Cardinal Muller: no need to clarify Amoris Laetitia [CC]

[Thomas_White]

While I am still contemplating the arguments being made that doctrine has not changed but merely the discipline, I would presume that those who interpret Amoris Laetitia in a more progressive manner seeing no rupture with past magisterial teaching would at least concede that the Maltese bishops seemed to have gone beyond AL. Besides the problem of allowing, in the final analysis, the individual’s sense of being ‘at peace with God’ to apparently trump any accompaniment or discernment provided by the priest and be sufficient for admission to holy communion, the bishops seem to propose something that is a rupture in doctrinal teaching, not merely in disciplinary practice. Namely, stating that it may be impossible for a person who is justified (i.e., possesses sanctifying grace and therefore in the state of grace) to obey God’s commandment. Does this not seem problematic as this was definitively anathematized at the Council of Trent? How is this point argued to be in continuity with past Church teaching?

The Maltese Bishop’s Guidelines closely follow AL and outline a process of accompanied discernment. From the guidelines:

“1…in line with the directions given by Pope Francis, we, the Bishops of Malta and Gozo, are offering these guidelines to the priests of our dioceses, in order to accompany these people through ‘a responsible personal and pastoral discernment’ to an awareness of their life situation in the light of Jesus (AL 300).”

“10. If as a result of the process of discernment, undertaken with ‘humility, discretion and love for the Church and her teaching, in a sincere search for God’s will and a desire to make a more perfect response to it’ (AL 300), a separated or divorced person who is living in a new relationship manages, with an informed and enlightened conscience, to acknowledge and believe that he or she is at piece with God, he or she cannot be precluded from participating in the sacraments of Reconciliation and the Eucharist (see AL, notes 336 and 351).” emphasis added

ms.maltadiocese.org/WEBSITE/2017/PRESS%20RELEASES/Norms%20for%20the%20Application%20of%20Chapter%20VIII%20of%20AL.pdf

What seems most problematic is that a person who possesses sanctifying grace would not be permitted to receive communion.

 

[_Abyssinia]

The Catechism addresses this:
1735 Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors.

Fr Brian W. Harris has written an article addressing the Kasper proposal and the 1735 Catechism passage, looking at immutibility. Here is an excerpt from the article in two posts that I will indent:

Here we need to consider those mitigating conditions that lie in the will rather than the intellect. Mortal sin requires a full, free consent of the will to the gravely immoral action that is being carried out. Now, among the imputability-diminishing factors listed in No. 1735 of the Catechism, those that would affect the will are as follows: “duress, fear, habit,” and “immoderate affections.” These are followed by two more broad and non-specific terms: “other psychological or social factors.” The Catechism gives no footnote reference here to any magisterial source; so for further clarification we will have to rely on what orthodox Catholic moral theology has said on this topic.

Of the above factors, “habits” and many “immoderate affections” would not be relevant for present purposes. Theologians have in mind here ingrained or even compulsive bad habits and addictions that are rarely conquered overnight. But deciding to remarry, or continue in an intimate relationship, is clearly nothing like that. The Catechism also mentions “social factors” that might mitigate imputability. One which might restrict the free will, rather than the intellect, would, I suppose, be what we now call peer group pressure, particularly in insecure and immature adolescents. But those who remarry after divorce are adults, and they do so because they want to, not because “society” pressures them into remarriage with bullying or threats of ostracism.

As regards “other psychological factors,” we should note two that might superficially seem to diminish our free will but, in fact, don’t. The first is when we feel strong reluctance to do something, but nevertheless decide it’s necessary. If the doctors tell you your gangrenous leg must be amputated to save your life, is your consent to that operation a fully free one? After all, you certainly don’t want to lose your leg! Saint Thomas Aquinas and other approved moral theologians agree that, in view of the even worse alternative, your consent to the amputation is full and free. The second type is our regret for having done something bad without wanting to, but after freely and inexcusably acting in a way which we knew ran a grave risk of causing that result. Consider a woman who is hit and killed by a drunk driver. There was no consent of his will to kill her; but he did fully and freely consent to go out, imbibe a whole lot of liquor, and then get in his car and try to drive home. So moral theology – along with common sense – agrees that he remains gravely imputable for the woman’s death.

