Blachernae, Florence, Filioque, Causality

[Cavaradossi]

I assume you read the whole letter. I only quoted that particular portion because it makes an explicit statement (in response to your query) that there is no other distinction in the Trinity except the distinction of Hypostases (and order, of course, which relates to their unique hypostatic properties). St. Gregory’s letter against the Macedonians defends the divinity of the Holy Spirit by showing His equality with the Father and Son. His process is to demonstrate the HS’s divinity and then by syllogistic inference apply it to Father and Son: “If such is the doctrine concerning Him when followed out , let the same inquiry be made concerning the Son and the Father as well.” If the same can be said of Father and Son, then they are all equal. So what does St. Gregory say of the Holy Spirit to prove His divnity?
If, then, the Holy Spirit is truly, and not in name only, called Divine both by Scripture and by our Fathers, what ground is left for those who oppose the glory of the Spirit? He is Divine, and absolutely good, and Omnipotent, and wise, and glorious, and eternal; He is everything of this kind that can be named to raise our thoughts to the grandeur of His being. The singleness of the subject of these properties testifies that He does not possess them in a measure only, as if we could imagine that He was one thing in His very substance, but became another by the presence of the aforesaid qualities. That condition is peculiar to those beings who have been given a composite nature; whereas the Holy Spirit is single and simple in every respect equally. This is allowed by all; the man who denies it does not exist. If, then, there is but one simple and single definition of His being, the good which He possesses is not an acquired good; but, whatever He may be besides, He is Himself Goodness, and Wisdom, and Power, and Sanctification, and Righteousness, and Everlastingness, and Imperishability, and every name that is lofty, and elevating above other names.

It is after all these arguments that the quote I orginally gave is placed. IOW, the “…therefore” that introduces my original quote includes these arguments. To St. Gregory of Nyssa, the unity of the three Persons is partly based on the argument of the unity between Essence and Energy in God (akin to his argument from post#53, wherein St. Gregory utilizes the fact of the unity between the different manifestations of Energy to demonstrate the unity of the Persons).

But these arguments do not base themselves upon the identity of essence and energy. What Gregory of Nyssa’s argument bases itself primarily upon is the acknowledged simplicity of the Spirit. What is simple has no accidents, and consequently, all of its properties must belong to it by nature, because if, “He was one thing in His very substance, but became another by the presence of the aforesaid qualities,” (which is to say, if he were to be called divine by participation and not by nature) this would imply that the aforesaid qualities would therefore be accidents which implies composition. The argument does not at all postulate the identity of essence and energy.

It’s not out of context. The Damascene actually constantly presumes two senses of “oneness” - (1) the oneness of Deity itself, evident in such terms as “simple and uncompound”; (2) the oneness between the Persons because of sharing a common Deity. Look what else the Damascene teaches us:
The Deity is simple and uncompound. But that which is composed of many and different elements is compound. If, then, we should speak of the qualities of being uncreate and without beginning and incorporeal and immortal and everlasting and good and creative and so forth as essential differences in the case of God, that which is composed of so many qualities will not be simple but must be compound. But this is impious in the extreme. Each then of the affirmations about God should be thought of as signifying not what He is in essence, but either something that it is impossible to make plain, or some relation to some of those things which are contrasts or some of those things that follow the nature, or an energy.

Umm, yes, that is a commonly cited passage in support of the essence energies distinction. This passage only proves that St. John of Damascus asserted, like every church father in the history of Christianity, that God is simple. It does not, however, demonstrate that the only distinctions in God are those between the persons.

 

[Vico]

Good catch. That is what I get for writing things late at night: things don’t come out quite right sometimes.

There’s no room for a distinct reception of essence as opposed to something’s hypostatic origin, is what I was trying to say (that only came half out). Marduk’s formula currently has the Son not as the hypostatic origin of the Spirit (which is to say that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son), whereas the Spirit can be said to proceed through the Son, which in his formula is interpreted as meaning that the Holy Spirit receives the divine nature through the Son, as if the Son were an instrumental cause. But this interpretation of the Filioque has several inconsistencies with the Latin formula of the Holy Spirit’s procession from the Father and Son as one principle which are problematic.

The first is that Aquinas does not admit anything but relations of origin which can establish an opposite relation between a principle and what is from the principle. This he makes clear in ST I, 36, ii:

Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other,  except relations of origin, as proved above. And opposite relations of  origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of what is "from  the principle." Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say  that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that  the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.

Here we can see that the claim that the Father is sole origin of the Spirit itself falls apart, because if this were true, there would be no opposite relation between the Son and the Spirit, which according to Aquinas would make the Spirit not distinct from the Son. As he writes in the same article:

Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as  they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the  Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and  by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations,  and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one  person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there  were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the  Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither  would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence,  as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of  the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed  to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical since it  destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost  must be related to each other by opposite relations.

Also problematic, is the way that the formulation of the Father as sole hypostatic origin, with the Son being the means through which the Spirit receives essence from the Father, necessitates some mean between the spirative power of the Son and the spirative power of the Father, such that one can be accounted as being a different cause from the other (hence, one is the first cause, and the other is the second cause in this particular formulation). But this contradicts Aquinas on two points. One can see that Aquinas rejects both that the Son can be accounted a second cause of the Spirit, and that the Son’s spirative power can be any different from the Father’s in ST I, 36, iii, ad. 2:

If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct power for  the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would be a  secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed  more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, on the contrary, the  same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the Son; and therefore  the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is  said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son  has this power from the Father.

This distinguishing between the hypostatic origin of the Spirit and the reception if essence seems not at all to be native to Aquinas’ thought, especially since Aquinas teaches explicitly that the Son is the source (see contra errores graecorum II, 25), origin (as shown above), and principle (as also shown above), of the Holy Spirit.

To avoid confusion, note that the Byzantine use of hypostasis has a different meaning than “substance” of Aquinas. The Byzantine hypostasis is better represented in the Latin theology by “subsistence”. So, subsistent origin (Lain) is closest to hypostatic origin (Byzantine).

Aquinas says: For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called “subsistence”; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called “a thing of nature”; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called “hypostasis,” or “substance.”
Also Aquinas statement, in your quotation of him, is “because the Son has this power from the Father”, which shows that he hold to the Monarchy of the Father.

 

[Cavaradossi]

To avoid confusion, note that the Byzantine use of hypostasis has a different meaning than “substance” of Aquinas. The Byzantine hypostasis is better represented in the Latin theology by “subsistence”. So, subsistent origin (Lain) is closest to hypostatic origin (Byzantine).

Aquinas says: For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called “subsistence”; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called “a thing of nature”; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called “hypostasis,” or “substance.”
Also Aquinas statement, in your quotation of him, is “because the Son has this power from the Father”, which shows that he hold to the Monarchy of the Father.

I think it is clear though that this understanding of the monarchy of the Father differs from the Greek understanding. He recognizes that the Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, because the Father is the cause of the Son sharing in the spirative power. But at the same time, he also recognizes no difference in the sense of first cause/second cause between the Father and the Son when speaking of the procession of the Spirit. This sort of thinking seems to contradict the principle of the Monarchy of the Father as understood by the East, regardless of whether one interprets causality to mean any type of cause or only ‘first cause’.

 

[GaryTaylor]

But at the same time, he also recognizes no difference in the sense of first cause/second cause between the Father and the Son when speaking of the procession of the Spirit.

I see his thinking here through Augustine, but I hear what you are saying.

There is no difference at this point since both are in perfect communion by this eternal gift of the Father to the Son, in the “final” thought the Spirit must proceed from both Father and Son, as they are one, triune God with the Holy Spirit. St Augustine is where the teaching from Aquina’s thinking imho stems from in this area. Augustine writes First principle is God the Father, spiration extends from God the Father to the Son then in communion equal the spiration continues.

