Catholic view on utilitarianism

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If you claim the act is moral then the death of the innocent man must be caused indirectly. How is that possible? Explain how his death is indirect.
The death of the innocent must not be in the object of the act.

I think a case can be made that the object of the act is not the death. The levers purpose is to redirect the trolley. I think the evil could be applied to intent or circumstances, which pass in the trolley problem.

I did consider the comparison to removing the baby from the tube and have come close to accepting it though.

I will share my own thoughts on how I understand etopic pregnancy.

I compare the tube to an appendix. If an appendix is about to rupture it can be removed. If that is applied to the tube then we can remove it but not the baby.

We know that not every act that results in a forseen death is murder and @LeafByNiggle is correct in that the criteria seems to be to do more with intent than directness. For example a lethal act of self defence.

Moral analysis is not always easy.
 
The death of the innocent must not be in the object of the act.
An act that directly kills the innocent would be an act with an evil moral object and illicit regardless of a good intention.
I think a case can be made that the object of the act is not the death. The levers purpose is to redirect the trolley. I think the evil could be applied to intent or circumstances, which pass in the trolley problem. …

We know that not every act that results in a forseen death is murder and @LeafByNiggle is correct in that the criteria seems to be to do more with intent than directness. For example a lethal act of self defence.
One cannot intend an end that is not foreseen. If foreseen that end is in the act’s moral object.

Remember that the Church teaches that direct abortion is always evil and never permitted, indirect abortions may be licit. Perhaps Pius XII’s explanation will be helpful.
Pope Pius XII, address to the Family Front Congress on November 27, 1951, published in Matrimony , Papal Teachings [Boston: Paul Editions], 1963, pages 437 to 440.
It has been our intention here to use always the expressions “ direct attempt on the life of the innocent person” [and] “ direct killing.” The reason is that if, for example, the safety of the life of the future mother, independently of her state of pregnancy, might call for an urgent surgical operation, or any other therapeutic application, which would have as an accessory consequence, in no way desired nor intended, but inevitable , the death of the fetus, such an act could not be called a direct attempt on the innocent life. In these conditions the operation can be lawful, as can other similar medical interventions, provided that it be a matter of great importance, such as life, and that it is not possible to postpone it till the birth of the child, or to have recourse to any other efficacious remedy …. Both for the one and the other, the demand cannot be but this: To use every means to save the life of both the mother and the child.
 
We know that not every act that results in a forseen death is murder and @LeafByNiggle is correct in that the criteria seems to be to do more with intent than directness.
That is right. o_mlly says one may never directly kill an innocent person, as if you could indirectly kill an innocent person. That shows that directness is not the operative criterion.
 
One cannot intend an end that is not foreseen. If foreseen that end is in the act’s moral object.

Remember that the Church teaches that direct abortion is always evil and never permitted, indirect abortions may be licit. Perhaps Pius XII’s explanation will be helpful.
What about my self defence response?
 
I compare the tube to an appendix. If an appendix is about to rupture it can be removed. If that is applied to the tube then we can remove it but not the baby.
The USCCB speaks directly to that situation below:

By contrast, in some situations, it may be permissible to perform a medical procedure on a pregnant woman that directly treats a serious health problem but that also has a secondary effect that leads to the death of the developing child. ERD Directive no. 47 states: “Operations, treatments, and medications that have as their direct purpose the cure of a proportionately serious pathological condition of a pregnant woman are permitted when they cannot be safely postponed until the unborn child is viable, even if they will result in the death of the unborn child.” The difference can be seen in two different scenarios in which the unborn child is not yet old enough to survive outside the womb. In the first scenario, a pregnant woman is experiencing problems with one or more of her organs, apparently as a result of the added burden of pregnancy. The doctor recommends an abortion to protect the health of the woman. In the second scenario, a pregnant woman develops cancer in her uterus. The doctor recommends surgery to remove the cancerous uterus as the only way to prevent the spread of the cancer. Removing the uterus will also lead to the death of the unborn child, who cannot survive at this point outside the uterus.

The first scenario describes a direct abortion. The surgery directly targets the life of the unborn child. It is the surgical instrument in the hands of the doctor that causes the child’s death. The surgery does not directly address the health problem of the woman, for example, by repairing the organ that is malfunctioning. The surgery is likely to improve the functioning of the organ or organs, but only in an indirect way, i.e., by lessening the overall demands placed upon the organ or organs, since the burden posed by the pregnancy will be removed. The abortion is the means by which a reduced strain upon the organ or organs is achieved. As the Church has said many times, direct abortion is never permissible because a good end cannot justify an evil means.

