Can a Catholic Still Maintain the Death Penalty?

[o_mlly]

Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves (CCC 1754)
Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances. (Aquinas ST I-II 18, 3)

The two statements are harmonious.

I believe the proper understanding of the phrase “moral quality of acts themselves” refers to the act’s moral object. By definition, circumstances (or accidents) cannot change the moral object (or species, genus, essence, etc.) of an act.

The second teaches that to be good the act must be good in all three fonts. An act good in its object and intent but evil in its circumstance is an evil human act. An act good in its object, intention and circumstances is a good human act. A defect in any of the three source vitiates the goodness of the act.

If I understand this, this would mean innocence was an aspect of the object of the act and thus determines the nature of the action. Can you define what you believe is the object in this instance?

The innocence or guilt of the prisoner is a proper accident, that is all accused must be one or the other. This proper accident is defined in the act’s moral object. Accidental accidents belong to the circumstantial font.

Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals (Aquinas ST I-II 18, 3,2).

If I understand this, this would mean innocence was an aspect of the object of the act and thus determines the nature of the action. Can you define what you believe is the object in this instance?

As explained above, the circumstance of innocence as a proper accident to the prisoner belongs to the moral object. Therefore:

Moral Object: Lawfully kill an innocent prisoner to protect society.

The end(s) in view are apparent goods, not true goods. (This is one of Pope Francis’ arguments for the inadmissibility of CP). Assuming all the state’s agents who participated to effect the prisoner’s death had the apparent good end-in-view does not make the act a good act; the execution of an innocent is always an evil act.

The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view (Aquinas ST I-II 18, 4,1).

 

[Rau]

If I expect the consequences to be bad, and act anyway, then my intention was bad. I cannot have a good intention if I believe my act will be harmful. My whole reason for acting is to achieve some end, but if I expect a bad (overall) end then my act is evil.

This may be a definitional issue - the “intention font” vs what you are loosely calling “my intention”. I am also not so sure I agree with you that all that is foreseen belongs in the Intention font or needs be seen as “intended”. There are outcomes not intended or desired but which are accepted.

 

[Rau]

The second teaches that to be good the act must be good in all three fonts. An act good in its object and intent but evil in its circumstance is an evil human act.

Ender appears to suggest the 3rd font (consequences) is often not needed because the net foreseen outcome can be taken up as “Intention”.

 

[Motherwit]

Yes, the circumstances cannot change the moral species of an act in either direction.

If I recall you have always maintained that while an act can be intrinsically evil, there is no intrinsically good acts? Are you modifying that to claim that the death penalty is intrinsically good?

 

[o_mlly]

Ender appears to suggest the 3rd font (consequences) is often not needed because the net foreseen outcome can be taken up as “Intention”.

I believe remote consequences belong in the font of circumstances (Veritas Splendor p. 74).

The intention of the actor must be one of the end(s)-in-view as described in the moral object for one cannot intend what they cannot foresee. The moral end(s)-in-view are the proximate consequences of the act which any reasonable actor foresees. As the particular act under discussion has only one proximate outcome – the death of the prisoner – there are no remote consequences to consider. Society is not threatened by an innocent person.

 

[Rau]

I believe remote consequences belong in the font of circumstances (Veritas Splendor p. 74).

In the CP context, there is a judgement to be made about whether the overall consequences (for all, not just the sentenced party) are net good or bad. These are remote to use your term, and yes, I say they are in the font of circumstances. I presume Francis 1 is making that judgement - if not, I don’t know what theological principles he is applying.

 

[o_mlly]

I presume Francis 1 is making that judgement - if not, I don’t know what theological principles he is applying.

We’ll have to wait for clarification. However, the case under discussion – a judicial error – does not seem to be a primary principle behind the rewrite of 2267.

https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2018/08/02/180802b.html

Furthermore, it is to be rejected “due to the defective selectivity of the criminal justice system and in the face of the possibility of judicial error.”

 

[Ender]

As explained above, the circumstance of innocence as a proper accident to the prisoner belongs to the moral object. Therefore:

Moral Object: Lawfully kill an innocent prisoner to protect society.

If this was the object then I would agree with you, but this could not possibly be the object because the prisoner is believed to be guilty, not innocent. The actor has not chosen to execute an innocent person, but one he believes to be guilty.

Assume two murder trials. In both the defendant is found guilty, sentenced to death, and finally executed. Is not the object the act chosen to accomplish the end, and, if so, then would not the objects in both cases be identical? The objects chosen in both trials are the same, and what is or is not discovered years later cannot change that.

It seems your position is that if I commit a deliberate act which inadvertently causes the death of an innocent person, regardless of my intent or knowledge, that act is intrinsically evil. What then divides evil act from tragic accident?

1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. the object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good.

It was never a choice to execute an innocent person. What was chosen was a just punishment for the crime believed to have been committed, this is why the objects would be identical in the two trials. If the action was evil it was evil only in the sense that hurricanes are natural evils. It was not a moral evil.

