To claim “I don’t know” regarding objective transcendent standards for qualities such as beauty, or truth or moral goodness can be humble and honest, but that also depends on how that statement is qualified. Any of these are possible:
- I don’t know and I don’t care to know.
- I don’t know and no one does, so I can think and do as I like; and others as they please.
- I don’t know but this is a critical question and requires careful consideration.
- I don’t know but the question is nonsensical.
Going beyond “I don’t know” and claiming such standards do not or cannot exist and the claimant has therefore an implicit right to define them or ignore them is indeed arrogant. The imperative nature of morality makes it necessary that the best possible standards, whether pragmatic, absolute or both, be uncovered or developed should itself be regarded as a responsibility, but never as a “right.” Claiming the right or privilege to redefine standards according to one’s own preferences merely because one does not accept, agree with or accede to existing objective standards is clearly hubris.
Claiming that one has an implicit right to define “what is good” for oneself – or to ignore what others say is good – is something that occurs in a few different contexts.
For example, a religiously zealous Jew may tell a Catholic (though generally doesn’t), “circumcision is a moral obligation that is not just for Jews, but for everybody. For a male child not to be circumcised is a transgression of an objective moral law.” And the Catholic may respond, “I respect your beliefs on this matter. There are many things that I, as a Catholic, consider essential to not transgressing the objective moral law. However, I honestly do not believe that circumcision is a question of morality. It is a valid question of choice, and I believe that each of us should be free to make that choice for our children, or not.”
This is, obviously, what is going on with the question of same-sex marriage. It’s not that those who are in support of same-sex marriage have “no morals.” In my experience, they tend to have strong and even passionate feelings about any of the following – rape and pedophilia; murder; violent theft; cruelty to animals; child abuse. But a religious camp is saying that this decision of whom to love – or whom to sleep with – is a moral decision. And the opposition is saying, “I grant that there are moral issues in our society (rape is immoral, as is violent theft); but you have not shown me how my decision to spend my life with someone of my own gender is immoral. That is my personal preference, and I have a right to it. In fact, it’s your depriving me of my right to it, that is immoral.”
This “I have a right to it” thinking is also one of the foundations of religious liberty, for example. This liberty can be based on the liberty to obey an objective moral law (as you understand it) or it can be the liberty to live according to your preference, if you are not convinced that the behavior in question has a bearing on the objective moral law, one way or another (e.g., “all meats are clean”, as in the apostle Peter’s dream; therefore, it is neither moral nor immoral to eat pork, though many would disagree and wonder whether you have* any* morals, since you are engaging in a behavior that is so obviously transgressive).
Beauty is even tougher, in a way. It is generally easier to convince a philosopher that there are objective moral standards, than it is to convince him that there is an objective aesthetics! You can try to define “beauty” in broad strokes – symmetry, harmony, order and regularity in the midst of richness and variation-- even if you acknowledge that there will always be any number of seemingly infinite minor divergences, in terms of subjective preference. For example, which is more beautiful – a Boticelli or a Michelangelo? How about the white iPhone, versus the black? Or, perhaps, neither of them is beautiful, or they are just about the same on the beauty scale.
There, it becomes a matter of personal preference – yet that preference is neither objectively moral nor immoral; nor, one could argue, is it a matter of objective beauty or objective ugliness.
Human beings do have free will (experientially, at least); we make choices. It’s a tough question to answer, as to when invoking free will and personal autonomy is a matter of
hubris, and when it is not (for the Greek, belief in free will was itself a form of
hubris, as when Oedipus had the
hubris to believe he could escape fate).