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STT
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You either do this or that without any constraint when you are free. This state however is state of potentiality since you go from undecided state to decided one.
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Richca
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I see what your saying here but it does not have to do with change understood in the Aristotlian/Thomistic sense as a movement from potentiality to actuality. Something else is going on here and I don’t quite have a handle on it to be honest but it may just be a matter of what God wills to be or doesn’t will to be. Since God is one eternal pure act without any mixture of potentiality, than change does not occur in him, he is altogether immutable. I don’t think it is hard to see that whatever God freely wills to be or wills not to be extraneous to him is immutable as this is an eternal choice. The objection and seemingly difficulty is that he could have eternally willed the opposite which again would be an immutable eternal choice but a different choice and will act. But neither of these different choices involve change as a movement from potentiality to actuality and they involve things extraneous to him and not his own inner divine life. Maybe this is why St Thomas speaks of the “necessary” ( and not change) when writing about whether God necessarily wills all that he wills and distinguishes between the absolute necessary which pertains to God’s own being and nature and the conditional necessary or necessary by supposition which pertains to things he can make or not make and which are extraneous to him.
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, chapter 82, there are points St Thomas writes about which pertain directly I think to the questions or difficulties at hand here. The SCG can be found online here:
https://isidore.co/aquinas/
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, chapter 82, there are points St Thomas writes about which pertain directly I think to the questions or difficulties at hand here. The SCG can be found online here:
https://isidore.co/aquinas/
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quaestio45
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I am actually in agreement here with you. It does not seem as if the issues arisen here may be at all resolved through appealing to such ideas because of what many of you have already told me, which is that it is, ultimately, only seemingly applicable to what is temporal and not necessarily to what is eternal. In fact, someone on another forum brought to my attention that potentiality as a concept itself is presupposing of a linear timeline. For, as this user said “We speak of “potential” only because a being operating in linear time reached a junction where she took one line when, as we say, she “could have” taken another, and afterward cannot revert to the other line. So your argument pertains to entities bound by the necessities of linear time.”
As true as that may be, however, I don’t think it really resolves the issue of what characterized “choice” for an eternal being, nor do I believe that it sufficiently answers the question of how God may choose as an immutable being… it certainly seems as if something is going straight over my head…
What I would say to this is that although it does involve what is extraneous to him, it nonetheless seems as if, were choice to be involved, the question of how God’s will (or simply, God, due to divine simplicity) can choose to act in a certain way whilst also potentially act another way (if such an idea is even applicable to him) can somehow be compatible with His immutability is still valid (for, if His will could’ve committed to one route of action but instead went down another, we are practically saying, so it seems, that His will may have been different, and therefore mutable).
I very much appreciate it @Richca. I’ll take a look through it to see if I may be enlightened to a solution to our predicament.
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Richca
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After some further consideration, I answer that God’s free choices such as to create our world or not to create our world does not equal mutability in him. There are many reasons for this but two are that God’s free decisions are eternal and mutability or change involves a composition of potency and act. In regards to an eternal free decision in act, there is no room for change or potentiality such that God’s will was in potentiality to not willing either to create the world or not and then decided at some point in time (for change involves time, a before and after though God is in eternity) or eternity so to speak to will to create the world or not. Nor did God will not to create the world and afterward decided to create the world. Rather, God has freely decided and willed from eternity to create the world. The same goes if God had freely decided not to create the world from eternity. In a word, in an eternal free choice in act, there is no change going on in God’s will whichever way he chooses.
We move from potentiality to act in our choices on a daily. basis because we are making new choices and acts of will all the time. Before our decision or choice, we are in potentiality to it, not willing it. Once we make and will some choice, we are no longer in potentiality to it but in act, actually willing it. God’s will doesn’t move from potentiality to act or not willing something to willing something, but it has always been in act, actually willing whatever he wills.
In regards to change involving a composition of potency and act, this is the case with all creatures but God is pure act and there are a host of metaphysical problems if God is not pure act but a composition of potency and act. St Thomas goes over a few of these in the first part of the Summa Theologica, Question 9, The Immutability of God.
God’s will, then, does not change. Whatever he wills he wills in act which is one eternal act of willing. There are certain things in God’s intellect or knowledge such as the creation of our world or potentially an infinite number of other worlds which God does not necessarily will to be, except by supposition, but has free choice.
We move from potentiality to act in our choices on a daily. basis because we are making new choices and acts of will all the time. Before our decision or choice, we are in potentiality to it, not willing it. Once we make and will some choice, we are no longer in potentiality to it but in act, actually willing it. God’s will doesn’t move from potentiality to act or not willing something to willing something, but it has always been in act, actually willing whatever he wills.
In regards to change involving a composition of potency and act, this is the case with all creatures but God is pure act and there are a host of metaphysical problems if God is not pure act but a composition of potency and act. St Thomas goes over a few of these in the first part of the Summa Theologica, Question 9, The Immutability of God.
God’s will, then, does not change. Whatever he wills he wills in act which is one eternal act of willing. There are certain things in God’s intellect or knowledge such as the creation of our world or potentially an infinite number of other worlds which God does not necessarily will to be, except by supposition, but has free choice.