There are other psychological factors, however, that really do diminish imputability by impairing the consent of one’s will. Some of the “immoderate affections” mentioned in CCC 1735 would be overpowering emotional states of different types. A murder committed in a sudden fit of indignant rage is rightly considered less malicious than one that is coldly premeditated. But of course, no one goes through a wedding ceremony in a fit of rage! Other will-weakening emotions such as profound grief and suicidal depression would likewise be inapplicable to the Kasper proposal. It is true that sexual passion, once aroused, momentarily weakens the will; but the decision to remarry and continue that intimate relationship is always one that is made calmly and constantly renewed with deliberation over a period of time.

However, one other kind of strong emotion might seem more relevant to our topic. Could fear, perhaps, sometimes weaken the will to the extent of reducing from mortal to venial sin the civil remarriage of a divorced Catholic?

We need to make another distinction here. When it is a question of a positive law – one that depends on the free will of a legislator, as distinct from an intrinsic and unchangeable requirement of the moral law – approved Catholic theologians agree that a serious and well-grounded fear cancels out even the objective obligation itself, so that non-compliance with the law is not grave matter (or even light matter) in that situation. For instance, if a Catholic has been credibly tipped off that if he leaves his house on a certain Sunday morning to attend Mass there will be assassins waiting near the church to gun him down, this reasonable fear of death objectively excuses him from the obligation of attending Mass that day – just as we are excused by illness. However, this is not the case with actions that are intrinsically and gravely contrary to the moral law: orthodox Catholic theologians teach that we are obliged to face death rather than commit such acts. Now, the sin we are considering in this paper – sexual relations with someone who in God’s sight is already married to another – is in that category. Jesus explicitly calls it adultery. Therefore it would remain grave matter even under threat of death.latinmassmagazine.com/articles/articles_harrison_diminished-imputability.html

 

[_Abyssinia]

The Catechism addresses this:
1735 Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors.

Continued:

Nevertheless, what about possible diminished imputability in such a situation? Let’s recall the “test case” we are considering: the civil spouse of a divorced Catholic woman threatens to abandon her if she breaks off intimate relations with him. So out of fear of the harm that will be done to her children if their parents are separated, she decides to continue that relationship. Will this kind of “fear” excuse her from mortal sin?

According to approved, orthodox Catholic moral theology, it definitely will not. Saint Thomas Aquinas, for instance, in considering the question “Whether fear hinders action,” teaches that, in fact, if there’s only moderate fear in a person’s soul, “without much disturbance of the reason, fear conduces to working well, insofar as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and pay greater attention to what he is doing.” For Saint Thomas, it is only when fear “increases so much as to disturb the reason [that] it hinders action on the part of the soul.”1 In the previous article of the Summa Saint Thomas talks about the physiological effects of the kind of fear he has in mind: “trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth.”2 Those of course are symptoms of extreme fear, or panic. Contemporary moral theologians have followed Aquinas here. The renowned Spanish Dominican Antonio Royo Marín says that actions carried out because of fear are a mixture of the voluntary and involuntary, “but the voluntary prevails.”3 And Father Bernard Häring, a prominent Redemptorist theologian, says this: “Fear which arises from without * . . . can weaken or destroy freedom of the will only to the extent that it produces a partial or total paralysis of the powers of the soul. . . *f fear arising from anxiety totally or partially unbalances the mind, then freedom is destroyed or diminished and consequently the guilt is entirely absent or diminished.”4

Now, does the state of mind of the woman in our test case scenario fit that description? Is her “fear” for the children’s welfare so extreme as to even partially “paralyze the powers of her soul,” “disturb her reason,” or “unbalance her mind”? Is an ongoing state of hysteria, trembling, or panic the cause of her constantly renewed decision to keep sleeping with the father of her children? Of course not. Rather, her kind of “fear” is like that of the man we considered earlier who is told by the doctor that his leg must be amputated to save his life. His fear of death does not even partially paralyze his mind or disturb his use of reason: he agrees to the amputation with full, free consent. And that is clearly the kind of decision taken by the divorced and remarried woman we are considering.

