Can a Catholic Still Maintain the Death Penalty?

[kapp19]

I quoted directly from the Bible, and the words speak for themselves.

Sola Scriptura - got it. This is not Catholic at all. (I can bring forward verses too - INCLUDING IN ROMANS 13 WHICH YOU CITE.) But still, I must have missed the verse though where Christ said, “Capital punishment is immoral.” Just because your reading of John 8 tells you that, for example, Trent’s Roman Catechism, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Benedict XVI are all condoning murder, or are all just not as enlightened as you in your wisdom in how to read Scripture, does not mean that you are right. In fact, you should really consider the possibility that the saints and great Doctors and popes are actually more merciful and enlightened in how to read Scripture than you are. I think humility before our great teachers is also part of God’s law, no? And in any case, you have not addressed the issue of the universal ordinary magisterium regarding morals. Does it exist? What better example is there than capital punishment? I can hardly think of one. So it seems your disagreement is not only with the greatest human authorities, but the Church Herself, and therefore God’s own teaching.

Will return again in a week to this unfortunate thread.

-K

 

[Rau]

The majority of the Christian west doesn’t regard cp as a ‘divine command’ or a ‘holy institution’ the way it’s beheld in the US.

I fail to see any connection with my post.

 

[Rau]

Every occurrence of a state execution of an innocent person is an evil act. If the state’s legal process is flawed either negligently or intentionally then the culpability of state’s agents is increased. If the state’s agents followed the law then their culpability may be mitigated or eliminated. However, the act remains an evil act.

Then so is every false conviction, every erroneous imprisonment. I wonder what is your point?

What is needed is a definition for the novel term “inadmissible”

Try “unthinkable”. That also captures the necessarily prudential nature of the conclusion.

 

[Lunam_Meam]

Lunam_Meam:

I didn’t interpret because there was no need. I quoted directly from the Bible, and the words speak for themselves.

Sola Scriptura - got it. This is not Catholic at all. (I can bring forward verses too - INCLUDING IN ROMANS 13 WHICH YOU CITE.) But still, I must have missed the verse though where Christ said, “Capital punishment is immoral.” Just because your reading of John 8 tells you that, for example, Trent’s Roman Catechism, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Benedict XVI are all condoning murder, or are all just not as enlightened as you in your wisdom in how to read Scripture, does not mean that you are right. In fact, you should really consider the possibility that the saints and great Doctors and popes are actually more merciful and enlightened in how to read Scripture than you are. I think humility before our great teachers is also part of God’s law, no? And in any case, you have not addressed the issue of the universal ordinary magisterium regarding morals. Does it exist? What better example is there than capital punishment? I can hardly think of one. So it seems your disagreement is not only with the greatest human authorities, but the Church Herself, and therefore God’s own teaching.

“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful.” (Lk. 6:36)

Consider the following death penalty case: the adulterous woman. Jesus could have killed her, and it would have been justice, but it would not have been mercy. He gave that soul time and possibility to arriving at repentance and holiness, if she wished to reach them.

Should mankind not imitate Jesus’s example of charity, even in death penalty cases?

 

[o_mlly]

Then so is every false conviction, every erroneous imprisonment. I wonder what is your point?

Yes, all human acts of injustice are evil acts. The point is that the morality of a human act is not relatively but objectively determined.

o_mlly:

What is needed is a definition for the novel term “inadmissible”

Try “unthinkable”. That also captures the necessarily prudential nature of the conclusion.

You or I could attempt to define “inadmissible” but only the Pope’s definition counts. Our fearless interlocutor will not, and should not accept anything other than that.

 

[Ender]

Why the angst? And, why the ongoing strawmanning of my position on Pope Francis? See Post #153.

You have called Francis’ change ambiguous and take that as justification for ignoring it. Your position appears to be no different than it would be if Francis had said nothing at all, but you also said his teaching and that of JPII were not contradictory, which appears contradictory to the claim that it is ambiguous. If you know what it means then it isn’t ambiguous, and if you don’t know what it means then you can’t know if it conflicts with JPII.

By the way, you are welcome. No charge on the Aquinas reference. Glad I could help.

