Can God be philosophically compatible with free will?

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A force doesn’t have consciousness. God has consciousness. Your assertion is invalid.
And what is the use of consciousness if a force can do the job? Just think about it, instead of God consider that the material existed at starting point without need for further cause.
 
And what is the use of consciousness if a force can do the job?
Fair enough. Please demonstrate a ‘force’ that is capable of creating ex nihilo. Or dying for our eternal beatitude. Or raising people from the dead. 🍿
Just think about it, instead of God consider that the material existed at starting point without need for further cause.
Freely asserted, freely denied. You have no case to make here, but only a bald assertion without any support.
 
Fair enough. Please demonstrate a ‘force’ that is capable of creating ex nihilo .
Just a force. We are talking about something which didn’t decide and apparently doesn’t need to be conscious. We obviously don’t talk about a person in here since any person has ability to make conscious decision.
Or dying for our eternal beatitude. Or raising people from the dead. 🍿
Please don’t mix miracles with creation ex nihilo. Even devils can do miracles.
Freely asserted, freely denied. You have no case to make here, but only a bald assertion without any support.
It is not a bald assertion. It is an example of how thing could be so that could be the case unless it is denied by any evidence or reason. Unfortunately you are providing neither any evidence nor reason.
 
We’re coming at it from radically different points of view, I’m afraid. We’re seeing the same thing – "God does not do X " – and I respond "correct; God does not will to do X ", while you’re saying, “a-ha! God is constrained! He may not do X , as an external constraint on Him!”

I don’t think that this take on it holds up. It’s not that God is constrained , as such. It’s that He does not will to do certain things. (If I looked at you and saw that you were holding a chocolate ice-cream-cone, would I exclaim, “a-ha! you’re constrained to not eat vanilla ice cream!”…? No – I’d recognize that you do not will to do so.)
I’m going to assume, @Gorgias, that we both believe that God cannot do what is logically impossible (such as make a four sided triangle), and I am also going to assume you believe that God cannot contradict His nature on the basis that it is logically impossible (such as Him committing evil). That be so, God is immutable, yes? Which means every aspect of Him (His conscious, His will, His substance, and His love) cannot change, correct? After all, it seems defintionally true for a being of pure act. That be so, if God made our universe from eternity, and God did not need to, and therefore He could’ve not created from eternity, it means that God chose eternally to create, yes?

Now I have been shown by Richca that God making a choice from eternity does not necessitate potency, however, what is still unanswered is how it is possible that God be able to make a decision from eternity to create whilst not having any difference in His being at all from if He did not create. For, there is at the very least a clear difference in that He chose to create, yes? That much should be self evident I believe. However, if choice is something which is caused by consciousness, and if it were so that God chose creation, then it must be that the consciousness of God is the reason there was that commitment at all. But that would mean that if He did not create, He would have not had His consciousness commit to the choice of creation, and thus, there is difference. But God is immutable, so this cannot be so. So, if that be the case, how do you explain this choice? Does it not stem from consciousness? Or can God somehow choose without needing alter even His conscious.

Do also bear in mind that I changed my language from “will” to “conscious”, for after reading further into Thomas Aquinas, it seems to me that to use the word “will” in relation to God’s eternal choice of creation does not seem befitting. For, as has been previously communicated to me, God’s will - whilst still holding the consistency of willing the good (and thus being oriented towards the good) - may encapsulate that which is unnecessary in attaining the good, such as creation, without change. As such, let us move our addressing of the problem away from will and perhaps towards conscious. That is, if you think it appropriate, of course.
 
Just a force. We are talking about something which didn’t decide and apparently doesn’t need to be conscious. We obviously don’t talk about a person in here since any person has ability to make conscious decision.
So, in other words… you can’t demonstrate the existence of such a force. You can posit it, mind you – but not demonstrate that any such thing actually exists.
Please don’t mix miracles with creation ex nihilo. Even devils can do miracles.
Devils aren’t “forces” either, STT. 😉
It is an example of how thing could be so that could be the case unless it is denied by any evidence or reason. Unfortunately you are providing neither any evidence nor reason.
It’s your assertion. No one is obligated to disprove it. However, since you are the one who asserted it, you are the one who is obligated to prove it.
 
we both believe that God cannot do what is logically impossible … and God cannot contradict His nature on the basis that it is logically impossible
Yes.
That be so, God is immutable, yes?
I don’t think that His immutability proceeds from the fact that He does not act against His nature. But, yes… He’s immutable.
Which means every aspect of Him (His conscious, His will, His substance, and His love) cannot change, correct?
As long as you’re not attempting to predicate that He has ‘parts’, sure – ‘immutable’ means immutable.
That be so, if God made our universe from eternity, and God did not need to, and therefore He could’ve not created from eternity, it means that God chose eternally to create, yes?
Depends on what you mean by “chose”. If you’re thinking of a process through which one reaches a decision that hadn’t previously been present, in the way that humans do it, then… no. After all, if you’re extrapolating from humans to God, then you’re projecting our nature on Him.

