Catholic view on utilitarianism

[o_mlly]

But as for the OP scenario, it is not self defense.

Excellent. Therefore, any discussion regarding the just use of self-defense to the OP’s trolley case is irrelevant. I can dismiss major portion of your latest post which is, as you now admit irrelevant.

None of those sources explain the moral difference between directness and intention. As I said, these sources do not use directness to determine morality. They do use intention as a determinative though.

Wrong. All the sources explain exactly the crucial difference between an act that directly kills and an act that indirectly kills. They all cite that the morality of indirect abortion may be permissible and that direct abortion is always immoral. We’ve been over this several times. I can only conclude that your ignorance of the difference between direct outcomes and indirect outcomes is feigned as an obstinate decoy to save face or invincible. In charity, I must presume the latter.

“They do use intention as a determinative though.” Wrong. Please read your catechism. The font of intention is not any more [sic] “determinative” than the moral object or the circumstances.

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.
1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just.

The only issue left is the quality of the moral object of the act.

Cite any teaching that says self defense can never be against the innocent.

It is you who claimed that self-defense is allowed against an innocent which is absurd. But since you’ve finally admitted that self-defense does not apply to the trolley case, we can leave that to another thread which you may start if you like.

(continued)

 

[o_mlly]

Once you define “directly”

If you will not accept the USCCB, Fr. Tad, George Weigel, Pius XII and the catechism’s definition of what is already self-evident to any reasonable person, there is no point in my copying and pasting again their explanations. Your tiring tactic of revisiting what has already been authoritatively cited is irrational.

I never said anything about that. I only said intention is more important than “directness”.

Still wrong. The notions of direct and indirect effects apply to the moral object of the act and have nothing to do with intention. I fear you are still woefully confused about the fundamentals of Catholic moral theology.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Wrong. All the sources explain exactly the crucial difference between an act that directly kills and an act that indirectly kills. They all cite that the morality of indirect abortion may be permissible and that direct abortion is always immoral.

That’s not how I read it. Here is the USCCB on abortion:
USCCB:

In certain cases, such as aggressive uterine cancer or an ectopic pregnancy, it is morally licit to remove the threat to the mother’s life by removing the cancerous uterus, or by removing part or all of the Fallopian tube where the child implanted, even though it is foreseeable that the child will die as an indirect and unintended effect of such surgery.

You see? Indirect goes with unintended. They are two ways of saying the same thing for the purposes of morality. An “indirect and intended effect” is also never moral. Can you cite an example where the effect was the intended effect, but is moral because it is indirect? No, because such an example cannot exist. If the evil effect was intended all along, it is immoral, regardless of whether the effect was direct or indirect. The Catechism affirms this explicitly in what I quoted before, but I will quote it again:
CCC #2269:

The fifth commandment forbids doing anything with the intention of indirectly bringing about a person’s death.

You see? Intention trumps indirectness.

I can only conclude that your ignorance of the difference between direct outcomes and indirect outcomes is feigned…

I know what I mean by directness and indirectness, but I do not know what you mean by it.

“They do use intention as a determinative though.” Wrong. Please read your catechism. The font of intention is not any more [sic] “determinative” than the moral object or the circumstances.

I didn’t say it was the only factor, but it is a factor. And in no case does indirectness excuse an evil intent, as CCC 2269 shows.

continued…

 

[LeafByNiggle]

continuing…

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

But a morally good act does not require indirectness.

1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just.

None of these apply to the trolley problem since throwing a switch is not intrinsically disordered. I know that you have stated previously that such an act is intrinsically disordered if it has an unintended effect of killing someone too, but I don’t think that is the correct understanding of an intrinsically disordered act. In the examples you gave above, the things that are intrinsically disordered are so because of the very nature independent of any circumstances and any consequences they may have, good or bad. So it is incorrect to count unintended consequences in a particular instance of an act when determining if that act is intrinsically disordered.

Cite any teaching that says self defense can never be against the innocent.

