Blachernae, Florence, Filioque, Causality

[Cavaradossi]

Yes, you have given examples of Fathers distinguishing between Essence and Energy even in the Godhead, but not any to support the idea that they can be separated in any way in the Godhead. They affirm an epistemological distinction between Essence and Energy, but not an ontological distinction. In other words, though Essence and Energy are not the same, they cannot be separated. Sorry for my lack of clarity previously - I thought it would be a given that as an Oriental, I adhere to the epistemological distinction between Essence and Energy. and that when I stated “there is no distinction” it refers to something other than epistemological distinction).

Again, I must respond that this criterion of separability is inadmissible, because the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are also said to be inseparable, yet are held to be ontologically distinct.

Not that the Energy cannot be associated with the Essence (as the Damascene taught, no Essence is lacking in Energy), but that they are not to be equated with each other.

Precisely so, but that has always been the concern, that the energies and the essence are not equivalent, and hence are distinct. The Energies are not equivalent to the essence, and furthermore, this non-equivalence precedes the intellect, because the intellect is not the sole cause of the energies of God differing from the essence of God. This is exactly what Scotus’ formal distinction is, an ontological distinction between things which are inseparable (separability being his criterion for the real distinction), but which differ in terms of their ratio, such that neither ratio overlaps. However, since the formal distinction is not caused by the intellect alone, this distinction is real in a loose sense of the term, and not conceptual in nature.

Again, when I speak of “distinction” here, I am not referring to epistemological distinction, but ontological distinction - i.e., that they can be separated. The properties are not ontologically distinct beacuse they can never be separated from each other. I.e., we cannot conceive of God’s Justice without God’s Love, or God’s Mercy, etc., etc., etc. We as humans think that God’s Mercy is separated from God’s Justice, but it is not. We think His Design is separated from His Love, but it is not. Etc. Etc. Etc.

I am beginning to wonder just what exactly you mean an epistemological distinction. By this do you mean a conceptual distinction, between things which can only be distinguished by the intellect? I do not think that you mean a distinction between modes of justifying that a statement can be known to be true (e.g., the distinction between synthetic and analytic, or the distinction between a priori and a posteriori). Either way, as I have pointed out, the criterion of separability provided is inadmissible on the grounds that it makes the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit not distinct ontologically.

…and, therefore, that, except for the distinction of order and Person, no variation in any point is to be apprehended; but we assert that while His place is counted third in mere sequence after the Father and Son, third in the order of the transmission, in all other respects we acknowledge His inseparable union with them; both in nature, in honour, in godhead, and glory, and majesty, and almighty power, and in all devout belief.
St. Gregory of Nyssa,

Against the Macedonians

One doesn’t even need to look at the context of this statement to know that Gregory of Nyssa is not saying that there is only a distinction between the three Trinitarian persons and nothing else. All he is saying here is that the Holy Spirit, aside from being distinct in his ordering and his hypostasis, is not to be held to be different from the Father and the Son in any way, either by essence or by energy. Nevertheless, for the benefit of the readers, here is the entire passage: This is the view we take, after the unprofessional way usual with us; and we reject all these elaborate sophistries of our adversaries, believing and confessing as we do, that in every deed and thought, whether in this world, or beyond this world, whether in time or in eternity, the Holy Spirit is to be apprehended as joined to the Father and Son, and is wanting in no wish or energy, or anything else that is implied in a devout conception of Supreme Goodness ; and, therefore, that, except for the distinction of order and Person, no variation in any point is to be apprehended; but we assert that while His place is counted third in mere sequence after the Father and Son, third in the order of the transmission, in all other respects we acknowledge His inseparable union with them; both in nature, in honour, in godhead, and glory, and majesty, and almighty power, and in all devout belief.

Notice here how he is not speaking of distinctions within God, but distinctions between the Holy Spirit and the other two hypostases, and remarking that the Holy Spirit is only held to be distinct by order and person, but not by anything else. Nowhere does he deny that essence is distinct from energy.

 

[Cavaradossi]

The Deity is perfect , and without blemish in goodness, and wisdom, and power, without beginning, without end, everlasting, uncircumscribed , and in short, perfect in all things. Should we say, then, that there are many Gods, we must recognise difference among the many. For if there is no difference among them, they are one rather than many…the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one in all respects, save those of not being begotten, of birth and of procession. But it is by thought that the difference is perceived. For we recognise one God: but only in the attributes of Fatherhood, Sonship, and Procession, both in respect of cause and effect and perfection of subsistence, that is, manner of existence, do we perceive difference.
St. John Damascene, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book I

Wow, talk about quoting things out of context, the ellipses points omit over two chapters of material! The context of the passage before the ellipses points is a reasoned proof that there is only one God. The passage after the ellipses points details how the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one. In context, there is no admission that the distinctions between the persons are the only distinctions recognized, but that the only differences recognized between the persons are that of the particular attributes of the three persons.

That’s not a proper analogy because individual stones, despite lack of will, have formal, ontological distinction (i.e., separate). Essence and Energy, and the various ways that God’s Energy appears to us, do not have formal distinction as if they can be conceived of separately from the other.

And again, the Father can be conceived of without His Only-Begotten? Perhaps Arius and Eunomius would approve of this statement, but Ss. Basil and Athanasius definitely would not. So what then? By this criterion, either the Father and Son are an indistinct Sabellian monad, or they are completely separable! Furthermore, one of the criteria for being formally distinct, according to Duns Scotus, is that the two things are inseparable. The statement, “Essence and Energy, and the various ways that God’s Energy appears to us, do not have formal distinction as if they can be conceived of separately…,” does not even seem to employ the term formal distinction correctly, but instead uses the term to describe something which is inconsistent with its own definition.

They are epistemologically distinct, but not ontologically distinct. To grant them formal, ontological distinction, would fall into the error of the Greek pagans, who granted such formal, ontological distinction to various attributes such as Love (Aphrodite), War (Ares), Fear (Phobos), etc. etc., thus giving each of them the status of deity.

But by this very logic, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit too are epistemologically distinct, but not ontologically distinct, since to say that they are ontologically distinct (that is, separable) would be to fall into the error of the Greek Pagans.

I’m not speaking of Creation, but of the Godhead, which is on a wholly different category. Tactile analogy can only get you so far before it fails, as far as the Godhead is concerned.

You wrote: I think that is rather clear. Btw, the reason that the Names of the Persons can indicate distinction, while the names of all other things we use to refer to the Godhead cannot, is because the latter refers to impersonal objects, while the former refers to personal beings with will.

I am simply requesting to know why it is that the property of having a will is a criterion for things being distinguishable, and how this criterion can be justified (some patristic evidence for this criterion would be nice).

 

[Cavaradossi]

I did not say that the distinction between the Persons is Will; I said the distinction between Essence/Energy, on the one hand, and the Persons, on the other, is the fact that the Persons have Will.

When I read:

I think that is rather clear. Btw, the reason that the Names of the Persons can indicate distinction, while the names of all other things we use to refer to the Godhead cannot, is because the latter refers to impersonal objects, while the former refers to personal beings with will.

I understood, “the Names of the Persons can indicate distinction, while the names of all other things… cannot, is because the latter refers to impersonal objects, while the former refers to personal beings with will,” to mean that having a will was what allowed for distinctions between persons, but not between things without wills, which is why I argued that this could only be true if they differed in will. However, it seems to me now that the argument from you is that person is distinct from essence/energy, because persons have will. But this is cannot be so, because as the fathers taught (in relation to the teaching of the Sixth Ecumenical Council), it is not persons which have will, but essences.

Agreed, but I would further posit that there are different levels of distinction. As stated in a previous poast, whatever distinction the Fathers conceived between Essence/Energy is not the same as the distinction conceived between Persons. I would include St. Palamas here, which would, IMO, save him from the accusation of novelty.

And what would be the difference between the two distinctions?

But not for separating them in any sense. The Fathers never conceived of Energy apart from Essence, though they can be distinguished (that has always been my point, despite my [admittedly] insufficiently qualified language prone to misinterpretation).

But again, this criterion cannot be applied for what would make the distinction between Essence and Energy different, since Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not separable.

