Article 14 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights holds that no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which they have already been acquitted.
But this apparently doesn’t extend to trial by the secular/atheist media or the anti-catholic court of public opinion.
Dozens of media already declaring Pell is finished.
Earlier I posted a link to a government owned news/media source in Australia in which the presenter stated live on air that Pell needs to “prove his innocence”.
The media is not and never will be our jury system. And yes, Cardinal Pell is looking forward to his day in court to prove his innocence.
No doubt his alleged victims/survivors are also looking forward to their day in court.
Cardinal Pell will start out in the Melbourne Magistrates Court for a filing hearing.
If Cardinal Pell is committed to trial ( a committal hearing ensues) and then the trial will begin only with the first allegations and move to the County Court, and a jury.
There are multiple complainants and multiple charges.
Risdale is still up on fresh charges.
This is going to be a long process spanning several years.
His lawyers can apply for a permanent stay of proceedings due to all the publicity. And the questions of fair trial will be thrashed out first.
judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/eManuals/VCPM/27777.htm
Chapter 15 – Abuse of Process and Stays
All courts have an inherent or implied jurisdiction to prevent their processes from being used as an instrument of oppression. Courts are able to modify their procedures to avoid such prejudice and take any steps that are necessary to prevent an abuse of process (Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186; Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75; Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254; Neill v County Court of Victoria [2003] VSC 328).
The concept of abuse of process overlaps with the obligation of a court to provide a fair trial. The content of these obligations cannot, however, be stated exhaustively or analytically. These obligations rely on intuitive judgments formed by experience (Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23; Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19).
The obligation on a court is to provide a fair trial in accordance with law. Legislation may vary existing trial procedures, the elements of offences and the laws of evidence. Subject to issues of constitutional validity and interpretive principles concerning modification of existing common law principles, courts must apply the law set by Parliament. Therefore, the right to a fair trial may be modified by Parliament and courts are extremely reluctant to consider arguments that a court must grant a stay where legislative amendment interferes with the fairness of a trial (see Grills v R [1998] HCATrans 351; R v PJE, Unreported, NSWCCA, 9 October 1995).
Courts have noted that the obligation is not to provide a perfect trial, but to provide a trial as fair as possible. A perfect trial is an unrealistic aspiration (Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23; R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592).
Where a proceeding has been regularly commenced, courts have an obligation to exercise their jurisdiction and determine the matter. A court should not lightly refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. However, the right to a fair trial is paramount and if a proceeding cannot be conducted fairly, a court may grant a permanent stay (Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23; Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75; Attorney-General (NSW) v Watson (1987) 20 Leg Rep SL 1).
Last updated: 14 September 2009
In This Chapter
15.1 - Permanent Stays
15.2 - Conduct of Proceedings for an Improper Purpose
15.3 - Unjustifiably Oppressive Proceedings
15.4 - Proceedings That Would Bring the Administration of Justice into Disrepute
15.5 - Stays and Initiating Criminal Proceedings