It follows that she is freely choosing to do evil that good may come – something totally forbidden by both divine revelation and the natural moral law. We saw earlier that as regards fulfilling the conditions for mortal sin, Cardinal Kasper’s revisionist proposal already had two strikes against it: grave matter and full knowledge. Now we have seen that the woman in our test case will also be giving her full and free consent to the sin in question. Strike Three. The claim of “diminished imputability” is unsustainable. So the people whom revisionists want to start admitting to the Eucharist will have to be presumed, on the basis of Catholic doctrine and theology, to be in mortal sin.

I would stress that what I have rebutted this evening is the most plausible version of the revisionist scenario. But how often would even this scenario exist in real life? Such Catholics would be admitted to the Eucharist on the flimsy pretext that their gravely sinful life-style choice supposedly does not involve the full consent of their will. But their sin is not something arduous or daunting that requires a lot of willpower, daring, or perseverance – like, say, hijacking an airliner or burgling a carefully guarded mansion. Quite the contrary: illicit sexual intercourse with a loved one is something very easy and highly pleasurable. So how credible is it to claim that these acts consistently involve real fear of any degree, let alone the grave fear or panic that would be necessary to impede full consent of the will? Indeed, the admission of such folks to Communion under the excuse of diminished imputability would mean a subjectivist revolution in the Church’s moral teaching and canon law. It would stand on its head the perennial principle enshrined in canon 1321, §3, which states, “When an external violation has occurred, imputability is presumed unless it is otherwise evident (nisi aliud appareat).”latinmassmagazine.com/articles/articles_harrison_diminished-imputability.html**

 

[pnewton]

Does this not seem problematic as this was definitively anathematized at the Council of Trent?

Anathema is a canonical penalty. Nothing has been anathema since 1983.

 

[Thomas_White]

". . . *f fear arising from anxiety totally or partially unbalances the mind, then freedom is destroyed or diminished and consequently the guilt is entirely absent or diminished.”

Now, does the state of mind of the woman in our test case scenario fit that description? Is her “fear” for the children’s welfare so extreme as to even partially “paralyze the powers of her soul,” “disturb her reason,” or “unbalance her mind”? Is an ongoing state of hysteria, trembling, or panic the cause of her constantly renewed decision to keep sleeping with the father of her children? Of course not."*

This reads like unintended hyperbole. It does not require “trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth” to diminish complete and deliberate consent. Even the article notes that anxiety could diminish culpability.

 

[Abba]

Amoris Laetitia | Interview with Cardinal Wuerl |
youtube.com/watch?v=UoBmHFREfEA

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Interesting. I always thought it was just sexual infidelity that was meant by adultery. Where are these disharmonies noted?

If you go through the previous pages the “disharmonies” that have been explored will become apparent. Quickly:

• adultery of the eyes
• “being made” an “adulterer” in Mt (passive versus active adultery)
• “being made” an “adulterer” in Mt simply by being “put away” and not even remarrying.
• committing “adultery” simply by marrying another (as in the Gospels)
• committing “technical adultery” simply by confecting a civil marriage or cohabiting?
• why are those irregulars still cohabiting but abstaining for the sake of the kids still barred from public Communion…is it because of technical adultery?
• was the prior state of those in a 2nd marriage truly “adultery” if they later receive an annulment?
• was the prior state of those in a 2nd marriage truly “adultery” if they later receive a radical sanation which recognised the validity of their civil exchange of vows?

 

[gus]

And likewise it seems we are expanding our understanding of exactly what sort of adulterers Jesus and past Popes condemned.

