goodness is the Essence of God, because the latter defines the essence or something contained within the essence, while the former says something true of the essence by way of conceptualization. Furthermore, this also would contradict St. John of Damascus, who writes in Orthodox Faith 1.9 The names ‘Good,’ ‘Just,’ ‘Holy,’ and the like are consequential to His nature and are not indicative of the essence itself.What could be a more clear passage than this, to demonstrate that it is inadmissible and contrary to the faith of the fathers to think that Justice, Goodness and Holiness are the essence of God?

What you just stated is exactly what I stated. Note that St. Basil and the Damascene uses the definite article with the term “Essence” in their arguments. That indicates that the properties (i.e., Goodness, Justice, Love, etc.) cannot be absolutely equated with the Essence (just as St. Gregory of Nyssa’s opposition to Eunomius’ argument that Essence is “nothing else but” Unbegottenness). So, for example, while it is perfectly orthodox for St. Basil to say “Goodness is Essence in the Holy Spirit ,” he would deny that “Goodness is the Essence.” Essence and Energy can be distinguished and cannot be perfectly equated (with which we agree), but they cannot be ontologically distinguished within the Godhead (as per your argument, with which I disagree).

This argument is inconsistent. Because you posit that the Holy Spirit receives hypostatic existence from the Father alone,

Yes, I have always stated that - because the term “from” is predicated of the Father alone, never the Son (as the Tomos of Blacharnae affirmed, “from” cannot be equated with “through” in the context of the Godhead; and as Florence affirmed, “and” is to be equated with “through” in reference to the Son).

and essential being from the Father through the Son, by the very form of your argument above, you also introduce composition into the Godhead, by holding that the hypostasis of the Spirit is not identical to the divine nature.

Yes, I have distinguished that the hypostasis is from the Father alone, while the essential being is from the Father through the Son, but only ever in the sense that the ORIGIN of the hypostasis is from the Father alone. The Son’s participation in the essential being of the Holy Spirit is never as origin of hypostasis (and, hence, never as origin of the ousia/energeia), but as the agency through which the ousia/energeia of the Father is communicated to the Holy Spirit. In my statements, the ontological distinction has never been between hypostasis/ousia/energeia, but between the Father as the principle of origin/“from” and the Son as principle of agency/“through.” There is a distinction between hypostasis, ousia, and energeia, but it is indefined, and is certainly not a distinction in the same way that the three Persons are distinct (i.e., ontologically). Otherwise, you will introduce the novelty that there are 5 Persons in the Godhead - Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Essence, and Energy.

This contradicts Thomas Aquinas, who wrote:

I don’t see how. I can (I think) understand St. Thomas’ position - God as a personal being is One Essence, and in that sense, Essence is not distinguished from Person (because the Oneness of the Personal Being we know as God is by vritue of the Oneness of Essence), but Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished nonetheless. It’s a great mystery, a mystery that I don’t want to delve into any further than what the Fathers have given us.

Blessings,
Marduk

P.S. I still have much to say on your other posts, though I don’t have the time right now. I should be able to get to them within 3 days.

 

[mardukm]

This is not entirely correct or in line with Cappadocian thought. The essence can have nothing predicated of it, because it is unknowable. But the energies can be named, and furthermore, those names apply to God as well, but not to His essence. St. Basil makes this clear in his epistle 234: But God, he says, is simple, and whatever attribute of Him you have reckoned as knowable is of His essence. But the absurdities involved in this sophism are innumerable. When all these high attributes have been enumerated, are they all names of one essence? And is there the same mutual force in His awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice and His creative power, His providence and His foreknowledge, and His bestowal of rewards and punishments, His majesty and His providence? In mentioning any one of these do we declare His essence? If they say, yes, let them not ask if we know the essence of God, but let them enquire of us whether we know God to be awful, or just, or merciful. These we confess that we know. If they say that essence is something distinct, let them not put us in the wrong on the score of simplicity. For they confess themselves that there is a distinction between the essence and each one of the attributes enumerated.
Notice how he asks the rehtorical question, “And is there the same mutual force, in His awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice and His creative power, His providence and His foreknowledge, and His bestowal of rewards and punishments, His majesty and His providence?” He answers this very rhetorical question in Against Eunomius 1.8:Gladly, then, would I scrutinize him to see if he similarly sticks to this prudence in the case of all that is said about God, or if he does so only in the case of this word. For if he does not consider anything at all by way of conceptualization so as to avoid the appearance of honoring God with human designations, then he will confess this: that all things attributed to God similarly refer to his substance [for context, Basil is arguing that Eunomius cannot privilege one attribute, unbegottenness, to refer to the essence, while not affirming the same of all of the other attributes]. But how is it not ridiculous to say that his creative power is his substance? Or that his providence is his substance? Or the same for his foreknowledge? In other words, how is it not ridiculous to regard every activity of his as his substance? And if these names converge upon a single meaning, each one has to signify the same thing as the others, such as is the case with polyonyms, as when we call the same man ‘Simon,’ ‘Peter,’ and ‘Cephas.’ In the same vein, whoever has heard that God does not change will be lead to his unbegottenness, and whoever has heard that he has no parts will also be brought to his creative power. What is more absurd than this confusion? Each of these names is deprived of its proper signification, and conventions are established that contradict both common usage and the teaching of the Spirit.

