Capital punishment debate: Dr. Feser and Msgr. Swetland

[Blue_Horizon]

This is very true, but if there are any forms of “state execution” that are moral then “state executions” are not intrinsically evil.

Ender logic!
Still looking at the pointing finger not the reality pointed to.

This is a different argument. Here you are saying that “executions of form X are intrinsically evil” (I think, it’s not always clear what you’re trying to say). So - is that your position? Are you claiming that executing someone where that person represents no further threat to society is intrinsically evil?

It isnt me saying this form/type of State executions is wrong Ender, its the Popes.

If you create multiple definitions for the same term it could mean anything at all.

Life comes before dictionaries Ender. Different people use different words differently in this debate. Have you still not realised this? And recent Popes have just invented/defined a new form of State Exectuion which is to be called wrong if the instance fits their new description. What could be more obvious

And the issue is not mutliple definitions for the same term. They are often well defined sub types as i have always observed to you.
Are you confused by killings being divided into murder, lethal self defence, abortion, mansluaghter…? Yet you are re different types of State Executions .

Reminds me of the Dubia…are those Cardinals “confused” or just dont want to accept.

I use terms in the straightforward way you will find them defined in dictionaries.

Dictionaries dont usually define moral objects which are the currency we work in here. And when they do they regularly differ from Church definitions. And in popular debate even among Catholics some people use them one way and others another. And some definitions are intentionally partly morally inchoate by defintion such as “sex”, and “killing”.

And some words have two or more distinct meanings dependent on context such as “sex” and “State executions”. Which is why the fact that all sex is not intrinsically evil does not mean some types of sex cannot. And the same obviously for SE.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

What “conceptual factors” could justify rape? The church doesn’t appear to recognize any. Or are you simply saying that “factors” may mean that a particular act was not rape? That’s certainly true, but it doesn’t change the fact that rape is intrinsically evil whatever the specifics of a particular case.

Ender

So apply that reasoning to all recognisable instances of “stop it I like it” type rapes.
This form of rape is not intrinsically evil…it could be consensual marital sex.

Yet following you current line of reasoning you have to say…all rape has to be wrong, therefore even though it looks like rape it isnt… its some form of kinky consensual sex.

So transfer that thinking to State Executions where, according to you, the reverse is true.
All CP is not intrinsically evil…
Yet CP of the permanently imprisioned type appears to be always evil according to recent Popes.
So we have to conclude that even though such looks like CP it isnt…its some form of unjustified political killing we dont have a name for.

Me, I’d just say that some recognisable types of State killings (of lifers) are murder while others are indeed Capital Punishment (and therefore just).

But then I dont have a set agenda that says all types of State killings have to be either intrinsically evil or not intrinsically evil. (And we all agree some are not so, according to Ender logic, all are not).

But for you there can be no forest composed of different sub forests
For you State killings cannot be divided into different types of killings as can personal killings (e.g. murder, lethal self defence, manslaughter, abortion…)
Why we do not know.

 

[Wesrock]

But then I dont have a set agenda that says all types of State killings have to be either intrinsically evil or not intrinsically evil. (And we all agree some are not so, according to Ender logic, all are not).

Now, maybe I’m approaching this wrong, but if some of the subsets are not intrinsically evil, and some of the subsets are intrinsically evil, the superset should be deemed “not intrinsically evil.” The superset being not intrinsically evil does not mean all the subsets are not intrinsically evil. Saying a set is intrinsically evil, to my mind, says that EVERYTHING contained in the set is intrinsically evil. But the converse isn’t true.

So to me:

(1) “The superset is intrinsically evil” means all objects in the set are intrinsically evil.

(2) “The superset is not intrinsically evil” means there is at least one object in the set that is not evil.

This of course relies on the sets being well defined.

At least, that’s what I’ve derived from other discussions, or perhaps it’s a point where people are operating with different logics and start talking past each other (I have other discussions in mind, not any particular thread on these forums).

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Now, maybe I’m approaching this wrong, but if some of the subsets are not intrinsically evil, and some of the subsets are intrinsically evil, the superset should be deemed “not intrinsically evil.” The superset being not intrinsically evil does not mean all the subsets are not intrinsically evil. Saying a set is intrinsically evil, to my mind, says that EVERYTHING contained in the set is intrinsically evil. But the converse isn’t true.