But, if by ‘chose’ you merely mean that He willed creation? Then yes.
I have been shown by Richca that God making a choice from eternity does not necessitate potency
If you’re using “choice” in an analogous way? Sure.
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quaestio45:
what is still unanswered is how it is possible that God be able to make a decision from eternity to create whilst not having any difference in His being at all from if He did not create.
Because you’re still thinking about “choice” from a human perspective and projecting it on God. That, I suspect, is where your hangup is (and, it’s why I keep insisting on not using the word ‘choice’, since my intuition is that the use of that word is the issue here).
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quaestio45:
So, if that be the case, how do you explain this choice? Does it not stem from consciousness? Or can God somehow choose without needing alter even His conscious.
He willed it eternally. There was no ‘process’ by which God went from a state of “not willing to create” to “willing to create”. There was no ‘before’ or ‘after’ in the will or in the act itself. There was no point at which something changed in God and after that point, He had ‘committed’ to creating the universe.

God simply willed the universe eternally.
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quaestio45:
Do also bear in mind that I changed my language from “will” to “conscious”
I noticed that. 😉
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quaestio45:
after reading further into Thomas Aquinas, it seems to me that to use the word “will” in relation to God’s eternal choice of creation does not seem befitting
Hmm… do you have a citation in mind?
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quaestio45:
As such, let us move our addressing of the problem away from will and perhaps towards conscious.
Hmm… I’m not certain that would be helpful. After I read the Aquinas passage you’re thinking about, though, we might consider whether ‘consciousness’ helps our discussion.
 
That be so, God is immutable, yes? Which means every aspect of Him (His conscious, His will, His substance, and His love) cannot change, correct? After all, it seems defintionally true for a being of pure act. That be so, if God made our universe from eternity, and God did not need to, and therefore He could’ve not created from eternity, it means that God chose eternally to create, yes?
God’s being consist of free choices because he is not a lifeless rock or robot but a being with intellect and will. The will is of such a nature that its act is voluntary. A person having will is master of their acts.
Now I have been shown by Richca that God making a choice from eternity does not necessitate potency, however, what is still unanswered is how it is possible that God be able to make a decision from eternity to create whilst not having any difference in His being at all from if He did not create.
God’s eternal free decisions or choices involve an act of his will which is his being and his will which is in act or whatever he wills or wills not is immutable. The knowledge of the choices are in his intellect and they have been there eternally. It has been shown here many times that God’s will which is in act is immutable. What has not been answered by you or anybody else is how God’s will is changeable if such be the case. Identify the change in God’s eternal act of will if such can be done? I suggest to focus on God’s act of will for starters.

God’s operations are the acts of his intellect or understanding wherein he has knowledge and his act of will which in reality are but one act and are one and the same thing. This is what God’s life consist in, his understanding or knowledge and will. By one eternal act of his intellect he knows all things at once and by one eternal act of his will, he wills all things.

Yes, God chose, that is, he willed from eternity to create the world. Your constant rebuttal is that God could have chose from eternity to not create the world. This is true but ‘could have’ is meaningless if it was in God’s will to create the world. The ‘could have’ here is a non-reality, it doesn’t exist. By eternally willing to create the world, God’s will did not change from not willing to create the world. He never willed to not create the world. Either God eternally wills it or he does not.
 
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@Richca, @Gorgias, it is made very apparent to me that my choice in language is causing problems that get in the way of addressing the primary issue (that being modal collapse, as I believe William Lane Craig called it). So perhaps the usage of more contemporary thought processes for the sake of clarity is warranted here.