All this says nothing more than what I have been saying - Essence cannot be perfectly equated with the Energy, but Energy is nevertheless intimately connected to the Essence and cannot be distinguished within the Godhead so as to separate them. As the Damascene (among many other Fathers) teaches us:
“For things that have the same essence have also the same will and energy, while things that are different in essence are different in will and energy.”

and

“But all that we can affirm concerning God does not show forth God’s nature, but only the qualities of His nature. For when you speak of Him as good, and just, and wise, and so forth, you do not tell God’s nature but only the qualities of His nature.”

So the Energy is of the Essence, though not perfectly equated with it. But since the Energy is of the Essence, it cannot ever be distinguished from it in the sense of being separated from it. So it is impossible to say that only the Energy is “through the Son” while the Essence is not “through the Son.” Rather, it can only be because the Essence is “through the Son” that one can properly say that the Energy is “through the Son.”

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[mardukm]

Notice that Basil denies that the names all signify the same thing. If they do not signify the same thing, then this admits that the energies are distinct. To say that ‘in God there is no distinction between the attributes’ is not entirely correct, because the attributes are distinct (that is, creation is not mercy, and judgment is not light), even when they are considered in God. And while it is might be tempting to argue that this only refers to the economy, notice that among the things St. Basil lists are God’s foreknowledge and providence, which certainly had no beginning, since God foreordained the world according to his foreknowledge from the very beginning.

OK. I see your pov now. You think that when I say that there is no distinction within the Godhead of Essence and Energy, then that means that Essence cannot be epistemologically distinguished from Energy. No, that is not what I am saying (though I can see how my unqualified terminology can lead to that misundestanding). What I mean when I say that there is no distinction within the Godhead of Essence and Energy is that Essence and Energy within the Godhead can never be separated ontologically. Essence always comes with Energy and vice-versa, and can never be separated; in the same sense, God’s Goodness always comes with His Justice, and always comes with His Mercy, and always comes with His Love, etc. ,etc., etc., and can never be separated from each other. It’s one package deal, so to speak.

I think that clarficiation mollifies much of your rhetoric.

In this case, it simply is incorrect to say that the fathers necessarily thought of the attributes of God as referring to the same thing in God

I’ve never said the attributes were “the same thing.”

The first part corresponds roughly to the English translation ([the Spirit] is good, as the Father is good, and the one Who is begotten of the good is good). The problem comes with this last phrase, οὐσίαν ἔχον τἠν άγαθότητα. The noun οὐσίαν, in the accusative, ought to be interpreted as an accusative of respect. That would be rendered then as, "having with respect to essence the [His] goodness,” which can hardly be interpreted as meaning that the essence of the Spirit is the Goodness of God. That reading (that the essence of the Holy Spirit is goodness) would be completely inconsistent with St. Basil’s theology, since he, like his brother, Gregory of Nyssa, denies that the essence of God can be named.

As already explained, there is a difference between saying “Goodness is Essence” and saying “Goodness is the Essence.” The latter defines the Essence of God, while the former merely admits that Goodness is related to the Essence of God in some say.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[mardukm]

Yet I have now provided two clear examples of Fathers denying this.

Yes, you have given examples of Fathers distinguishing between Essence and Energy even in the Godhead, but not any to support the idea that they can be separated in any way in the Godhead. They affirm an epistemological distinction between Essence and Energy, but not an ontological distinction. In other words, though Essence and Energy are not the same, they cannot be separated. Sorry for my lack of clarity previously - I thought it would be a given that as an Oriental, I adhere to the epistemological distinction between Essence and Energy. and that when I stated “there is no distinction” it refers to something other than epistemological distinction).

