Capital punishment debate: Dr. Feser and Msgr. Swetland

[o_mlly]

All human acts – speaking, taking, seeing, talking, etc. – when abstracted from their natural ends are so rarefied that the object of the will cannot be known. If the object of the will is unknown then the moral object cannot be known.

I would suggest the use of the word “qualifiers” instead of “circumstances” to describe the necessary additions that allow one to determine the object of inadequately defined human acts. I understand what is meant but using the same word as the third font may confuse some. As the third font, circumstances (thing that stand around the act) are not the “matter” of the act and are only secondary, that is, in themselves do not change the morality qulaity of the act.

Is there a knowable moral object to the act of capital punishment? No.
Is there a knowable moral object to the act of capital punishment in a state that has other bloodless means to punish and protect? Yes. (If the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been fully determined.)

We cannot put the existence or non-existence of “other bloodless means” into the third font of circumstances as that font never change the moral object of the act. Circumstances can only render evil an act good in its object and good in its intention if evil in its circumstance. The circumstance of “other bloodless means exist” is not evil per se.

 

[Wesrock]

so too “Capital Punishment”. It can mean both the somewhat indeterminate superset meaning (“State Executions”) or a subset of these (those involving a just imposition of the Death Penalty which by definition are not intrinsically evil).

I almost missed this line. So it seems you’ve addressed my own specific question, about what I meant by capital punishment, at least.

 

[o_mlly]

I will attribute that to my rushed phone-posting while waiting for a table at a restaurant.

If someone asked “Is sex intrinsically evil”, one would say, “no, sex is not intrinsically evil. But there are circumstances when sex would be evil.” Someone who believes sex is “intrinsically” evil would believe sex is anywhere and always evil no matter the circumstances. Sex could never be justified. Sex would always be morally evil.

When someone asks "is sex “intrinsically evil,” you know what that means. There’s no insisting the question is more complicated because of unspecified circumstances, which completely misses the question being asked. There are circumstances where it is not evil and circumstances when it is evil, so it is not intrinsically evil. Perhaps none of the circumstances when it is not evil are currently present, but have been historically or could be in a possible hypothetical.

Asking if capital punishment is intrinsically evil is the same concept.

All human acts – speaking, taking, seeing, touching, worshiping, etc. – when abstracted from their natural ends are so rarefied that the object of the will cannot be known. If the object of the will is unknown then the moral object cannot be known.

To avoid confusion with the third font, circumstances (things that stand around the act), I would suggest the use of the word “qualifiers” instead of “circumstances” to describe the necessary definitional additions that allow one to determine the object of inadequately defined human acts. Circumstances are not the “matter” of the act and are only secondary, that is, in themselves do not change the morality of the object.

Analyze the capital punishment of one whose identity, guilt and responsibility are not fully determined. Is the act immoral in object (first font) or only immoral because of an evil circumstance (third font)? Let’s call this capital punishment without “due process.” I would argue that the act is immoral in its object, i.e., intrinsically evil.

Why not the third font? The third font, circumstance, cannot change the moral species of the object. No human act in the concrete is indifferent in its object. Therefore, if one finds the act evil only in its circumstance then one must also find this particular act intrinsically good in the first font. But is it?

This “circumstance” is always and everywhere necessary to determine the moral object of every instance of capital punishment as good or evil. Capital punishment that lacks “due process” is always evil in its object. “Due process” is not circumstantial but central to the act; due process does not “stand around” the act; due process is in the “matter” of the act. All qualifiers that tells us what this act is are necessary to determine the object of the act. Information that tells us who, when, where, how (by what means) are circumstantial.

So, capital punishment without due process is intrinsically evil.

Substitute the phrase ”without due process” with “where other bloodless means are available.”

The development of doctrine in EV gives us: Capital punishment where other bloodless means are available is intrinsically evil.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I almost missed this line. So it seems you’ve addressed my own specific question, about what I meant by capital punishment, at least.