It is you who claimed that self-defense is allowed against an innocent which is absurd.

I said it is very rare, but not absurd. One good example is soldiers killing in war. Two opposing soldiers are both engaging in self-defense. Both are morally innocent if they are following legitimate orders from their commanders. So if one of them happens to kill the other, that is a clear instance of justified self defense against an innocent aggressor.

But I agree that it is only relevant to the modification of the trolley problem you posed and not to the original trolley problem.

 

[o_mlly]

… that the child will die as an indirect and unintended effect of such surgery.

No. Both words, “indirect” and “unintended” are adjectives that modify the noun “effect”. Please read more carefully.

The fifth commandment forbids doing anything with the intention of indirectly bringing about a person’s death.

More confusion. The word “indirectly” is an adverb modifying the verb “bringing” Bringing what? Bringing about the death of the child. Please learn to read what is written.

I know what I mean by directness and indirectness, but I do not know what you mean by it.

The problem is that you obviously do not know, or pretend not to know, what Fr. Tad, Pius XII, George Weigel, the catechism, and Monsignor Smith mean by direct and indirect. Or the problem may be that one cannot explain how to manage differential equations with another who refuses to learn their multiplication tables.

And in no case does indirectness excuse an evil intent … But a morally good act does not require indirectness …

More evidence of your fundamental misunderstanding of Catholic moral theology.

None of these apply to the trolley problem since throwing a switch is not intrinsically disordered. I know that you have stated previously that such an act is intrinsically disordered if it has an unintended effect of killing someone too, but I don’t think that is the correct understanding of an intrinsically disordered act. In the examples you gave above, the things that are intrinsically disordered are so because of the very nature independent of any circumstances and any consequences they may have, good or bad. So it is incorrect to count unintended consequences in a particular instance of an act when determining if that act is intrinsically disordered.

Surely this is an attempt to muddle the issue as the above is gobbeldy-gook at best.

I fear you are lost. I have persisted in this exchange for the sake of other Catholic readers who because of your ongoing misstatements on Catholic morality may think that murder is sometimes permissible. If anyone is still confused then they should seek counsel of authoritative Catholic teaching. Apparently, in your scheme you think the last one to post prevails. You may have the last word but you should seek much needed help discerning the morality of human acts.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

… that the child will die as an indirect and unintended effect of such surgery.

No. Both words, “indirect” and “unintended” are adjectives that modify the noun “effect”.

My point is they don’t appear in opposition. If they were truly unrelated concepts there could be something that was indirect but intended. In that case would the act be moral because of “indirect” or immoral because of “intended”. The answer is immoral because of “intended”. Which is confirmed by:
CCC 2269:

The fifth commandment forbids doing anything with the intention of indirectly bringing about a person’s death.

So when indirect and unintended appear together to make something moral, it is the “unintended” aspect that makes it moral, not the “indirect” part.

The fifth commandment forbids doing anything with the intention of indirectly bringing about a person’s death.

More confusion. The word “indirectly” is an adverb modifying the verb “bringing” Bringing what? Bringing about the death of the child. Please learn to read what is written.

Please understand the import of why I quoted this part of the Catechism, as explained above.

And in no case does indirectness excuse an evil intent … But a morally good act does not require indirectness …

More evidence of your fundamental misunderstanding of Catholic moral theology.

All can see you have no response to what you quoted, except a put-down.

None of these apply to the trolley problem since throwing a switch is not intrinsically disordered. I know that you have stated previously that such an act is intrinsically disordered if it has an unintended effect of killing someone too, but I don’t think that is the correct understanding of an intrinsically disordered act. In the examples you gave above, the things that are intrinsically disordered are so because of the very nature independent of any circumstances and any consequences they may have, good or bad. So it is incorrect to count unintended consequences in a particular instance of an act when determining if that act is intrinsically disordered.

Surely this is an attempt to muddle the issue as the above is gobbeldy-gook at best.