Similarly, St. Basil ridicules the idea that God’s energies are to be associated with His essence

Not that the Energy cannot be associated with the Essence (as the Damascene taught, no Essence is lacking in Energy), but that they are not to be equated with each other.

these names do not have the power to make distinctions within the Godhead itself. To claim that these mere names that we use to accomodate our frail understanding of God are real distinctions within God himself is surely beyond the patristic evidence.

Yet to hold to this sort of thinking involves denying that any knowledge of God is true, from which all sorts of absurdities follow. If nothing we say of God is corresponds to anything distinct considered in God, then it necessarily follows that any substitution of God’s energies for another is not only theologically true, but that it is also fitting…

Again, when I speak of “distinction” here, I am not referring to epistemological distinction, but ontological distinction - i.e., that they can be separated. The properties are not ontologically distinct beacuse they can never be separated from each other. I.e., we cannot conceive of God’s Justice without God’s Love, or God’s Mercy, etc., etc., etc. We as humans think that God’s Mercy is separated from God’s Justice, but it is not. We think His Design is separated from His Love, but it is not. Etc. Etc. Etc.

Show me an Eastern Father who says, “there is no other distinction within the Godhead except that of the Persons.”

…and, therefore, that, except for the distinction of order and Person, no variation in any point is to be apprehended; but we assert that while His place is counted third in mere sequence after the Father and Son, third in the order of the transmission, in all other respects we acknowledge His inseparable union with them; both in nature, in honour, in godhead, and glory, and majesty, and almighty power, and in all devout belief.
St. Gregory of Nyssa, Against the Macedonians

The Deity is perfect , and without blemish in goodness, and wisdom, and power, without beginning, without end, everlasting, uncircumscribed , and in short, perfect in all things. Should we say, then, that there are many Gods, we must recognise difference among the many. For if there is no difference among them, they are one rather than many…the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one in all respects, save those of not being begotten, of birth and of procession. But it is by thought that the difference is perceived. For we recognise one God: but only in the attributes of Fatherhood, Sonship, and Procession, both in respect of cause and effect and perfection of subsistence, that is, manner of existence, do we perceive difference.
St. John Damascene, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book I

But this is a completely arbitrary category to make. By this logic, individual stones are indistinguishable, since they do not have wills.

That’s not a proper analogy because individual stones, despite lack of will, have formal, ontological distinction (i.e., separate). Essence and Energy, and the various ways that God’s Energy appears to us, do not have formal distinction as if they can be conceived of separately from the other. They are epistemologically distinct, but not ontologically distinct. To grant them formal, ontological distinction, would fall into the error of the Greek pagans, who granted such formal, ontological distinction to various attributes such as Love (Aphrodite), War (Ares), Fear (Phobos), etc. etc., thus giving each of them the status of deity.

Furthermore, why would it be that the property of having will allows for things to be distinct from one another?

I’m not speaking of Creation, but of the Godhead, which is on a wholly different category. Tactile analogy can only get you so far before it fails, as far as the Godhead is concerned.

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[mardukm]

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This could only be true if the will constituted a difference between the distinct things, by which we are able to perceive that they differ

I did not say that the distinction between the Persons is Will; I said the distinction between Essence/Energy, on the one hand, and the Persons, on the other, is the fact that the Persons have Will.

No, I am saying that they never said anything about there being only distinctions between the persons (one could argue that the essence is distinct from the persons in Eastern theology, for example).

Agreed, but I would further posit that there are different levels of distinction. As stated in a previous poast, whatever distinction the Fathers conceived between Essence/Energy is not the same as the distinction conceived between Persons. I would include St. Palamas here, which would, IMO, save him from the accusation of novelty.

That would also be contrary to history. Scholasticism proper was a uniquely Western thing, based on a revival of certain Greek metaphysical texts, and the development of a systematic method for resolving disputed questions.

Of course, the Oriental fathers, like Cyril, Athanasius, and Severus of Antioch never employed scholasticism proper either, so I am not sure what that is supposed to mean. Besides, the Orthodox do not have an aversion to the method of scholasticism, Orthodox Christians take issue with the conclusions that certain scholastics reached.

I’ve never studied with any rigor what makes “Scholasticism” what it is. I always thought it was a method, and in that sense our statements would be identical. I agree that the conclusions drawn from Greek thought are different between East and West.