So to me:

(1) “The superset is intrinsically evil” means all objects in the set are intrinsically evil.

(2) “The superset is not intrinsically evil” means there is at least one object in the set that is not evil.

This of course relies on the sets being well defined.

At least, that’s what I’ve derived from other discussions, or perhaps it’s a point where people are operating with different logics and start talking past each other (I have other discussions in mind, not any particular thread on these forums).

Traditionally this logic (of specifying the moral object) is handled by means of the Scholastic distinction begtween genus and species.
In other words the genus (superset) is partly defined and partly inchoate.
It is the purpose of the “specific difference” to split off the better defined/specified subsets.
Thus animal is the genus of the human species, the specific difference being rationality.
Hence if the genus is SE then the subset of immoral killings that the Popes speak of are split off by the specifier “life impisionment” types.

As the genus of State Executions is still partly inchoate wrt specifiers that might allow us to determine the presence of intrinsic evil in the object it would seem we must conclude that neither predicate (intrinsic evil or not intrinsic evil) can rightly be fully applied to all members of that genus as yet.
In short, like the genus “killings” it is not yet possible to say whether they are intrinsically evil or not. Because to apply that predicate means all later species of the genus must be so…and clearly that is not the case with “personal killings” and re “State killings” it is the very point we are trying to discover.

What it all comes down to is whether the Popes have defined a new species/class of State Killings or not. Whether they speak of a sub-forest or just a many singular exceptional but unrelated trees.

Its pretty clear to me they are defining a clear sub-class of State Killings that are all immoral.
This then is a new moral precept being born. Just like contraception in the 1960s.

 

[Ender]

Now, maybe I’m approaching this wrong, but if some of the subsets are not intrinsically evil, and some of the subsets are intrinsically evil, the superset should be deemed “not intrinsically evil.” The superset being not intrinsically evil does not mean all the subsets are not intrinsically evil. Saying a set is intrinsically evil, to my mind, says that EVERYTHING contained in the set is intrinsically evil. But the converse isn’t true.

You aren’t approaching this wrong; your comments are obviously accurate. It is clear that “capital punishment” as the church uses the term applies to all instances where death is inflicted as a penalty for a crime. Sometimes such punishment is justified, sometimes it is not, but (as you said) since there are times when it is justified the act cannot be defined as intrinsically evil. Unlike abortion, rape, euthanasia and any number of acts to which the church has applied the term.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Now, maybe I’m approaching this wrong, but if some of the subsets are not intrinsically evil, and some of the subsets are intrinsically evil, the superset should be deemed “not intrinsically evil.” The superset being not intrinsically evil does not mean all the subsets are not intrinsically evil. Saying a set is intrinsically evil, to my mind, says that EVERYTHING contained in the set is intrinsically evil. But the converse isn’t true.

So to me:

(1) “The superset is intrinsically evil” means all objects in the set are intrinsically evil.

(2) “The superset is not intrinsically evil” means there is at least one object in the set that is not evil.

This of course relies on the sets being well defined.

At least, that’s what I’ve derived from other discussions, or perhaps it’s a point where people are operating with different logics and start talking past each other (I have other discussions in mind, not any particular thread on these forums).

In case it isnt obvious…modern set theory and Scholastic genus/species conepts are not perfect analogues. Set theory seems to assume well defined names. The scholastic concepts by their very nature trade on undefined aspects of the genus re its sub species.

Nor is the genus/species of the scholastics exactly the same as that used by Darwin and the natural scientists in classifying plant and animal life.

 

[o_mlly]

After listening to the debate, I think Swetland defeated Feser’s OT arguments (citations) by reminding Feser of the Catholic “Unity of Bible” principle in interpreting scripture.

I think Swetland also defeated Feser’s second argument from Tradition by reminding Feser that Catholics believe in the development of doctrine. Developments never contradict but do clarify (more restrictive, usually) moral permits in previous teachings.

But Feser’s citation of Paul in Romans 13:4 still stands. Future theological reflections on Romans may focus on the passages preceding and following this oft cited verse 4 by capital punishment advocates.