I understand what you are saying - that St. Gregory’s is proposing how the Godhead is one, not how the energies (operations) are one. In truth, St. Gregory actually utilizes the latter to demonstrate the former. One of the opposing rationales he argues against is the idea that because there are many operations (or energies), there are many Gods. He refutes this with the assertion that the many operations are actually one operation in the Godhead because their result is the same:
“and again, when we hear that the Father judges no man , we do not think that the Scripture is at variance with itself—(for He Who judges all the earth does this by His Son to Whom He has committed all judgment; and everything which is done by the Only-begotten has its reference to the Father, so that He Himself is at once the Judge of all things and judges no man, by reason of His having, as we said, committed all judgment to the Son, while all the judgment of the Son is conformable to the will of the Father; and one could not properly say either that They are two judges, or that one of Them is excluded from the authority and power implied in judgment);— so also in the case of the word Godhead, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, and that very power of superintendence and beholding which we call Godhead, the Father exercises through the Only-begotten, while the Son perfects every power by the Holy Spirit, judging, as Isaiah says, by the Spirit of judgment and the Spirit of burning, and acting by Him also, according to the saying in the Gospel which was spoken to the Jews. For He says, If I by the Spirit cast out devils; where He includes every form of doing good in a partial description, by reason of the unity of action: for the name derived from operation cannot be divided among many where the result of their mutual operation is one.”

No, that is not what he is saying. He is saying that the name of an operation, like judging, burning, wisdom, etc., cannot be applied to the different persons as three. When Gregory of Nyssa writes, “for the name derived from operation cannot be divided among many where the result of their mutual operation is one,” it should be clear that the words “many” and “their” here refers not to the energies of God, but to the three hypostases, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who as a result of their mutual operation, cannot have the divine names like fire, judge, etc., split up amongst them so as to say that there are three fires, three judges, etc. But he nowhere in that passage writes that the energies of God, like burning and judgement, are identical with one another.

 

[mardukm]

Where in your original argument did you ever even mention anything about the presence or absence of the definite article?

I’ve always understood a difference between the inclusion of a definite article and lack of it. I assumed you perceived the difference as well(?).

But suppose that there were no definite article. Then when one says Goodness is -]the/-] Essence of God, what is meant by this statement?

I thought I already explained it. To say “goodness is the essence” (i.e., WITH the definite article) is to restrict/define essence as goodness (in St. Gregory’s words “nothing else but”). WITHOUT the definite article, essence is not being defined.

Is it meant to say that we know the essence of God to be good by its operations, or because we are to think of goodness itself is in the essence of God?

The former, but I disagree that the latter is heterodox. The point of the Fathers for saying “Goodness is not the Essence” (and other such statements which deny the equation of the various manifestations [plural] of the Energy [singular] of God to the Essence") is NOT to say that these operations (or attributes or names or whatever you want to call them) are not in the Essence, but rather that none of these operations (singularly or even all of them taken together) can ever completely define what the unfathomable Essence of God is (“There is no one name sufficiently broad to take in the whole essence of God. There are names, however, many and varied, obscure and of little importance in view of the whole, but each of its own special significance, which, when assembled together, convey to us a sufficient understanding of God’s essence…” [notice he says “sufficient,” not “complete”] -St. Basil, Against Eunomius 1:10). The Fathers are clear that the Energy is of the Essence. St. Basil himself teaches that the connection between Essence and Energy is so intimate that to conceive of a separation or variation in the Energy is to make the Essence itself mutable (“He is called good, as the Father is good, and He who was begotten of the Good is good, and to the Spirit His goodness is essence. He is called upright, as the Lord is upright, in that He is Himself truth, and is Himself Righteousness, having no divergence nor leaning to one side or to the other, on account of the immutability of His essence.”).

Exactly, so according to your argument, the Holy Spirit receives either hypostasis or existence (it is not exactly clear which you intend) separately from ousia, since one is received from the Father alone, while the other is received from the Father through the Son.

No. My argument is and always has been that the ORIGIN of the Hypostasis (which intimately includes ousia/energeia) is from the Father ALONE. I am not denying that the hypostasis can be THROUGH the Son, but only saying that the manner in which the Son participates in that hypostatic existence is by being the Agency through which the ousia/energeia of the Father is transmitted to the Spirit. IOW, the Son participates in the hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit NOT and NEVER as the Origin of anything, but only as Agency. You have already admitted that with respect to Energy, the Son’s role as Agency does not interfere with the Father’s sole role as Source. Isn’t it inconsistent to deny that same argument with respect to the Essence (and unpatristic, in the face of so many Fathers indicating that the Essence of the Holy Spirit is through the Son or that the Spirit’s hypostatic connection to the Father is through the Son or, especially, the Damascene’s explicit affirmation that the Holy Spirit ekporeusai through the Son)?

But your argument is inconsistent in another way. St. Palamas states that there are three realities in the Godhead - Essence, Energy and Hypostases (plural). How do you justify joining the Essence and Hypostasis, yet separating them from the Energy in the eternal Procession? Please respond

How can this be reconciled with the affirmation that there is no real distinction between the hypostases and the essence?

I’ve never said there is no real distinction between hypostasis and essence. What I’ve argued is that Essence and Energy can never be separated within the Godhead.

If the distinction between hypostasis and essence is not prior to the intellect in the thing, but is to be found in the intellect alone, then it stands to reason that the two cannot be communicated by separate means, but must be communicated in the exact same manner, since they are identical, and not distinct in reality.

First of all, rhetorically speaking, I’ve never stated there is no real distinction between hypostasis and essence, nor that they are identical. So that part is a straw man. Secondly, I disagree completely with your language that Hypostasis is “communicated.” The hypostasis is not communicated from the Father to the Son. The Essence and Energy are communicated, but not the Hypostasis. We can speak of the Hypostases of Son and Holy Spirit originating from the Father, but we do not speak of the Hypostases being “communicated” the way that the Essence/Energy are communicated. Sonship is a hypostatic property of the Son, and is not given from the Father, just as the Proceeding is a hypostatic property of the Spirit, and not given to the Spirit from the Father. To claim that the hypostases is communicated confuses the Persons. These are great Mysteries, but the fact that you conflate the communication of the Essence/Energy from the Father with the origination of Hypostases from the Father I believe exposes a weakness in your rhetoric.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

His entire argument has to do with preserving his account of divine simplicity. Essence is indistinguishable from person, because for Aquinas, to have a difference between the suppositum and the essence, is to be composed. God, being uncomposed has no difference between the so-called supposita and the essence,

I haven’t read Aquinas fully on this matter YET. But I’ll take a shot in the dark and assert that I highly doubt Aquinas’ argument is the same as what you just stated. Your statement is so obviously circular that I can’t believe a master rhetorician such as Aquinas would argue in that way.

so each person, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is identical with the essence but distinct from the other two

I think I see where Aquinas is coming from here. Each Person is all that God is (i.e. Essence), which would explain Thomas’ equivalence of Person and Essence. I don’t think there is anything heterodox about that, since Thomas maintains a real distinction between Persons (unlike Sabellius). I think Aquinas’ basic premises are fully orthodox, but his expressions take a bit of thought to comprehend.

by way of relations of opposition, the Father against the Son, and the Father and the Son both against the Holy Spirit.

Not sure what you or Thomas mean by “relations of opposition.” If Thomas means that the Father is not the Son or the Holy Spirit, the Son is not the Father or Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is not the Father or the Son, then that’s a very orthodox statement.

But if this is true, then your very theory of the Holy Spirit receiving essence by a different manner than the Holy Spirit receiving existence contradicts this.

This argument is based on what I believe is a heterodox assumption that Hypostasis is “received.” Only Essence and Energy can properly be stated to be “received.” My position is that Hypostasis (which inherently includes Essence and Energy) ORIGINATES from the Father ALONE, and the inherent Essence/Energy is transmitted to the Son from the Father, and to the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son. So Essence and Energy are transmitted in the same way; Hypostasis cannot be spoken of as being transmitted. A more relevant question is how do you justify the idea that the Holy Spirit receives the Essence differently than the Energy in the Procession.