For example…

St. Gregory of Nazianzus, entrusts this summary of Trinitarian faith to the catechumens of Constantinople:

“Above all guard for me this great deposit of faith for which I live and fight, which I want to take with me as a companion, and which makes me bear all evils and despise all pleasures: I mean the profession of faith in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. I entrust it to you today. By it I am soon going to plunge you into water and raise you up from it. I give it to you as the companion and patron of your whole life. I give you but one divinity and power, existing one in three, and containing the three in a distinct way. Divinity without disparity of substance or nature, without superior degree that raises up or inferior degree that casts down. . . the infinite co-naturality of three infinites. Each person considered in himself is entirely God. . . the three considered together. . . I have not even begun to think of unity when the Trinity bathes me in its splendor. I have not even begun to think of the Trinity when unity grasps me.”

St Augustine

The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as the first principle and, by the eternal gift of this to the Son, from the communion of both the Father and the Son" (St. Augustine, De Trin. 15, 26, 47: PL 42, 1095).

The spiration from the Father as the first principle.

 

[Vico]

I think it is clear though that this understanding of the monarchy of the Father differs from the Greek understanding. He recognizes that the Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, because the Father is the cause of the Son sharing in the spirative power. But at the same time, he also recognizes no difference in the sense of first cause/second cause between the Father and the Son when speaking of the procession of the Spirit. This sort of thinking seems to contradict the principle of the Monarchy of the Father as understood by the East, regardless of whether one interprets causality to mean any type of cause or only ‘first cause’.

Alexander Lossky wrote about the monarchy: “…the monarchy of the Father: that the Father is the personal principle of unity of the Three, the source of their common possession of the same content, of the same essence. The expressions “Godhead-source” and “source of the Godhead” do not mean that the divine essence is subject to the person of the Father, but only that the person of the Father is the basis of common possession of the same essence, because the person of the Father, not being the sole person of the Godhead, is not to be identified with the essence.”
From: In the Image and Likeness of God, SVS Press: Crestwood, NY, 1976, pp. 71-96 (chapter 4).

Note what was stated by the Pontificial Council for Promoting Christian Unity in THE GREEK AND LATIN TRADITIONS REGARDING THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, in their recommendation, wherein that Monarchy of the Father means sole origin which is arch or aitia: The doctrine of the Filioque must be understood and presented by the Catholic Church in such a way that it cannot appear to contradict the Monarchy of the Father nor the fact that he is the sole origin (arch, aitia) of the ekporeusiV of the Spirit.
The monarchy of the Father implies that the Father is the sole Aitia (principium) of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. I found this recommendation of the Pontificial Council for Promoting Christian Unity**, interesting, especially the use of ekporeusiV and proienai:This origin of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone as principle of the whole Trinity is called ekporeusiV by Greek tradition, following the Cappadocian Fathers. St Gregory of Nazianzus, the Theologian, in fact, characterizes the Spirit’s relationship of origin from the Father by the proper term ekporeusiV, distinguishing it from that of procession (to proienai) which the Spirit has in common with the Son. "The Spirit is truly the Spirit proceeding (proion) from the Father, not by filiation, for it is not by generation, but by ekporeusiV (Discourse 39, 12, Sources chrétiennes 358, p. 175). Even if St Cyril of Alexandria happens at times to apply the verb ekporeusqai the Son’s relationship of origin from the Father, he never uses it for the relationship of the Spirit to the Son (Cf. Commentary on St John, X, 2, PG 74, 910D; Ep 55, PG 77, 316 D, etc.). Even for St Cyril, the term ekporeusiV as distinct from the term “proceed” (proienai) can only characterize a relationship of origin to the principle without principle of the Trinity: the Father.
THE GREEK AND LATIN TRADITIONS REGARDING THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

ewtn.com/library/curia/pccufilq.htm

**

 

[mardukm]

No, because in Greek, the usage of the definite article does not always correspond to how the definite article is used in English. This argument is already problematic on linguistic grounds, because it is based upon the grammar of a language which the Greek Fathers clearly did not speak.

Knowing 5 languages myself, I am amazed at the common principles of thought inherent in all the languages. There is a definite (no pun intended) concept of particularity with the use of the definite article in all languages as opposed to its absence. That the definite article even exists is indicative of a particular meaning attached to its use. What is the basis for claiming otherwise? What is this difference that you perceive (I mean since a difference is being claimed, don’t simply claim it, but explain it)?

But again, even if we grant that the essence is not being defined, then what is the relationship of the term to the essence? If goodness is meant to correspond to something in the essence, then it holds that all of the names do something similar, and so are either all identical, or they make the essence of God complex.

Similarity does not equate to identiy, so it is a non sequitur to jump to that conclusion. As far as identity, here’s an analogy: let’s say several different parents give the same punishment to their own child, and each child got the punishment for performing the same action. One child will see his/her parent’s action as “mean.” Another will see it as “unfair.” Another will see it as “justice” (i.e., mean, but fair). Another will see it as “love.” Etc… Etc. Etc. There are a multitude of ways to see the one action, and all these descriptives truly refer to that one action, but was there not only one action after all? I will make this evident according to the other examples you give later on.

As far as making God complex, the Energy is in the Essence because it comes from the Essence. The Energy comes from God’s very Being, His Essence. They are originally “in” God and flows “from” Him. You can distinguish His Essence from his action (i.e., Energy), but they can never be separated. Where God’s Energy is evident, His Essence is ontologically and objectively present as well - it is only that we do not experience or perceive His Essence, but only His Energy. Do you deny any part of the previous sentence? Please answer that.

In light of the fact that from God’s perspective, His Essence always exists with His Energy, let me ask again a question I have asked several times, but which has never been answered by any EO: How do the EO justify separating the Essence from the Energy within the Godhead to the extent that it can be stated that only the Energy is through the Son, but the Essence is not?

Firstly, the word being translated as “operations” in Greek is ἐνεργείαι. To argue that there is only one single energy, is a rather fallacious, use of equivocation, since “energy” is a polysemic term.

There is no fallacy in affirming that they are a multiplicity from our limited perspective as creatures, but is singular from the perspective of God. As the Fathers teach us, they appear as a multiplicity ONLY because each one receives the one Energy according to his own capacity. See above with the analogy of how different children can perceive the same action in many different ways.

But for the sake of argument, let us suppose that the energies are something within the essence of God. Then it stands to reason that they are either all identical, or that the essence of God is complex. The first is explicitly rejected by St. Basil. The second is inadmissible for obvious reasons.

See above.

St. Basil goes on to write in the very same chapter that: Again, we say that God is ‘good,’ ‘just,’ ‘Creator,’ ‘Judge,’ and all such things. So, then, as in the case of the terms we just spoke about which signified a denial and rejection of what is foreign to God, so here they indicate the affirmation and existence of what has affinity with God and is appropriately considered in connection with him.The positive names correspond to the essence of God in terms of knowing that, but not knowing what (a distinction which Basil makes clear in several places). We do not know what God is.

Yes. That’s what I said. The Energy tells us something OF God’s Essence, but they do not define the Essence - i.e., they do not tell us what the Essence IS. A lot of time is being wasted on straw men.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

That seems to be a complete stretch. St. Basil does not even use the term energy in this passage, nor does he make any argument concerning the energy being mutable. He is explaining that God is called upright, truth and righteousness on account of knowledge that His essence (whatever it is) is immutable.

First, I must express incredulity at this constant attachment to mere terminology. This is admittedly not something I am used to as an Oriental and a Catholic. Goodness, Uprightness, Truth, Righteousness - these are just a few of the manifestations of the one Energeia of God. This is basic theology 101 for any Eastern or Oriental. So there is no stretch going on here. Second, I didn’t say anything about the energy being mutable. Please read my statement again. Third, it is not true that St. Basil is arguing that our knowledge of God’s Goodness, Upgrightness, Truth, etc. is due to his immutability. Rather he is very plainly and immediately connecting the immutability of Essence to the fact that His Energies (or rather, what we perceive in multiplicity) are not separable (i.e., “divergence”) or that He is more one energy than another (i.e., “leaning to one side or the other”). Fourth, if this argument is maintained, it offers a sure refutation of the previous argument that it is absurd to claim that knowledge of one attribute of God cannot lead to a knowledge of another attribute of God that are seemingly unrelated. God’s Immutabitlity itself does not immediately lead to a knowledge of His Uprightness, Goodness, etc.

My argument stands.

None of the patristic quotes so far provided have ever stated that the Spirit receives essence from the Son (they must rather be interpreted to say that, because they do not explicitly say it).