From the USCCB’s commentary on Romans:
Paul must come to grips with the problem raised by a message that declares people free from the law. How are they to relate to Roman authority? The problem was exacerbated by the fact that imperial protocol was interwoven with devotion to various deities. Paul builds on the traditional instruction exhibited in Wis 6:1–3, according to which kings and magistrates rule by consent of God. From this perspective, then, believers who render obedience to the governing authorities are obeying the one who is highest in command. At the same time, it is recognized that Caesar has the responsibility to make just ordinances and to commend uprightness; cf. Wis 6:4–21. That Caesar is not entitled to obedience when such obedience would nullify God’s prior claim to the believers’ moral decision becomes clear in the light of the following verses.
Is it correct to interpret that when Paul refers to the “magistrate who bears his sword not in vain” that he excludes magistrates whose authority does not come from God? (In Paul’s own capital death, Nero did “bear his sword in vain.”)

The false concept of the divine right of kings is over and even when appealed to in the middle ages was subject to the pope’s approval. How do we know today that democratically elected magistrates have authority from God? Does the magistrate who enacts unjust laws immediately evidence the lack of divine authority? Do we still look to the pope for approval? Does the papal interdict have a future? Is this an area for future development of doctrine?

It is clear to me that St. JPII in EV opened this line of future inquiry to theologians.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

You aren’t approaching this wrong; your comments are obviously accurate. It is clear that “capital punishment” as the church uses the term applies to all instances where death is inflicted as a penalty for a crime. Sometimes such punishment is justified, sometimes it is not, but (as you said) since there are times when it is justified the act cannot be defined as intrinsically evil. Unlike abortion, rape, euthanasia and any number of acts to which the church has applied the term.

Ender

That a genus cannot be labelled “intrinsically evil” by no means rules out the possibility that this genus may contain a species that is intrinsically evil. Then all members of this species must be intrinsically evil.

The primary genus (State killings) are therefore clearly morally indeterminate wrt the predicate “intrinsic evil” and the predication either way is strictly speaking inappropriate.

We dont really say that personal killings are not intrinsically evil because that suggests never intrinsically evil. The Magisterium goes out of its way in fact to suggest the opposite by translating the 5thC as Thou shall not kill rather than Thou shall not murder.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

After listening to the debate, I think Swetland defeated Feser’s OT arguments (citations) by reminding Feser of the Catholic “Unity of Bible” principle in interpreting scripture.

I think Swetland also defeated Feser’s second argument from Tradition by reminding Feser that Catholics believe in the development of doctrine. Developments never contradict but do clarify (more restrictive, usually) moral permits in previous teachings.

But Feser’s citation of Paul in Romans 13:4 still stands. Future theological reflections on Romans may focus on the passages preceding and following this oft cited verse 4 by capital punishment advocates.

From the USCCB’s commentary on Romans:
Paul must come to grips with the problem raised by a message that declares people free from the law. How are they to relate to Roman authority? The problem was exacerbated by the fact that imperial protocol was interwoven with devotion to various deities. Paul builds on the traditional instruction exhibited in Wis 6:1–3, according to which kings and magistrates rule by consent of God. From this perspective, then, believers who render obedience to the governing authorities are obeying the one who is highest in command. At the same time, it is recognized that Caesar has the responsibility to make just ordinances and to commend uprightness; cf. Wis 6:4–21. That Caesar is not entitled to obedience when such obedience would nullify God’s prior claim to the believers’ moral decision becomes clear in the light of the following verses.
Is it correct to interpret that when Paul refers to the “magistrate who bears his sword not in vain” that he excludes magistrates whose authority does not come from God? (In Paul’s own capital death, Nero did “bear his sword in vain.”)

The false concept of the divine right of kings is over and even when appealed to in the middle ages was subject to the pope’s approval. How do we know today that democratically elected magistrates have authority from God? Does the magistrate who enacts unjust laws immediately evidence the lack of divine authority? Do we still look to the pope for approval? Does the papal interdict have a future? Is this an area for future development of doctrine?

It is clear to me that St. JPII in EV opened this line of future inquiry to theologians.

I agree, but certain others wont.

 

[e_c]

After listening to the debate, I think Swetland defeated Feser’s OT arguments (citations) by reminding Feser of the Catholic “Unity of Bible” principle in interpreting scripture.