This is like presenting the well-accepted fact that grass is green to support the assertion that the sky is red. Of course things with the same essence will have the same energy and will, this is a teaching universal to all of the East, right up until this very modern day. Who would doubt this? But it does not logically follow from this that energy and essence are indistinguishable. If essence is identical to energy

As explained, when I have stated that the Energy and Essence cannot be distinguished in the Godhead, all I’ve meant is that they cannot be separated. It’s a straw man to claim that I ever argued that Essence and Energy are identical.

But by this very criterion for things being distinguishable, (that is, separability), the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are nothing more than Sabellian unity, since none are separable from the others (for who has ever heard something so absurd as to think that the Father has ever been separate from His Only-Begotten and His Spirit, or that there was ever a time when the Father did not dwell in the Son and the Son did not dwell in the Father), and therefore, must be reckoned to be ontologically indistinguishable. So then under this criterion for being truly distinct, God has collapsed into a monad wearing three masks, rather than a triad, one in essence and undivided (as is sung in the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, «Τριάδα ὁμοούσιον καὶ ἀχώριστον.»)

Your whole argument is based on the idea that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinguishable in the same way that Essence and Energy are distinguishable. I’ve never claimed this because I believe such an idea would make Essence and Energy divine Persons, which is heterodox. I have already affirmed in past posts that the distinction between Essence and Energy is different from the distinction between Persons (St. Palamas affirms this by categorizing Hypostases as one reality, distinct from the Essence and Energy; and I made this affirmation long before I made the clarification of what I meant by “there is no distinction between Essence and Energy in the Godhead” - so it is disinegnuous to claim that I am arguing that the Essence and Energy are identical).

See above. By your criterion of separability, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit cannot even be accounted as ontologically distinct.

See above. I reject the premise that the Essence and Energy are distinct in the same way that the Persons are distinct.

But if this were true, that God’s mercy, creation, judgment, love, etc. were inseparable in all circumstances, then all of God’s attributes could be deduced from just beholding one act of revelation from God in the world. But who, upon witnessing the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah would be led to know of God’s simplicity? Who upon learning of God’s foreknowledge and providence through the prophecies of his prophets would be led to know of His unity?

First of all, they are indeed inseparable, but not indistinguishable. Do you accept the difference between the two concepts?

Secondly, does one deny God’s simplicity when His Justice is evinced? Does one deny his unity upon learning of God’s foreknowledge and providence? If not, what is the merit of this argument? They can be distinguished, but they cannot be separated.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

You wrote:We do not refer to the Energies of God, but rather the Energy of God. The Energy appears as a multiplicity only from our limited human perspective, but within God Himself, there is no such distinction in attirbutes.Which would be to say that the attributes are only distinguishable conceptually, but that they are actually the same thing in reality (so God’s mercy would be God’s foreknowledge, and His simplicity would be His creation). If I am understanding you correctly here, then I am glad to see that you have made this a concession that the attributes are not completely identical.

Again, when I’ve said “no distinction” in terms of the discussion of Essence and Energy, I meant “no ontological separation.”

But since you now seem willing to concede both that the attributes are not completely identical, and that a statement like “goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit” does not mean that the essence is composed of goodness and other attributes, nor that the essence is defined by goodness, but rather that the essence of God is only being related to goodness, by way of conceptualization, then there is little to dispute, because this already admits that God’s essence is distinct from his acts of goodness, the latter of which cause us to name the former good, while not supposing that goodness is what it is.

Well, since I asserted long before this round of debate that the distinction between Essence and Energy is not the same distinction between Persons, then you should have known that I recognized a distinction between Essence and Energy, much less that I ever claimed they were identical. So I’m not conceding anything so much as you simply misunderstanding my rhetoric (which is my own fault since I assumed a common knowledge of my past rhetoric on this issue).

Again, I must respond that this criterion of separability is inadmissible, because the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are also said to be inseparable, yet are held to be ontologically distinct.

See above. I reject the premise that the Essence and Energy are distinct in the same way that the Persons are distinct. Also see below on my understanding of “distinct.”

but which differ in terms of their ratio, such that neither ratio overlaps. However, since the formal distinction is not caused by the intellect alone, this distinction is real in a loose sense of the term, and not conceptual in nature.

I don’t understand all this talk of ratios. I don’t think it’s relevant to our discussion anyway.

I am beginning to wonder just what exactly you mean an epistemological distinction. By this do you mean a conceptual distinction, between things which can only be distinguished by the intellect? I do not think that you mean a distinction between modes of justifying that a statement can be known to be true (e.g., the distinction between synthetic and analytic, or the distinction between a priori and a posteriori).

I perceive the distinctions thus:
(1) The distinction between manifestations of God’s Energy is epistemological because it is true, but only conceptual, (i.e., as perceived by the intellect), and not ontological. In other words, from our perspective, it is perceived in many manifestations, but from the perspective of God, there is only one Energy.
(2) The distinction between Essence and Energy is epistemological because it is true. But it is not merely conceptual because we know that we can experience His Energy, but not His Essence - to put it another way, we can define his Energy (singular) according to its manifestations (plural), but we can never define His Essence. The distinction is an objective reality, not merely subjective according to our understanding/experience. However, the distinction is not ontological because Essence and Energy are never separable in God. Think about it - from our perspective, they are separable ONLY because we can never understand/experience the Essence, but do you think for one moment that from God’s perspective, one Person somehow cannot experience the Essence or is disconnected from the Essence so as to justify any sort of separation between Essence and Energy? Dwell on that seriously and deeply.
(3) The distinction between the Persons is epistemological because it is true. It is not merely conceptual because our knowledge from divine revelation dictates the distinction is an objective reality, not merely subjective. And it is ontological because from the perspective of God, they are separable - i.e., the Father is not the Son nor the Holy Spirit, the Son is not the Father nor the Holy Spirit, etc.
In summary:
(1) Distinction between manifestations of God’s one Energy - epistemological, conceptual, not ontological.
(2) Distinction between Essence and Energy - epistemological, not merely conceptual, not ontological.
(3) Distinction between Persons - epistemological, not merely conceptual, ontological.
I use “epistemological” to refer to that which is true.
I use “conceptual” to mean “God from man’s perspective.”
I use “ontological” to mean “God as He is according to God’s own perspective.”

Either way, as I have pointed out, the criterion of separability provided is inadmissible on the grounds that it makes the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit not distinct ontologically.

I reject the premise that the Essence and Energy are distinct in the same way that the Persons are distinct.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

One doesn’t even need to look at the context of this statement to know that Gregory of Nyssa is not saying that there is only a distinction between the three Trinitarian persons and nothing else. All he is saying here is that the Holy Spirit, aside from being distinct in his ordering and his hypostasis, is not to be held to be different from the Father and the Son in any way, either by essence or by energy. Nevertheless, for the benefit of the readers, here is the entire passage: This is the view we take, after the unprofessional way usual with us; and we reject all these elaborate sophistries of our adversaries, believing and confessing as we do, that in every deed and thought, whether in this world, or beyond this world, whether in time or in eternity, the Holy Spirit is to be apprehended as joined to the Father and Son, and is wanting in no wish or energy, or anything else that is implied in a devout conception of Supreme Goodness ; and, therefore, that, except for the distinction of order and Person, no variation in any point is to be apprehended; but we assert that while His place is counted third in mere sequence after the Father and Son, third in the order of the transmission, in all other respects we acknowledge His inseparable union with them; both in nature, in honour, in godhead, and glory, and majesty, and almighty power, and in all devout belief.

Notice here how he is not speaking of distinctions within God, but distinctions between the Holy Spirit and the other two hypostases, and remarking that the Holy Spirit is only held to be distinct by order and person, but not by anything else. Nowhere does he deny that essence is distinct from energy.