Other readers: Please look up “intrinsically evil” and “intrinsically disordered” for yourself and see if you agree that my explanation of why throwing a switch is not intrinsically disordered is gobbledy-gook, or a clear explanation.

… readers who because of your ongoing misstatements on Catholic morality may think that murder is sometimes permissible…

That would be a serious misunderstanding of my statements, since I never said that. But in case any other readers did get that impression, I will say again that murder is never permissible, and I never said otherwise.

 

[o_mlly]

since throwing a switch is not intrinsically disordered …

One cannot hope that what begins with a serious error will get better if one just keeps reading more of the same gobbeldy-gook. I explained your error 200 posts ago. But you continue to ignore. Intentionally? One wonders.

The moral object of an act is always more than the mere physicality of the act. The moral object answers the question. “ What is morally happening?”. The intent answers the question, “ Why did the actor act?”.

John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis splendor , 78; cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church , 1751. “In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behavior. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world”( Ibid. ). The “physical object” should not be confused with the “moral object” of the action (one and the same physical action may be the object of different moral acts, e.g., cutting with a scalpel may be a surgical operation or a homicide).

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

since throwing a switch is not intrinsically disordered …

… I explained your error 200 posts ago. …

The moral object of an act is always more than the mere physicality of the act. The moral object answers the question. “ What is morally happening?”. The intent answers the question, “ Why did the actor act?”.

John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis splendor , 78; cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church , 1751. {snipped for brevity, but quoted in the previous posting}

This can’t be an explanation of “intrinsically disordered” because it does not even mention “intrinsically disordered”. So don’t say you already explained why throwing a switch is intrinsically disorder when I just explained why it is not. But the question the citation above addresses is what makes an act immoral (not intrinsically disorder, which more than immoral.)

But if you like I will explain what you just quoted and how it might actually be applied.

John Paul II is explaining that the object of a given act is not merely the scalpel cutting something, but it could be either a licit surgical operation or a homicide depending on the purpose of the cutting. If the purpose is to end the life of a fetus, then the act is immoral. If the purpose is to remove a diseased tissue, it can be moral. That is just one example. But others come to mind. What do those other examples have in common? They all have in common the fact that the purpose of the act is only to accomplish the good end, not the evil one. "To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will" means " means that the object of the act (which is what “it” refers to in the quote) is the cause of the goodness of the will. That is, the object of the act is that which the will perceives is the desired good end. That is why the death of the baby in the tube on the operating table is not the object of the act of excising the tissue, according to John Paul II, because it was never the cause of performing the act. The tube is not excised so that it might kill the baby. That is why the death of the baby does not make the act immoral.

Of course this says nothing about throwing switches on tracks, but it is probably more useful to talk about this because this really happens while I never heard of anyone actually tied to a trolley track with a person in a position to switch the trolley to another track where there is also someone tied. Really! We are spinning on a useless hypothetical, don’t you agree?

 

[o_mlly]

But if you like I will explain what you just quoted and how it might actually be applied.

John Paul II is explaining that the object of a given act is not merely throwing the switch, but it could be either a licit act or a homicide depending on the foreseeable moral outcomes of the throwing of the switch. …

Corrections in bold.

There you go. Now fill in the blanks with the OP’s foreseeable outcomes – directly kill an innocent and indirectly save five.

And remember (I’ve lost count as to the number of times this has been posted) intent has nothing to do with and does not change the moral objects of the act, that is the foreseeable outcomes, i.e., the species of the act itself.

I fear I am not as good as I’d like to be at the virtue of long-suffering and some may think that I am now punching down so I’m done with this thread. Perhaps someone else will try to help you.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

But if you like I will explain what you just quoted and how it might actually be applied.

John Paul II is explaining that the object of a given act is not merely throwing the switch, but it could be either a licit act or a homicide depending on the foreseeable moral outcomes of the throwing of the switch. …

Corrections in bold.

Your bolded addition can’t be right because then tubal excision would not be moral, since the immediate death of the baby in that tube is a foreseeable outcome of cutting out the tube.