Aquinas used the term differently than it was used in the catechism. He used it to include aspects of the object and the intent. The catechism did not use it that way, which is why it says, contrary to your claim, that the circumstances cannot change the nature of the act.

Circumstances can’t alter the moral object (act itself) from good to evil or the reverse. But of course the circumstances is one of the 3 fonts

Yes, I agree.

If you think Gen. 9:6 is the equivalent of “eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth…”, remember Jesus says: “You have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say to you not to resist evil: but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other:” (Mat. 5:38-39)

You mistake the obligations of the State for those of the individual. The individual is forbidden to punish; the State is required to. Don’t conflate the two.

Every occurrence of a state execution of an innocent person is an evil act.

No, it isn’t. It is a tragic error.

Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (Q[43], A [3]; FS, Q[12], A[1]) (Aquinas, ST II-II 64,7)

On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): “When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.” Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty (Ibid 64,8)

 

[o_mlly]

You have called Francis’ change ambiguous and take that as justification for ignoring it. Your position appears to be no different than it would be if Francis had said nothing at all, but you also said his teaching and that of JPII were not contradictory, which appears contradictory to the claim that it is ambiguous. If you know what it means then it isn’t ambiguous, and if you don’t know what it means then you can’t know if it conflicts with JPII.

This is nonsense. If a statement is ambiguous then one cannot judge the meaning. If one cannot judge the meaning then one cannot say the statement conflicts, contradicts or is contrary to another statement.

Aquinas used the term differently than it was used in the catechism. He used it to include aspects of the object and the intent. The catechism did not use it that way, which is why it says, contrary to your claim, that the circumstances cannot change the nature of the act.

No, this sophistry is your invention and is not supported by the text.

No, it isn’t. It is a tragic error.

Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended , and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (Q[43], A [3]; FS, Q[12], A[1]) (Aquinas, ST II-II 64,7)

No. You confuse end(s)-in-view which is integral to the moral object with the font of intention which is subjective and varies with each particular actor.

On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): “When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.” Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty (Ibid 64,8)

No, you confuse the determination of subjective culpability with the determination of the morality of the act. The two determinations are separate.

 

[Rau]

Rau:

Circumstances can’t alter the moral object (act itself) from good to evil or the reverse. But of course the circumstances is one of the 3 fonts

Yes, I agree.

To check if we are really on the same wavelength: Because the circumstances is one of the fonts, an individual, according to their (good faith) assessment of circumstances, may choose to act immorally in light of their assessment of those circumstances. Any of the 3 fonts can condemn the human act.

 

[Ender]

To check if we are really on the same wavelength: Because the circumstances is one of the fonts, an individual, according to their (good faith) assessment of circumstances, may choose to act immorally in light of their assessment of those circumstances.

If one chooses to act immorally the act would be immoral because of the intent, not the circumstances. The circumstances, especially the foreseeable consequences, are evaluated and an action is taken based on the expected outcome. If I choose a bad outcome I have sinned because of my intent, but if I (reasonably) expect a good outcome and it turns out badly, I have simply made a mistake.

I’m not sure I understand your point. If a person acts in good faith how can the act be immoral even if he misjudges the circumstances?

Any of the 3 fonts can condemn the human act.

The circumstances can increase or decrease ones culpability, but they cannot make an otherwise acceptable act immoral.

If one cannot judge the meaning then one cannot say the statement conflicts, contradicts or is contrary to another statement.

True enough, and neither can one say the statement does not conflict, contradict, or is contrary to another. Neither position can be asserted.

No, this sophistry is your invention and is not supported by the text.

You are the one who has taken a position directly contrary to the catechism. I think sophistry is more your problem than mine.

You confuse end(s)-in-view which is integral to the moral object with the font of intention which is subjective and varies with each particular actor.

The execution of a person thought to be guilty who later turns out to be innocent is “beside the intention”, and does not determine the morality of the act. When Aquinas referred to “what is intended” he was assuredly speaking of the intention font, and not the proximate end of the object.

No, you confuse the determination of subjective culpability with the determination of the morality of the act. The two determinations are separate.

The two passages go together. It was the first one that is relevant to this question, the one that states “moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention.”

 

[o_mlly]

The execution of a person thought to be guilty who later turns out to be innocent is “ beside the intention ”, and does not determine the morality of the act.