I think Swetland also defeated Feser’s second argument from Tradition by reminding Feser that Catholics believe in the development of doctrine. Developments never contradict but do clarify (more restrictive, usually) moral permits in previous teachings.

But Feser’s citation of Paul in Romans 13:4 still stands. Future theological reflections on Romans may focus on the passages preceding and following this oft cited verse 4 by capital punishment advocates.

From the USCCB’s commentary on Romans:
Paul must come to grips with the problem raised by a message that declares people free from the law. How are they to relate to Roman authority? The problem was exacerbated by the fact that imperial protocol was interwoven with devotion to various deities. Paul builds on the traditional instruction exhibited in Wis 6:1–3, according to which kings and magistrates rule by consent of God. From this perspective, then, believers who render obedience to the governing authorities are obeying the one who is highest in command. At the same time, it is recognized that Caesar has the responsibility to make just ordinances and to commend uprightness; cf. Wis 6:4–21. That Caesar is not entitled to obedience when such obedience would nullify God’s prior claim to the believers’ moral decision becomes clear in the light of the following verses.
Is it correct to interpret that when Paul refers to the “magistrate who bears his sword not in vain” that he excludes magistrates whose authority does not come from God? (In Paul’s own capital death, Nero did “bear his sword in vain.”)

The false concept of the divine right of kings is over and even when appealed to in the middle ages was subject to the pope’s approval. How do we know today that democratically elected magistrates have authority from God? Does the magistrate who enacts unjust laws immediately evidence the lack of divine authority? Do we still look to the pope for approval? Does the papal interdict have a future? Is this an area for future development of doctrine?

It is clear to me that St. JPII in EV opened this line of future inquiry to theologians.

Unity of Scripture? Sure. That’s why it can’t contradict itself. Same with doctrine - to say capital punishment is intrinsically evil would be to contradict past doctrine, and it seems very difficult to see how restricting capital punishment to only certain kinds of cases would also not contradict past teaching or Biblical law.

Divine right of kings (as a shorthand) remains fundamental to understanding why government must be obeyed at all. The government is the lawful authority in civil matters because it participates in God’s governance through the natural law. See Thomas’ treatise on law.

 

[Ender]

After listening to the debate, I think Swetland defeated Feser’s OT arguments (citations) by reminding Feser of the Catholic “Unity of Bible” principle in interpreting scripture.

I think it is a mistake to separate the Old Testament from the New as if they were somehow different categories of teachings. While it is true that not all of the Mosaic law is still adhered to, it is not true that what the OT taught was simply abrogated by the NT. As for the specific OT reference that is most relevant to the topic (Gn 9:5-6), that has not been and cannot be reversed, and certainly nothing in the NT suggests that it was.

I think Swetland also defeated Feser’s second argument from Tradition by reminding Feser that Catholics believe in the development of doctrine. Developments never contradict but do clarify (more restrictive, usually) moral permits in previous teachings.

If doctrine cannot be developed to the point of reversal, does this mean that retribution is still the primary objective of punishment, because that has been the doctrine of the church?

Is it correct to interpret that when Paul refers to the “magistrate who bears his sword not in vain” that he excludes magistrates whose authority does not come from God? (In Paul’s own capital death, Nero did “bear his sword in vain.”)

Authority, whether used for good or bad, comes from God. If Christ recognized that Pilate’s authority was from God why would we believe his authority is given only to the good ruler? The point was asked and answered by St. Bellarmine:*Thirdly, from St. Augustine, who says, “Since this is the case, let us not attribute the giving of a kingdom and the power to rule except to the true God, who gives happiness in the kingdom of heaven only to the good, but the kingdom of earth both to the good and bad, as is pleasing to Him to Whom nothing unjust is pleasing.” And below, “He Who gave dominion to Marius, gave it also to Caesar, He Who gave it to Augustus, gave it also to Nero, He Who gave it to Vespasian, father or son, most benign emperors, gave it also to the most cruel Domitian; and that it may not be necessary to recount every instance, He Who gave it to Constantine the Christian gave it also to Julian the Apostate.” *(De Laicis, ch 8)
Ender

 

[o_mlly]

Unity of Scripture? Sure. That’s why it can’t contradict itself. Same with doctrine - to say capital punishment is intrinsically evil would be to contradict past doctrine, and it seems very difficult to see how restricting capital punishment to only certain kinds of cases would also not contradict past teaching or Biblical law.