Imagine, if you will, two seemingly possible worlds: one where God created and one where God did not create. Now if God is immutable, and His existence is completely and utterly explicable through His essence, that must mean His existence is the exact same across all possible worlds. If that be so, how could God cause something (creation) in one world and not create (a world with only Himself) in a different world whilst not having within Himself any distinction in order to explain the difference (no distinction in will, conscious, substance, etc.)? That is my primary question. And it seems to me that there is simply no explanation. That be so, God’s “choice” which stems from either His conscious or will, necessarily cannot be existent if there cannot even be a change in what allows for choice, it seems.

Also, @Gorgias, my switching of using the term “will” due to its non-necessitude for change in order to incorporate creation comes from reading chapter 75 and 76 of Thomas’s first book in the summa contra gentiles (although I do indeed acknowledge that I could’ve read the chapters wrong, given its quite difficult for me to understand Thomas’s writing).
 
Imagine, if you will, two seemingly possible worlds: one where God created and one where God did not create. Now if God is immutable, and His existence is completely and utterly explicable through His essence, that must mean His existence is the exact same across all possible worlds.
No. A merely “possible world” has no existence. Therefore, there is no “there” there in which to exist.
If that be so, how could God cause something (creation) in one world and not create (a world with only Himself) in a different world whilst not having within Himself any distinction in order to explain the difference (no distinction in will, conscious, substance, etc.)? That is my primary question. And it seems to me that there is simply no explanation.
The question boils down to “how is it that God is, where there is existence, and is not, where there is no existence?” The answer is simple: the “merely possible but not actual” world doesn’t exist. There’s no “choice” there. Rather, there is God’s will, which gives rise to the actual world.

The “seemingly possible world” is a philosophical thought experiment. It has no basis (save the imagination of a creative philosopher). It does not require any other explanation, no?
Also, @Gorgias, my switching of using the term “will” due to its non-necessitude for change in order to incorporate creation comes from reading chapter 75 and 76 of Thomas’s first book in the summa contra gentiles
OK. I don’t have time to go back to it this weekend, but I’ll re-read those citations during the week!
 
So, in other words… you can’t demonstrate the existence of such a force. You can posit it, mind you – but not demonstrate that any such thing actually exists.
I did demonstrate the existence of such a force. If the cause of universe does not decide and is not conscious then it is a force.
Devils aren’t “forces” either, STT. 😉
That was not me who start talking about miracles.
It’s your assertion. No one is obligated to disprove it. However, since you are the one who asserted it, you are the one who is obligated to prove it.
I am talking about a feasible scenario.
 
@Gorgias, what I was attempting to show was that it just does not seem as if there is any logical support to the idea that it was ever possible for God to act differently then the way he did because God is divinely simple (God’s act is as much God as His will and conscious). And because of that, we fall into modal collapse because it means that all the acts of God along with their effects are seemingly necessary because God is necessary.

The only way out of such conundrum, it seems to me, is to deny His acts are included in the divine simplicity. However, even if that were the case, the conscious which commits to such act (eternally or not) must be different then the one which does not commit to the act. But God cannot ever be different in His existence across two different planes of thought, for that would deny that His essence wholly explains His existence. Therefore, the conception of God ever acting differently then the way He did will always be false. Its like what @STT is saying; God becomes a force rather than a person, if there is never any valid conception of Him acting different. It may just be a thought experiment, but its an important one which demonstrates, I believe, that the idea of God acting differently whilst also being the God of “actus purus” can never be coherent.
 
we fall into modal collapse because it means that all the acts of God along with their effects are seemingly necessary because God is necessary.
Hmm… I don’t think that this follows. Creation is contingent, not necessary. God was not compelled to create.
Therefore, the conception of God ever acting differently then the way He did will always be false.
Whether He would is distinct from whether He could, though, no? He had the freedom to “not create” (even though that would seem to be counter to His omnibenevolence).
It may just be a thought experiment, but its an important one which demonstrates, I believe, that the idea of God acting differently whilst also being the God of “actus purus” can never be coherent.
I would say that the “idea” of God acting differently is possible, but that this is something that is never actualized. So, conceive of it all you want – that doesn’t mean that it has reality outside of your thought experiment.
 
Whether He would is distinct from whether He could , though, no? He had the freedom to “not create” (even though that would seem to be counter to His omnibenevolence).
But it seems to me that to say “would” is to presuppose “could” (to say “I wouldn’t run a million miles” is to entertain the idea that you ever have the ability to do so in the first place). But - and I know I keep going back to this, but I think its important - if God’s existence is His essence, and therefore our conception of God existing differently is always invalid, and creation is a state of existence opposed to noncreation (insofar as their must be a difference in either the will or conscious in order for their to be a difference in effect of ‘choice’), then therefore our conception of God not creating is always invalid unless we can somehow say God did not need to be able to change in will or conscious in order for their to be that difference in “choice”. But that seems, frankly, absurd to me.
 
