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This is perhaps the strongest statement I have seen in defense of the position that capital punishment depends on historical circumstances. Against this, however, is Pius XII’s comments:*Equally important is the Pope’s [Pius XII] insistence that capital punishment is morally defensible in every age and culture of Christianity. Why? Because the Church’s teaching on “the coercive power of legitimate human authority” is based on “the sources of revelation and traditional doctrine.” It is wrong, therefore “to say that these sources only contain ideas which are conditioned by historical circumstances.” On the contrary, they have “a general and abiding validity.” *(Fr. John Hardon)Anyway, here’s what Romano Amerio has to say: From St. Augustine to St. Thomas Aquinas to Taperelli d’Azeglio, the traditional teaching is that the decision as to the necessity and legitimacy of capital punishment depends on historical circumstances, that is, on the urgency of the need to hold society together in the face of the disruptive behavior of individuals who attack the common good. (Iota Unum 187)
I am not aware of what Amerio is referring to with regard to the comments of Augustine and Aquinas.
EV at least addresses other aspects of punishment but I don’t think it is accurate to read that into 2267. We know it ought to be there, but it is a shortcoming of that section that it contains nothing beyond the appeal to personal safety. It refers only to “defending lives”, “defend and protect”, and “rendering inoffensive”. There is a passing reference to rehabilitation, but nothing about deterrence or, more significantly, retribution.My understanding is that more than just physical defense is meant when 2267 uses “defense” in the first sentence. I think Evangelium Vitae shows quite nicely that a proper sentence will obtain all four objectives of punishment.
It is debatable whether capital punishment can or should be considered as an aspect of self defense. We know, for example, that while one may kill in self defense, such killing must not be intentional. In the case of capital punishment, however, the killing is very much intended; that is the purpose of the punishment, not some unintended effect.CCC 2265 says the following: The defense of the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm. For this reason, those who legitimately hold authority also have the right to use arms to repel aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their responsibility.
This is another troubling quote about which there is some debate.The Holy Father is obviously invoking the principle of double effect in the passage, for his concern is to deny that the “fatal outcome” is attributable to the self-defender’s intention; accordingly, he cites Part II-II, Question 64, Article 7 of the Summa at this point. Paragraph 56 then begins with the remark, “It is in this context that the question of capital punishment arises.” But this is false, at least historically, for the question was never considered by the Church within that context. (Kevin L. Flannery, S.J., Pontifical Gregorian Univ, Rome)56. This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty.
I don’t think this is supportable; that is simply not what the words mean. One might consider deterrence to be defense by other means, but defense carries no concept of retribution or rehabilitation.I don’t think so. Clearly the traditional way of explaining capital punishment breaks up “defense” into retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and (physical) defense against the criminal. But it seems to me that the Catechism has chosen to explain it more broadly under the title of defense.
Dulles at least recognizes the problem, just as he recognizes that the wording of the relevant sections in EV and the catechism is at best confusing, but I’m not sure Professor Long provides much support for the positions those documents put forth.*From a Thomistic vantage point, the reductionist interpretation of Evangelium vitae is difficult to reconcile with Catholic tradition, because this tradition must consider the political state as providentially bound to acknowledge and implement a morally transcendent order of justice. So long as Catholics do not become contract theorists or Hobbesians, they must conceive the state as executing an order of justice that transcends it in origin, majesty, and truth. Only on such a ground does punishment as a righting of moral imbalance make sense. This is, implicitly, the trouble faced by largely secular societies that aren’t themselves any longer sure why they should punish if society may be otherwise physically protected. *(Prof. Steven Long)In fact, however, the Pope says nothing against the traditional doctrine…It is at least plausible to think, with Professor Steven Long, that when the Pope speaks of the protection of society as grounds for using the death penalty, he may have more in mind than mere physical defense against the individual criminal. - Avery Dulles, SJ
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