Appreciate the observation.
I think part of the problem is people actually have different understandings of the reality that is actually referred to by the expression “capital punishment” when it comes the the moral meaning.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

All human acts – speaking, taking, seeing, touching, worshiping, etc. – when abstracted from their natural ends are so rarefied that the object of the will cannot be known. If the object of the will is unknown then the moral object cannot be known.

To avoid confusion with the third font, circumstances (things that stand around the act), I would suggest the use of the word “qualifiers” instead of “circumstances” to describe the necessary definitional additions that allow one to determine the object of inadequately defined human acts. Circumstances are not the “matter” of the act and are only secondary, that is, in themselves do not change the morality of the object.

Analyze the capital punishment of one whose identity, guilt and responsibility are not fully determined. Is the act immoral in object (first font) or only immoral because of an evil circumstance (third font)? Let’s call this capital punishment without “due process.” I would argue that the act is immoral in its object, i.e., intrinsically evil.

Why not the third font? The third font, circumstance, cannot change the moral species of the object. No human act in the concrete is indifferent in its object. Therefore, if one finds the act evil only in its circumstance then one must also find this particular act intrinsically good in the first font. But is it?

This “circumstance” is always and everywhere necessary to determine the moral object of every instance of capital punishment as good or evil. Capital punishment that lacks “due process” is always evil in its object. “Due process” is not circumstantial but central to the act; due process does not “stand around” the act; due process is in the “matter” of the act. All qualifiers that tells us what this act is are necessary to determine the object of the act. Information that tells us who, when, where, how (by what means) are circumstantial.

So, capital punishment without due process is intrinsically evil.

Substitute the phrase ”without due process” with “where other bloodless means are available.”

The development of doctrine in EV gives us: Capital punishment where other bloodless means are available is intrinsically evil.

Wholeheartedly agreed, it has been my argument for the last 3 months on a number of threads. It is the only theologically sensible way of reconciling the different seeming contradictions.

Unfortunately Rau still mistakenly believes that an act can be made evil by the 3rd font alone so you wont get any agreement there from what I can see.
I observe that whenever a changed “circumstance” of the 3rd font seems to make an act immoral it is only because it indicates that this better description of the underlying reality in fact indicates a change also in one of the other two fonts. In which case we are in fact talking about a better specification of the object (and/or purpose) and not a true circumstance of the newly described act.

It is also interesting to note that direct or indirect purpose/intention in an act is also essentially rearranging what details we consider belonging to the object and what details belong to circumstances.

 

[thinkandmull]

Feser’s article in This Rock magazine rejected John Paul II’s teaching that killing a criminal harms his human dignity. Cardinal Ratzinger’s statement that one can still believe in the death penalty for reasons of justice does not do away with JPII’s teaching. They are not exclusive. The pope was saying that they have human dignity still and the reasons must be high to do something odious to it.

 

[Ender]

If “personal killings” can be both … then pray tell why “State killings” MUST be only one or the other?

Let’s start with this: what you “quoted” me as saying was not what I wrote.
What I actually said: “Capital punishment either is or is not intrinsically evil.”
What you claimed I said: “State killings either are or are not intrinsically evil.”

You have several times accused me of cherry picking my citations - of course without any evidence to support the charge - but even your wildest accusations never included the charge that I deliberately altered what someone else said. Like you just did. The thing is that even rewriting what I wrote doesn’t make your position any better. It is still indefensible.

How can something be both intrinsically evil and not? You perhaps meant that killing can sometimes be both evil and justifiable, but that wasn’t the issue. Personal killings are not both intrinsically evil and not. Capital punishment is not. “State killings” (no matter what is meant by that inventive term) are not. Nothing is both intrinsically evil and not intrinsically evil.

Ender

 

[e_c]

Let’s start with this: what you “quoted” me as saying was not what I wrote.
What I actually said: “Capital punishment either is or is not intrinsically evil.”
What you claimed I said: “State killings either are or are not intrinsically evil.”

You have several times accused me of cherry picking my citations - of course without any evidence to support the charge - but even your wildest accusations never included the charge that I deliberately altered what someone else said. Like you just did. The thing is that even rewriting what I wrote doesn’t make your position any better. It is still indefensible.