Divine right of kings (as a shorthand) remains fundamental to understanding why government must be obeyed at all. The government is the lawful authority in civil matters because it participates in God’s governance through the natural law. See Thomas’ treatise on law.

The right of the magistrate to wield his sword has already been restricted without contradicting past teaching or biblical law. As St. Paul explains, the right is not unconditional.

The magistrate may not wield the sword in any case where the identity, guilt and responsibility of the accused has not been fully determined. This restriction certainly begs further reflection. What does “fully determined” mean? Does “beyond a reasonable doubt” satisfy?

In 1995, EV elevated the teaching to encyclical status that the magistrate is restricted from wielding the sword in those cases where other bloodless means are available. It seems to me that subsequent popes and bishops wish to take these restrictions further. Is that the will of the Holy Spirit manifested through the hierarchy?

The issue of the magistrates divine authority may also be questioned. If his authority does comes from on high then his powers of governance are not limited by man’s will but only God’s. But we no longer have God’s prophets anointing His magistrates from on high but (in democracies) elected by the people from below. If the magistrates authority comes from below, can the people give their magistrate’s rights that they themselves do not possess? The people have the right to lethal self-defense only in the moments of attack by the unjust aggressor. It seems EV furthers the teaching that would limit the state to the same restriction.

The government’s role as the lawful authority in purely civil matters is not questioned. In civil matters that involve moral matters the lawful government shares the public square with the Church. When both stand in the public square, as they do on the death penalty, the Church is the voice of authority.

Capital punishment is neither commanded nor prohibited. The next few decades will, IMHO, of Church teaching will narrow the window allowing its moral use. I could be wrong.

 

[Ender]

In 1995, EV elevated the teaching to encyclical status that the magistrate is restricted from wielding the sword in those cases where other bloodless means are available.

It is certainly true that EV opposed the use of capital punishment in those cases, but it is far from clear that this is not a prudential judgment rather than a doctrinal development. Before you can claim that this is a new doctrine you have to resolve these questions: what is the primary objective of punishment, and is it not the primary objective that determines the extent of the punishment?

The issue of the magistrates divine authority may also be questioned. If his authority does comes from on high then his powers of governance are not limited by man’s will but only God’s. But we no longer have God’s prophets anointing His magistrates from on high but (in democracies) elected by the people from below. If the magistrates authority comes from below, can the people give their magistrate’s rights that they themselves do not possess? The people have the right to lethal self-defense only in the moments of attack by the unjust aggressor. It seems EV furthers the teaching that would limit the state to the same restriction.

The magistrate has not just the right to punish, but the obligation to do so. That is, he has the responsibility to exact vengeance (*“Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned.” - *Aquinas) This, however, is absolutely forbidden to the individual. Here is an example of the magistrate having a right (and duty) that the people do not possess. If your explanation was accurate no one would be justified in punishing criminals.

The government’s role as the lawful authority in purely civil matters is not questioned. In civil matters that involve moral matters the lawful government shares the public square with the Church. When both stand in the public square, as they do on the death penalty, the Church is the voice of authority.

The church is the authority on questions of morality. The government, however, has the authority to apply those teachings in the real world. As the catechism says about war:* The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good. *(CCC 2309)

Capital punishment is neither commanded nor prohibited.

It is certainly not required as a response to every murder, but a good argument can be made that it is the presumptive punishment.*For God says, “Whosoever shall shed man’s blood, his blood shall be shed.” These words cannot utter a prophecy, since a prophecy of this sort would often be false, but **a decree and a precept. ***(St. Bellarmine, De Laicis, ch 13)
Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

How can something be both intrinsically evil and not? You perhaps meant that killing can sometimes be both evil and justifiable, but that wasn’t the issue. Personal killings are not both intrinsically evil and not. Capital punishment is not. “State killings” (no matter what is meant by that inventive term) are not. Nothing is both intrinsically evil and not intrinsically evil.

Ender

Great, so back on point, you accept that personal killings and State killings are analogous in this regard.

Therefore your original assertion that State killings can never be considered intrinically evil (because everyone agrees some are just) is absurd.