I have given plenty of justification for distinguishing between the essence and energies of God.

But not for separating them in any sense. The Fathers never conceived of Energy apart from Essence, though they can be distinguished (that has always been my point, despite my [admittedly] insufficiently qualified language prone to misinterpretation).

You can’t use St. Gregory of Nyssa to support your idea that this procession only refers to Energy, because he did not recognize that distinction within the Godhead: "For if (according to the idea of those who have been led astray) the nature of the Holy Trinity were diverse, the number would by consequence be extended to a plurality of Gods, being divided according to the diversity of essence in the subjects. But since the Divine, single, and unchanging nature, that it may be one, rejects all diversity in essence, it does not admit in its own case the signification of multitude; but as it is called one nature, so it is called in the singular by all its other names, God, Good, Holy, Saviour, Just, Judge, and every other Divine name conceivable: whether one says that the names refer to nature or to operation, we shall not dispute the point.

"
This is the identical to St. Basil’s position, btw, who wrote that “goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit.”
As for this quote, from Not Three Gods, it is being taken out of context. It should be clear that here, Gregory of Nyssa is not talking about divine simplicity; he is talking about how the trinity can be understood to be one, even though the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three distinct hypostaseis.

I understand what you are saying - that St. Gregory’s is proposing how the Godhead is one, not how the energies (operations) are one. In truth, St. Gregory actually utilizes the latter to demonstrate the former. One of the opposing rationales he argues against is the idea that because there are many operations (or energies), there are many Gods. He refutes this with the assertion that the many operations are actually one operation in the Godhead because their result is the same:
“and again, when we hear that the Father judges no man , we do not think that the Scripture is at variance with itself—(for He Who judges all the earth does this by His Son to Whom He has committed all judgment; and everything which is done by the Only-begotten has its reference to the Father, so that He Himself is at once the Judge of all things and judges no man, by reason of His having, as we said, committed all judgment to the Son, while all the judgment of the Son is conformable to the will of the Father; and one could not properly say either that They are two judges, or that one of Them is excluded from the authority and power implied in judgment);— so also in the case of the word Godhead, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, and that very power of superintendence and beholding which we call Godhead, the Father exercises through the Only-begotten, while the Son perfects every power by the Holy Spirit, judging, as Isaiah says, by the Spirit of judgment and the Spirit of burning, and acting by Him also, according to the saying in the Gospel which was spoken to the Jews. For He says, If I by the Spirit cast out devils; where He includes every form of doing good in a partial description, by reason of the unity of action: for the name derived from operation cannot be divided among many where the result of their mutual operation is one.”

As I pointed out above, that St. Basil quote was mistranslated.

Your rejoinder on this point was based on a misunderstanding of my argument (which was my own fault given my isufficiently qualified language - namely, you thought I was arguing that there is not even an epistemological distinction between Essence and Energy, whereas I was only arguing against an ontological distinction that leads to a notion of separation).

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[mardukm]

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he writes that whether the names refer to nature or operation is not a cause for dispute, not because he regards the two as being identical, but because here there is no indication that the names are being used to define the essence of God, so they can loosely be said to refer to the nature.

I disagree. Identity of Essence and Energy is not the issue here. The reason he says that we shall not dispute whether the names refer to the nature or the operation is not because there is no consideration of making the names applicable to Essence (indeed, he argues against that conception in the final paragraphs of the letter), but because from either standpoint, the heterodox opinion of using the names to make an ontological distinction is implausible. In other words, the Essence is One, and the Energy is One, so whether one uses the names to refer to the Essence (nature) or the Energy (operation), they cannot be used to argue diversity in the Godhead.

. In his disputes against Eunomius, however, it should be clear that Gregory of Nyssa, like Saint Basil, holds that the essence of God cannot be named

Yes and no. If one understands “naming” to mean that one can encapsulate all that the name signifies, then one definitely cannot name the Essence of God, for nothing can encapsulate or encompass infinity. But if by “naming,” one means simply an imperfect attempt to comprehend that which is actually incomprehensible…Thus, to call God “good” cannot be taken to mean that we have comprehended all that God is, for God is infinitely more than merely “good”; the same argument goes for every attribute that can be applied to God. Absolutely no singular word can encapsulate or encompass all that God actually is (iow, absolutely no singular word can encapsulate or encompass all that is God’s Essence). Even if we were to name every word that we can conceive and apply it to God, all those words, either singly or together, can ever begin to encapsulate or encompass all that is God’s true Essence.