The second scenario describes a situation in which an urgently-needed medical procedure indirectly and unintentionally (although foreseeably) results in the death of an unborn child. In this case the surgery directly addresses the health problem of the woman, i.e., the organ that is malfunctioning (the cancerous uterus). The woman’s health benefits directly from the surgery, because of the removal of the cancerous organ. The surgery does not directly target the life of the unborn child. The child will not be able to live long after the uterus is removed from the woman’s body, but the death of the child is an unintended and unavoidable side effect and not the aim of the surgery.
(continued)
 
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with surgery to remove a malfunctioning organ. It is morally justified when the continued presence of the organ causes problems for the rest of the body. Surgery to terminate the life of an innocent person, however, is intrinsically wrong. There are no situations in which it can be justified. Pope Pius XII summed up Catholic teaching when he stated: "As long as a man is not guilty, his life is untouchable, and therefore any act directly tending to destroy it is illicit, whether such destruction is intended as an end in itself or only as a means to an end, whether it is a question of life in the embryonic stage or in a stage of full development or already in its final stages.
 
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with surgery to remove a malfunctioning organ. It is morally justified when the continued presence of the organ causes problems for the rest of the body. Surgery to terminate the life of an innocent person, however, is intrinsically wrong. There are no situations in which it can be justified.
I have highlighted the use of the word “to” in the statement above to illustrate something important. When we say “do X to accomplish Y” it means Y is the intent of the action. So when we say remove an organ to remove a disease from the mother, that is moral because of the moral intention. But when we say remove an organ to end the life of the baby inside, that is immoral because of the immoral intention. The intent is what makes them different.

This is even clearer in the case of a cancerous womb. Its removal is moral, even if there is a baby inside. But if the womb is not cancerous (and has a baby inside) and mother still wants it removed, the only intention of such a removal would be to end the pregnancy, which can only be accomplished through the means of killing the baby (making it immoral because of the intention). Or if the woman is not pregnant and still has the womb removed, even though it has no disease at all, that could only be for the purpose (with the intention) of sterilizing the woman, which is also immoral (because of the intention) for different reasons.

Much has been made about the “directness” and the “moral object” of an act. But there are examples that show that in the kind of cases we have been discussing, “intention” is the most important factor.
 
Taking phrases out of context and applying meanings that are contrary to the document is dishonest.

The intention in both procedures is the same as is clearly shown below.
The doctor recommends an abortion to protect the health of the woman. In the second scenario, a pregnant woman develops cancer in her uterus. The doctor recommends surgery to remove the cancerous uterus as the only way to prevent the spread of the cancer.
Since intentions are the same, the immorality of one and the morality of the other are dependent, as the USCCB clearly defines it, on the moral objects of the acts. The direct abortion is illicit and the indirect abortion is licit.
 
Taking phrases out of context and applying meanings that are contrary to the document is dishonest.

The intention in both procedures is the same as is clearly shown below.
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o_mlly:
The doctor recommends an abortion to protect the health of the woman. In the second scenario, a pregnant woman develops cancer in her uterus. The doctor recommends surgery to remove the cancerous uterus as the only way to prevent the spread of the cancer.
Since intentions are the same, the immorality of one and the morality of the other are dependent, as the USCCB clearly defines it, on the moral objects of the acts. The direct abortion is illicit and the indirect abortion is licit.
The two cases you just described are morally different, but not for the reason you give. The real reason has nothing to do with directness vs indirectness. The real reason one of them is moral and the other is immoral has to do with rule #2 in the 4 conditions for valid double-effect:
  1. The means-end condition. The bad effect must not be the means by which one achieves the good effect. Good ends do not justify evil means.
In the case of the abortion, the bad effect (the aborting of the baby) is the means by which the health of the mother is protected. In the case of the removal of the cancerous womb, the death of the baby is not the means by which the mother’s health is protected. The mother’s health was not threatened by the baby in the first place. The mother’s health was threatened by the cancer in the womb. The removal of the womb was the means of effecting this cure. It’s all about the means.

Now since you use the word “direct” every time I think you should be using the word “means”, and since you have not defined “direct,” I will just assume from now on that when ever you say “direct” or “indirect” you mean “is the means of achieving the good end” or “is not the means of achieving the good end”.

With this in mind we can look again at the trolley problem and note that the death of the one man on the track was not the means of saving the 5. Therefore, in your words, it was “indirect.”
 
Every time you use the word “you” to refer to me, you should use the word “bishops”.