While you personally may not prudentially accept there is any elbow room on the question it is a logical possibility and therefore no “contradiction” is inelectubly or intrinsically present between Pope Francis and even recent Popes.

Of course many Catholics no doubt were “confused” or saw “logical contradictions” in those developments of the past re such things as atheists and heretic Protestants being saved after all.

Nothing new under the sun here methinks.

Putting Heretics and Prosantanrs in the same category is wrong a heretic can’t be ignorant but definition.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Nothing leads me, per se, to believe that conscience (why the uppercase “C”?) trumps everything. But I’ve read repeatedly from people on this teaching that nobody can know the interior, if a d&r Catholic decides he/she just cannot live in continence but desires communion, he/she can receive.

I’ve had other discussions on this board with people who seem steeped in theology and Thomistic thought and who insist on the primacy of conscience. They even debate the merits of the CCC and argue that part of a well-formed conscience does not include knowing and obeying Church teaching.

So it led me to as the questions to which you’ve responded with the questions and comment, above. And note that I’m quite in earnest with my questions: they are not to be construed as hyperbole or sarcasm.

I think you may be conflating a number of different things here that don’t readily go together.

This thread is about AL - have you read it?
If not it is understandable why you are blown one way, then the other by people who have.
If you read it for yourself you know just as much as them, it isn’t that heavy theologically.

I cannot find anywhere there where it says the PP must give his accompanied penitents Communion if they feel they deserve it.

Have you researched the Code of Canon Law quoted on this thread re the duties of a PP in giving Communion. Its 915 and its freely available on the Net.

Surely we must all follow the guidance of our conscience if it certain. Though we may be culpable for those actions if we have taken little care to well form our understanding through wise counsel. That hardly means a loyal Catholic will be a complete renegade but it may be they see otherwise on a few typically known disputed/grey natural matters such as contraception in the West and perhaps polygamy in Asia (my Malaysian Chinese brother in law is a Catholic and he was born of wife number two).

I would find it hard to accept that even half a Catholic would sincerely believe that just because they have always believed that their first marriage was invalid they could also in good conscience believe it was acceptable, by that reason alone, to receive publically…even post AL.

They clearly require to go through a process and convince the PP to agree.
If they were silly enough to go to public Communion simply be cause “their conscience told them to” (an unlikely real world scenario) I suggest the PP would follow his conscience and call them out.

Mostly common sense isn’t it?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Putting Heretics and Prosantanrs in the same category is wrong a heretic can’t be ignorant but definition.

Like your good self I was typing very quickly and I suppose I assumed readers would guess there were quotation marks as in “heretic Protestants” … as in the old pejorative that considered them damned. We don’t hold that nowadays do we, they aren’t all heretics as you say. Some are but material heretics.

Just as all those who commit what is called adultery may not be the adulterers that both Jesus and JPII were speaking of .

 

[Vico]

Anathema is a canonical penalty. Nothing has been anathema since 1983.

Although there is no canonical penalty, the anathemas issued by all councils are infallible, that is, the canons retain their infallible status.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

"10. If as a result of the process of discernment…

I do not understand how a neutral reader could read this to be saying anything different from AL myself.

The “result” by no means excludes the authoritative role of the PP in this “process of discernment” from what I can see.

 

[pnewton]

Although there is no canonical penalty, the anathemas issued by all councils are infallible, that is, the canons retain their infallible status.

Odd how these anathemas are called infallible, even though as a matter of fact they are not the anathema (the penalty) the are proclaimed. So that part is at least not true. Yet the dogmatic constitutions are so easily dismissed. Don’t get me wrong. I get it, though if you literally read some of the statements in Trent they do no mean what some think they mean. I have never came across statements from Trent and Vatican II that could not be reconciled. I find the same thing true of Amoris Laetitia.

 

[edwayne]

Anathema is a canonical penalty. Nothing has been anathema since 1983.

I don’t believe that is correct. The anathemas from the Council of Trent remain valid today and are condemning positions that are contrary to the catholic and apostolic faith.