Gregory of Nyssa is quite clear that no name can name the divine essence. He also makes clear from this passage below that the energies of God do not reflect the being of God, rather they reflect an attribute considered in the essence of God:

I would disagree. I believe the Energy does reflect the Essence, because the Energy is of the Essence. Whenever the Fathers say that we cannot understand the Essence, what they mean is that we can never understand ALL that the Essence is. After all, this is how the Fathers understood the action of “naming.” To name something is to actually comprehend what it is that is actually named. To say “God is Good” is to comprehend that God is good according to everything that we understand is “good.” But it does not thereby mean we comprehend EVERYTHING about God, because God is infinitely more than merely “good.” Thus it is that the Essence can never be named because nothing we comprehend can ever encapsulate what the Essence is in all its fullness. It is akin to the illustration of the blind man and the elephant. The blind man can only comprehend something of the elephant because of what he touches, but can never comprehend what the elephant is in its totality.

This passage contains another mistranslation. Nowhere at all in that passage does Gregory of Nyssa mention a first cause; he in fact only writes ‘first’…
Reading the distinction between first cause and second cause into that passage, where it never mentions a second cause or first cause at all would be quite a stretch.

That’s pure semantics. I haven’t read anything into the passage. The concept of “first cause” as Source (“one is directly from the Cause”) and “second cause” as Agency (“another by that which is directly from the Cause”) is definitely present. Sure, let’s admit that the terminology is absent, but that is at best all you can argue. However, as St. Paul instructs us, let’s not focus on mere words for the sake of division.

Neither of these teaches that the Holy Spirit receives essence from the Son. Both teach that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, because the Spirit belongs to the Son by virtue of the Son’s consubstantiality with the Father.

Yes. In the context of the relationship between the Son and Holy Spirit, by virtue of Essence, the Spirit is FROM the Son. But in the context of the relationship of the entire Trinity, by virtue of Essence, the Spirit is FROM the Father THROUGH the Son. That’s what the Latins teach. That’s what the Fathers have always taught. I don’t understand what differentiation you are trying to make. What do you think “from the Son” means in this context?

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[mardukm]

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I quoted these two paragraphs together to make a point. Your reading too runs into this same problem. It requires a “clarification” that ἐκ is not equivalent to being source. But too this runs against the “natural and most obvious meaning” of these statements. I got into this discussion with Ghosty a while back. The most obvious meaning of a statement often runs contrary to the faith. When we see, for example, that the Son is called by Paul, “the firstborn of creation,” are we to conclude that the Son is a creature, as the most obvious reading suggests? When we see that Jesus says in the Gospel of John that, “the Father is greater than I,” are we to assume that the Father is greater than the Son in all respects, as the most plain reading of the passage would suggest? See then what absurdity it is to argue or insist upon interpreting things according to their “natural and most obvious meaning?” Furthermore, what is most natural to one person is not most natural to another person, so how can an appeal then to such a concept be given any weight?

I consider what is “most natural” to be the entire context of a paticular Father’s teaching. Though ek is predicated of the Son by St. Cyril in reference to His relationship to the Spirit in terms of Essence, he informs us in his Commentary on Joel that this is so only by way of analogy to the relationship between the Father and Son in terms of Essence. So even though the Spirit derives Essence from the Son, the Son Himself derives Essence from the Father, thus making the Son not the Source of Essence. There is no “reading into” going on here when I say that the Son is not “Source” even though ek is predicated of the Son in relation to the Holy Spirit. That is simply the most obvious reading given the entire context of St. Cyril’s teaching on the matter.

To argue that the “most natural meaning” (which in reality is itself an interpretation which takes advantage of many interpretive clues and glosses which are not self-evident) benefits a certain position is therefore completely meaningless. The test of whether an interpretation can be correct is rather its consistency with the patristic condition as a whole. And so we must test a particular interpretation of St. Cyril’s statements for consistency with the tradition as a whole.

No need for interpretative clues and glosses since St. Cyril’s teaching is obvious given the entire context of his corpus. You want to argue that what is “most natural” is not “most natural” only by neglecting that entire context.

That being said, I find that this particular interpretation here is weak, because if, the statement is meant to be understood as meaning that the Spirit receives the divine nature from the Son, then how can the Son be said not to participate in the Spirit’s hypostatic coming into existence, since, as the Fathers taught, hypostasis refers to both the hypostatic characteristics and essence of something considered as a whole (as confirmed by the Council of Blachernae)?