How can something be both intrinsically evil and not? You perhaps meant that killing can sometimes be both evil and justifiable, but that wasn’t the issue. Personal killings are not both intrinsically evil and not. Capital punishment is not. “State killings” (no matter what is meant by that inventive term) are not. Nothing is both intrinsically evil and not intrinsically evil.

Ender

The problem is a failure to distinguish between an act as a general type which includes certain matter and circumstances conceptually such that the act is per se ordered to an injustice and is therefore intrinsically evil, and an act void of any actually morally distinctive matter or circumstance which might admit of bad matter or bad circumstances. To speak of the latter in these conversations is, I suggest, unhelpful, as it confuses things. We know what capital punishment is, and we can speak of it on those terms. No need to get more abstract.

 

[Ender]

so too “Capital Punishment”. It can mean both the somewhat indeterminate superset meaning (“State Executions”) or a subset of these (those involving a just imposition of the Death Penalty which by definition are not intrinsically evil).

All of this flutter about a “superset” of “state executions” revolves around this point: sometimes it is justly applied (one set), and sometimes it isn’t (another set). When it is justly used it is (and I quote): “not intrinsically evil” (yay, we have an answer), but when it is unjustly used it is evil. What this means is that evil acts are intrinsically evil. If there is another distinction here I missed it.

By CP Ender clearly only means one of the subsets of State Executions and, as observed over the years, regularly confuses the part for the whole and the whole for the part.

True. It did not occur to me that it would be necessary to show that evil acts are, you know, evil, or to point out that because something is not wrong in every circumstance (e.g. intrinsically evil) does not mean it is not wrong in any.

Ender

 

[e_c]

I observe that whenever a changed “circumstance” of the 3rd font seems to make an act immoral it is only because it indicates that this better description of the underlying reality in fact indicates a change also in one of the other two fonts. In which case we are in fact talking about a better specification of the object (and/or purpose) and not a true circumstance of the newly described act.

This is correct. Objects “swallow” circumstances, or they are made worse by them. For example, playing cards becomes a sacrilege if it’s done on an altar. It becomes worse if Mass is actually being celebrated. Even though the guys playing “just want to play cards,” they are committing a grave sacrilege because of these circumstances. They introduce a character, sometimes in the form of an effect, into the integral nature of the material act itself. Even if an effect is accidental, if there is undue proportion of good and evil then it will remain a bad act, even though it can’t be called an intrinsically evil act. One example is smoking in a maternity ward. There is an accidental effect of causing a serious health risk to infants. This is a form of neglect - accidentally (unless one is TRYING to get the infants sick, in which case that becomes a per se effect of one’s act, because it is now the measure of success, which demarcates the object insofar as it is choiceworthy). It would change the object in this sense - we could say a “bad smoking” on account of the disproportion between good done in pleasure and evil done by damage.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Let’s start with this: what you “quoted” me as saying was not what I wrote.
What I actually said: “Capital punishment either is or is not intrinsically evil.”
What you claimed I said: “State killings either are or are not intrinsically evil.”

And I did so on purpose to see how you reacted…

1. Because you do this bait and switch thing to other people and to quoted texts all the time when it seems to work in your favour - and often draw the most absurd conclusions by doing so.

For example:
AB Chaput said: “The death penalty is not intrinsically evil. …the legitimacy of capital punishment under certain circumstances.”
And you then quoted him as saying: *… the illegitimacy of ever holding that **capital punishment *could be considered intrinsically evil."

First of all he said its the “death penalty” (not CP) that is not intrinsically evil.
Secondly, when he did speak of CP he didn’t say it could never be considered intrinsically evil ( an absolute double negative). He made a single, conditional positive statement.

Now he may well mean the same thing by both CP and DP expressions here…but to assume that as you have is a novice hermeneutic/scholarly mistake. It depends on context and his previous usages which need to be carefully checked out.