Some explicitly do, and others imply it by a direct application of common principles and teachings. On the other hand, no patristic proof has been provided for the notion that the Essence and Energy can be separated in the Godhead to the extent that one can be said to be through the Son, while the other cannot. There has only been proof that Essence and Energy can be distinguished, but not that they can be separated in the Godhead.

After this round of responses from me, I will re-present the quotes from the Fathers that demonstrate that the Spirit receives the Essence through the Son. We did debate it in another thread, wherein you responded to the quotes, and I responded, but there was not another round of responses from you. When I re-present them here, perhaps we can continued the discussion.

By contrast, this idea that the Spirit receives hypostatic existence through the Son is definitely unpatristic, for St. Cyril denied that the Spirit received existence when Theodoret accused him of implying this, to which Theodoret responded with approval.

Yes, this is the problem I perceive with the EO argument proposed thus far (as evident from the idea that Essence and Hypostasis are “communicated” in the same way). There seems to be a confusion that the notion of Essence (or existence) is identical to the notion of Hypostasis (or Being). It cannot be denied that in the 3rd through early 5th centures, the notions of hypostasis and ousia were in its primordial stages of understanding among the Churches, and the two terms were often held to mean the same thing. This was the source of the confusion between Cyril and Theodoret (and between Jerome and other homoousians; between the Paulinist and Meletian parties in Antioch; etc.). But we are beyond that now. St. Cyril did not deny that Essence is received from the Son (as the principle of Agency in the relation between themselves) – only that Hypostasis (or Being) is not received from the Son, which is identical to my response to the statement made earlier that seemed to confuse the communication of Essence with the origination of Hypostasis. IOW, I believe the EO argument maintains this original solid lack of distinction between hypostasis (“being”) and ousia (“existence”). I know that the EO make the distinction between hypostasis and ousia, but maybe in the context of the apologetics and polemics regarding filioque, it is perhaps unintentionally not being taken into full account.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

And, returning to the original subject of this thread, the idea that the Spirit receives existence through the Son certainly contradicts Blachernae. The fourth anathematism states: To the same, who affirm that the Paraclete, which is from the Father, has its existence through the Son and from the Son, and who again propose as proof the phrase “the Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son.” In certain texts [of the Fathers], the phrase denotes the Spirit’s shining forth and manifestation [here, Gregory II of Cyprus is drawing his distinction between existing and having existence]. Indeed, the very Paraclete shines from and is manifest eternally through the Son, in the same way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun’s rays; it further denotes the bestowing, giving, and sending of the Spirit to us. It does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through Him and from Him… To those who believe and say such things, we pronounce the above resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.

Again, the denial of “through the Son” can easily be meant to denote the DEPENDENCE of which St. Basil speaks (i.e., the Father’s hypostatic property as Cause does not DEPEND on the Son’s hypostatic property of agency). Note also that Blacharnae distinguishes between the eternal manifestation, on the one hand, and the temporal “bestowing, giving, and sending of the Spirit to us,” on the other. Blacharnae need not be intepreted as opposing Florence in any way.

Btw, can you please explain the distinction that Gregory II recognized between “existing” and “having existence?” What terms that we have already used are identified with those notions?

No I have not. I reject all attempts to reinterpret the word cause to mean only source, because such attempts remain unjustified.

Regardless of the definition of the term “cause,” to claim that it is proper to say “the Energy is through the Son” yet deny that “the Essence is through the Son” is still inconsistent; it also separates Essence from Energy in a way that the has not been justified from patristic sources. Please respond to that. So far, all that has been argued is that “Hypostasis and Essence are communicated in the same way,” which you already admitted was a mistake in terminology, if not in meaning.

It is the same tactic that was used by the Eutychians and all sorts of Docetists, who took St. Cyril’s use of the polysemic term ‘physis’ and misinterpreted it to make it look as if Cyril meant to say that there was only one mixed essence in Christ. There is simply no justification to restrict arbitrarily the meaning of a polysemic word like ‘aitia’ to mean only source, when it can also mean cause.

Permit me first of all to point out that I will not go off like certain EO have done that to compare the rhetoric I use to what certain heretics argued is to accuse me directly of heresy. So rest assured we won’t have to waste time going on tangents about pretended insults that never occurred. Secondly, the argument here dramatically proves my point. There is more than one way to understand “aitia” (i.e., theologically, and philosophically). Just as St. Cyril’s use of “physis” cannot be restricted only to one understanding that makes St. Cyril heterodox, neither can the Latin Church’s use of “aitia” be restricted to only one understanding that makes the Latin Church heterodox. Just as St. Cyril should be judged according to his own understanding of “physis,” the Latin Church should also be judged according to its own understanding of “aitia.”

Furthermore, the Son does not have any sort of causal power, with regard to the existence of the Spirit, either as an instrument or as a first cause, which is how the Monarchy of the Father has always been understood (as referring to the property of causing alone the existence and consubstantiality of the other hypostases).

First, define “causal power.” When I think of “causal power” I think only of the Father. The property of agency is not a “causal power” in the theological sense, but it can be termed “cause” only in the philosophical sense of being “prior to.” Are you claiming that there is no sense of the Son’s hypostatic property of agency in the Trinitarian relationships? Obviously not, since St. Palamas asserts this very thing in terms of Energy. The problem really is (despite claims to the contrary) that no patristic proof has been presented for separating Energy from Essence in God that can justify the idea that the Energy is through the Son, yet the Essence is not. Even the correct translation of St. Basil’s statement “Essence is goodness” does not in any way imply an ontological separation of Essence from Goodness (which is Energy).

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

By contrast, the Son and the Holy Spirit can be said to be the cause of other things, like our existence and salvation, and this cannot be said to violate the Monarchy of the Father.

Why? Please explain. I want to stress that request because I propose that whatever justification can be given for explaining why the Son and HS can be causes while maintaining the Father’s Monarchy will easily justify the Latin (and indeed Catholic) teaching that the Essence is “through” the Son.

For this reason, relations by energy, like the Holy Spirit’s manifestation through the Son do not violate the Monarchy, while saying that the Son can be accounted as cause of the Spirit’s existence or consubstantiality with the Father is rightfully said to violate the Father’s property as sole cause within God.

Just saying so doesn’t explain a thing. This is just begging the question. All that has been stated is “The Son and HS can be said to be the cause of Energy, and for this reason, relations of Energy do not violate the Monarchy.” WHAT REASON? That the Son and HS can be said to be the cause of Energy? This is exactly equivalent to arguing, “this car is red, therefore no other cars can be red.” There is no conceivable reason being offered here for the conclusion that “the Son [being accounted] cause of the Spirit’s existence or consubstantiality [violates] the Father’s property as sole cause within God.” The actual reason has been consistently absent from the EO rhetoric.

Permit me to offer proper justification why the Son and HS can be said to be causes of the Energy of God while not violating the Father’s monarchy. It is because “cause” is here applied to the Son and HS in a different manner than it is applied to the Father; it is understood in the sense of agency (or “second cause”; i.e., the philosophical meaning of merely being “prior to”), and being “second cause” (or agency) in no way violates the premise of the Father being the sole Source or First Cause. This is what St. Basil meant when he stated “so the expression through whom contains a confession of an antecedent Cause, and is not adopted in objection to the efficient Cause.” In the exact same way do the Latins utilize the term “cause” in the relationship between Son and Holy Spirit with respect to Essence. The Latins do not violate the Father’s Monarchy because they apply the term “cause” in a different manner than it is applied to the Father.

How do you justify joining the Essence and Hypostasis, yet separating them from the Energy in the eternal Procession? Please respond

Because the manifestation of the Holy Spirit through the Son means nothing more than that all of the uncreated energies are actualized in the Holy Spirit through the Son, following the Patristic formula that all blessings come from the Father, are prepared by the Son, and perfected in the Holy Spirit. It does not mean that the Holy Spirit receives these by virtue of the Son (the Holy Spirit has them by virtue of being God by nature), but that they are actualized by virtue of the Son, and so the Spirit is said to be manifest through (or shines forth from) the Son.