I assume you read the whole letter. I only quoted that particular portion because it makes an explicit statement (in response to your query) that there is no other distinction in the Trinity except the distinction of Hypostases (and order, of course, which relates to their unique hypostatic properties). St. Gregory’s letter against the Macedonians defends the divinity of the Holy Spirit by showing His equality with the Father and Son. His process is to demonstrate the HS’s divinity and then by syllogistic inference apply it to Father and Son: “If such is the doctrine concerning Him when followed out , let the same inquiry be made concerning the Son and the Father as well.” If the same can be said of Father and Son, then they are all equal. So what does St. Gregory say of the Holy Spirit to prove His divnity?
If, then, the Holy Spirit is truly, and not in name only, called Divine both by Scripture and by our Fathers, what ground is left for those who oppose the glory of the Spirit? He is Divine, and absolutely good, and Omnipotent, and wise, and glorious, and eternal; He is everything of this kind that can be named to raise our thoughts to the grandeur of His being. The singleness of the subject of these properties testifies that He does not possess them in a measure only, as if we could imagine that He was one thing in His very substance, but became another by the presence of the aforesaid qualities. That condition is peculiar to those beings who have been given a composite nature; whereas the Holy Spirit is single and simple in every respect equally. This is allowed by all; the man who denies it does not exist. If, then, there is but one simple and single definition of His being, the good which He possesses is not an acquired good; but, whatever He may be besides, He is Himself Goodness, and Wisdom, and Power, and Sanctification, and Righteousness, and Everlastingness, and Imperishability, and every name that is lofty, and elevating above other names.

It is after all these arguments that the quote I orginally gave is placed. IOW, the “…therefore” that introduces my original quote includes these arguments. To St. Gregory of Nyssa, the unity of the three Persons is partly based on the argument of the unity between Essence and Energy in God (akin to his argument from post#53, wherein St. Gregory utilizes the fact of the unity between the different manifestations of Energy to demonstrate the unity of the Persons).

Wow, talk about quoting things out of context, the ellipses points omit over two chapters of material! The context of the passage before the ellipses points is a reasoned proof that there is only one God. The passage after the ellipses points details how the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one. In context, there is no admission that the distinctions between the persons are the only distinctions recognized, but that the only differences recognized between the persons are that of the particular attributes of the three persons.

It’s not out of context. The Damascene actually constantly presumes two senses of “oneness” - (1) the oneness of Deity itself, evident in such terms as “simple and uncompound”; (2) the oneness between the Persons because of sharing a common Deity. Look what else the Damascene teaches us:
The Deity is simple and uncompound. But that which is composed of many and different elements is compound. If, then, we should speak of the qualities of being uncreate and without beginning and incorporeal and immortal and everlasting and good and creative and so forth as essential differences in the case of God, that which is composed of so many qualities will not be simple but must be compound. But this is impious in the extreme. Each then of the affirmations about God should be thought of as signifying not what He is in essence, but either something that it is impossible to make plain, or some relation to some of those things which are contrasts or some of those things that follow the nature, or an energy.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

So he affirms that these many qualities do not signify the Essence. But does this mean he affirms that these qualities are in fact many and not one? No: Further, the true doctrine teaches that the Deity is simple and has one simple energy, good and energising in all things, just as the sun’s ray, which warms all things and energises in each in harmony with its natural aptitude and receptive power, having obtained this form of energy from God, its Maker.

So when the Damascene asserts, “the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one in all respects,” he is referring not merely to the unity between the Persons, but ALSO to the simplicity and uncompoundness of Deity itself (which the three Persons share in common). Of course, he affirms that they are “one in all respects” except in their Hypostatic identities. So the character of simplicity and uncompoundness refers to all things when Deity is considered (which includes Essence and Energy, as well as the many manifestations of Energy), except to the Hypostatic identities of the Persons. So separation can be considered when discussing the Hypostases, but not when discussing Essence and Energy.

Any time a Father says “God is one except in the distinction of Hypostases,” while it is obviously true that “one” refers to the unity between Persons, there should be no doubt that such a statement inherently admits the unity between different manifestations of Energy, on the one hand, and the unity between Essence/Energy, on the other.

And again, the Father can be conceived of without His Only-Begotten? Perhaps Arius and Eunomius would approve of this statement, but Ss. Basil and Athanasius definitely would not. So what then? By this criterion, either the Father and Son are an indistinct Sabellian monad, or they are completely separable! Furthermore, one of the criteria for being formally distinct, according to Duns Scotus, is that the two things are inseparable. The statement, “Essence and Energy, and the various ways that God’s Energy appears to us, do not have formal distinction as if they can be conceived of separately…,” does not even seem to employ the term formal distinction correctly, but instead uses the term to describe something which is inconsistent with its own definition.

But by this very logic, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit too are epistemologically distinct, but not ontologically distinct, since to say that they are ontologically distinct (that is, separable) would be to fall into the error of the Greek Pagans.

Again, this argument depends on the notion that Essence/Energy are distinct in the same way that the Persons are distinct, a premise I reject. Essence/Energy are not ontologically distinct, but the Persons are ontologically distinct.

You wrote: I think that is rather clear. Btw, the reason that the Names of the Persons can indicate distinction, while the names of all other things we use to refer to the Godhead cannot, is because the latter refers to impersonal objects, while the former refers to personal beings with will.

I am simply requesting to know why it is that the property of having a will is a criterion for things being distinguishable, and how this criterion can be justified (some patristic evidence for this criterion would be nice).

Will is a property ONLY of personal beings, not of impersonal objects. Do you really need me to quote Fathers on that truism? Will is what distinguishes the Persons from the impersonal Essence/Energy, but the Persons themselves are distinguished by a factor other than will - their eternal relationship to each other. This relationship itself is personal (i.e., imbued with Will), not impersonal.

When I read:I understood, “the Names of the Persons can indicate distinction, while the names of all other things… cannot, is because the latter refers to impersonal objects, while the former refers to personal beings with will,” to mean that having a will was what allowed for distinctions between persons, but not between things without wills, which is why I argued that this could only be true if they differed in will. However, it seems to me now that the argument from you is that person is distinct from essence/energy, because persons have will. But this is cannot be so, because as the fathers taught (in relation to the teaching of the Sixth Ecumenical Council), it is not persons which have will, but essences.

That is not true at all. Essences do not have will. Only persons have will. The united Will, while indeed flowing from the united Essences, can only be conceived as such because the Essences are enhypostasized in the PERSON of our Lord. Without the Hypostasis (i.e., the Person), “Will” cannot even be spoken of. Hence, the definition of Faith states: “he calls his own will the will of his flesh, inasmuch as his flesh was also his own.”

And what would be the difference between the two distinctions?

But again, this criterion cannot be applied for what would make the distinction between Essence and Energy different, since Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not separable.

Explained above.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

No, that is not what he is saying. He is saying that the name of an operation, like judging, burning, wisdom, etc., cannot be applied to the different persons as three. When Gregory of Nyssa writes, “for the name derived from operation cannot be divided among many where the result of their mutual operation is one,” it should be clear that the words “many” and “their” here refers not to the energies of God, but to the three hypostases, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who as a result of their mutual operation, cannot have the divine names like fire, judge, etc., split up amongst them so as to say that there are three fires, three judges, etc. But he nowhere in that passage writes that the energies of God, like burning and judgement, are identical with one another.

The argument here again depends on a misunderstanding of my position. I never said the various manifestations are identical. I said the various manifestations of God’s Energy cannot be separated. And that is exactly what St. Gregory asserted. I said that he uses the oneness of the Energy to evince the oneness of the Persons. How does your explanation oppose my statement?

But you have provided no justification for restricting the meaning of the term cause in theology to meaning only source. The proof you provide are all passages which could be read in either way.

There is a theological use of the term “Cause” and a philosophical use of the term “cause.” In theology, especially Trinitarian theology, “Cause” has only one sense - i.e., that FROM which ALL ELSE springs. In philosophical use, on the other hand, the term “cause” can apply not only to “that from which all else springs,” but also to anything that comes prior to something else - hence, there is the language of “first cause”(i.e., “that from which all else springs” or “source”), “second cause” (i.e., agency), etc. St. Basil in his treatise on the Holy Spirit complains of the philosophy of the Greeks only because the Greeks deemed each type of cause to be different essences - resulting in a belief in multiple gods and other heterodox opinions on the Deity. While the Latins accomodated the Greek philosophical terminology of cause(s) into theology (a common complaint against Latin scholasticism), the Latins nevertheless maintained an orthodox meaning to the terms (i.e., unlike the Greek philosophers, the Latin Catholics did not apply the different types of cause to different essences, but to the different hypostatic properties).