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quaestio45
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Ahhhh, I see! So, if I am in understanding of you @Richca, you come to the conclusion that God having free will is not in conflict with His immutability on the basis that mutability stems from potentiality, yes? But to be eternal (not bound by temporal limitations) means that there is no potentiality in choice, for all acts and “decisions” are eternal ones, correct? As such, God is never in potentiality when making or commiting to an act of choice or free will, and thus, he still may have created and not created, yes? And because His will never moves from potency to act, it is not a contradiction to say that he created this world but may have created another, right?
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Gorgias
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OK. But… God doesn’t “choose”, per se. He doesn’t move from one stance to a different one. So, if you’re going to look at free will in terms of “choices”, then you’ll reach a conclusion which – I think! – is invalid. After all, “choice” is something that happens in a particular way in a temporal framework, and not quite the same way in an atemporal framework. So, if you’re going to attempt to analyze God in a way that’s appropriate to a temporal framework, I think the attempt will fail (or, as I suspect, it will lead to inaccurate results).
I think that this gets closer to it! So… God wills. He simply wills things to be… and they are. So, that’s the closest analogy that we have to the notion of a choice in a temporal framework. There are critical differences, though:
- God’s will does not change.
- There is not a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ to God’s will, in the way that there are in the case of temporal choices / acts.
- God himself is not “altered” by the operation of His will, in the way that – for instance – we humans are changed by virtue of the choices and actions we take.
It is difficult, since it’s so foreign to us! But, I agree – it’s critical in the scope of these kinds of analyses!
In a temporal framework, I’d agree.
In the context of God, which is an atemporal framework, I’d say that it’s almost – but not quite! – there. In the context of God (who is, after all, a singleton – there’s nothing else in existence like Him!), though, I think that the analogous notion is “will”.
It perfectly expresses God’s will. You might not think that it’s all that hot, but… go create a universe for yourself that perfectly expresses your will, and we’ll call it even.
Which is why it doesn’t apply to God, in whom there is only act, not potential.
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quaestio45
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That seems very fair. However, if God eternally wills for creation, and he could very well eternally will for no creation, and it also follows that God’s will is changeless, how would it be that that His will is the same yet He could will differently?
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Richca
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Yes, this is correct. For a thing or being to be mutable, there must be an element of potentiality in it as well as act, a composition of potency and act. Aristotle defined motion or change as ‘the act of a being in potency in so far as it is still in potency.’ The first of the 24 Thomistic Theses states: Potency and Act so divide being that whatsoever exists either is a Pure Act, or is necessarily composed of Potency and Act, as to its primordial and intrinsic principles.
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STT
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Which does apply to God if God decides.Which is why it doesn’t apply to God, in whom there is only act, not potential.
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Gorgias
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Yes… and no.
God has the freedom to act as He wishes. However, He will only act in conformance with His will. So… although He wills freely, He does not will for something that does not concord with His perfection.
You might wish to re-acquaint yourself with what “tautology” means. It doesn’t mean “something with which I disagree.” It does mean “the saying of the same thing twice in different words.”
God’s act perfectly expresses His will. That’s not “saying the same thing twice in different words”. (It is, apparently, “saying two things that you personally don’t like”, however.
)“Decision” implies ratiocination. It implies “change of thought.” God doesn’t “decide”, as such.
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STT
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Decision does not implies change of thought. Decision is needed when there are two thoughts, create or not create for example.“Decision” implies ratiocination. It implies “change of thought.” God doesn’t “decide”, as such.
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STT
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It does not implies change of act. You first decide and then act. State of decision is state of potentiality.
Create or not create were apparently options to God.
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STT
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Therefore, God has not freely decided.
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quaestio45
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That be so @Richca , my response will be the same as tbe one I had to Gorgias:
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quaestio45
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So he may will to freely act outside of conformation of His nature (or will) but He does not do so, correct? However, I thought it would be impossible for Him to act outside of accordance with His nature, the same way it is impossible for a triangle to be more than three sides. If that be so, it is out of necessity that He conforms with His nature and not voluntarily. In which case, your rebuttal seems to fall apart, right? However, I fully acknowledge that I may be misconstruing what you are attempting to say; if that be so, I am more than happy to be corrected.
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Gorgias
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Two thoughts:
- that’s a trivial conclusion, since He doesn’t “decide” as such
- the issue really was in regard to God’s freedom and not His decisions
We’re coming at it from radically different points of view, I’m afraid. We’re seeing the same thing – "God does not do X " – and I respond "correct; God does not will to do X ", while you’re saying, “a-ha! God is constrained! He may not do X, as an external constraint on Him!”
I don’t think that this take on it holds up. It’s not that God is constrained, as such. It’s that He does not will to do certain things. (If I looked at you and saw that you were holding a chocolate ice-cream-cone, would I exclaim, “a-ha! you’re constrained to not eat vanilla ice cream!”…? No – I’d recognize that you do not will to do so.)
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Richca
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The act of God’s will is immutable in that whatsoever he wills he wills and his will was never in potentiality to willing but always actually willing. There are certain objects of the divine will in the divine intellect which God has a free choice about such as the creation of our world, that is, he can either will it to be or not be. And these free decisions or choices in God are eternal and forever abiding.
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STT
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So God is not a person. Things that do not decide and only cause are called forces.
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