Blacharnae’s teaching can easily be understood as defining that the Son does not participate as SOURCE of hypostasis or Essence (or Energy for that matter). In other words, the Son does not participate in the Father’s hypostatic property of being “FROM” or Source. The Son has his own hypostatic property of being “THROUGH” or Agency. That is why in the context of filioque, Blacharnae affirmed that “from” and “through” can never be equated.

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[mardukm]

CONTINUED

Furthermore, such an interpretation does little to explain why in the case of verbs like ἐκχέω and πρόειμι, St. Cyril used the prepositions ἐκ and διά interchangeably, but in the case of the verb ἐκπορεύω, St. Cyril only used the preposition ἐκ with reference to the Father. If we were to admit that the Fathers were concerned with source and not cause, then St. Cyril’s careful distinction between verbs would be entirely undone! What is the difference between ἐκχέω and ἐκπορεύω with respect to source? Does not the presence of the preposition ἐκ in both verbs give the same implication that whatever is poured out (ἐκχέω) or made to come out (ἐκπορεύω) comes from something as source? Yet when it is understood that the dispute is over causality, and not source, then the distinction between the verbs makes sense, because verbs related to the verb πορεύω all have a causal implication attached to them, while χέω and εἶμι, have no causal implication. This is why it is acceptable to say that the Spirit progresses and is poured out both from and through the Son, but why it is unacceptable to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, because to use ἐκπορεύω with ἐκ implies that the Son has a causal role, whereas using ἐκ with the verbs πρόειμι and ἐκχέω does not.

The quandary is not real, but of your own making. The reason that St. Cyril can use ekxeoo with both ek and dia is precisely because he understands that the concept of second cause does not intrude upon the Father’s Monarchy as First Cause or Source. Hence, he can say in a fully orthodox sense that in terms of Essence, the Spirit is “from the Son,” if and only if he understands that the concept of second cause, whereby the “from” can be predicated of the Son, does not in fact intrude upon the Monarchy of the Father as First Cause. If he did not have such an understanding, then he would never have used “from” in reference to the relationship between Son and Holy Spirit at all. He does not use dia with ekporeusai most likely only to pacify those who insisted he utilize language more faithful to the Creed, which was a pressing issue between him and the other Fathers of Ephesus at that time. However, we do find that the Damascene a few centuries later indeed explicitly utilizes ekpoereusai with dia in reference to the relationship between Son and Holy Spirit. This is only possible if one makes the distinction between “source” (i.e., First Cause) and “agency” (i.e., second cause), and a realization that the existence of agency (i.e, second cause) in no way detracts from the Monarchy of the Father as Source (i.e., First Cause).

There is a difference between saying that the Spirit progresses from the Son essentially and saying that the Spirit receives essence from the Son, in that the former establishes that the Spirit has the property of issuing forth from the divine nature and therefore from the Son by virtue of the Son’s consubstantiality with the Father (this is why the Spirit is “no stranger to the essence of the Son”), while the latter would be to say that the Son gives the Spirit Its ontological content and consubstantiality with the Father.

No, it is the Father Who gives the consubstantiality because He is the Source of the Substance of both the Son and Holy Spirit, but with respect to the Holy Spirit, it is done through the Son as the Agency. If taken merely in the context of the relationship between Son and Holy Spirit, it can be stated that the Son gives the Essence to the Spirit (or, as St. Cyril says, the Spirit is from the Son in terms of Essence). But in the greater context of the relationship between the three Persons, it can only be stated that the Father gives the Essence through the Son (i.e., from the Father through the Son). In either case, the Son is never conceived of as Source.

Duns Scotus is the one who does that, arguing that the persons of the trinity are formally distinct from each other and formally distinct from the essence, and that the divine attributes are formally distinct from each other, formally distinct from the divine nature, and formally contained within the divine nature. Gregory Palamas is simply distinguishing between the divine nature, the three persons, and uncreated energies, as three different realities of God. All three are different and not completely identical in the common sense of the word (as opposed to the specialized sense that Duns Scotus and other scholastics used the term identical).

I’m not at all familiar with Duns Scotus (aside from his popular rhetoric on the IC). I’d agree with you that the three realities are not identical, but I disagree with you that they can be separated, so as to make the Energy “through the Son” but not the Essence.