In terms of Trinitarian theology, the application of the hypostatic property of Agency (of being “through”) is termed “cause” only in the philosophical sense of being “prior to,” not in the theological sense of being that from which all else springs. It is the divinely revealed ordering of the Names that gives us an indication that the Son is “prior to” the Holy Spirit (again, not in the sense of time). St Basil wrote, "so the expression through whom contains a confession of an antecedent Cause, and is not adopted in objection to the efficient Cause (On the Holy Spirit, ch. 8). Similarly, the Damascene wrote, “And when I think of the relation of the three subsistences to each other, I perceive that the Father is super-essential Sun, source…and productive source… for the Father alone is Cause”; yet, he does not shrink from admitting that the Son “is the only power of the Father, the immediate cause of the creation of the universe as perfect subsistence begotten of perfect subsistence in a manner known to Himself” (Exposition, ch, 12). As many Fathers explain, the Son has the property of being the Agency of the Father’s power and will. Only in the sense of being a principle of agency is the Son a “cause,” not in the same sense that the Father is Cause, or that from which ALL ELSE springs. Both Father and Son are “cause” with respect to the Holy Spirit in that both are “prior” to the Holy Spirit. But within that same general category of “cause,” it is only the Father who maintains the property of Source or First Cause as that from which ALL ELSE springs, while the Son has only the property of being the agency of the Father’s power and will.

But again, the Eastern Fathers all spoke of the Monarchy in terms of cause, not source. Just asserting that the concerns over the Monarchy of the Father should be read as being over source, is not a good justification for doing so.

See above.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

I could equally make the claim that the Eastern Fathers really understood the Monarchy of the Father in terms of pink elephantness, and that since the Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son violates the Father’s unique hypostatic property as pink elephant, the filioque therefore violates the Monarchy of the Father, and that furthermore, since the fathers did not ever deny that their use of the term cause in theology was concerned with the unique pink elephantness of the Father, my claim would be true because it is difficult if not impossible to falsify. But this is of course faulty logic because just because a claim is difficult to falsify, that does not make it true.

This rhetoric is utterly faulty because the Latins had an actual basis for calling the Son “cause,” and it had nothing to do with “pink elephantness.” Despite this faulty rhetoric, you cannot deny that the Fathers admitted “throughness” as unique property of the Son. Injecting the philosophical use of the term “cause” into theology, the Latins referred to the Son’s principle of “throughness” as “cause.” Nor can you deny that the Latins assert that “fromness” is a property of the Father ALONE. Fine – so you do not want to use the term “cause” in reference to the Son. However, given that for the Latins, the meaning of the term “cause” with respect to the Father (i.e., “that from which ALL ELSE springs”) is different from the meaning of the term “cause” with respect to the Son (i.e., agency), doesn’t your whole argument amount to nothing more than a difference in terminological understanding (at least on this issue of “cause”)? See my signature line below for St. Paul’s exhortation against using mere words as a source of disunity.

In fact, the historical evidence would be against you here, because at this point in time, the study of Aristotle had been revived as basic formative education (Palamas, for example, had studied Aristotle thoroughly in his youth). Surely, having studied Aristotle, they would have understood cause to have multiple senses, since the matter of something can be said to be its material cause, even though it is not its final cause or formal cause. Their decision to leave the word cause unqualified should suggest that they wished to condemn all meanings of the word.

As stated, the Greek philosophical use of the term “cause” was different from the traditional Christian theological use of the term “cause.” The whole misunderstanding came when the Latins injected the Greek philosophical use of the term into Christian theology. It is now only a matter of understanding the orthodox sense with which the Latins have accomodated the Greek philosophical use of the term into Christian theology.

I object because you have not provided any justification for reading the word cause in this way except for insisting that it should understood in this fashion, which is not a very good reason at all. You write, “You cannot excise the Tomos from the context of the Eastern Fathers’ general concern for the Monarchy of the Father,” but then don’t provide any evidence that the Eastern Fathers, when they wrote ‘cause’ understood it to mean only source.

You have not provided any evidence for your position either. All you have asserted is that the late medieval Eastern Fathers understood the philosophical distinction of causes (with which I agree), but you have not provided any proof that they applied this distinction of causes to theology proper. The Latins, on the other hand, did apply the distinction of causes to their theological understanding of things. Isn’t this part of the general Eastern objection to Western scholasticism?

In any case, with regards to my argument respecting the monarchy of the Father, I have asked you a few times the following questions, which you have never answered -
(1) How does the notion of the Son as principle of agency interfere with or intrude upon the Father’s monarchy?
(2) How does the Son as principle of agency interfere with or intrude upon the Father as principle of Source?
(3) You have already admitted that in terms of Energy, there is no interference or intrusion. What is your rationale for claiming that applying the Son’s agency to the Essence will interfere or intrude upon the Father as principle of Source?

How absurd, for example, would it be to think that Maximus the Confessor, who sometimes even quoted Aristotle verbatim, did not understand the difference between types of causes, when he wrote that the Latins did not make the Son a cause of the Spirit?

He did understand the difference, but it is a simple matter to perceive that he nevertheless restricted “cause” according to its theological relevance (i.e., to mean “that from which ALL ELSE springs”), and did not wish to confuse that with the Greek philosophical usage of the term.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

Reexamining the passage from that anathematism:To the same, who teach that the Father and the Son—not as two principles and two causes—share in the causality of the Spirit, and that the Son is as much a participant with the Father as is implied in the preposition “through.” According to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit’s cause, with the result that sometimes they believe and say that the Father is cause, and sometimes the Son. This being so, they introduce a plurality and a multitude of causes in the procession of the Spirit…See how they write, “according to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit’s cause?” And then they show that those who posit such a distinction therefore as a result, “introduce a plurality and multitude of causes in the procession of the Spirit?” What they are condemning here is not that the Son is a cause equal to the Father (something which they condemn elsewhere), but that the Son can be accounted as being a distinct cause, joining in the causality of the Father, but distinct by the strength of the prepositions (by which they mean through and from), which therefore makes the Son another cause and introduces a multiplicity of causes.

There is nothing new under the sun here, Cavaradossi. St. Basil had already explained this whole thing to which Blacharnae was objecting. St. Basil in On the Holy Spirit explains that the Greek philosophers maintained that the principle of first cause (being “from” or source) was of a different essence than the principle of second cause (being “through” or instrumentality), thus resulting in a multitude of gods. But on the principle that first cause and second cause must always exist together, this makes one god dependent on the other, hence negating the very notion of deity (since, according to St. Basil, true deity depends on nothing outside itself). It is the idea that the Father is DEPENDENT on the Son to which Blacharnae is objecting. It is because of this perceived dependence whereby Blacharnae objects to the Son as being another “cause” - i.e., the idea that the Father as the One from whom ALL ELSE springs (i.e., Cause in the theological sense, or Source) needs the Son’s agency for the Father to be the Source of the Holy Spirit. That is the only way to understand Blacharnae’s complaint that “the Son is as much a participant with the Father as is implied in the preposition ‘through.’” Blacharnae’s objection to a “multitude of causes” is identical to St. Basil’s objection to a multitude of gods in the Greek philosophical conception of “cause.” Blacharnae is not objecting to the Son being principle of agency, but only the idea that the Father is DEPENDENT on the Son to be the Cause (i.e., theologically speaking). I had already explained this long ago, to which you never responded. I would appreciate a response now, so as to forestall future repetitions of your arguments that have already been answered.

In any case, the Latin Catholic Church understands the Son’s principle of “throughness” in accordance with St. Basil’s teaching – i.e… that the Son being the principle of agency does not indicate that the Father is dependent on the Son in order for the Father to be the Source. The relationship is not one of necessity, but of natural will. There is no dependence involved, and so there is no splitting up of the Cause of the Holy Spirit into “a plurality” - i.e., the Father is Source of the Spirit without being dependent on anything or anyone outside Himself to be the Source of the Spirit.

This is not entirely true. The Cappadocians, because of the distinction between economy and theology only admitted that certain statements were more fitting than others. That statement is certainly unfitting, but it is not theologically untrue, insofar as it reflect the consubstantial unity of the Son and the Spirit.

I am not objecting to its propriety to indicate consubstantiality. I was objecting to your statement that “there is no implication with the phrasing of having what another has that he who has must receive what is shared in common from the other.” You obviously meant your the statement to mean that one can conceive of the Son as receiving all He has from the Holy Spirit. But, according to St. Basil, such a notion is an impious transgression of the law.

