Everything acts towards good per se, and good is a purely actual entity, because potential would cause a contradiction and it could not be good per se.
This isn’t an explanation; it’s just a re-stating of the same assertion.
The final cause is still to act towards some good, however there may be accidents that come into play that cause this good to be a deficient of the good that is intended in the final cause. As when I attempt to put myself in physical motion but trip and fall down.
And this relates to good how, exactly?
I mean metaphysical good. Because metaphysical evil doesn’t exist, so all things have to.
Adding the word “metaphysical” doesn’t really provide any explanatory power. What do you mean by “metaphysical good”? And why do you say that metaphysical evil doesn’t exist?
Moral evil is known to us by a violation of natural law.
Before I can accept this, you’ll have to define “natural law” and demonstrate that it exists.
We know that all acts are acted in order to obtain some good.
No, all
intentional actions are acted in order to obtain some
result. Unintentional acts aren’t “acted in order to obtain” anything at all, and the object of an action isn’t necessarily good.
For the act of existing is for the good of being, and the act of moving an object forward two inches is to move it forward and not backwards.
Unless you walk around to the other side, and then what was “forward” becomes “backward”.
How is this relevant, anyhow?
Thus we understand that all actions are undertaken for some good.
You’ll need quite a bit more explanation before we’re anywhere near understanding that.
No it doesn’t, metaphysical evil is just a relational concept.
It’s relational to good, but it’s just as valid to define good in terms of evil as it is to define evil in terms of good.
As nothing cannot exist because then there will be something, and that something will be nothing. What we call darkness is just a deficiency of light, what we call cold is just a deficiency of heat.
It’s a very pretty analogy, but analogies do not make an argument.
Take light for example; say we are in an area of the universe that has no light. One would call this complete darkness. Nobody suggests that there is such an ontological entity as darkness. Darkness is just a lack of light. You can have a mental concept of the ontological entity as a relational concept only; you would never be able to know metaphysical evil per se, because it does not have potential existence.
And again, your explanation isn’t actually an explanation; it’s just a re-statement of your initial claim.
There can be what we call absolute evil in once sense, if you mean the deficiency of evil approaching potential infinity. However there cannot be an ontological entity of metaphysical evil.
You’re contradicting yourself.
If evil is simply the absence of good, once all the good is removed from a thing, it is maximally, finitely evil and can’t be made any more evil.
You used the analogy of temperature. There is no colder temperature than -273.15 degrees Celsius, because at this temperature, there is no heat left to remove. You can’t have “a deficiency of heat approaching potential infinity”; you simply have no heat.
So… just as absolute zero for temperature is a specific, finite value (-273.15 C), if evil is simply defined as the absence of good, there would be a specific, finite value for the “absolute zero” for morality. It would be a fixed barrier that would be impossible to traverse. What is it? And don’t think you necessarily need to give a quantitative value. Even in qualitative terms, what is “maximal evil”?
Until you provide an actual, valid definition for what you’re calling “good”, we have no way of knowing this at all.
- Therefore this good has to be pure actually because what has potential cannot be good per se because this would include a deficiency of good.
Only if we accept your model of the relationship between good and evil, which still has issues to be resolved.
- The ontological being of good has to be purely good and lack potentiality, otherwise it would not be good per se.
But does “the ontological being of good” necessarily exist?
- Therefore evil per se does not exist as an ontological entity.
Begging the question. You had to assume this to assert your point #2.
If you do not agree that all being act towards some good, I would challenge you to give me an example of somthing that does not act towards a good.
It would be hard for me to do this until we agree on a definition of “good”. So far, you haven’t given one that’s sufficient for me to figure out whether I agree with it or not.