There is another obvious possibility… “killings”, whether personal or State, are incompletely described from a moral point of view.

In which case it doesnt make sense to even attempt to apply the predicate (intrinsic evil or not) to the genus “killings” (State or personal).

This is the obvious logical conclusion to most of us without an axe to grind and its surprising you cannot see it…

Therefore it is perfectly sensible to hypothesise there exists a definable class/species of State killings that are intrinsically evil. And in the C21st those forms are mainstream in First World Countries. This does not deny that CP can also be just outide of the class just defined.

Why do you have such a problem with allowing such a hypothesis?

 

[IWantGod]

Great, so back on point, you accept that personal killings and State killings are analogous in this regard.

Therefore your original assertion that State killings can never be considered intrinically evil (because everyone agrees some are just) is absurd.

There is another obvious possibility… “killings”, whether personal or State, are incompletely described from a moral point of view.

In which case it doesnt make sense to even attempt to apply the predicate (intrinsic evil or not) to the genus “killings” (State or personal).

This is the obvious logical conclusion to most of us without an axe to grind and its surprising you cannot see it…

Therefore it is perfectly sensible to hypothesise there exists a definable class/species of State killings that are intrinsically evil. And in the C21st those forms are mainstream in First World Countries. This does not deny that CP can also be just outide of the class just defined.

Why do you have such a problem with allowing such a hypothesis?

I understand exactly what you are saying… Capital punishment is only good if it meets the criteria for good. If it does not then it is intrinsically evil. There are situations where Capital punishment is in fact murder.

 

[Ender]

I understand exactly what you are saying… Capital punishment is only good if it meets the criteria for good. If it does not then it is intrinsically evil. There are situations where Capital punishment is in fact murder.

Not exactly. A category of acts is intrinsically evil only if it is evil without exception. Since there are cases when capital punishment is justified it cannot be considered intrinsically evil. It is different from actions like abortion, euthanasia, rape, etc which are immoral without exception, and thus the church considers their evil to be intrinsic. Any act that is not morally justifiable is an evil act, but that is a condemnation of the particular act, not of the category to which the act belongs.

The real question with capital punishment is: what constitutes the “criteria for good”?

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I understand exactly what you are saying… Capital punishment is only good if it meets the criteria for good. If it does not then it is intrinsically evil. There are situations where Capital punishment is in fact murder.

Well murder may not be quite the right word but yes this is the angle I am coming from.
Murder suggests the matter is grave.
The matter may admit of “parvity” (lightness) as they say…like theft.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Not exactly. A category of acts is intrinsically evil only if it is evil without exception. Since there are cases when capital punishment is justified it cannot be considered intrinsically evil. It is different from actions like abortion, euthanasia, rape, etc which are immoral without exception, and thus the church considers their evil to be intrinsic. Any act that is not morally justifiable is an evil act, but that is a condemnation of the particular act, not of the category to which the act belongs.

The real question with capital punishment is: what constitutes the “criteria for good”?

Ender

“Killings” is indeed a category or genus of moral objects…but not of moral acts as you opine.

It is too inchoate and generic to yet anchor any identifiable moral intent…which is absolutely necessary before we can say it is a “moral act”.

Only better defined objects can possibly be labelled moral or immoral.

CP of those imprisioned for life is immoral.
CP in other cases may be moral if the usual conditions hold.

The first is a clearly defined category separate from the second.

We havent invented a word for the first yet.
I am sure we will one day. And it will always be wrong.

 

[Rau]

…CP of those imprisoned for life is immoral.

Certainly, upon reading CCC 2267, one would arrive at that conclusion (given we assume a secure prison).

“…if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.” [NB: I assume “unjust aggressor” refers to this criminal, not such persons in general.] If that is the traditional teaching, then there would seem to be nothing new proposed.]

The difficulty I see when reading the whole of the relevant section of the CCC (let alone the wider writings on CP) is that 2267 is not well harmonised with the remainder of the section. 2266 speaks about punishment more widely than as preventing a proven wrongdoer from repeating crimes, eg:

*The efforts of the state to **curb the spread *of behavior harmful to…correspond to the requirement of safeguarding the common good.

Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offense.

Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense.

Then 2267 cuts across all of this and argues that regardless of all that - it’s sufficient to securely confine the wrongdoer (prevent him from further crimes).