Furthermore, you have misread St. Basil here.

No, I haven’t. What you forgot was the statement immediately prior to the text you quoted:
“Thus the way of the knwoledge of God lies from One Spirit through the One Son to the One Father, and conversely the natural Goodness and the inherent Holiness and the royal Dignity extend from the Father through the Only-begotten to the Spirit.”

To repeat St. Basil, “He who confuses this order will be no less guilty of transgressing the law than are the impious heathen”

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

I’ve always understood a difference between the inclusion of a definite article and lack of it. I assumed you perceived the difference as well(?).

No, because in Greek, the usage of the definite article does not always correspond to how the definite article is used in English. This argument is already problematic on linguistic grounds, because it is based upon the grammar of a language which the Greek Fathers clearly did not speak.

I thought I already explained it. To say “goodness is the essence” (i.e., WITH the definite article) is to restrict/define essence as goodness (in St. Gregory’s words “nothing else but”). WITHOUT the definite article, essence is not being defined.

But again, even if we grant that the essence is not being defined, then what is the relationship of the term to the essence? If goodness is meant to correspond to something in the essence, then it holds that all of the names do something similar, and so are either all identical, or they make the essence of God complex.

]The former, but I disagree that the latter is heterodox. The point of the Fathers for saying “Goodness is not the Essence” (and other such statements which deny the equation of the various manifestations [plural] of the Energy [singular] of God to the Essence") is NOT to say that these operations (or attributes or names or whatever you want to call them) are not in the Essence, but rather that none of these operations (singularly or even all of them taken together) can ever completely define what the unfathomable Essence of God is

Firstly, the word being translated as “operations” in Greek is ἐνεργείαι. To argue that there is only one single energy, is a rather fallacious, use of equivocation, since “energy” is a polysemic term. But for the sake of argument, let us suppose that the energies are something within the essence of God. Then it stands to reason that they are either all identical, or that the essence of God is complex. The first is explicitly rejected by St. Basil. The second is inadmissible for obvious reasons.

“There is no one name sufficiently broad to take in the whole essence of God. There are names, however, many and varied, obscure and of little importance in view of the whole, but each of its own special significance, which, when assembled together, convey to us a sufficient understanding of God’s essence…” [notice he says “sufficient,” not “complete”] -St. Basil, Against Eunomius 1:10).

St. Basil goes on to write in the very same chapter that: Again, we say that God is ‘good,’ ‘just,’ ‘Creator,’ ‘Judge,’ and all such things. So, then, as in the case of the terms we just spoke about which signified a denial and rejection of what is foreign to God, so here they indicate the affirmation and existence of what has affinity with God and is appropriately considered in connection with him.The positive names correspond to the essence of God in terms of knowing that, but not knowing what (a distinction which Basil makes clear in several places). We do not know what God is. Goodness, judge, justice, mercy, none of these names tell us what God is, either in part (for God has no parts), or in whole. They only tells us that God is like something which is known. This is what the Orthodox mean, when we deny that there is knowledge of the essence of God. Of course, we are taught of its “existence” and of those things which relate to it (namely, the energies by which we learn of its existence), but we never find any teaching as to what it is.

He is called good, as the Father is good, and He who was begotten of the Good is good, and to the Spirit His goodness is essence. He is called upright, as the Lord is upright, in that He is Himself truth, and is Himself Righteousness, having no divergence nor leaning to one side or to the other, on account of the immutability of His essence.[/I]

").

That seems to be a complete stretch. St. Basil does not even use the term energy in this passage, nor does he make any argument concerning the energy being mutable. He is explaining that God is called upright, truth and righteousness on account of knowledge that His essence (whatever it is) is immutable.

 

[Cavaradossi]

No. My argument is and always has been that the ORIGIN of the Hypostasis (which intimately includes ousia/energeia) is from the Father ALONE. I am not denying that the hypostasis can be THROUGH the Son, but only saying that the manner in which the Son participates in that hypostatic existence is by being the Agency through which the ousia/energeia of the Father is transmitted to the Spirit. IOW, the Son participates in the hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit NOT and NEVER as the Origin of anything, but only as Agency… Isn’t it inconsistent to deny that same argument with respect to the Essence (and unpatristic, in the face of so many Fathers indicating that the Essence of the Holy Spirit is through the Son or that the Spirit’s hypostatic connection to the Father is through the Son or, especially, the Damascene’s explicit affirmation that the Holy Spirit ekporeusai through the Son)?

None of the patristic quotes so far provided have ever stated that the Spirit receives essence from the Son (they must rather be interpreted to say that, because they do not explicitly say it). By contrast, this idea that the Spirit receives hypostatic existence through the Son is definitely unpatristic, for St. Cyril denied that the Spirit received existence when Theodoret accused him of implying this, to which Theodoret responded with approval. And, returning to the original subject of this thread, the idea that the Spirit receives existence through the Son certainly contradicts Blachernae. The fourth anathematism states: To the same, who affirm that the Paraclete, which is from the Father, has its existence through the Son and from the Son, and who again propose as proof the phrase “the Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son.” In certain texts [of the Fathers], the phrase denotes the Spirit’s shining forth and manifestation [here, Gregory II of Cyprus is drawing his distinction between existing and having existence]. Indeed, the very Paraclete shines from and is manifest eternally through the Son, in the same way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun’s rays; it further denotes the bestowing, giving, and sending of the Spirit to us. It does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through Him and from Him… To those who believe and say such things, we pronounce the above resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.

You have already admitted that with respect to Energy, the Son’s role as Agency does not interfere with the Father’s sole role as Source.

No I have not. I reject all attempts to reinterpret the word cause to mean only source, because such attempts remain unjustified. It is the same tactic that was used by the Eutychians and all sorts of Docetists, who took St. Cyril’s use of the polysemic term ‘physis’ and misinterpreted it to make it look as if Cyril meant to say that there was only one mixed essence in Christ. There is simply no justification to restrict arbitrarily the meaning of a polysemic word like ‘aitia’ to mean only source, when it can also mean cause. Furthermore, the Son does not have any sort of causal power, with regard to the existence of the Spirit, either as an instrument or as a first cause, which is how the Monarchy of the Father has always been understood (as referring to the property of causing alone the existence and consubstantiality of the other hypostases). By contrast, the Son and the Holy Spirit can be said to be the cause of other things, like our existence and salvation, and this cannot be said to violate the Monarchy of the Father. For this reason, relations by energy, like the Holy Spirit’s manifestation through the Son do not violate the Monarchy, while saying that the Son can be accounted as cause of the Spirit’s existence or consubstantiality with the Father is rightfully said to violate the Father’s property as sole cause within God.

But your argument is inconsistent in another way. St. Palamas states that there are three realities in the Godhead - Essence, Energy and Hypostases (plural). How do you justify joining the Essence and Hypostasis, yet separating them from the Energy in the eternal Procession? Please respond

Because the manifestation of the Holy Spirit through the Son means nothing more than that all of the uncreated energies are actualized in the Holy Spirit through the Son, following the Patristic formula that all blessings come from the Father, are prepared by the Son, and perfected in the Holy Spirit. It does not mean that the Holy Spirit receives these by virtue of the Son (the Holy Spirit has them by virtue of being God by nature), but that they are actualized by virtue of the Son, and so the Spirit is said to be manifest through (or shines forth from) the Son.

I’ve never said there is no real distinction between hypostasis and essence. What I’ve argued is that Essence and Energy can never be separated within the Godhead.