I’m sorry, but I don’t comprehend how this answers my query. You only explain what is meant when EO say that “the Energy is through the Son in the Procession.” You are not offering an explanation of how the Energy can be separated from the Essence in the Procession. Let me explain my puzzlement according to the terms you use in your explanation here. You say “the Holy Spirit has them by virtue of being God by nature.” But this still does not refute the idea that the Essence is received through the Son (indeed, not FROM the Son, but THROUGH the Son).

I am also puzzled by the implication of your use of the word “actualized.” You seem to be defending the idea that the manifestation is merely temporal, for that is where “actualization” actually takes place. But Blacharnae and Palamas are clear that the manifestation is ETERNAL. So my understanding is that they must be referring to something more than the actualization of God’s Energy. As noted earlier, Blacharnae seems to make a distinction between the “eternal manifestation,” on the one hand, and the “actualization” (i.e., the “bestowing, giving, and sending of the Spirit to us”), on the other.

No, but Thomas Aquinas did.

I’m not that familiar with St. Thomas. I’ll let others handle the brunt of it, but I do have comments later on the matter.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

I meant that if hypostasis and essence cannot be accounted as distinct, then ideas like the ones found in this post are impossible.

I don’t know where I ever agued that hypostasis and essence are not distinct, I don’t know where St. Thomas argued it (given the full context of his teaching on the matter), and I don’t know where the CC dogmatically teaches that. So I think it is a straw man to bring it up.

There is no need to imply on account of a simple mistake that I therefore am incapable of distinguishing between the origin of the hypostases and the consubstantial communion of the three hypostases. :nope:

Your admission of unclarity was sufficient. My assumption was proper - until proven otherwise, which your admission did.

One needen’t take my word for it.

Thanks for the quote, but I percieve St. Thomas to be saying only that the Essence of God naturally includes everything we can conceive of about God, which inherently includes the Persons. Of course, I’m sure elsewhere he points out that our conception of God can never be complete and can never encapsulate God’s Essence because God is infinite. I don’t see anything unorthodox about that. I admit, though, I’m not that well read on St. Thomas. But what you have provided so far does not necessitate a heterodox explanation.

It doesn’t matter whether Thomas Aquinas is right or wrong for the purpose of this debate. What does matter is if it is recognized that there are multiple definitions of divine simplicity, as I have always insisted.

I don’t understand what you mean by “multiple definitions.” Can you explain some of these definitions? Maybe I should have asked that earlier. Sorry.

For Aquinas, the persons are subsistent relations within the essence. From the Father, the Son is generated, and from both, the Spirit is spirated.

I disagree with the statement that the Catholic Church teaches “FROM BOTH, the Spirit is spirated.” The property of being “from” is possessed by the Father ALONE according to Catholic teaching, while the Son possesses the property of being “through.” So the correct presentation of the Catholic teaching would be, “There is one spiration, and in this one spiration, the Father possesses the property of being ‘from,’ while the Son possesses the property of being ‘through’.” It is not correct to say that the Father and Son both possess the property of being “from” in the spiration.

I doubt that there is even room in Aquinas’ model for talk of how the Son and Spirit ‘receive’ essence, since they are real subsistent relations within the essence.

I think brother Vico responded to that well enough.

Where did I write that hypostasis is received? I wrote that existence is received, which is in accordance with the Blachernae which argues that the Spirit has existence from the Father alone.

In our past debates on filioque, there was quite an insistent attempt to claim that hyparxeos and hypostasis are to be interpreted in an identical way. If that was not you, forgive me. But if it was, I think my statement is justified.

Earlier, I made a bad choice of words with ‘communicated’ and ‘hypostasis’, I admit, but to run amok with a simple mistake and to accuse me of “heterodoxy” (which is nothing more than a nice way to say “heresy”) is rather mean-spirited.

An argument that claims hypostasis is communicated is indeed heterodox. If that is not what you meant, then simply explain so. I can’t retract a perfectly correct statement. I’ll just ask once - please don’t waste time pretending I made any accusations against your person.

that Holy Spirit proceeds as an hypostasis from the Father alone, but receives essence from the Father through the Son, necessitates that essence and hypostasis be non-identical. That the Father contributes to the Spirit’s being in one way (as the hypostatic origin), and the Son in a different way (as the means for the reception of the essence) implies that the two are not identical and distinct in God.

Yes, I agree. But the statements here are based on a mistaken assumption that I ever claimed that hypostasis and essence are identical (which I never did). This assumption was itself based on nothing I stated, but by a sheer inventive extrapolation from other unrelated statements - i.e., I stated that Essence and Energy nor the different manifestations of Energy can be distinguished in the Godhead. This was mistakenly assumed to mean that Essence and Energy are identical. Then on the premise (not made by me) that Essence and Energy, and the latter’s different manifestations, are distinguished in the same way that the Hypostases (i.,e., Persons) are distinguished, then if I claimed that Essence and Energy are identical (which I did not), then that must mean I am claiming that Essence and Hypostasis are identical. Later, Cavaradossi brought up the idea that St. Thomas does not distinguish between Essence and Hypostasis. At this point, I think Cavaradossi is partly trying to argue against how he understands St. Thomas, not my own position.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

At this point, it would be useful to remind the readers that the original argument made against me was:

When you utilize the distinction between Energy and Essence to conclude that the Energy ekpoereusai through the Son, yet deny that the Essence ekporeusai through the Son (for the verb ekporeusai refers to nothing more nor less than ontological origin), then you imply that God is a composite being.

I would like to point two things. One is that this argument completely misunderstands the manner in which the term ἐκπορεύω is to be used. It is the Spirit which proceeds through the Son, not essence and energy.

The Spirit proceeds through the Son, and the Spirit by definition is Hypostasis, Essence and Energy. How can one say “the Spirit proceeds through the Son, not essence and energy?”

Of the latter, the Spirit is said to be from and through the Son according to it, while of the former, the Spirit is said to be from the Father alone, and of (in the sense of belonging to) the Son.

My position is that Essence & Energy cannot be ontologically distinguished in God - i.e., Essence & Energy cannot be separated in God. The distinction between Essence & Energy from our persepective is a distinction of necessity because our essence is different from God’s Essence – thus, while we can experience His Energy, we cannot even touch His Essence. But since there is no difference of Essence in God, there is no such necessity for ontological distinction of Essence & Energy in God. In other words, where God’s Essence is, God’s Energy is, and vice-versa. Hence, it cannot be stated that only the Energy is “through the Son,” while the Essence is not.

The Catholic position is that Hypostasis, which inherently includes Essence and Energy, ORIGINATES from the Father ALONE (in other wods, Hypostasis, Essence and Energy originates from the Father alone). We do not speak of the Hypostasis being communicated, because it cannot be communicated. However, we do say that the Essence and Energy are communicated FROM the Father to the Son, and FROM the Father THROUGH the Son to the Holy Spirit.

I would also object (not theologically, but for the sake of clarity) to the phrase “from and through the Son.” I would posit that if “from” and “through” are used in the same statement, “from” must always be explicitly predicated of the Father and “through” must always be explicitly predicated of the Son, because the two terms have very concisely different meanings. One can say the Holy Spirit is “from the Son” and then explain that this is only in the sense of being “through” as second cause; and one can say that the Holy Spirit is “through the Son” without further explanation. But one cannot use “from and through” with the same object in mind in the same statement, for that would already inherently indicate that “from” must be used in a different sense than “through.”

The second is that this argument hinges itself upon the idea of divine simplicity having only one meaning. Now the theory of the Spirit originating from the Father alone, while receiving essence from the Father through the Son seems to posit that the Spirit must in some sense be nonidentical with the essence, since if the Spirit were completely identical with the essence, it would stand to reason that the above distinction—which is between the Spirit’s originating from the Father alone and the very same Spirit receiving essence—would be absurd.

I agree with this completely. Btw, can you please lay out what the various meanings of “divine simplicity” you perceive?

But then the appeal to divine simplicity falls apart, because a real distinction between the Holy Spirit and the divine nature is not admitted by Thomas Aquinas.