Reading the two sections together would seem to require one of two conclusions:

Either: (1) that life-imprisonment satisfies the above purposes/requirements (no matter the severity of the offence), or alternatively (2) life imprisonment is in some cases a “best efforts” attempt, because to go further, if the individual criminal is now contained, crosses another line.

[The ironic thing of course is that the last part of the first para of 2267 suggests that (2) has always been the case.]

A final observation - the last para of 2267 reads:
*
“Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has committed an offense incapable of doing harm…”*

Effectively preventing “crime” (last para of 2267) - is an odd way to express the effect of putting one criminal into secure confinement. The context suggests the wording should have been something like “effectively eliminating the threat posed by the criminal” or similar.

Secure confinement surely prevents a given criminal re-offending - but the extent to which it “prevents crime”, vs. alternatives, is a matter of judgement.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Certainly, upon reading CCC 2267, one would arrive at that conclusion (given we assume a secure prison).

“…if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.” [NB: I assume “unjust aggressor” refers to this criminal, not such persons in general.] If that is the traditional teaching, then there would seem to be nothing new proposed.]

The difficulty I see when reading the whole of the relevant section of the CCC (let alone the wider writings on CP) is that 2267 is not well harmonised with the remainder of the section. 2266 speaks about punishment more widely than as preventing a proven wrongdoer from repeating crimes, eg:

*The efforts of the state to **curb the spread ***of behavior harmful to…correspond to the requirement of safeguarding the common good.

Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offense.

Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense.

Then 2267 cuts across all of this and argues that regardless of all that - it’s sufficient to securely confine the wrongdoer (prevent him from further crimes).

Reading the two sections together would seem to require one of two conclusions:

Either: (1) that life-imprisonment satisfies the above purposes/requirements (no matter the severity of the offence), or alternatively (2) life imprisonment is in some cases a “best efforts” attempt, because to go further, if the individual criminal is now contained, crosses another line.

[The ironic thing of course is that the last part of the first para of 2267 suggests that (2) has always been the case.]

A final observation - the last para of 2267 reads:
*
“Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for effectively preventing crime*, by rendering one who has committed an offense incapable of doing harm…”

Effectively preventing “crime” (last para of 2267) - is an odd way to express the effect of putting one criminal into secure confinement. The context suggests the wording should have been something like “effectively eliminating the threat posed by the criminal” or similar.

Secure confinement surely prevents a given criminal re-offending - but the extent to which it “prevents crime”, vs. alternatives, is a matter of judgement.

I am shocked by the insightfulness re the apparent contradictions and scholarly overview of the CCC material .

They must of course be in harmony and it is the job of faithful scholars to work out what has to be “better worded” to bring out the real intent of the author despite the literal words.

I surprisingly agree with almost all you say.
I think it is obvious that life imprisonment is considered adequate retribution for murder.
The wording re preventing “crime” may well be a poor translation of the Latin but the meaning is clear enough which I believe you correctly identify.
Also obvious is whether such imprisonment is secure - yes its a prudential judgement on a case by case basis (not true in 3rd World I would say).

However the norm is now clear, CP of those in imprisoned for life (as reasonably judged to be so) is always immoral. This is not a **prudential **matter in the same sense despite Ender’s mantra to the contrary.

The creation of norms (technically called “derived moral precepts”) by the Magisterium is a process of “synderesis” not “conscience”.
A judgement of conscience is always prudential because the syllogistic reasoning involved always contains a minor premise based on judging the sensible which is contigent.

Synderesis is also an intellectual operation, and it involves judgements about the sensible world but not in the same way. It is more like cleaning the glass to see the workings of objective natural law working in sensible nature more clearly. Mystical authors compare this practical/speculative reasoning to understanding of self-evident principles (like maths). If one cannot see this for oneself (it takes wisdom and purity) one must trust in a teacher.
That is the role of the Magisterium only.

By saying that CP of those reasonably understood to be imprisioned for life is always immoral they are not making a fallible prudential judgement of conscience like .

They are implicitly inviting the faithful to freely assent and trust that they have correctly formulated a derived moral precept no different and no less self-evident than that of killing the innocent, or lying or taking what belongs to another when not in need of surbvival.

That is my take of where this will clearly go in the next 50 years.