 

[Gorgias]

(Extreme mental illness negates moral culpability, so the sufferer is in fact innocent.)

Wrong. The definition of ‘innocence’ is not ‘lack of culpability’. One may be guilty but not culpable.

Does the expression of “the lesser of two evils” mean anything?

Yes. It means you either misunderstand or reject Catholic moral theology.

If you are confronted with two evil choices, aren’t you required to choose the lesser one?

Not unless you’re Jack Aubrey.

(Dang. @Wozza beat me to it…)

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

(Extreme mental illness negates moral culpability, so the sufferer is in fact innocent.)

Wrong. The definition of ‘innocence’ is not ‘lack of culpability’. One may be guilty but not culpable.

OK, I can go with that definition. Using that definition, what does it say about how I was using it? Well, I was using it to analyze the o_mlly variation on the trolly problem. In this variation, o_mlly asks "what if the one man tied to the tracks has a gun, and seeing what is happening, shoots the observer to prevent him from throwing the switch. In that case what can we say about the morality of the action of the man on the track? I posited that in such a case, the man on the tracks would not be acting immorally because of self defense. This is true. But then I added "after all, repelling an aggressor, even an innocent aggressor, is morally licit. Under this corrected understanding of what “innocent” means, my addition is no longer valid. But the point still is valid. All I need to do is change the addendum to “after all, repelling an aggressor, even an aggressor who is not culpable for his actions, is morally licit.” It is now correct and still makes the point that in the modified scenario, the man on the tracks is morally justified in acting in self defense against the observer at the switch. But the man at the switch is himself not culpable because he is performing an act which is justified by double effect. Thank you for correcting me.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

MAGA-huelye:

Does the expression of “the lesser of two evils” mean anything?

Yes. It means you either misunderstand or reject Catholic moral theology.

Well, let’s see the entire quote by MAGA-huelye, which is
MAGA-huelye:

I was away for some time. Does the expression of “the lesser of two evils” mean anything? If you are confronted with two evil choices, aren’t you required to choose the lesser one? Just curious.

So the context in which the question was asked in when confronted with two evil choices. This characterization of the context assumes that the only choices are those two evil ones. Of course a third choice exists - that of not acting at all. In that case it would be morally licit to choose between all three choices. And if the choice of not acting at all is the least evil, then it may be chosen.

What we are beating around the bush about is whether their is a difference between choosing to act and choosing not to act. And I think there is a difference. The bar for determining the morality of acting is somewhat higher than the bar for not acting. There are times when action is morally required, such as in self defense. The Catechism says:
CCC 2265:

Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for one who is responsible for the lives of others.

But in general the Church is much harder on action than on inaction. So with that in mind I think we can say there is something to “the lesser of two evils” but it is not the simple binary choice that some make it out to be, because the preference for non-action must be factored into the evaluation of what is “lesser”.

 

[Gorgias]

"what if the one man tied to the tracks has a gun, and seeing what is happening, shoots the observer to prevent him from throwing the switch. In that case what can we say about the morality of the action of the man on the track? I posited that in such a case, the man on the tracks would not be acting immorally because of self defense. This is true.

Interesting wrinkle. So, by your analysis, the switch-toggler is acting immorally, committing an act of aggression which your Paul in peril character defends himself by shooting him?

I think I’d answer as follows:

• if Paul could shoot to warn, that would be preferable to shooting to hit the target.
• if Paul shoots to warn, but the toggler still looks to want to toggle, then Paul should shoot to disable him from toggling.
• Paul cannot shoot to kill merely in order to shoot to kill. His intent must be to thwart the aggression.

All I need to do is change the addendum to “after all, repelling an aggressor, even an aggressor who is not culpable for his actions, is morally licit.”

No. Repelling an aggressor is morally licit. However, it doesn’t make it morally praiseworthy. If you had the choice of shooting a three-year-old who was about to toggle the switch, it would be morally licit, but I think it would be more praiseworthy to allow yourself to be killed than to take the life of a toddler.