I don’t think so. I THINK St. Thomas is arguing that the three Persons are “in” the Essence simply because He perceives Essence to be all that God is, which includes the Hypostases and their distinctions. Everything in God IS God, so there are no parts. But of the Three Hypostases, the distinction is maintained, and the Father’s Monarchy is maintained.

Our (Eastern/Oriental) position is different - that Essence is not “God” because His Essence (i.e., the Essence) cannot be named nor even conceived and thus must be above even our mere conception of “God.” To be honest, I think this distinction between the two theologies is wholly subjective and artificial. It is not an essential difference in our theologies because both theologies posit a reality of God that is above mere and all human conception. We are just expressing ourselves differently than the Latins, that is all.

The manifestation is not about receiving energy in the sense of a potency

Well the Latins would certainly agree with this since God is actus purus.

or a property.

I’d disagree, but only grammatically speaking. We can speak of properties while admitting they are natural.

That would already belong to the Spirit by nature.

If this is the basis for claiming that the Essence is not “through the Son,” then it must simultaneously discount the fact that the Essence is “from the Father.” But just as the Spirit having his Energy “by nature” does not discount the fact that his Essence and Energy are received from the Father, then by the same token, one cannot discount the notion that the Essence and Energy are received through the Son.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

It is about the way energy is worked from the Father, through the Son, and in the Holy Spirit. In this way, the Holy Spirit is said to be manifest to the world according to energy through the Son,

But this manifestation of the Energy to the world, or its operation in the world, is not all that the Fathers speak about when it comes to the relationship between Son and Holy Spirit. They also speak of the fact that the Energy itself is received from the Son (i.e, as second cause; i.e., from the Father THROUGH the Son). If you are saying it ONLY refers to its working out in creation, then you are admitting that it is only temporal. That does not do justice to the attribution of ETERNITY to the manifestation of which the later Eastern Fathers speak. I believe only the Catholic position properly explains why the later Eastern Fathers can speak of an ETERNAL manifestation. Can modern EO apologetics explain this? This question has been posited by other Easterns here, and no one has ever been able to answer the question, AFAIK.

but is neither from nor through the Son by nature,

With respect to the relationship between the Son and HS, the Fathers do teach (particularly St. Cyril and the Cappadocians) that the HS is through the Son by nature.

but only belongs to the Son by nature.

That too.

Thus the Holy Spirit progresses essentially from the Son, because the Holy Spirit, belonging to the Son by nature, is manifest through him and sent to the world by him.

This explanation does not do justice to the times when the Fathers speak clearly of the ETERNAL relationship between the Persons as distinct from the times when they speak of their economic relationship as pertains to Creation.

But nothing in God can be separated. Not even the persons can be separated, since they always dwell in one another.

That statement itself is a straw man. It is a given that we do not speak of “separability” in terms of absolute ontological separability like we do with creation. However, there is a separability between the Persons because they can be really distinguished ontologically from God’s own perspective that does not apply between the different manifestations of Energy on the one hand, and the distinction between Essence and Energy, on the other. I’ve already explained why the Energy is ONE from God’s perspective (remember the analogy with the parent’s action and the child’s understanding), and why the Essence and Energy are ONE from God’s perspective (because the necessity dictated by the fact of the difference in essence between us and God does not exist between the Persons of the Godhead).

Again with the accusations of “heterodoxy”. Most unkind. :nope:

A belief that the Essence and Energy are Persons is indeed heterodox. If that is not what was meant, then simply explain so. I can’t retract a perfectly correct statement.

But let us investigate this argument to determine whether it holds any merit. The argument goes like this: the persons cannot be distinguishable in the same manner that essence and energy are distinguishable, because this would make essence and energy persons, or in other words, to make a general formula: (a) x cannot be distinguished from y in the same manner that w is distinguished from z, because this would make w and z the same kind of thing as x and y are. But is this true? If one investigates the universals ‘man,’ ‘dog,’ and ‘ox,’ he will see that all of these species are really distinct from one another, because all of them is capable of existing without the other (the criterion for a real distinction according to Scotus is two things are really distinct if and only if one of them is capable of existing without the other). Upon investigating Socrates and God the Father, however, one will find that there is also a real distinction between them. So then God the Father and Socrates must, by argument (a) above be species. But this is altogether absurd. In fact, by this argument, one could reach all sorts of absurd conclusions, like that ‘whiteness’ and ‘heaviness’ are essences, and that ‘man’ and ‘horse’ are accidents. This argument, therefore, is completely groundless.

The argument fails because the analogy is fallacious. God within God has distinctness and simultaneous unity that is ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT from the way creatures can be said to be distinct and simultaneously united. Your second premise of placing Socrates and God in the same category is invalid and wholly inconceivable. In any case, the reason that to claim that Essence and Energy are distinguished in the same way the Persons are dstinguished is to make the Essence and Energy Persons is because the Persons are distinguished IN ONLY ONE WAY - i.e., their relationship to each other. According to Eastern theology “Essence is God” and “Energy is God.” If you add to that concept the same distinction that exists between the Persons, then you get nothing more nor less that 2 more Persons in the Godhead.

CONT’d

 

[mardukm]

CONT’d

Yes, but this reading of Gregory Palamas in fact would imply the opposite of what is being put forth in post #65, namely that the distinction between Essence, Energy, and Hypostasis for Gregory Palamas would be a stronger and more real distinction than the distinction between the Hypostases. But I do not think that is what Gregory Palamas means, nor do I think, that this reading of him can be correct.

My statement does not necessitate that the distinction between the three realities is stronger than the distinction between Persons. They are simply different, and I don’t claim to know how (I gave a theory on how I perceive the distinctions, though, and unless someone convinces me otherwise, I think my theory stands).

But I propose the following as a demonstration that the distinction between Essence and Energy is actually weaker than the distinction between Persons: All the Persons share in Essence and Energy in equal measure and in a perfectly equivalent manner. It is altogether true in every sense that the Father shares in the Essence and Energy of the Son and Holy Spirit; that the Son shares in the Essence and Energy of the Father and Holy Spirit; and the Spirit shares in the Essence and Energy of the Father and the Son (NOTE: I’m not speaking here in the least of the principles of origination of Essence and Energy, but only of the fact that they share the same Essence and Energy). But the Father does not share in the hypostatic property of Sonship or Proceeding; the Son does not share in the hypostatic property of Fatherhood or Proceeding; the Holy Spirit does not share in the hypostatic property of Fatherhood or Sonship. Further, we can speak of the Energy being of the Essence, but we cannot speak of Sonship being of Fatherhood, or of Fatherhood being of Sonship, etc., etc., etc. From these facts, the hypostatic distinctions must be stronger than the distinctions between the three realities proposed by St. Palamas. Thus do I speak of an ontological distinction between the Persons, but not between the realities proposed by St. Palamas.

Yes, but if they are inseparable in reality, then as I wrote earlier, it holds that the energies of God should all be revealed in one act of divine revelation. But this is not so, for we know God to have revealed himself to us in various ways.

No, God reveals them all to us in one Energy, but the Energy can only be perceived/accepted differently according to each person’s own nature and capacity. That’s why it (only) appears to be a multitude of energies.

So again, if they are inseparable, then it stands to reason that when God destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, he did so not only by his power, but also by his wisdom, foreknowledge, love, mercy, and providence.

Yes indeed, God’s wisdom was evident in the action. Yes indeed, his foreknowledge cannot be denied if we contemplate God’s eternity. His love and mercy for those who may otherwise be infected by the sins of Sodom and Gomorrah in its present and future is indeed evident. And in that consideration of the future, His Providence is made known.

And when He chose the elect before the foundation of the world, He did so in one simple operation completely inseparable from His power of creation.

From God’s point of view, indeed He did.

But then the Scriptures are shown to have lied, for God did not choose the elect before the foundation of the world, but rather, His choosing of the elect began with the creation of the world.

Please read Ephesians 1:4.

Furthermore, we know that there are energies which have neither beginning nor end (life, for example), energies which have a beginning (creation), and energies which have no beginning but an end (St. Maximus the Confessor taught that the providence of God would come to an end in the age to come). If these are inseparable, then what happens to the energies after providence comes to an end, or when creation began? Will the divine intellect cease to be, in the age to come, because the inseparable power of providence has also ceased to be? If not, it hardly makes sense to account them as being totally inseparable.