 

[o_mlly]

Assume two murder trials. In both the defendant is found guilty, sentenced to death, and finally executed. Is not the object the act chosen to accomplish the end, and, if so, then would not the objects in both cases be identical?

From post #976:

The end(s) in view are apparent goods, not true goods. … Assuming all the state’s agents who participated to effect the prisoner’s death had the apparent good end-in-view does not make the act a good act; the execution of an innocent is always an evil act.

The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view (Aquinas ST I-II 18, 4,1).

The objects chosen in both trials are the same, and what is or is not discovered years later cannot change that.

No, nothing has changed in reality: the act of condemning an innocent person was then, is now and always will be evil.

The objects are substantially different as to the true disposition of the prisoner. If an end-in-view is in fact evil although apparently good to the actor in the moment then the act is still evil (as Aquinas teaches). The actor lacking full knowledge may escape all culpability but receives no merit for his evil act. If the end-in-view is a true good then the act (ceteris paribus) is good and the actor merits the goodness due to his act.

What then divides evil act from tragic accident?

1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. the object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good.

If the tragic accident is the direct killing of an innocent person then nothing separates that tragic accident from an evil act. The accident would not be considered tragic otherwise.

1751 affirms the Aquinas teaching that in order to be good and not apparently good, the object chosen must conform to the true good.

If the action was evil it was evil only in the sense that hurricanes are natural evils. It was not a moral evil.

I think the judgement that no moral evil occurred must be withheld pending a concrete case. All involved in the evil act must be vindicated in order to ascribe the evil to nature. For instance, if the true criminal did not come forward then his act of omission bears some culpability. Or, if witnesses perjured themselves by giving false testimony then they must bear some culpability for the evil act.

 

[Ender]

Well this has gotten complicated. I’ll have to find time to get back to this.

 

[Ender]

I think the judgement that no moral evil occurred must be withheld pending a concrete case. All involved in the evil act must be vindicated in order to ascribe the evil to nature.

As it turns out, “evil” is an ambiguous word: it can mean natural evils like hurricanes, as well as moral evils like abortion, and of moral evils we may or may not be accountable for them. It would help if you would clarify the sense in which you used the term.

Your comment here suggests that in cases where no deliberate act was committed that led to the wrongful execution, that would not be a moral evil, that we could “ascribe the evil to nature.” I would agree with that.

 

[o_mlly]

As it turns out, “evil” is an ambiguous word: it can mean natural evils like hurricanes, as well as moral evils like abortion, and of moral evils we may or may not be accountable for them. It would help if you would clarify the sense in which you used the term.

Your comment here suggests that in cases where no deliberate act was committed that led to the wrongful execution, that would not be a moral evil, that we could “ ascribe the evil to nature .” I would agree with that.

Evil is always a privation of the good. If the direct or indirect cause of the privation comes as a result of a human act then the evil is a moral, i.e., of human agency. If not then the evil is physical.

It would seem to me in the case under examination – the unjust execution of an innocent – that the absence of any human agency is possible but highly improbable. The innocence of the victim is presumed until his guilt is, according to the catechism, “fully” determined. How could an untruth be “fully” determined? It would seem at a minimum a human act of negligence is involved.

In the abstract only can one, I think, judge the state’s execution of an innocent to be a physical evil.

 

[Rau]

Evil is always a privation of the good. If the direct or indirect cause of the privation comes as a result of a human act then the evil is a moral, i.e., of human agency. If not then the evil is physical.

I’m not sure that’s correct use of the terminology. The ill consequences of human acts foreseen but not intended (and offset by good consequences) are not termed moral evils as I understand it.

 

[o_mlly]

I’m not sure that’s correct use of the terminology. The ill consequences of human acts foreseen but not intended (and offset by good consequences) are not termed moral evils as I understand it.

In the unique case of the state’s execution of an innocent, the direct killing of the one convicted is intended. No other situation permits the direct killing of a human being. I do not think that the permissible indirect killing of an unjust aggressor can be applied as in the moment, the prisoner poses no lethal threat.

Applying the principle of the double effect, it seems to me, that the third principle, i.e., the good may not proceed through the evil effect (the protection of society proceeds from the death of the innocent one) renders the act immoral. The first principle – the act may not be intrinsically evil – is obviated by special exception for the state.

The uniqueness of the teaching that the state possesses a conditional right to directly kill a human being makes moral comparisons practically impossible. Perhaps that why three popes have had difficulty with the traditional teaching.

 

[Ender]

Evil is always a privation of the good. If the direct or indirect cause of the privation comes as a result of a human act then the evil is a moral, i.e., of human agency. If not then the evil is physical.

This would make all erroneous convictions moral evils. We all understand that if someone takes an overt action to deliberately cause an unjust outcome that is an immoral act. The question at issue here is whether an inadvertent act which leads to the wrong outcome is also a moral evil or simply a physical one.

