This misconstrues the “Christian” position of those people. They are not saying they wouldn’t “know” the difference between right and wrong, but that there would be no actual (objective from a human standpoint) difference if God does not exist.
This is indeed a problem; I believe it
would be preferable if objective moral standards did exist, in the metaphysical sense (and it certainly would be preferable for there to be an afterlife, versus no afterlife).
This gets back to the fact that the non-believer makes a distinction between what he believes
ought to be the case, ideally; and what he honestly believes to be the case. Just because he says there is no objective morality (in a metaphysical sense) does not mean he denies it would be preferable for there to be an objective morality, in the metaphysical sense. He sees insufficient evidence for this assertion, however; indeed, even the near universality of certain moral prohibitions, may be nothing more than a
consensus gentium and tell us more about ourselves as
human beings, than about any transcendent order.
On the other hand, there are real weaknesses I see in the belief in objective moral standards that are transcendentally-grounded. First problem – what
are those objective moral standards? There is a great deal of disagreement about this, as the same-sex marriage debate makes clear. Desmond Tutu, for example – a theist and a Christian – has compared the denial of equal marriage rights for same-sex couples, with racism and apartheid.
Another problem with objective morality is, how do we
know it? How is it discoverable? While there is much consensus regarding basic moral standards such as no killing, no stealing, or no rape – namely, those tenets of an absolute morality that are precisely the most pragmatically necessary to a peaceful society – there is
wild disagreement regarding moral absolutes that intersect with religion.
So, for example, it is objectively immoral to eat beef (says the Hindu); objectively immoral to eat pork (says the Jew or Muslim); objectively immoral to eat meat on Good Friday (says the Catholic); objectively immoral not to attend church on Sunday (says the Catholic); objectively immoral not to attend church on Saturday (says the Seventh Day Adventist); objectively immoral to eat any meat, whatsoever (says the principled vegetarian); objectively immoral to eat any animal products whatsoever (says the principled vegan). Objectively immoral to harm
any living thing, including an insect (says the Jainist). Objectively immoral to allow a woman to study (says the 1st century Jew and the 21st century Tabliban moralist). Objectively immoral
not to allow a woman to study (says the 21st century westerner).
can strive to understand and accept what real beauty is, what real goodness is, etc. However, to attempt to usurp or annex these essences by claiming humans have full authority to apply and change these at will, because they mean nothing but what we define them to be, is the height of arrogance. That is the very definition of hubris. (Overreaching or excessive ambition, pride, etc., that will ultimately cause the transgressor’s ruin.)
If one has honest reasons for not believing that a. this objectively morality exists, or b. that it is discoverable, then it is not at all necessarily arrogance, for morals to change. To the contrary, one can be trying to do the best with what one has. And, as Bradski has pointed out, many of these changes have been in the name of rendering our societies more humane – more humane towards women; towards animals; towards children; towards the poor. At one time, this safeguarding of the rights of women – to name one example – would have been viewed as objectively immoral (and is still viewed as objectively immoral, by some).
it will be easier for an atheist to “be moral” by his/her definition because s/he has full control over what “moral” means. It means merely “what I agree that it means” so essentially it is doing “what I want.” Of course, that is very self-consistent because by definition they are the same thing.
A great many non-believers – most, perhaps – do live by an objective set of values. They try to, at least. Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens are two examples; they waxed indignant over the idea of genocide, for example, or of violence in the name of religion. Their defenses of their sense of morality may ultimately be problematic, since they would chalk it up to innate ideas; or pragmatic necessity; or psychological health versus psychological sickness. A transcendent metaphysical basis for saying “murder is wrong” would be preferable. But, again, they honestly do not believe – and I agree with them – that a transcendent basis for morality is demonstrable. It’s an article of faith – a very important one, perhaps. But the disagreements will remain as regards what that absolute morality consists in.
Again, though, this sense of “the height of arrogance” can just open up mutual accusations,
ad infinitem. For example, one could say, “it is the height of arrogance to believe that you have the truth and are incapable of being wrong, and that you have an infallible source of knowledge”; or “it is the height of arrogance to believe that what
we, as humans, believe, is inscribed in the very nature of the cosmos.”
To say, “I don’t know” is not necessarily arrogant; to the contrary, it can be evidence of a honest humility, as it was in the case of Socrates himself. Doubt need not be stubborn, or arrogant – it can also be humble, and honest with oneself.