Who are these some? I would be curious to see which Oriental Orthodox theologians make this accusation.

As I’ve always stated, I’m not much into reading theologians. These are your run-of-the-mill OO that I came into contact with when I was still in the COC. It’s been a LOOONG time since I’ve been to Orthodoxchristianity.net, but the issue has been discussed there in the past, IIRC.

I am saying that energy and essence are not the same, but essence is typically understood as being prior to energy…We are left then only with the first option, that energy and essence must be distinct, or else our entire salvation would be false.

Agreed.

It should rather be said that energy is the movement of a nature, and both subsist in the hypostasis.

Agreed.

That’s it for now. I’ll address the rest of your posts (regarding the understanding of “Cause” as “Source”) as time permits over the next 3 days.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

What you just stated is exactly what I stated. Note that St. Basil and the Damascene uses the definite article with the term “Essence” in their arguments. That indicates that the properties (i.e., Goodness, Justice, Love, etc.) cannot be absolutely equated with the Essence (just as St. Gregory of Nyssa’s opposition to Eunomius’ argument that Essence is “nothing else but” Unbegottenness). So, for example, while it is perfectly orthodox for St. Basil to say “Goodness is Essence in the Holy Spirit ,” he would deny that “Goodness is the Essence.” Essence and Energy can be distinguished and cannot be perfectly equated (with which we agree), but they cannot be ontologically distinguished within the Godhead (as per your argument, with which I disagree).

Where in your original argument did you ever even mention anything about the presence or absence of the definite article? But suppose that there were no definite article. Then when one says Goodness is the Essence of God, what is meant by this statement? Is it meant to say that we know the essence of God to be good by its operations, or because we are to think of goodness itself is in the essence of God? The latter is heterodox, and by all accounts would make God complex on account of his many names. The former is acceptable, but it must come with the admission that no name is capable of even giving any sort of account of what the essence of God is, only what it is not, contrasting it with other things, or those things which are consequential to the divine nature.

Yes, I have distinguished that the hypostasis is from the Father alone, while the essential being is from the Father through the Son, but only ever in the sense that the ORIGIN of the hypostasis is from the Father alone. The Son’s participation in the essential being of the Holy Spirit is never as origin of hypostasis (and, hence, never as origin of the ousia/energeia), but as the agency through which the ousia/energeia of the Father is communicated to the Holy Spirit.

Exactly, so according to your argument, the Holy Spirit receives either hypostasis or existence (it is not exactly clear which you intend) separately from ousia, since one is received from the Father alone, while the other is received from the Father through the Son. How can this be reconciled with the affirmation that there is no real distinction between the hypostases and the essence? If the distinction between hypostasis and essence is not prior to the intellect in the thing, but is to be found in the intellect alone, then it stands to reason that the two cannot be communicated by separate means, but must be communicated in the exact same manner, since they are identical, and not distinct in reality.

I don’t see how. I can (I think) understand St. Thomas’ position - God as a personal being is One Essence, and in that sense, Essence is not distinguished from Person (because the Oneness of the Personal Being we know as God is by vritue of the Oneness of Essence), but Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished nonetheless. It’s a great mystery, a mystery that I don’t want to delve into any further than what the Fathers have given us.

His entire argument has to do with preserving his account of divine simplicity. Essence is indistinguishable from person, because for Aquinas, to have a difference between the suppositum and the essence, is to be composed. God, being uncomposed has no difference between the so-called supposita and the essence, so each person, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is identical with the essence but distinct from the other two by way of relations of opposition, the Father against the Son, and the Father and the Son both against the Holy Spirit. But if this is true, then your very theory of the Holy Spirit receiving essence by a different manner than the Holy Spirit receiving existence contradicts this.

 

[Cavaradossi]

All this says nothing more than what I have been saying - Essence cannot be perfectly equated with the Energy, but Energy is nevertheless intimately connected to the Essence and cannot be distinguished within the Godhead so as to separate them. As the Damascene (among many other Fathers) teaches us:
“For things that have the same essence have also the same will and energy, while things that are different in essence are different in will and energy.”

and

“But all that we can affirm concerning God does not show forth God’s nature, but only the qualities of His nature. For when you speak of Him as good, and just, and wise, and so forth, you do not tell God’s nature but only the qualities of His nature.”