Does not the beginning or end of anything happen by God’s will? Explain to us please how from God’s perspective it is not one unified act of God, all done with his foreknowledge, his will, his power, his love, his mercy, etc., etc., etc., etc.? Does God change? Does an act of God’s Justice or vengeance from our perspective mean God did not do so out of Love, or Mercy, or Providence, or Will, etc., etc., etc.? DId God’s act of Creation happen without his Mercy, His foreknowledge, His Love, His Justice, etc., etc… etc. ? As St. Basil wrote, Energy of God is without divergence, or leans to one side or the other.

There’s no room for a distinct reception of essence as opposed to something’s hypostatic origin, is what I was trying to say (that only came half out). Marduk’s formula currently has the Son not as the hypostatic origin of the Spirit (which is to say that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son), whereas the Spirit can be said to proceed through the Son, which in his formula is interpreted as meaning that the Holy Spirit receives the divine nature through the Son, as if the Son were an instrumental cause.

First of all, why do you say “currently?” When have I ever not consistently maintained this position?

Secondly, it should be clarified that the Son is an instrumental cause not in the sense of the Greek philosophers (i.e., out of necessity, to which St. Basil objected), but because of natural will.

CONT’d

 

[mardukm]

CONT’d

But this interpretation of the Filioque has several inconsistencies with the Latin formula of the Holy Spirit’s procession from the Father and Son as one principle.

The first is that Aquinas does not admit anything but relations of origin which can establish an opposite relation between a principle and what is from the principle. This he makes clear in ST I, 36…

Actually, all that he is trying to establish here is the notion that the Persons are distinct - i.e., he does not discuss anything about the three hypostases (what the relations are, how they are related, what are the properties of each hypostasis), except for the fact that they exist. The following portions of your post are more relevant to the point you are trying to make.

Also problematic, is the way that the formulation of the Father as sole hypostatic origin, with the Son being the means through which the Spirit receives essence from the Father, necessitates some mean between the spirative power of the Son and the spirative power of the Father, such that one can be accounted as being a different cause from the other (hence, one is the first cause, and the other is the second cause in this particular formulation).

Actually nothing you have quoted from Aquinas indicates that the Son’s participation in the spiration is a necessity within the Godhead. All St. Thomas states is that it is there.

But this contradicts Aquinas on two points. One can see that Aquinas rejects both that the Son can be accounted a second cause of the Spirit, and that the Son’s spirative power can be any different from the Father’s in ST I, 36, iii, ad. 2:If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father. This distinguishing between the hypostatic origin of the Spirit and the reception if essence seems not at all to be native to Aquinas’ thought, especially since Aquinas teaches explicitly that the Son is the source (see contra errores graecorum II, 25), origin (as shown above), and principle (as also shown above), of the Holy Spirit.

OK. Now we are getting to the meat of the matter. You actually present 3 specific points requiring response:
(1) As far as not accounting the Son to be a secondary and instrumental cause, I agree with St. Thomas. Note that he qualifies this statement by asserting that the Son does not receive a “numerically distinct power for spiration.” This is exactly what Blacharnae asserted (i.e., objecting to making the Son a different causative power), so St. Thomas is wholly orthodox on this point. And this is actually what I have consistently been asserting:
(a) The term “cause” as applied to the Son by the CC is only in the philosophical sense, not the theological sense. Recall above that I objected to your use of the term “causal power” in reference to the Son;
(b) The term “cause” as applied to the Son is different from the term “cause” as applied to the Father (i.e., “cause” in the philosophical sense).

(2) As far as Aquinas not distinguishing between the hypostatic origin and the reception of Essence, the quotes from him presented thus far do not even touch upon that issue, so I’m not sure how that conclusion can be drawn. Perhaps you can present other, more relevant quotes.

(3) As far as Aquinas teaching that the Son is the Source, Origin, and principle, the first two notions can definitely and unequivocally be discounted because the Son is not the Source or Origin of the power of spiration, but only the Father. As far as “principle,” I can agree with that. Recall what I stated at the beginning of the thread that “principle” is not identical to “cause.” To be perfectly concise - theologically speaking, “principle” is equated to “cause,” but philosophically speaking, the two terms are different. The “principle” of spiration has two philosophical causes within it - the Source or Origin (or First Cause) which is the Father ALONE, and the Agency (or second cause) which is the Son. Even as the Son shares in the power of spiration, He is NEVER considered the Source or Origin.

CONT’d

 

[mardukm]

CONT’d

To recap, theologically speaking, there is only one Cause or Principle - the Father. This is affirmed by St. Thomas (i.e., he rejects the idea that the Son is a second causal power) and agrees with Blacharnae. When Florence states that the Son is Cause just as the Father is Cause, Florence does not, in agreement with St. Thomas and Blacharnae, regard the Son as a second causal power, whether considered separately or together with the Father. When Florence states that the Son is Cause or Principle, just as the Father is Cause or Principle, Florence means that the Son SHARES the Causal power. But in thus sharing, the philosophical distinction is maintained - i.e., within the one Cause or Principle, it is the Father ALONE who is the Source, Origin, and First Cause, while the Son is the agency. And, to repeat, this natural property of being agency is not a second causal power, nor is it a relationship of necessity as if the Father needed the Son to be the Cause, but is borne of natural Will. Thus, as the Fathers assert, the natural connection of the Spirit to the Father and Son, as well as the Monarchy of the Father, are faithfully maintained.

In light of St. Thomas, we see that the Catholic position is wholly orthodox when compared with Blacharnae. Cavaradossi, can you please analyze this previous paragraph, which I believe is the most concise expression of the Catholic position I have presented. Is there anything about it that can be criticized from the EO perspective? If not, we can focus on the issue of the ontological separation of Essence and Energy. On this latter issue, I must ask – I know we have been discussing it with fervor, but I maintain my attitude that it need not be discussed nor is a point of difference sufficient to justify disunity. Do you agree with this foregoing statement?

I do appreciate your attempt to analyze my position in light of Aquinas. I have not read Aquinas much on this issue, so I appreciate the references and the chance to investigate it, and confirm what I have asserted all along.

It is not at all a misunderstanding, because to posit that essence and energy are not distinct within God is equivalent to saying that they are identical in reality, and that only in the mind do they differ.

I didn’t say that they are not distinct within God, but that they cannot be separated, so it is a misunderstanding. Too much time is being wasted on constant misrepresentations, after it has already been explained.

Considering that the discussion is about differing types of distinctions, I think a discussion of Scotus’ formal distinction would be highly relevant.

If neither of us agrees with Scotus’ distinctions (I don’t even understand them since I never studied him), how do you propose constantly bringing him up is going to resolve anything? I’m not at all impressed that a theologian’s name is being attached to a particular idea or argument. I’d rather address the concepts or arguments from our own perspectives instead of wasting time quoting theologians that may not even match our perspectives.

But then God’s providence, will, and foreknowledge would be the same thing in reality. But this leads to all sorts of absurd conclusions, like that the providential fall of man was in accordance with the divine will, or that God’s foreknowledge is what predestines everything in a fatalistic manner.

Yes, the conclusions are absurd, but I’m not proposing those conclusions. Didn’t you claim to understand the difference between indistinguishability and inseparability? Why this regression or digression to these absurd (not my words) propositions?

But the Son not being the Spirit and the Father not being the Son is not what traditionally would be called separability.

That’s the language the Fathers use, so it’s enough for me (if you want quotations, please say so, but give me some time).

CONT’d

 

[mardukm]

CONT’d

Things would traditionally be said to be separable if and only if one can exist without the other.

I’m not sure I can accept this definition. First of all, there are a lot of symbiotic relationships even in nature, even though they are ontologically distinct. Secondly, the Fathers use the term “separability” or some term with some such concept to describe the relationship between the Persons, though They never actually exist without the Other.

This (that the Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Spirit, etc.) would probably be better termed as non-identity(either formal or real). Now going back to read (2) with this definition of “separability in mind”, it seems to me that what is proposed in (2) is that to God, essence and energy are identical, but to creation, essence and energy are not identical. But then this still collapses the distinction between essence and energy to being merely conceptual, because it implies that this is only how creation conceives of God, and that the distinction between essence and energy is not in God Himself. That is, because the distinction is not in the thing itself it cannot be said to be based on any sort of objective reality, but rather, it remains only conceptual.