It is quite clear that a double negative does not always have the same nuanced meaning as a single positive…certainly not when a conditional is replaced by an absolute. This is mere rhetoric and biased interpreting.

That is why I find your views far more indicative of a hack than a scholar.

1. Re your own personal use of the terms you pull me up on … it is fairly clear you see no significant difference between the two anyways - as you seem to admit?

This demonstrates my point that your contributions and use of authorities is little more than a heavily biased misinterpretation and procrustean usage and you are not even aware of doing it.

You gaily “bait and switch” phrases from others but nit-pick the moment someone does it to you - even when that person accurately assessed that you see the two expressions as univocal anyways as you just admitted .

I am not trying to convince you, that is impossible, I simply observe it to silent lurkers who may confuse subtle hack rhetoric for scholarship when you quote authorities.

Its

 

[Blue_Horizon]

How can something be both intrinsically evil and not?

Hmmmnnn…perhaps because by that “something” (e.g. State executions) people refer to a sensible reality that is not fully described in detail. Depending on the fine details it may define a type of State execution that is either moral or immoral.

If it is a SE of a person imprisoned for life…bingo… recent Popes say that is always immoral. If not of this type then it may well be moral.

If you believe “capital punishment” is a code expression for “always moral” then clearly we call the latter types of moral State executions “CP”. These State executions are clearly not intrinsically evil as you say. But the same cannot be said of the other type of State executions it seems.

Thus State executions can be either - no great problem of logic.

Or it could just be a matter of semantics - “Capital Punishment” may be a word like “sex”.
As a previous contributor observes the word “sex” assumes a lot of hidden stuff.
In most contexts people usually mean the marital embrace (never intrinsically evil last time I checked). In other contexts we often mean a more generic understanding (intercourse) which can be intrinsically evil.

The two clearly are not the same and often even in a given sentence we can slide between one meaning or the other.

Hence “sex” can be both intrinsically evil and also not depending on the eye of the beholder. What is the big deal with that .

Clearly State executions or State Killings or “death penalty” or even 'capital punishment" (for some people) are similarly morally loaded…or not.

You perhaps meant that killing can sometimes be both evil and justifiable, but that wasn’t the issue. Personal killings are not both intrinsically evil and not.
Ender

When you use these terms you have to make up your mind whether you are referring to a class of specific, concrete, particular and well understood observable instances…or whether you are referring to a single universal and abstract norm/definition.

They are not the same, though to you they seem to be.
Clearly the latter (an can be both intrinsically evil or not depending on the degree of specification.
Clearly the former, being fully specified actual cases of a particular class are known fully and can only be one or the other.

 

[Rau]

This is correct. Objects “swallow” circumstances, or they are made worse by them. For example, playing cards becomes a sacrilege if it’s done on an altar. It becomes worse if Mass is actually being celebrated. Even though the guys playing “just want to play cards,” they are committing a grave sacrilege because of these circumstances. They introduce a character, sometimes in the form of an effect, into the integral nature of the material act itself. **Even if an effect is accidental, if there is undue proportion of good and evil then it will remain a bad act, even though it can’t be called an intrinsically evil act. **One example is smoking in a maternity ward. There is an accidental effect of causing a serious health risk to infants. This is a form of neglect - accidentally (unless one is TRYING to get the infants sick, in which case that becomes a per se effect of one’s act, because it is now the measure of success, which demarcates the object insofar as it is choiceworthy). It would change the object in this sense - we could say a “bad smoking” on account of the disproportion between good done in pleasure and evil done by damage.

The manner in which circumstances - in particular consequences - impact on morality can be debated. If an act is contemplated which appears in itself a good act, but we anticipate consequences which are on-balance bad, we know that to go forward with the act is immoral. If we do go forward, has the “act itself”, become intrinsically evil because at this point in time , and in all the current circumstances, we anticipated net bad consequences but went ahead anyway? Or have we just acted immorally. I favour the latter view.