This is like presenting the well-accepted fact that grass is green to support the assertion that the sky is red. Of course things with the same essence will have the same energy and will, this is a teaching universal to all of the East, right up until this very modern day. Who would doubt this? But it does not logically follow from this that energy and essence are indistinguishable. If essence is identical to energy, then when Christ raised Lazarus by divine power from the dead, did He fill Lazarus with divine energy or with essence? If he filled Lazarus with the divine nature, why then do we not worship Lazarus as our God? And when we are raised in the age to come, and sustained for eternity by the divine power, is it the essence of God which we receive? If we receive the essence of God upon being resurrected, why would it not be improper to say therefore that we become Gods by nature, as well as by grace? But of course, both of these are absurdities, for we know that the non-identity of essence and energy is how the cosmos is filled with divine power without becoming divine itself.

So the Energy is of the Essence, though not perfectly equated with it. But since the Energy is of the Essence, it cannot ever be distinguished from it in the sense of being separated from it. So it is impossible to say that only the Energy is “through the Son” while the Essence is not “through the Son.” Rather, it can only be because the Essence is “through the Son” that one can properly say that the Energy is “through the Son.”

But by this very criterion for things being distinguishable, (that is, separability), the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are nothing more than Sabellian unity, since none are separable from the others (for who has ever heard something so absurd as to think that the Father has ever been separate from His Only-Begotten and His Spirit, or that there was ever a time when the Father did not dwell in the Son and the Son did not dwell in the Father), and therefore, must be reckoned to be ontologically indistinguishable. So then under this criterion for being truly distinct, God has collapsed into a monad wearing three masks, rather than a triad, one in essence and undivided (as is sung in the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, «Τριάδα ὁμοούσιον καὶ ἀχώριστον.»)

 

[Cavaradossi]

OK. I see your pov now. You think that when I say that there is no distinction within the Godhead of Essence and Energy, then that means that Essence cannot be epistemologically distinguished from Energy. No, that is not what I am saying (though I can see how my unqualified terminology can lead to that misundestanding). What I mean when I say that there is no distinction within the Godhead of Essence and Energy is that Essence and Energy within the Godhead can never be separated ontologically.

See above. By your criterion of separability, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit cannot even be accounted as ontologically distinct.

Essence always comes with Energy and vice-versa, and can never be separated; in the same sense, God’s Goodness always comes with His Justice, and always comes with His Mercy, and always comes with His Love, etc. ,etc., etc., and can never be separated from each other. It’s one package deal, so to speak.

But if this were true, that God’s mercy, creation, judgment, love, etc. were inseparable in all circumstances, then all of God’s attributes could be deduced from just beholding one act of revelation from God in the world. But who, upon witnessing the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah would be led to know of God’s simplicity? Who upon learning of God’s foreknowledge and providence through the prophecies of his prophets would be led to know of His unity?

I’ve never said the attributes were “the same thing.”

You wrote:We do not refer to the Energies of God, but rather the Energy of God. The Energy appears as a multiplicity only from our limited human perspective, but within God Himself, there is no such distinction in attirbutes.Which would be to say that the attributes are only distinguishable conceptually, but that they are actually the same thing in reality (so God’s mercy would be God’s foreknowledge, and His simplicity would be His creation). If I am understanding you correctly here, then I am glad to see that you have made this a concession that the attributes are not completely identical.

As already explained, there is a difference between saying “Goodness is Essence” and saying “Goodness is the Essence.” The latter defines the Essence of God, while the former merely admits that Goodness is related to the Essence of God in some say.

But earlier you wrote, "Further, there is no distinction within the Godhead of Essence and Energy, which is why in one place, St. Basil taught “goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit,” a proposition which I pointed out is supported with a bad translation. Furthermore, it seemed to me that by goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit that you meant to assert that goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit in the sense that goodness would be the being of Holy Spirit. But were that the case, then it should also stand to reason that the other divine names too are the being of the Holy Spirit. So then goodness, creation, design, judgment, mercy, etc., would all be essence in the Holy Spirit. But of course, we know that this is absurd, since this would either make the Holy Spirit compounded, or make goodness, creation, judgment, etc., completely identical. But since you now seem willing to concede both that the attributes are not completely identical, and that a statement like “goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit” does not mean that the essence is composed of goodness and other attributes, nor that the essence is defined by goodness, but rather that the essence of God is only being related to goodness, by way of conceptualization, then there is little to dispute, because this already admits that God’s essence is distinct from his acts of goodness, the latter of which cause us to name the former good, while not supposing that goodness is what it is.