 

[edwayne]

It seems to me Ed it depends on whether you believe the totality of the teachings of the Church from the beginning at Pentecost, or you pick and choose from the last 50 years. Trent does not seem to carry much weight any longer.

The Council of Trent, after V II, is the most often quoted council in the Catechism.

 

[edwayne]

The Catechism addresses this:
1735 Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors.

You missed the point of my post. CCC 1735 does not have anything to do with expressing the impossibility of a person in the state of grace obeying God’s Commandments. I am presuming for the moment, for the sake of argument, that such a person is indeed justified and in the state of grace, and therefore, can receive holy communion. The question is, if they are in the state of grace, how is it impossible for them to obey the moral commands of God?

 

[Vico]

You missed the point of my post. CCC 1735 does not have anything to do with expressing the impossibility of a person in the state of grace obeying God’s Commandments. I am presuming for the moment, for the sake of argument, that such a person is indeed justified and in the state of grace, and therefore, can receive holy communion. The question is, if they are in the state of grace, how is it impossible for them to obey the moral commands of God?

I understood that point. The dogma excludes venial sins and venial sin may involve grave matter.

The dogma from Trent is this:

828 Can. 18. If anyone shall say that the commandments of God are even for a man who is justified and confirmed in grace impossible to observe: let him be anathema [cf. n. 804].

832 Can. 22. If anyone shall say that he who is justified can either persevere in the justice received without the special assistance of God, or that with that [assistance] he cannot: let him be anathema [cf. n. 804, 806].

804 But no one, however much justified, should consider himself exempt from the observance of the commandments [can. 20]; no one should make use of that rash statement forbidden under an anathema by the Fathers, that the commandments of God are impossible to observe for a man who is justified [can. 18 and 22: cf. n. 200]. “For God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes you both to do what you can do, and to pray for what you cannot do, and assists you that you may be able”; * “whose commandments are not heavy” [1 John 5:3], “whose yoke is sweet and whose burden is light” [Matt. 11:30]. For they who are the sons of God, love Christ: “but they who love him, (as He Himself testifies) keep his words” [John 14:23], which indeed with the divine help they can do. For although in this mortal life men however holy and just fall at times into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial [can. 23], they do not for that reason cease to be just. For that word of the just, “Forgive us our trespasses” [Matt. 6:12; cf. n.107], is both humble and true. Thus it follows that the just ought to feel themselves more bound to walk in the way of justice, in that having been now “freed from sin and made servants of God” [Rom. 6:22], “living soberly and justly and piously” [Tit. 2:12], they can proceed onwards through Christ Jesus, through whom they “have access unto this grace” [Rom. 5:2]. For God “does not forsake those who have once been justified by His grace, unless He be first forsaken by them.” * And so no one should flatter himself because of faith alone [can. 9, 19, 20], thinking that by faith alone he is made an heir and will obtain the inheritance, even though he suffer not with Christ “that he may be also glorified” [Rom. 8:17]. For even Christ Himself (as the Apostle says), “whereas he was the Son of God, he learned obedience by the things which he suffered and being made perfect he was made to all who obey him the cause of eternal salvation” [Heb. 5:8 ff.] For this reason the Apostle himself admonishes those justified saying: “Know you not, that they who run in the race, all run indeed, but one receiveth the prize? So run, that you may obtain. I therefore so run, not as at an uncertainty, I so fight, not as one beating the air, but I chastise my body and bring it under subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway” [1 Cor. 9:24ff.]. So also the chief of the Apostles, Peter: “Labor the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election; for doing these things, you shall not sin at any time” [2 Pet. 1:10]. Thence it is clear that they are opposed to the teaching of orthodox religion who say that the just man sins at least venially in every good work [can. 25], or (what is more intolerable) that he merits eternal punishments; and that they also who declare that the just sin in all works, if in those works, in order to stimulate their own sloth and to encourage themselves to run in the race, with this (in view), that above all God may be glorified, they have in view also the eternal reward [can. 26, 31], since it is written: “I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications on account of the reward” [Ps. 118:112], and of Moses the Apostle says, that he “looked to the reward” [Heb. 11:26].