The difficulty is the fact that you conceive of “conceptual” to mean an idea that has no reality, which is obviously not how I use the term. Again, there is an evident and undue focus on mere terminology. Please address the actual ideas I am conveying from my explanation.

But the common usage of the term epistemological distinction does not mean what is true, it is a distinction between different types of knowledge. Distinguishing between knowing how, knowing that, and knowing what, for example, would be epistemological distinctions, as would the distinction between synthetic and analytic knowledge.

If you have another term to signify what I mean, that’s fine. Until then, I’ll use “epistemological.”

But that again goes against the common usage of this term. A conceptual distinction has always been understood to be one which exists only in the mind.

If you have another word in mind to mean “how man perceives/understands/experiences God,” that’s fine. Until then, I’ll use “conceptual.” My actual argument has yet to be addressed. Since it seems too difficult to overcome the stricture of language, why not suggest a word we can use in common. I have absolutely no problem focusing on the actual essence of the matter, regardless of terminology. But if it will help our conversation/debate progress, you suggest a word we can use in common that conveys what I mean, and I’ll agree to it.

I suppose one could understand it that way, but only with the reservation that the divine intellect knows things as they really are, so therefore, a distinction known “according to God’s perspective” is truly in the thing.

Agreed. There is one more thing to clarify. I have never spoken of “ontological separation,” but only of “ontological distinction” (which I term merely “separation”). There is no ontological separation in the Godhead, only ontological distinction. Conversely, when I speak of “separation,” I do not mean “ontological separation,” but only “ontological distinction.”

So, from my perspective, there is “epistemological distinction,” “conceptual distinction,” and “ontological distinction” (or “separation”) in the Godhead, but never “ontological separation.” Do you understand my meaning?

CONT’d

 

[mardukm]

CONT’d

But these arguments do not base themselves upon the identity of essence and energy. What Gregory of Nyssa’s argument bases itself primarily upon is the acknowledged simplicity of the Spirit. What is simple has no accidents, and consequently, all of its properties must belong to it by nature, because if, “He was one thing in His very substance, but became another by the presence of the aforesaid qualities,” (which is to say, if he were to be called divine by participation and not by nature) this would imply that the aforesaid qualities would therefore be accidents which implies composition. The argument does not at all postulate the identity of essence and energy.

Too much time is being wasted on straw men. I never claimed Essence and Energy are identical, only that they cannot be separated from each other.

Umm, yes, that is a commonly cited passage in support of the essence energies distinction. This passage only proves that St. John of Damascus asserted, like every church father in the history of Christianity, that God is simple. It does not, however, demonstrate that the only distinctions in God are those between the persons.

Concisely, the only ontological distinction (i.e. separability) in God is that of the Persons. There are other distinctions, but they are not ontological. If they were ontological, God cannot be said to be simple and uncompound. The early medieval Eastern/Oriental Fathers say Deity is simple and uncompound, and seem to define that simplicity and uncompoundness by the fact that the Essence is simple and uncompound. They preserve the simplicity and uncompoundness of Essence by distinguishing the hypostatic relations and the Energy from the Essence. HOWEVER, in these considerations, there is one fact that dictates the intimate connection between Essence and Energy - namely, the Fathers speak of Energy being OF the Essence, but the Hypostases are never spoken of as being OF the Essence.

I think it is clear though that this understanding of the monarchy of the Father differs from the Greek understanding. He recognizes that the Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, because the Father is the cause of the Son sharing in the spirative power. But at the same time, he also recognizes no difference in the sense of first cause/second cause between the Father and the Son when speaking of the procession of the Spirit.

Already addressed above. The validity of the last sentence should be questioned on the mere fact that the very notion of distinction between philosophical causes is affirmed by St. Thomas.

Whatever else may be said, it cannot be pretended that the Latins ever anathematized the Essence/Energy distinction, nor defined what “simplicity of God” means. As you stated, there may be different conceptions of “simplicity.” I am not aware that the CC has ever even dogmatically affirmed St. Thomas’ expressions/opinions on the subject (do you know?). The Catholic Church has for a long time affirmed that unity can be maintained if certain doctrinal expressions are not maintained with too much rigor. The only ones doing any dogmatizing on the matter are the polemicists on both sides, who do not even have the authority to do so.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[mardukm]

Cavaradossi, here is the transcript of our discussion on the patristic texts supporting the Essence of the HS through the Son. NOTE: The following is from a PAST debate about 8 MONTHS AGO, and contains rhetorical language/style that may no longer be allowed in the ECF. I’ve re-presented my original arguments (with additions) to adhere to the Forum rules, but I have not done so with Cavaradossi’s original statements. If the Moderator is reading this, please keep in mind that this is a transcript of a debate many months ago, so the statements re-presented should (I pray) not be taken as breaking any current Forum rules.

The Fathers clearly testify that, the ousia being an indispensable and inseparable element of the hypostasis, the Spirit receives the ousia from the Father through the Son (or from the Son as relative cause, though never as Source).

Note that none of these quotes can be rationalized away by claiming they refer only to the economic activity of the Trinity in time, which is the popular belief of many modern EO.

For as the Son, who is in the Father and the Father in him, is not a creature but pertains to the essence of the Father (for this you also profess to say); so also it is not lawful to rank with the creatures the Spirit who is in the Son, and the Son in him
Pope St. Athanasius,To Serapion,I:21(A.D. 360)

For He, as as been said, gives to the Spirit, and whatever the Spirit hath, He hath from the Word.
Pope St. Athanasius,Against the Arians,III:24(A.D. 362)

Interesting, neither says that the Spirit receives the divine essence from the Word, unless you count essence as being a possession.

Yes. The Holy Spirit is not himself the source of His ousia, but the Father is the Source through the Son (or, per St. Athanasius , “from the Son” obviously to be understood in the mere context of the immediate relationship between the Son and HS). So it is a possession of the HS, albeit a natural possession.

The Holy Spirit … is ever with the Father and the Son, and is from God, proceeding from the Father and receiving of the Son.
St. Epiphanius,The Man Well-Anchored,7(A.D. 374)

What exactly did you doctor out of this quotation, I wonder? Where does it say he receives essence from the Son?

What else could he mean by “receiving of the Son?” I don’t see any specification that He receives only the Energy. Rather, he is asserting here a general theological Truth that the Spirit receives of the Son. It is in fact, a statement contained in the Creed of St. Epiphanius: “And we believe in the Holy Spirit, who spoke in the Law and proclaimed in the Prophets and descended in the Jordan, speaking in the Apostles and dwelling in the Saints; thus do we believe in Him: that the Spirit is Holy, Spirit of God, Spirit perfect, Spirit Paraclete, increate, and is believed to proceed from the Father and to receive from the Son. We believe in one Catholic and Apostolic Church…”

Even if the Holy Spirit is third in diginity and order, why need he be third also in nature? For that he is second to the Son, having his being from him and receiving from him and announcing to us and being completely dependent on him, pious tradition recounts.
St. Basil, Against Eunomius,3, PG 29:653B(A.D. 365)

Funny, I don’t see St. Basil teaching that the Spirit receives essence from the Son either.

“Having his being from him” and “completely dependant on him.” This latter phrase should be taken in its orthodox sense - i.e., as St. Basil clarifies in another place, dependence in the Godhead is not one of necessity but of natural will.

I know that the quotation from St. Basil is interpolated because I have seen the critical edition of the text, and there is no mention in that text of the Spirit “having His being” from the Son. That said, I have not looked up each and every quotation in the original Greek (or Latin) sources in order to see if others are interpolated as well, but if I have the time I may do that, because I really do not like the dishonesty of proof-texts torn from the proper context and poorly translated in order to support a particular position whether Catholic or Orthodox.

I read an assessment of the text from St. Basil recently. Unfortunately, I forgot to save the link. All I remember is that the author’s first name was Alexander and he had a Greek last name.