It would seem to me in the case under examination – the unjust execution of an innocent – that the absence of any human agency is possible but highly improbable

Finding a person guilty of a crime he didn’t commit is not a frequent occurrence, but surely happens despite the best intentions of all involved. If such an outcome is not a moral evil, then we agree, and in that case finding an innocent person guilty of murder is morally no different than finding him guilty of any other crime. All such cases are morally identical.

 

[o_mlly]

This would make all erroneous convictions moral evils.

I do not believe these terms are synonyms: “morally evil” and “moral evils”. The former describes the objective act. The latter categorizes the kind of evil emanating from the act.

We agree that an erroneous conviction is an objectively evil act, i.e., a morally evil act. Categorizing the subjective culpability of the actor(s) does not change the morality of the act. One may believe that the evil effect is a moral evil (culpable actor) or physical evil (no one to blame) but that’s a distinction without a difference with respect to the morality of the act.

CCC#1793 If - on the contrary - the ignorance is invincible, or the moral subject is not responsible for his erroneous judgment, the evil committed by the person cannot be imputed to him. It remains no less an evil, a privation, a disorder. One must therefore work to correct the errors of moral conscience.

If such an outcome is not a moral evil, then we agree, and in that case finding an innocent person guilty of murder is morally no different than finding him guilty of any other crime. All such cases are morally identical.

I don’t think identical is a correct description. The difference is not dependent on the category of evil, moral or physical, but on the gravity of objective evil effected by the act. For instance, these two acts are not morally identical:

• A traffic court magistrate coerces a $10 fine for a wrongfully issued parking ticket.
• The state executes an innocent person wrongfully convicted of murder.

Perhaps I’m missing the importance of categorizing the type of evil emanating from executing an innocent person. If so can you p(name removed by moderator)oint the importance of doing so?

 

[Ender]

I do not believe these terms are synonyms: “morally evil” and “moral evils”. The former describes the objective act. The latter categorizes the kind of evil emanating from the act.

The point stands: This would make all erroneous convictions morally evil.

We agree that an erroneous conviction is an objectively evil act, i.e., a morally evil act.

No, we don’t. I am willing to call it a physical evil, but not a moral one.

One may believe that the evil effect is a moral evil (culpable actor) or physical evil (no one to blame) but that’s a distinction without a difference with respect to the morality of the act.

I think this defines all mistakes and errors (at least those that harm someone) as morally evil. If that is so then term is really without meaning as it doesn’t differentiate between inadvertently harming someone and deliberately doing so.

Nor does CCC 1793 apply; that refers to an altogether different type of error. If the conscience is ill formed and a person thereby chooses wrongly he may well be accountable for his error. In that case he has chosen something he should have known was wrong. In the case of an error in judging a matter of fact there is no “he should have known better” issue. There is no morally evil act in such a circumstance.

“When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.” (Augustine)

Perhaps I’m missing the importance of categorizing the type of evil emanating from executing an innocent person. If so can you p(name removed by moderator)oint the importance of doing so?

What is important is understanding the difference between an inadvertent act with tragic consequences, and a deliberate act leading to the same end. Your argument erases that distinction by calling them both morally evil.

 

[Dolphin]

Doesn’t matter personal opinion on the matter. As Catholics, we are suppose to believe in what is in the Catechism, and the Catechism says the death penalty can never be used. End of story.

 

[Rau]

As Catholics, we are suppose to believe in what is in the Catechism, and the Catechism says the death penalty can never be used. End of story.

Is it? Which Catechism has the most weight? The most recent? Why that one?

 

[o_mlly]

o_mlly:

I do not believe these terms are synonyms: “morally evil” and “moral evils”. The former describes the objective act. The latter categorizes the kind of evil emanating from the act.

The point stands: *This would make all erroneous convictions morally evil. * … I am willing to call it a physical evil, but not a moral one.

Are you arguing that the state’s execution of an innocent person is not an evil act?

If not then are you arguing that the state’s agents are not causally responsible for the intrinsically evil act of directly killing an innocent person?

If so then are you arguing that, therefore, Catholics can still maintain the death penalty?

Where are you trying to go with this notion of distinguishing physical vs. moral evil?

In the case of an error in judging a matter of fact there is no “he should have known better” issue. There is no morally evil act in such a circumstance.

“When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.” (Augustine)

We have Aquinas and the catechism teaching that invincible ignorance (which is essentially the moral defense of the state’s agents whose acts directly kill an innocent person) does not make a morally evil act good. The act remains evil.

As I posted earlier, your argument about the kind of evil – moral or physical – can only make sense in the abstract. The teaching is that the guilt of the prisoner must be “fully” determined before capital punishment may be morally employed. I submit that that condition cannot have been met in all concrete cases in which the state executed an innocent person.