But the man at the switch is himself not culpable because he is performing an act which is justified by double effect.

No. Culpability did not fail to attach by virtue of ‘double effect’; in your example, culpability might fail to attach by virtue of the standards by which mortal sin is judged: full knowledge of the sin and deliberate intent to commit the grave sin. If either is missing, then the sin is grave but not mortal, and the person is not culpable of mortal sin.

And if the choice of not acting at all is the least evil, then it may be chosen.

Nice try. “Not acting at all” is not evil; therefore, it is not the “lesser of the evils”. It may not be chosen because it is least evil ; rather, it is able to be chosen because it is not evil at all.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

"what if the one man tied to the tracks has a gun, and seeing what is happening, shoots the observer to prevent him from throwing the switch. In that case what can we say about the morality of the action of the man on the track? I posited that in such a case, the man on the tracks would not be acting immorally because of self defense. This is true.

Interesting wrinkle. So, by your analysis, the switch-toggler is acting immorally, committing an act of aggression which your Paul in peril character defends himself by shooting him?

I did not say the switch toggle is acting immorally. In fact I believe the opposite.

I think I’d answer as follows:

• if Paul could shoot to warn, that would be preferable to shooting to hit the target.
• if Paul shoots to warn, but the toggler still looks to want to toggle, then Paul should shoot to disable him from toggling.
• Paul cannot shoot to kill merely in order to shoot to kill. His intent must be to thwart the aggression.

I agree on every assertion here. But despite his best efforts to merely disable, death may still result. But as you said, death can never be the intended end.

All I need to do is change the addendum to “after all, repelling an aggressor, even an aggressor who is not culpable for his actions, is morally licit.”

No. Repelling an aggressor is morally licit. However, it doesn’t make it morally praiseworthy. If you had the choice of shooting a three-year-old who was about to toggle the switch, it would be morally licit, but I think it would be more praiseworthy to allow yourself to be killed than to take the life of a toddler.

That may be true. I think if I were faced with that choice I might bias my aim so as to minimize the chance of killing the toddler, even if it meant I might miss entirely and have to die as a result. So again I think we agree.

And if the choice of not acting at all is the least evil, then it may be chosen.

Nice try. “Not acting at all” is not evil; therefore, it is not the “lesser of the evils”. It may not be chosen because it is least evil ; rather, it is able to be chosen because it is not evil at all.

Most of the time that is true. Failing to act is not immoral. But not always. CCC #2265 says not acting in that case is shirking a grave duty. Of that does not apply in this case, but it does disprove your generalization that failing to act is never evil.

 

[Gorgias]

Failing to act is not immoral. But not always. CCC #2265 says not acting in that case is shirking a grave duty. Of that does not apply in this case, but it does disprove your generalization that failing to act is never evil.

In the context of “lesser of two evils” – which is the context in which I was writing – it is not evil.

I did not say the switch toggle is acting immorally. In fact I believe the opposite.

Hmm. Not sure I agree. Let’s switch back to the battleground example; I think it will provide clarity (and avoid the bickering of the trolley problem):

• I invade your country by force of arms. It is immoral for me to act in this way.
• You respond with morally justified self-defense.
• I see that you’re shooting at me, and therefore, it’s morally just for me to shoot back.

See the problem? In the first sentence, I’m acting immorally. In the last, I’m acting morally – although the two actions are the same act!

That kind of contradiction demonstrates that there’s a problem somewhere, and I think that it lies in an incorrect assignment of ‘morally just’. In the battlefield, it’s the third assertion (aggressor fires back, supposedly in “self-defense”). In the trolley (you knew I’d come back to it, right?), it’s that the toggler is acting in a morally justified way.

When we get one of them wrong, we see that the example falls apart down the line.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

Failing to act is not immoral. But not always. CCC #2265 says not acting in that case is shirking a grave duty. Of that does not apply in this case, but it does disprove your generalization that failing to act is never evil.