The article revealed that the pro-filioque version of the St. Basil text was contained in more ancient manuscripts than the pro-Greek version. In fact, at the Council, of the 6 sources presented, 5 came from the Greeks, and only one from the Latins. Of these 6, 5 of them (including the one from the Latins) contained the pro-filioque version.

The purpose of the article was to demonstrate that the Latins did not falsify the text of St. Basil, though the author himself was of the opinion that the pro-Greek version was the correct one.

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One, moreover, is the Holy Spirit, and we speak of Him singly, conjoined as He is to the one Father through the one Son, and through Himself completing the adorable and blessed Trinity.
St. Basil,On the Holy Spirit,18:45(A.D. 375),in NPNF2,VIII:28

Ok, great, where does it say the essence of the Spirit is received from or through the Son?

That the Spirit is united/conjoined to the Father because of the ousia is basic Trinity 101. St. Basil says that the HS is conjoined to the Father THROUGH THE SON. If the Essence was directly from the Father, and not through the Son, how do you explain this statement?

Thus the way of the knowledge of God lies from One Spirit through the One Son to the One Father, and conversely the natural Goodness and the inherent Holiness and the royal Dignity extend from the Father through the Only-begotten to the Spirit. Thus there is both acknowledgment of the hypostases and the true dogma of the Monarchy is not lost.
St. Basil,On the Holy Spirit,18:47(A.D. 375)

Sounds like a great quote which is in full agreement with Gregory Palamas’ teaching on the procession of the Spirit.

I’m using this quote to demonstrate 2 things: (1) St. Basil understands that the Son’s hypostatic property of agency refers not just to the economic manifestation, but also reveals something about the eternal relationship (i.e., the Hypostases); (2) that the Son’s hypostatic property of agency in no way detracts from the Monarchy of the Father. This latter principle is key to understanding the Catholic Church’s teaching on filioque, and forestalls any argument that filioque is heterodox.

One Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit must be confessed according to the divine tradition. Not two Fathers, nor two Sons, since the Spirit neither is the Son nor is called. For we do NOT receive anything from the Spirit in the SAME way as the Spirit from the Son; but we receive him (ie. the Spirit) coming to us and sanctifying us, the communication of divinity, the pledge of eternal inheritance, and the first fruits of the eternal good.
St. Basil,Homilies,PG 31:1433(ante A.D. 379)

Did Basil really write NOT and SAME in all caps? He is definitely correct, of course, we don’t receive from the Spirit the divine energies in the same way that the Spirit receives the divine energies through the Son.

I highlighted those because when the Fathers say the Spirit “receives” from the Son, they are speaking of the ontological nature of the Godhead, not a mere temporal manifestation. When we receive divinity, we only participate. But when the Spirit receives from the Son, it is an ontological relation. We cannot receive Essence, but only God’s Energy, because we are creatures, but the Spirit receives from the Son in an altogether different way - i.e., He receives BOTH Essence and Energy from the Son. If this is not the difference, please explain to us what the difference is. If the Spirit only receives Energy from the Son, how is that different from the way we receive from the Spirit? I believe this definitely refutes the claim that the Spirit does not receive Essence from the Son, and only receives Energy.

If ever there was a time when the Father was not, then there was a time when the Son was not. If ever there was a time when the Son was not, then there was a time when the Spirit was not.
St. Gregory of Nazianen,5th Oration(31),3(A.D. 380)

Still not seeing that teaching that the essence of the Spirit comes through the Son.

It has been constantly claimed by EO that because the Son does not have anything to do with the Spirit’s existence, His Essence thus cannot come from the Son (or, rather, from the Father through the Son). As St. Gregory Nazianzen affirms that the Holy Spirit’s existence depends on the Son, in the same way that the Son’s depends on the Father (again, not by virtue of necessity, but by virtue of natural divine Will), then the EO argument crumbles.

Our Lord teaches that the being of the Spirit is derived not from the Spirit Himself, but from the Father and the Son; He goes forth from the Son, proceeding from the Truth; He has no subsistence but that which is given Him by the Son.
St. Didymus the Blind,The Holy Spirit, 37(ante A.D. 381)

Getting warmer, but Didymus the Blind says that the Spirit has no subsistence (that is hypostasis) except from the Son. You yourself admit that this is incorrect.

I suspect that St. Didymus used hyparxeos, not hypostasis, which would be consistent with Catholic teaching. If hyparxeos is used, it is orthodox.

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For as the Son is bound to the Father, and, while deriving existence from Him, is not substantially after Him, so again the Holy Spirit is in touch with the Only-begotten, Who is conceived of as before the Spirit’s subsistence only in the theoretical light of a cause. Extensions in time find no admittance in the Eternal Life; so that, when we have removed the thought of cause, the Holy Trinity in no single way exhibits discord with itself; and to It is glory due.
St. Gregory of Nyssa,Against Eunomius,1:42(A.D. 384)

Strange, another one which confesses that the hypostasis of the Spirit comes from the Son, which you again say is incorrect.

No, I fully admit, and always have, that the Son can be “cause” in relation to the Holy Spirit in the philosophical sense of “cause,” as merely being “prior to.” That is perfectly and exactly what St. Gregory has stated here. So St. Gregory of Nyssa is fully in line with Catholic teaching, to which I adhere.

If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the Persons, we shall make to such a charge this answer;–that while we confess the invariable character of the nature, we do not deny the difference in respect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we apprehend that one Person is distinguished from another;-by our belief, that is, that one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause; and again in that which is of the Cause we recognize another distinction. For one is directly from the first Cause, and another by that which is directly from the first Cause; so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without doubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of being Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirit from His relation by way of nature to the Father.
St. Gregory of Nyssa,To Ablabius-There are not three gods(A.D. 375)

Ok, great, where does it say that the essence of the Spirit is drawn through the Son?

The whole purpose of his statement is given in the last sentence. “so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without doubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of being Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirit from His relation by way of nature to the Father.” That’s basic Trinity 101b. The Spirit’s relationship to the Father according to Essence (or Nature) is THROUGH THE SON. Btw, here is St. Gregory of Nyssa himself in the context of his own writings proving the Catholic understanding that the analogy of the Three Torches signifies the internal, eternal divine relationships, not mere economic manifestation.

He is the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son, seeing that He is poured forth by way of essence from Both or in other words, from the Father through the Son.
St. Cyril of Alexandria,Worship and Adoration,1(A.D. 429)

Absolutely true, he is the Spirit of the Father and the Son. I’ll give you this one. We can talk about it, if you’re able to keep your mind open.

He is poured forth by way of ESSENCE from both. That’s plain as day. He’s not talking of Energy alone (I add this word “alone” because Essence can never be separated from Energy, so if it is asserted the Spirit by way of Essence is poured forth from both, it naturally includes the Energy, and - for that matter - vice-versa.

Those of the Queen of the cities(Constantinople) have attacked the synodal letter of the present very holy Pope, not in the case of all chapters that he has written in it, but only in the case of two of them. One relates to the theology (of the Trinity) and, according to them says:‘The Holy Spirit also has his ekporeusis(ekporeuesthai) from the Son’. The other deals with the divine incarnation. With regard to the first matter, they(the Romans) have produced the unanimous evidence of the Latin Fathers, and also of Cyril of Alexandria, from the study he made of the gospel of St. John. On the basis of these texts, they have shown that they have not made the Son the cause(aitian) of the Spirit–they know in fact that the Father is the only cause of the Son and the Spirit, the one by begetting and the other by ekporeusis(procession)–but that they have manifested the procession through him (to dia autou proienai) and have thus shown the unity and identity of the essence.
St. Maximus the Confessor,To Marinus(A.D. 655)

As you should very well know, this letter was thrown out at Florence, because it essentially showed that the Latins were in heresy and did not teach what St. Maximus was told they did.

From what I know, it was excluded only because of its seeming implication. The fact is, Florence affirmed this teaching, but it used a different term than aitia when referring to the Father alone. So it’s not as if the doctrine was different, only the terminologies. Regardless of that, it cannot be denied that St. Maximus’ here affirms: (1) the Son’s participation in ekporeusai as agency, and (2) this participation pertains to the internal, eternal relationship of the Persons, not mere economic manifestation.

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