The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who “alone is good”, and thus brings about the perfection of the person (VS p.78).

The execution (lawful killing) of an innocent person is an incorrect choice, an unjust act and cannot be ordered to God who is all just. The act is evil in its object.

CCC #1780 Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent.

Whether an evil act is also a sinful act depends on knowledge and intent of the actors. Assuming the state’s agents acted in good faith, they did not have full knowledge as their verdict was in error. All culpability for the evil act may be eliminated but the act remains evil.

The two passages go together. It was the first one that is relevant to this question, the one that states “ moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention. ”

And Saint Thomas observes that "it often happens that man acts with a good intention, but without spiritual gain, because he lacks a good will. Let us say that someone robs in order to feed the poor: in this case, even though the intention is good, the uprightness of the will is lacking. Consequently, no evil done with a good intention can be excused (Ibid).

Substituting one evil act for another – “kills an innocent” for “robs” and a good end for another – “protect family” for “feed the poor”:
Let us say that someone kills an innocent one to protect his family: in this case, even though the intention is good, the uprightness of the will is lacking. Consequently, no evil done with a good intention can be excused.

“Uprightness of will” is not synonymous with “intention”. The former is in the moral object referring to the willed end of the act itself that obtains to any actor. The latter is subjective and refers to the willed end of a particular actor.

 

[Ender]

The execution (lawful killing) of an innocent person is an incorrect choice, an unjust act and cannot be ordered to God who is all just. The act is evil in its object.

Does this mean that all mistakes are sins? Is it unjust to err? The object here is not executing an innocent man; it is to carry out a lawful execution, but if this is a sin, who committed it? It can’t be the warden or prison staff who carry out the execution; they were never part of trial or the sentencing process. Was it the jury who found the prisoner guilty and prescribed the punishment? They listened to the evidence and did what by all appearances was right and just. So again: who sinned, and what exactly was the sin?

All culpability for the evil act may be eliminated but the act remains evil.

You assert this but your citations don’t actually address it, and again: where is the line between sin and error? You said above that the incorrect choice in this case was a sin. What is unique about this case that this incorrect choice is sinful, but other incorrect choices are not? I assume it’s not sinful to get a 95 on a math test.

 

[o_mlly]

Does this mean that all mistakes are sins? Is it unjust to err?

Of course not. Our exchange is on the evilness of the act, not the sinfulness of the actor. Sin is always subjective. The morality of the human act is objective.

The object here is not executing an innocent man; it is to carry out a lawful execution, but if this is a sin, who committed it?

The calculus for determining an evil human act and a sinful act have different criteria. In the former, the criteria are moral object, intention and circumstances. In the latter, the criteria are gravity, knowledge and freedom of will.

To your point above, a lawful execution does not equate to a moral execution. Jesus Christ being the exemplar.

You said above that the incorrect choice in this case was a sin.

No, I did not. I wrote the incorrect choice to execute an innocent man is an evil act. Until you acknowledge that the determination of an evil act is different than a sinful act, this exchange is stymied.

 

[Rau]

If one chooses to act immorally the act would be immoral because of the intent, not the circumstances.

My intent might be good, but I evaluate the harm of what I will do to exceed the good. I don’t intend the harm, but I proceed. This is immoral despite a good intent and a good object.

The circumstances can increase or decrease ones culpability, but they cannot make an otherwise acceptable act immoral.

The circumstances can’t change the act itself (the object) from bad to good. However, the act as a whole requires the circumstances (consequences) to be net good if it is to be a good act.

 

[o_mlly]

The circumstances can’t change the act itself (the object) from bad to good.

True.

Ender’s argument, as I understand it, is that a circumstance cannot change the moral species of the act in the other direction, i.e., good to evil. The answer lies is in a proper moral rather than conventional understanding of circumstance.

What exactly are circumstances? In the conventional definition of circumstances, the very elements that define the moral object itself may be considered circumstantial.

However, as cited, Aquinas gives the key to differentiating that which are merely moral circumstances. The moral circumstances are things that stand (circa) surround the act, i.e., are accidental to the act. “Circumstances” that are essential to defining the moral object, i.e., that give the principal condition(s) that specifies the object, without which the object is undefined are not moral circumstances.