But coming back to the issue of CP, an earlier post remarked that CP “without due process” is intrinsically evil. That would seem to be a reasonable proposition, because the absence of due process suggests that persons are being killed with dubious justification and minimal regard for guilt or innocence. Whatever such behaviour is about, it does not appear to have the good moral object we associate with CP. And CP can only be “punishment” if the guilty party has in fact been identified.

It is also being argued that CP "where other bloodless means are available” is intrinsically evil. But before passing comment on that view, I think we need to be clear what “bloodless” means actually means. A bloodless means to what? Does it (just) refer to a means to prevent the criminal carrying out more heinous crimes - eg. as a secure prison system would achieve? If so, then it would indeed seem impossible to justify killing the criminal. The act of killing becomes somewhat inexplicable. Certainly, it entails a very bad “consequence”, but is it intrinsically evil, or just an immoral act? [Reading statements from recent Popes, they appear to focus largely on the ends of punishment being the preventing of more crimes by that criminal.]

Is State administered punishment limited to the end of preventing further crimes by that criminal, or is the end (to which the punishment - be it CP or otherwise - is the means) broader? If it is broader, then we have to judge whether “bloodless means” are available that can fulfil the broader ends.

 

[Ender]

And I did so on purpose to see how you reacted…

1. Because you do this bait and switch thing to other people and to quoted texts all the time when it seems to work in your favour - and often draw the most absurd conclusions by doing so.

For example:
AB Chaput said: "The death penalty is not intrinsically evil. …the legitimacy of capital punishment under certain circumstances."
And you then quoted him as saying: *… the illegitimacy of ever holding that **capital punishment ***could be considered intrinsically evil."

Again your accusation is false: I did cite Chaput (your first sentence), but the second one was not a citation; it was my paraphrase of his comment. As for making a distinction between “the death penalty” and “capital punishment”, I don’t think anyone but you sees those terms as not being synonymous. Even Chaput in the phrase you just cited used both terms, and he clearly meant them as equivalent.

First of all he said its the “death penalty” (not CP) that is not intrinsically evil.
Secondly, when he did speak of CP he didn’t say it could never be considered intrinsically evil ( an absolute double negative). He made a single, conditional positive statement.

Now he may well mean the same thing by both CP and DP expressions here…but to assume that as you have is a novice hermeneutic/scholarly mistake. It depends on context and his previous usages which need to be carefully checked out.

No, it depends on whether one accepts the plain usage of terms. These are verbal gymnastics that would impress Bill Clinton.

1. Re your own personal use of the terms you pull me up on … it is fairly clear you see no significant difference between the two anyways - as you seem to admit?

The terms are two ways of saying the same thing.
"Capital* punishment, death penalty or execution is punishment by death.*" (Internet definition on the search term capital punishment.)

Ender

 

[Ender]

Hmmmnnn…perhaps because by that “something” (e.g. State executions) people refer to a sensible reality that is not fully described in detail. Depending on the fine details it may define a type of State execution that is either moral or immoral.

This is very true, but if there are any forms of “state execution” that are moral then “state executions” are not intrinsically evil. Something is intrinsically evil only if it is evil in all circumstances, and as you have just noted, executions may sometimes be moral. By the definition of the term this means that executions are not intrinsically evil.

If it is a SE of a person imprisoned for life…bingo… recent Popes say that is always immoral. If not of this type then it may well be moral.

This is a different argument. Here you are saying that “executions of form X are intrinsically evil” (I think, it’s not always clear what you’re trying to say). So - is that your position? Are you claiming that executing someone where that person represents no further threat to society is intrinsically evil?

Thus State executions can be either - no great problem of logic.

If you create multiple definitions for the same term it could mean anything at all.

When you use these terms you have to make up your mind whether you are referring to a class of specific, concrete, particular and well understood observable instances…or whether you are referring to a single universal and abstract norm/definition.

I use terms in the straightforward way you will find them defined in dictionaries. I don’t create unique, personal distinctions.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Is State administered punishment limited to the end of preventing further crimes by that criminal, or is the end (to which the punishment - be it CP or otherwise - is the means) broader? If it is broader, then we have to judge whether “bloodless means” are available that can fulfill the broader ends.