806 So also as regards the gift of perseverance [can. 16] of which it is written: He that “shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved” [Matt. 10:22; 24:13] (which gift cannot be obtained from anyone except from Him, “who is able to make him, who stands, stand” [Rom. 14:4], that he may stand perseveringly, and to raise him, who falls), let no one promise himself anything as certain with absolute certitude, although all ought to place and repose a very firm hope in God’s help. For God, unless men be wanting in His grace, as He has begun a good work, so will He perfect it, “working to will and to accomplish” [Phil. 2:13; can. 22]. * Nevertheless, let those “who think themselves to stand, take heed lest they fall” [1 Cor. 10:12], and “with fear and trembling work out their salvation” [Phil. 2:12] in labors, in watchings, in almsdeeds, in prayers and oblations, in fastings and chastity [cf. 2 Cor. 6:3 ff.]. For they ought to fear, knowing that they are born again “unto the hope of glory” [cf. 1 Rom. Pet. 1:3], and not as yet unto glory in the combat that yet remains with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, in which they cannot be victors, unless with God’s grace they obey the Apostle saying: “We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh. For if you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live” [Rom. 8:12 ff.].

 

[Pulvis]

Another interesting article on the current issue from Fr. Alexander Lucie-Smith;

catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2017/01/23/the-maltese-bishops-cannot-alter-st-john-paul-iis-teaching-but-they-can-damage-church-unity/

“The Criteria are problematic, to say the least. Firstly, they say – claiming to follow Amoris Laetitia – that if “a separated or divorced person who is living in a new relationship manages, with an informed and enlightened conscience, to acknowledge and believe that he or she are at peace with God, he or she cannot be precluded from participating in the sacraments of Reconciliation and the Eucharist.” In other words, the Maltese Criteria make explicit something that is only hinted at in Amoris Laetitia; moreover, the Criteria give permission for something that is specifically forbidden in Familiaris Consortio, the very clear teaching of St John Paul II, not to mention the very clear teaching of the Church up to now.”

 

[Ender]

Your view that the Pope’s only job is to hold the status quo ante contradicts 2000 years of Church history. Church teaching on many topics has developed and changed over the centuries. As I have said before, this is a very minor development compared to others, such as the significant development on EENS.

I do agree that Catholics have the right to speak up and to voice their concerns if they think the Church is doing something wrong. But to predicate their objections on a false belief that doctrine has never changed and can never change is simply inaccurate.

You have rather substantially misunderstood my point. First, as to whether doctrine can change, that word is too ambiguous to be helpful. Yes, doctrine can “change” if we mean grow and develop, but no, it cannot change if what is meant is it has reversed itself. (And even this is a bit over broad as what is taught by the ordinary Magisterium is not held to be infallible and may contain errors of some degree.)

This is precisely the concern about the way some have interpreted AL: it says yes today where it said no in the past. Can this be considered development?

The second point was about the extent of papal authority. It is assuredly not accurate to say that truth is whatever the pope says it is. Of course he has the power to express doctrine in his terms, and to expand its meaning. He does not, however, have the authority to create new doctrine. He is bound by truth; he is not freed by inclination. It is dangerous and harmful to believe that doctrines are merely papal innovations.

Lots of developments look like contradictory changes depending on how they are viewed and presented. We now understand how those apparent about faces are actually developments of Church teaching. The same is true of this relatively minor development.

Is it your position that AL represents a reversal of previous doctrine? After all, if what was banned before is permitted now, how is that not a repeal of what was taught?

Ender

 

[Ender]

Lots of developments look like contradictory changes depending on how they are viewed and presented. We now understand how those apparent about faces are actually developments of Church teaching. The same is true of this relatively minor development.

Is it your position that AL represents a reversal of previous doctrine? After all, if what was banned before is permitted now, how is that not a repeal of what was taught?

Ender