The object is those “circumstances” that together make the action what it is.
All other circumstances qualify the action one way or another, but still leave it essentially the same class of action are moral circumstances.

So, circumstances do not change the species of the moral object iff they are moral circumstances. The innocence of an executed prisoner is not a moral circumstance.

 

[Rau]

circumstances do not change the species of the moral object iff they are moral circumstances.

Agreed.

The circumstances I have in mind are the consequences foreseen. There can be acts which despite their inherent goodness (object) we may not morally pursue because we anticipate more harm than good being caused. We are not intending that harm - it is not our motivation (only the good is) - but we foresee the greater evil and proceed anyway. So 1 of the 3 fonts fails to be good so the overall act is not good. Or so I understand it to be.

 

[Motherwit]

You assert this but your citations don’t actually address it, and again: where is the line between sin and error? You said above that the incorrect choice in this case was a sin. What is unique about this case that this incorrect choice is sinful, but other incorrect choices are not? I assume it’s not sinful to get a 95 on a math test.

When the Taliban was using stoning, flogging, amputation as forms of legal punishment should humanitarian groups like Amnesty and the UN keep their nose out of it? They appeal against those punishments on moral grounds but it sounds like you wouldn’t call those immoral?

 

[Ender]

Our exchange is on the evilness of the act, not the sinfulness of the actor… the criteria are moral object, intention and circumstances.

1. In the case where an innocent person is executed, which is the evil aspect: the object, the intent, or the circumstances?
2. Who committed the evil act?
3. It seems you are equating sin with culpability such that if a person is not culpable for his evil act he has not sinned. Is that accurate?

…a lawful execution does not equate to a moral execution.

I never meant to suggest otherwise, but Jesus’ execution is not representative of the issue. We are discussing the execution of a person believed guilty but who was in fact innocent There was never any question about Jesus’ innocence (“I did not find this man guilty of any of your charges against him” - Lk 23:14)

 

[Ender]

The circumstances can’t change the act itself (the object) from bad to good. However, the act as a whole requires the circumstances (consequences) to be net good if it is to be a good act.

I think this is where we disagree. If I expect the consequences to be good and they turn out bad that does not make the act evil. If I expect the consequences to be bad, and act anyway, then my intention was bad. I cannot have a good intention if I believe my act will be harmful. My whole reason for acting is to achieve some end, but if I expect a bad (overall) end then my act is evil.

Suppose I expect my act to be net harmful but in fact the evil doesn’t occur and my act is net beneficial; isn’t that still an evil act? And if it is it can only be because of my intent, not the consequences.

 

[o_mlly]

In the case where an innocent person is executed, which is the evil aspect: the object, the intent, or the circumstances?

Object.

Who committed the evil act?

The state’s agents.

It seems you are equating sin with culpability such that if a person is not culpable for his evil act he has not sinned. Is that accurate?

If he has committed a gravely evil act and is not culpable then he has not mortally sinned. Older texts refer to such an excusable act as objective sin as opposed to mortal sin. The individual in such a case does not lose God’s friendship by the his act.

…a lawful execution does not equate to a moral execution.

Good.

 

[Ender]

Ender’s argument, as I understand it, is that a circumstance cannot change the moral species of the act in the other direction, i.e., good to evil.

Yes, the circumstances cannot change the moral species of an act in either direction.

The answer lies is in a proper moral rather than conventional understanding of circumstance.

Exactly, which is the only way to understand this apparent contradiction:

Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves (CCC 1754)
Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances. (Aquinas ST I-II 18, 3)

“Aquinas used the term differently than it was used in the catechism.” (Post #951)

So, circumstances do not change the species of the moral object iff they are moral circumstances.

OK, and this seems to be the manner in which the catechism uses the word, and was how I was using it (although this term seems counter intuitive). The same analysis applies to the intent.

The innocence of an executed prisoner is not a moral circumstance.

If I understand this, this would mean innocence was an aspect of the object of the act and thus determines the nature of the action. Can you define what you believe is the object in this instance?

Ender:

Who committed the evil act?

The state’s agents.

Would that be the jurists who found him guilty, the judge who pronounced the sentence, or the prison staff who carried out the execution? Again, innocence is established subsequent to all of these actions.