This is a point that has been covered multiple times, but it is important enough that we should cover it again.

Punishment has four ends of which the prevention of future crimes is only one, the other three being rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. These are the traditional objectives of punishment the church has always presented, so no, punishment by the state is not limited merely to preventing a particular individual from repeating his crimes.

If physical protection was the primary objective then it might be reasonable to argue that once the primary objective is achieved it would be improper to execute someone simply to achieve a secondary objective. The problem of course is that protection is itself merely one of the secondary objectives, and it is not at all clear that the primary objective - retribution (retributive justice) - can be achieved with a lesser punishment.

Pius XII addressed the issue of personal security, and rejected it as the most important aspect of punishment.*A word must be said on the full meaning of penalty. Most of the modern theories of penal law explain penalty and justify it in the final analysis as a means of protection, that is, defense of the community against criminal undertakings, and at the same time an attempt to bring the offender to observance of the law. In those theories, the penalty can include sanctions such as the diminution of some goods guaranteed by law, so as to teach the guilty to live honestly, but **those theories fail to consider the expiation of the crime committed, which penalizes the violation of the law as the prime function of penalty ***(Address to Italian Catholic jurists, 1954)
Ender

 

[e_c]

The manner in which circumstances - in particular consequences - impact on morality can be debated. If an act is contemplated which appears in itself a good act, but we anticipate consequences which are on-balance bad, we know that to go forward with the act is immoral. If we do go forward, has the “act itself”, become intrinsically evil because at this point in time , and in all the current circumstances, we anticipated net bad consequences but went ahead anyway? Or have we just acted immorally. I favour the latter view.

It is clear that an “intrinsic character” of any act is indeed dependent on conceptual factors rather than its physical parts when spoken of abstractly. The extent of detail with which we speak about acts conceptually removed from their actual instances is dependent on what is being investigated and also the general popularity of chosen means.

 

[Ender]

It is clear that an “intrinsic character” of any act is indeed dependent on conceptual factors rather than its physical parts when spoken of abstractly.

What “conceptual factors” could justify rape? The church doesn’t appear to recognize any. Or are you simply saying that “factors” may mean that a particular act was not rape? That’s certainly true, but it doesn’t change the fact that rape is intrinsically evil whatever the specifics of a particular case.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Again your accusation is false: I did cite Chaput (your first sentence), but the second one was not a citation; it was my paraphrase of his comment.

The problem is Ender that you believe your distorted paraphrases are just as good as the original…so much so that you even later label your own invented paraphrases as “citations”
in some sort of weird rhetorical revisionist history.

And you clearly did just this with your Chaput distortions above referring to your versions later on as citations or even fantasising “Chaput stated flatly that capital punishment is not intrinsically evil”.

As I say your paraphrase also manipulated his simple conditional positive statement into an absolute double negative that certainly destroyed the nuances of his original.
This is what you do and you do not even know that you do it.

These are the bull in a china shop distortions of a hack or a rhetorician not a scholar.
Dont give up your day job just yet.

 

[Wesrock]

It is also being argued that CP "where other bloodless means are available” is intrinsically evil. But before passing comment on that view, I think we need to be clear what “bloodless” means actually means. A bloodless means to what? Does it (just) refer to a means to prevent the criminal carrying out more heinous crimes - eg. as a secure prison system would achieve?

The qualifier “bloodless” has been on my mind as well. Considering historical conditions, bloodless seems insufficient as a qualifier, though not something to be disregarded. There is the question of whether the bloodless conditions could be considered humane. Not every village or city or nation in history had the infrastructure or resources to reasonably provide indefinite or even long-term humane living environments for violent prisoners, even if chance of escape was nil. Cells or other holdings could be cold, damp, unsanitary, cramped, disease ridden, and unable to ensure the protection of the prisoner from others, to name a few issues, and perhaps far more degrading to the dignity of the person than some forms of the death penalty, “bloodless” though they may be.

The death penalty may be inadmissible for a developed nation today, as recently commented on by Pope Francis.