No, but Thomas Aquinas did. That is the entire point of my argument. If the formula of receiving essence through the Son, and hypostatic existence from the Father alone requires for there to be non-identity between essence and hypostasis, then it must be admitted that it is not consistent with Aquinas’ understanding of divine simplicity. But if that were so, then it also needs to be admitted that there are multiple ways of understanding divine simplicity, at which point, the argument made against me, that understanding through the Son to be referring to the Spirit’s energetic manifestation from the Son

 

[Cavaradossi]

First of all, rhetorically speaking, I’ve never stated there is no real distinction between hypostasis and essence, nor that they are identical. So that part is a straw man. Secondly, I disagree completely with your language that Hypostasis is “communicated.” The hypostasis is not communicated from the Father to the Son. The Essence and Energy are communicated, but not the Hypostasis. We can speak of the Hypostases of Son and Holy Spirit originating from the Father, but we do not speak of the Hypostases being “communicated” the way that the Essence/Energy are communicated. Sonship is a hypostatic property of the Son, and is not given from the Father, just as the Proceeding is a hypostatic property of the Spirit, and not given to the Spirit from the Father. To claim that the hypostases is communicated confuses the Persons. These are great Mysteries, but the fact that you conflate the communication of the Essence/Energy from the Father with the origination of Hypostases from the Father I believe exposes a weakness in your rhetoric.

I suppose that was unclear. I meant that if hypostasis and essence cannot be accounted as distinct, then ideas like the ones found in this post are impossible:

To Orthodox, the line “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father” means that the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is from the Father alone.

To Latin Catholics, the line “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son” means that the ousia of the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son.

Both notions are completely orthodox. It is just that for centuries up to today, many - even most - Orthodox and Catholics have misunderstood each other.

I simply chose a bad word (‘communicate’) to convey my meaning. There is no need to imply on account of a simple mistake that I therefore am incapable of distinguishing between the origin of the hypostases and the consubstantial communion of the three hypostases. :nope:

 

[Cavaradossi]

I haven’t read Aquinas fully on this matter YET. But I’ll take a shot in the dark and assert that I highly doubt Aquinas’ argument is the same as what you just stated. Your statement is so obviously circular that I can’t believe a master rhetorician such as Aquinas would argue in that way.

One needen’t take my word for it. All one has to do is read what he writes in Summa Theologiae I, 39, i: The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Question 3, Article 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as “suppositum,” which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), “relation multiplies the Trinity of persons,” some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be “adjacent”; considering only in the relations the idea of “reference to another,” and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Question 28, Article 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (29, 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.

newadvent.org/summa/1039.htm

I think I see where Aquinas is coming from here. Each Person is all that God is (i.e. Essence), which would explain Thomas’ equivalence of Person and Essence. I don’t think there is anything heterodox about that, since Thomas maintains a real distinction between Persons (unlike Sabellius). I think Aquinas’ basic premises are fully orthodox, but his expressions take a bit of thought to comprehend.

It doesn’t matter whether Thomas Aquinas is right or wrong for the purpose of this debate. What does matter is if it is recognized that there are multiple definitions of divine simplicity, as I have always insisted.

Not sure what you or Thomas mean by “relations of opposition.” If Thomas means that the Father is not the Son or the Holy Spirit, the Son is not the Father or Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is not the Father or the Son, then that’s a very orthodox statement.

For Aquinas, the persons are subsistent relations within the essence. From the Father, the Son is generated, and from both, the Spirit is spirated. I doubt that there is even room in Aquinas’ model for talk of how the Son and Spirit ‘receive’ essence, since they are real subsistent relations within the essence.

This argument is based on what I believe is a heterodox assumption that Hypostasis is “received.” Only Essence and Energy can properly be stated to be “received.”

Where did I write that hypostasis is received? I wrote that existence is received, which is in accordance with the Blachernae which argues that the Spirit has existence from the Father alone. Earlier, I made a bad choice of words with ‘communicated’ and ‘hypostasis’, I admit, but to run amok with a simple mistake and to accuse me of “heterodoxy” (which is nothing more than a nice way to say “heresy”) is rather mean-spirited.

 

[Cavaradossi]

My position is that Hypostasis (which inherently includes Essence and Energy) ORIGINATES from the Father ALONE, and the inherent Essence/Energy is transmitted to the Son from the Father, and to the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son. So Essence and Energy are transmitted in the same way; Hypostasis cannot be spoken of as being transmitted.

Again, It is not hypostasis which I wrote was received. Strawmen and red herrings aside, none of this answers the charge that in order to posit that Holy Spirit proceeds as an hypostasis from the Father alone, but receives essence from the Father through the Son, necessitates that essence and hypostasis be non-identical. That the Father contributes to the Spirit’s being in one way (as the hypostatic origin), and the Son in a different way (as the means for the reception of the essence) implies that the two are not identical and distinct in God. At this point, it would be useful to remind the readers that the original argument made against me was:

When you utilize the distinction between Energy and Essence to conclude that the Energy ekpoereusai through the Son, yet deny that the Essence ekporeusai through the Son (for the verb ekporeusai refers to nothing more nor less than ontological origin), then you imply that God is a composite being.

I would like to point two things. One is that this argument completely misunderstands the manner in which the term ἐκπορεύω is to be used. It is the Spirit which proceeds through the Son, not essence and energy. Of the latter, the Spirit is said to be from and through the Son according to it, while of the former, the Spirit is said to be from the Father alone, and of (in the sense of belonging to) the Son.

The second is that this argument hinges itself upon the idea of divine simplicity having only one meaning. Now the theory of the Spirit originating from the Father alone, while receiving essence from the Father through the Son seems to posit that the Spirit must in some sense be nonidentical with the essence, since if the Spirit were completely identical with the essence, it would stand to reason that the above distinction—which is between the Spirit’s originating from the Father alone and the very same Spirit receiving essence—would be absurd. But then the appeal to divine simplicity falls apart, because a real distinction between the Holy Spirit and the divine nature is not admitted by Thomas Aquinas, meaning that this theory already must work with a slightly altered understanding of divine simplicity, whereby the hypostases are distinct from the essence, which in turn implies that divine simplicity can be understood in multiple ways, which completely disarms the argument.

A more relevant question is how do you justify the idea that the Holy Spirit receives the Essence differently than the Energy in the Procession.

The manifestation is not about receiving energy in the sense of a potency or a property. That would already belong to the Spirit by nature. It is about the way energy is worked from the Father, through the Son, and in the Holy Spirit. In this way, the Holy Spirit is said to be manifest to the world according to energy through the Son, but is neither from nor through the Son by nature, but only belongs to the Son by nature. Thus the Holy Spirit progresses essentially from the Son, because the Holy Spirit, belonging to the Son by nature, is manifest through him and sent to the world by him.

As explained, when I have stated that the Energy and Essence cannot be distinguished in the Godhead, all I’ve meant is that they cannot be separated. It’s a straw man to claim that I ever argued that Essence and Energy are identical.

But nothing in God can be separated. Not even the persons can be separated, since they always dwell in one another.

Your whole argument is based on the idea that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinguishable in the same way that Essence and Energy are distinguishable. I’ve never claimed this because I believe such an idea would make Essence and Energy divine Persons, which is heterodox.

Again with the accusations of “heterodoxy”. Most unkind. :nope: But let us investigate this argument to determine whether it holds any merit. The argument goes like this: the persons cannot be distinguishable in the same manner that essence and energy are distinguishable, because this would make essence and energy persons, or in other words, to make a general formula: (a) x cannot be distinguished from y in the same manner that w is distinguished from z, because this would make w and z the same kind of thing as x and y are. But is this true? If one investigates the universals ‘man,’ ‘dog,’ and ‘ox,’ he will see that all of these species are really distinct from one another, because all of them is capable of existing without the other (the criterion for a real distinction according to Scotus is two things are really distinct if and only if one of them is capable of existing without the other). Upon investigating Socrates and God the Father, however, one will find that there is also a real distinction between them. So then God the Father and Socrates must, by argument (a) above be species. But this is altogether absurd. In fact, by this argument, one could reach all sorts of absurd conclusions, like that ‘whiteness’ and ‘heaviness’ are essences, and that ‘man’ and ‘horse’ are accidents. This argument, therefore, is completely groundless.

 

[Cavaradossi]

I have already affirmed in past posts that the distinction between Essence and Energy is different from the distinction between Persons (St. Palamas affirms this by categorizing Hypostases as one reality, distinct from the Essence and Energy; and I made this affirmation long before I made the clarification of what I meant by “there is no distinction between Essence and Energy in the Godhead” - so it is disinegnuous to claim that I am arguing that the Essence and Energy are identical).