In the context of “lesser of two evils” – which is the context in which I was writing – it is not evil.

Agreed.

I did not say the switch toggler is acting immorally. In fact I believe the opposite.

Hmm. Not sure I agree. Let’s switch back to the battleground example; I think it will provide clarity (and avoid the bickering of the trolley problem):

• I invade your country by force of arms. It is immoral for me to act in this way.

Well, now, let’s stop right there and consider this statement. If you are a soldier in an army of a nation that I perceive is invading my nation. But perhaps from your point of view, my nation has already committed an act of war. Imagine I am a Japanese soldier in 1942. My government has told me that America was planning an attack on Japan and that the bombing of Perl Harbor was necessary to protect Japan. So from my point of view, you are invading my country by force of arms. Is it immoral for me to defend my country against attack? No. On the other hand, from your point of view, the attack on Pearl Harbor was an unprovoked act of war, and a response by force of arms is required. Are you immoral for participating in that response and “invading” Japan? No. So we can have a very unfortunate situation where opposing soldiers are met on the battlefield. From what each person has been told, their actions are moral. And since sin requires full knowledge and assent to a known evil, neither company of soldiers is acting immorally, even though they are engaged in a battle where many will likely be killed. This is not a contradiction. This is just the way things are.

Now if you want to look up a little higher to commanders and maybe the President or the Emperor, it is very likely that one or the other (or maybe both) are acting immorally. And even down in the trenches, there are certain commands that no soldier can morally obey (such as a command to execute innocent civilians). But for soldiers fighting soldiers in the ordinary way, it is quite possible to have two soldiers engaged in battle and both of them are morally engaged in what they believe to be the defense of their homeland. Again, this is not a contradiction.

 

[Gorgias]

Well, now, let’s stop right there and consider this statement. If you are a soldier in an army of a nation that I perceive is invading my nation. But perhaps from your point of view, my nation has already committed an act of war.

The question isn’t one of perception, but one of fact. Sure, both sides might claim “God is on our side!”, but that doesn’t imply that both sides are in the right.

Once you step aside from the “perception” argument and look at objective fact, you’ll see that your line of thinking here melts away. The attack on the U.S. is immoral, and if you prefer to say that the government of Japan was acting immorally, then the implication is that the order to attack the U.S. was an immoral order (and therefore, soldiers do not have an obligation to obey it).
See? The argument disintegrates.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

Well, now, let’s stop right there and consider this statement. If you are a soldier in an army of a nation that I perceive is invading my nation. But perhaps from your point of view, my nation has already committed an act of war.

The question isn’t one of perception, but one of fact. Sure, both sides might claim “God is on our side!”, but that doesn’t imply that both sides are in the right.

Once you step aside from the “perception” argument and look at objective fact, you’ll see that your line of thinking here melts away. The attack on the U.S. is immoral, and if you prefer to say that the government of Japan was acting immorally, then the implication is that the order to attack the U.S. was an immoral order (and therefore, soldiers do not have an obligation to obey it).
See? The argument disintegrates.

I was not arguing that point. Sure, there is an objective truth out there. Both nations cannot be objectively right in fighting the other. I was only arguing about individual low-level soldiers, and what they should do, morally. They cannot be expected to make their decisions about right and wrong based on information they do not have. Moral culpability requires full knowledge and assent to something that you know is evil. These soldiers do not know what they are doing is evil. It may be objectively evil, but they do not necessarily have any way of knowing it.

Maybe the problem is what we mean by morality. I have been assuming it relates to the decisions one makes in life. But if we say morality has to do with objective evil of a larger act, that would be something else.

 

[Gorgias]

Moral culpability requires full knowledge and assent to something that you know is evil.

Now you’ve brought another facet to the discussion: whereas you were talking about the morality of the act, now you’re talking about culpability. I agree with you, by the way: although, in the example you raise, the soldiers on the side of the aggressor are acting immorally, it is very possible that they are not culpable for this immoral action. (Their leaders, on the other hand? Not so much. )