One can be fairly certain that the more wordy the argument the less likely clarity and more likely obfuscation is intended. I will leave you to your confusion.
The test of the intelligibility of any statement that overwhelms
us with its air of profundity is its translatability into language
that can pass muster as a simple and clear statement in ordinary,
everyday speech (Mortimer Adler, “Six Great Ideas”).
 
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Every time you use the word “you” to refer to me, you should use the word “bishops”.

One can be fairly certain that the more wordy the argument the less likely clarity and more likely obfuscation is intended. I will leave you to your confusion.
As far as I know, bishops have not commented on the trolley problem. So it is still “you” interpreting their principles to this problem. Neither have the bishops defined “direct” in any way that clearly makes the trolley problem direct and the tubal excision indirect.
 
The innocent one tied to the track hears you say that you’re going to throw the switch that will kill him, sees you put your hand on the switch and with his free hand shoots and kills you before you can do the deed. Is he justified?
So, apparently no one condemns the innocent one for killing the bystander? That’s correct. The innocent one has an absolute right to defend his life from whom? An unjust aggressor.
CCC# 2321. The prohibition of murder does not abrogate the right to render an unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm.
And for those who would argue that such lethal action is unjust …
CCC# 2264. Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life than of another’s.
And for those who argue, the “bishops have not commented on the trolley problem” please get a grip and from principles that the bishop’s have taught, explain how the innocent one commits an evil act in killing the bystander as proposed, that the bystander is not an unjust aggressor. The bystander cannot in the moment be just and unjust in his act. Other than atheists, I believe only one Catholic claims that position, others do not or are still pondering this hypothetical.
 
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So, apparently no one condemns the innocent one for killing the bystander? That’s correct. The innocent one has an absolute right to defend his life from whom? An unjust aggressor.
If the innocent has access to a gun they could use it to shoot the trolley to a stop.

On another note if somebody innocent is on death row and being led to their execution I would not condemn them for killing a guard to escape, but the guard would not be an unjust aggressor.
 
If the innocent has access to a gun they could use it to shoot the trolley to a stop.
The gun is too small in caliper to stop the trolley.
On another note if somebody innocent is on death row and being led to their execution I would not condemn them for killing a guard to escape, but the guard would not be an unjust aggressor.
I do not know of a specific teaching that addresses a whether a wrongly convicted man who imminently faces the death penalty may kill. However, we may examine the same just defense principles as they apply in war to analyze the case.

  1. Just cause: force may be used only to correct an evil to the nation or community that is lasting, grave, and certain.
  2. All other means of securing or defending its rights must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective.
  3. There must be a serious probability of success.
  4. Proportionality: the expected good to be achieved must be greater than the destruction and disorder that will be caused by the use of force.
  5. Force may be used only as a last resort.
Points 3 and 4 argue against the morality of killing the guard. It is unreasonable to think that killing one guard will achieve the good end. If killing more than one guard is reasonably expected then proportionality is lost.

In contrast, the innocent one in the trolley case would not violate any of these conditions and so may kill his unjust aggressor.
 
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And for those who argue, the “bishops have not commented on the trolley problem” please get a grip and from principles that the bishop’s have taught, explain how the innocent one commits an evil act in killing the bystander as proposed, that the bystander is not an unjust aggressor.
Your describing it as an “evil act” begs the question.
 
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LeafByNiggle:
Your describing it as an “evil act” begs the question.

The Phrase You’re Probably Misusing​

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-phrase-youre-probably_b_1599663
Wrong. I know exactly what “begs the question means” and I used it correctly. In the Aristotelian sense, begging the question means adopting as a premise the very thing you are trying to prove. You are trying to prove that the observer in the trolley problem engages in an evil act. To prove that assertion, you start out describing the act as an “evil act”. So you adopt the assumption that it is an evil act in order to prove it is an evil act. That is a correct example of begging the question.
 
explain how the innocent one commits an evil act in killing the bystander as proposed, that the bystander is not an unjust aggressor.
I see. I did misread the object of the sentence, not realizing you were talking about a modification of the trolley problem. In that case, I will try to answer it.

The two killings are both justified, but under different grounds.

The man tied to the tracks would be justified under self defense, if the man on the track could not prevent the switching any other way, say by shooting the man’s hand or leg. And the bystander is justified by double effect. And by the way, the fact that the man on the tracks is justified in shooting the bystander does not imply the bystander is an unjust aggressor. As was noted a long time ago in this thread, there are times when killing in self defense is justified even when there is no unjust aggressor. So where is the problem?
 
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