Yes, but this reading of Gregory Palamas in fact would imply the opposite of what is being put forth in post #65, namely that the distinction between Essence, Energy, and Hypostasis for Gregory Palamas would be a stronger and more real distinction than the distinction between the Hypostases. But I do not think that is what Gregory Palamas means, nor do I think, that this reading of him can be correct.

See above. I reject the premise that the Essence and Energy are distinct in the same way that the Persons are distinct.

On what grounds?

First of all, they are indeed inseparable, but not indistinguishable. Do you accept the difference between the two concepts?

Yes, but if they are inseparable in reality, then as I wrote earlier, it holds that the energies of God should all be revealed in one act of divine revelation. But this is not so, for we know God to have revealed himself to us in various ways.

Secondly, does one deny God’s simplicity when His Justice is evinced? Does one deny his unity upon learning of God’s foreknowledge and providence? If not, what is the merit of this argument? They can be distinguished, but they cannot be separated.

So again, if they are inseparable, then it stands to reason that when God destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, he did so not only by his power, but also by his wisdom, foreknowledge, love, mercy, and providence. And when He chose the elect before the foundation of the world, He did so in one simple operation completely inseparable from His power of creation. But then the Scriptures are shown to have lied, for God did not choose the elect before the foundation of the world, but rather, His choosing of the elect began with the creation of the world. Furthermore, we know that there are energies which have neither beginning nor end (life, for example), energies which have a beginning (creation), and energies which have no beginning but an end (St. Maximus the Confessor taught that the providence of God would come to an end in the age to come). If these are inseparable, then what happens to the energies after providence comes to an end, or when creation began? Will the divine intellect cease to be, in the age to come, because the inseparable power of providence has also ceased to be? If not, it hardly makes sense to account them as being totally inseparable.

 

[Vico]

…
For Aquinas, the persons are subsistent relations within the essence. From the Father, the Son is generated, and from both, the Spirit is spirated. I doubt that there is even room in Aquinas’ model for talk of how the Son and Spirit ‘receive’ essence, since they are real subsistent relations within the essence…

Communication of essence:Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?

Objection 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature ([11], [4]), it follows that only one procession exists in God.

Reply to Objection 2: All that exists in God, is God ([3], [3],4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and this does not apply to other natures.

ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP/FP027.html

 

[Cavaradossi]

Communication of essence:Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?

Objection 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature ([11], [4]), it follows that only one procession exists in God.

Reply to Objection 2: All that exists in God, is God ([3], [3],4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and this does not apply to other natures.

ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP/FP027.html

Good catch. That is what I get for writing things late at night: things don’t come out quite right sometimes. :coffeeread:

There’s no room for a distinct reception of essence as opposed to something’s hypostatic origin, is what I was trying to say (that only came half out). Marduk’s formula currently has the Son not as the hypostatic origin of the Spirit (which is to say that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son), whereas the Spirit can be said to proceed through the Son, which in his formula is interpreted as meaning that the Holy Spirit receives the divine nature through the Son, as if the Son were an instrumental cause. But this interpretation of the Filioque has several inconsistencies with the Latin formula of the Holy Spirit’s procession from the Father and Son as one principle which are problematic.

The first is that Aquinas does not admit anything but relations of origin which can establish an opposite relation between a principle and what is from the principle. This he makes clear in ST I, 36, ii:Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved above. And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a “principle,” and of what is “from the principle.” Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.Here we can see that the claim that the Father is sole origin of the Spirit itself falls apart, because if this were true, there would be no opposite relation between the Son and the Spirit, which according to Aquinas would make the Spirit not distinct from the Son. As he writes in the same article:Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations.Also problematic, is the way that the formulation of the Father as sole hypostatic origin, with the Son being the means through which the Spirit receives essence from the Father, necessitates some mean between the spirative power of the Son and the spirative power of the Father, such that one can be accounted as being a different cause from the other (hence, one is the first cause, and the other is the second cause in this particular formulation). But this contradicts Aquinas on two points. One can see that Aquinas rejects both that the Son can be accounted a second cause of the Spirit, and that the Son’s spirative power can be any different from the Father’s in ST I, 36, iii, ad. 2:If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father. This distinguishing between the hypostatic origin of the Spirit and the reception if essence seems not at all to be native to Aquinas’ thought, especially since Aquinas teaches explicitly that the Son is the source (see contra errores graecorum II, 25), origin (as shown above), and principle (as also shown above), of the Holy Spirit.

 

[Cavaradossi]

Again, when I’ve said “no distinction” in terms of the discussion of Essence and Energy, I meant “no ontological separation.”

Ok.

Well, since I asserted long before this round of debate that the distinction between Essence and Energy is not the same distinction between Persons, then you should have known that I recognized a distinction between Essence and Energy, much less that I ever claimed they were identical. So I’m not conceding anything so much as you simply misunderstanding my rhetoric (which is my own fault since I assumed a common knowledge of my past rhetoric on this issue).

It is not at all a misunderstanding, because to posit that essence and energy are not distinct within God is equivalent to saying that they are identical in reality, and that only in the mind do they differ.

See above. I reject the premise that the Essence and Energy are distinct in the same way that the Persons are distinct. Also see below on my understanding of “distinct.”

But how is this rejection justified?

I don’t understand all this talk of ratios. I don’t think it’s relevant to our discussion anyway.

Considering that the discussion is about differing types of distinctions, I think a discussion of Scotus’ formal distinction would be highly relevant.

I perceive the distinctions thus:
(1) The distinction between manifestations of God’s Energy is epistemological because it is true, but only conceptual, (i.e., as perceived by the intellect), and not ontological. In other words, from our perspective, it is perceived in many manifestations, but from the perspective of God, there is only one Energy.

But then God’s providence, will, and foreknowledge would be the same thing in reality. But this leads to all sorts of absurd conclusions, like that the providential fall of man was in accordance with the divine will, or that God’s foreknowledge is what predestines everything in a fatalistic manner.

(2) The distinction between Essence and Energy is epistemological because it is true. But it is not merely conceptual because we know that we can experience His Energy, but not His Essence - to put it another way, we can define his Energy (singular) according to its manifestations (plural), but we can never define His Essence. The distinction is an objective reality, not merely subjective according to our understanding/experience. However, the distinction is not ontological because Essence and Energy are never separable in God. Think about it - from our perspective, they are separable ONLY because we can never understand/experience the Essence, but do you think for one moment that from God’s perspective, one Person somehow cannot experience the Essence or is disconnected from the Essence so as to justify any sort of separation between Essence and Energy? Dwell on that seriously and deeply.
(3) The distinction between the Persons is epistemological because it is true. It is not merely conceptual because our knowledge from divine revelation dictates the distinction is an objective reality, not merely subjective. And it is ontological because from the perspective of God, they are separable - i.e., the Father is not the Son nor the Holy Spirit, the Son is not the Father nor the Holy Spirit, etc.

But the Son not being the Spirit and the Father not being the Son is not what traditionally would be called separability. Things would traditionally be said to be separable if and only if one can exist without the other. This (that the Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Spirit, etc.) would probably be better termed as non-identity(either formal or real). Now going back to read (2) with this definition of “separability in mind”, it seems to me that what is proposed in (2) is that to God, essence and energy are identical, but to creation, essence and energy are not identical. But then this still collapses the distinction between essence and energy to being merely conceptual, because it implies that this is only how creation conceives of God, and that the distinction between essence and energy is not in God Himself. That is, because the distinction is not in the thing itself it cannot be said to be based on any sort of objective reality, but rather, it remains only conceptual.

I use “epistemological” to refer to that which is true.

But the common usage of the term epistemological distinction does not mean what is true, it is a distinction between different types of knowledge. Distinguishing between knowing how, knowing that, and knowing what, for example, would be epistemological distinctions, as would the distinction between synthetic and analytic knowledge.

I use “conceptual” to mean “God from man’s perspective.”

But that again goes against the common usage of this term. A conceptual distinction has always been understood to be one which exists only in the mind

I use “ontological” to mean “God as He is according to God’s own perspective.”

I suppose one could understand it that way, but only with the reservation that the divine intellect knows things as they really are, so therefore, a distinction known “according to God’s perspective” is truly in the thing.

I reject the premise that the Essence and Energy are distinct in the same way that the Persons are distinct.

Again, on what grounds?