Which part?
Anyway, here’s what Romano Amerio has to say:
From St. Augustine to St. Thomas Aquinas to Taperelli d’Azeglio, the traditional teaching is that the decision as to the necessity and legitimacy of capital punishment depends on historical circumstances, that is, on the urgency of the need to hold society together in the face of the disruptive behavior of individuals who attack the common good. (Iota Unum 187)
This has nothing to do with punishment in general, however, and it is not correct to imply that punishment is determined solely or even mostly by historical context.
The way punishment is applied does. The greater good must always be achieved.
As to the justness of a punishment, that is dependent on whether its severity is appropriate to the severity of the crime; it must be neither too lenient nor too severe. Since the severity of (at least) the crime of murder cannot change with time, if capital punishment for such a crime was ever just then it is always just, even if it is frequently unwise to use it in specific instances. You cannot use a prudential objection (it won’t benefit modern societies) to a doctrinal definition (the severity of the punishment must be commensurate with the severity of the crime). That something is just but unwise does not make it unjust.
I didn’t say capital punishment is unjust.
The problem with this (unsupported) assertion is that it addresses only one of the four objectives of punishment while totally ignoring the other three. This is the problem with 2267, which essentially does the same thing. I’ll point out, again, that defense is merely a secondary objective of punishment. Why should not a concern with the primary objective be more important?
My understanding is that more than just physical defense is meant when 2267 uses “defense” in the first sentence. I think Evangelium Vitae shows quite nicely that a proper sentence will obtain all four objectives of punishment.
Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfils the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people’s safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her behaviour and be rehabilitated. (Evangelium Vitae 56)
CCC 2265 says the following: The defense of the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm. For this reason, those who legitimately hold authority also have the right to use arms to repel aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their responsibility.
And Evangelium Vitae 55-56 again: *Moreover, **“legitimate defence **can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another’s life, the common good of the family or of the State”.44 Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it about, even though he may not be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason. 45
- This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty.*
This is the point where words start to lose their meanings. 2267 asserts something that seems demonstrably unsupported by history and, in order to overcome that problem, you have had to introduce concepts that have nowhere been advanced by any Church document, and reshape the actual words into something you find more reasonable. As much as anything else I think this shows the tenuousness of your position.
I don’t think so. Clearly the traditional way of explaining capital punishment breaks up “defense” into retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and (physical) defense against the criminal. But it seems to me that the Catechism has chosen to explain it more broadly under the title of defense.
- In fact, however, the Pope says nothing against the traditional doctrine…It is at least plausible to think, with Professor Steven Long, that when the Pope speaks of the protection of society as grounds for using the death penalty, he may have more in mind than mere physical defense against the individual criminal.* - Avery Dulles, SJ