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Imagine, if you will, two seemingly possible worlds: one where God created and one where God did not create. Now if God is immutable, and His existence is completely and utterly explicable through His essence, that must mean His existence is the exact same across all possible worlds. If that be so, how could God cause something (creation) in one world and not create (a world with only Himself) in a different world whilst not having within Himself any distinction in order to explain the difference (no distinction in will, conscious, substance, etc.)? That is my primary question. And it seems to me that there is simply no explanation. That be so, God’s “choice” which stems from either His conscious or will, necessarily cannot even be a change in what allows for choice, it seems.
Choice is substantially an act of the will although the intellect or reason is also involved such as the reason considering the choices, makes a judgement, and then presents this judgment to the will. Before the will chooses, it is in potentiality to the choice. When the will wills a choice it is no longer in potentiality to the choice but in act, willing the choice.

God’s will is not a will in potentiality but a will eternally in act, actually willing this or that or this or that choice. And this act of God’s will is immutable, it’s perfect and it follows from his perfect knowledge.

Whether God creates one possible world and not another, or both, or neither depends on his will in conjunction with his intellect or knowledge or wisdom. And again, God’s will is not a will in potentiality to free choices but a will eternally in act, that is, actually willing this or that.

The distinction whether God can create this possible world or that possible world is in his eternal knowledge. He knows he can create this possible world or not or many other worlds, probably an infinite number of them. God has all knowledge and not just knowledge about himself but also what he can cause to exist in any way, shape, or form extraneous to him. Whether God chooses to create anything depends on the application of his will to what he knows, that is, to either will it or not.
 
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But - and I know I keep going back to this, but I think its important
No worries… it’s an interesting discussion!
if God’s existence is His essence
Yep…
and therefore our conception of God existing differently is always invalid
Note that you just changed perspective: from God’s essence to human conception of God…!
therefore our conception of God not creating is always invalid
It’s unreal – as it “not actualized reality.” It’s merely a human construct.

Therefore, I don’t know that we’d categorize it as “valid” or “invalid”. It’s merely a hypothetical idea in the mind of humans. Doesn’t touch upon God at all, wouldn’t you say?
unless we can somehow say God did not need to be able to change in will or conscious in order for their to be that difference in “choice”. But that seems, frankly, absurd to me.
It’s merely a counter-factual: “If God’s nature were different, then the universe might be otherwise (or not at all).” But, God’s nature is not different, and therefore it holds.

Intuitively, it seems to me to be akin to truth tables:
XYX -> Y
TTT
TFF
FTT
FFT
So… if the premise “if God’s existence were different” is false (and it is!), then the implication itself is true (or, in your words, “valid”), even if the conclusion does not follow. Simple logic.
 
God’s will is not a will in potentiality but a will eternally in act, actually willing this or that or this or that choice. And this act of God’s will is immutable, it’s perfect and it follows from his perfect knowledge.
Yes, I’m in one hundred percent agreement.
Whether God creates one possible world and not another, or both, or neither depends on his will in conjunction with his intellect or knowledge or wisdom
The distinction whether God can create this possible world or that possible world is in his eternal knowledge. He knows he can create this possible world or not or many other worlds, probably an infinite number of them. God has all knowledge and not just knowledge about himself but also what he can cause to exist in any way, shape, or form extraneous to him. Whether God chooses to create anything depends on the application of his will to what he knows, that is, to either will it or not.
So… lets see here… we both definitely agree that God isn’t ever in potency on the basis of choice alone because his choices are eternal, right? And that therefore means that he wasn’t confronted with potential then acted, it was always act.

The thing is, you seem to admit that creation does indeed stem from will, knowledge, and wisdom. Which means that, were he to have the exact same will, knowledge, and intelect in a parallel universe, he should end up creating the exact same thing that was created here, yes? So it must mean that God, in order to have a different product of his effects, must therefore have a difference in either will, knowledge, or wisdom. But if God is perfect will, knowledge, and wisdom, it means any alternative would be imperfect, wouldn’t you agree? And therefore, that wouldn’t be God, correct?
 
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