Catholic view on utilitarianism

[o_mlly]

This is not an explanation, this is an assertion.

? I did not merely assert. Please reread my post. After showing the logical error in your argument, I made the argument that the general criteria of “target” distinguishes the direct and indirect outcomes of an act. I repeat the argument below.

Directness is not determined by manipulating the phrasing of the moral objects. Directness is determined by the chain of causation. “Target” is the operative word that determines to what the act is directed.

To what does the act as described target itself? Target , not as intention, but as a description of the moral agent(s) directly affected by the act, determines the act’s direct outcome. Moral agents affected, but not as targets, are the indirect outcome. The surgeon who directs a scalpel that cuts the fetus, targets the fetus. One who fires a gun that directs a bullet at an innocent person, targets the innocent person. One who directs a trolley at an innocent person, targets that innocent person.

The direct causation of the innocent person’s death is self-evident:

Bystander → throws switch → directs trolley at innocent person → innocent person dies.

Gunman – > pulls trigger → directs bullet at innocent person → innocent person dies.

In both cases, the innocent person is targeted and dies directly as a consequence of the gunman and bystander’s act.

A self-evident fact is by definition a fact for which it is impossible to hold the opposite. I have asked several times for an explanation as to the essential difference in the above acts. No answer given. I ask again: Explain the how the bystander does not, like the gunman, target an innocent person.

Let me remind you of what you said earlier:

" The moral object of an act includes the physical act and all the reasonable foreseeable moral outcomes, that is, the ends in view.

The object includes an intent, and that intent is to achieve the ends in view. This is different than the intent font, which is about why we choose those ends. Murder is an intrinsically evil act separate from the intent which motivates it, but killing is not murder unless it is intentional. That intent is part of the object which is murder.

No. You continue in this confusing of the font of intent as modifying the font of object. You fail to contrast the two fonts.

CCC# 1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject.*

The ends in view belong to the object font and are the foreseeable outcomes with moral content upon which any or all actors deliberate and freely choose to act on or not act. To deliberate does not mean to intend as I have also explained citing Veritas Splendor. Ignored?

The end is the first goal or the intention of a particular actor.

(continued)

 

[o_mlly]

What is targeted by throwing the switch are the five being saved by the action.

That may be the bystander’s intention but it is not his target. Does the bystander’s act direct the trolley at the innocent person? Yes. Does the innocent person die if, and only if, the bystander throws the switch? Yes.

Only if you can show an essential difference between pulling the trigger/throwing the switch can you argue an innocent man is not the target of both acts. (You have already agreed the gunman targets his victim.)

I also await you argument that the innocent person does not have a right of self-defense.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

I think I understand now why the notion of directness is important in the discussion of double effect, and it goes back to this formulation by The New Catholic Encyclopedia:
The New Catholic Encyclopedia:

1. The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent.
2. The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may permit it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect he should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary.
3. The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) as the bad effect. In other words the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect. Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed.
4. The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the allowing of the bad effect

I have highlighted the place where “directly” is used. In this context it means that the chain of causality leading to the good effect may not run (indirectly) through the bad effect. In the case of tubal excision, that would mean that the saving of the mother must not be caused by the death of the baby. In the case of the trolley problem, it means that the saving of the five on the track must not be caused by the death of the one man on the other track. In both cases this is true, and so both are licit.

So the notion of directness is not an absolute one but a relative one. It is a comparision of where the good effect and the evil effect are situated in the causal chain. If the evil effect is situated prior to the good effect, then the act is illicit. Otherwise the other three conditions of double effect may be applied to determine the morality of the act.

The use of the word “indirectly” should also be noted. Here it is explained in terms of what is positively willed, as opposed to foreseen and permitted. So again, it is another way of describing intention.

 

[o_mlly]

Murder is an intrinsically evil act separate from the intent which motivates it, but killing is not murder unless it is intentional.

To introduce “murder” is a red herring. The moral prescription that has been cited throughout this thread that the bystander violates is CCC#2258 “… no one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being.”

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Ender:

Murder is an intrinsically evil act separate from the intent which motivates it, but killing is not murder unless it is intentional.

To introduce “murder” is a red herring. The moral prescription that has been cited throughout this thread that the bystander violates is CCC#2258 “… no one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being.”

Engaging in an act that unintentionally destroys an innocent human being does not constitute claiming the right directly to destroy an innocent human being, because, among other things, we still have the unresolved issue of directness. But putting that objection aside, the main reason is that claiming the right to destroy a life is a higher claim than claiming the right to allow said destruction as an unintended consequence. One can claim the latter without claiming the former.

Also it is worth following up on the footnote to CCC 2258 to see the context in which it lives. It is INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN
AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION
REPLIES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF THE DAY Section 5, which reads in full:

On its part, the Magisterium of the Church offers to human reason in this field too the light of Revelation: the doctrine concerning man taught by the Magisterium contains many elements which throw light on the problems being faced here. From the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected in an absolute way because man is the only creature on earth that God has "wished for himself " (16) and the spiritual soul of each man is “immediately created” by God; (17) his whole being bears the image of the Creator. Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves “the creative action of God” (18) and it remains forever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end.(19) God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can, in any circumstance, claim for himself the right to destroy directly an innocent human being. (20) Human procreation requires on the part of the spouses responsible collaboration with the fruitful love of God; (21) the gift of human life must be actualized in marriage through the specific and exclusive acts of husband and wife, in accordance with the laws inscribed in their persons and in their union.

So that is the full context.

 

[Gorgias]

The object of the action would be “ switching the trolley away from the five ”.

This seems more like “intent” than “object”. (Although, that horse has already been flogged to death in this thread.)

And, if “object”, couldn’t it just as validly be written “switching the trolley toward the one”?

If you are going to appeal to authority on the ectopic pregnancy analysis, you would have to appeal to authority on the trolley problem. You cannot analyze the trolley problem using a different method or else the comparison is not valid.

Has Fr Tad written on the trolley problem? Has he IDed it as an instance of “double effect”? Serious question, here, not rhetorical. If he has, can anyone provide a link or citation? Thanks!

 

[o_mlly]

This seems more like “intent” than “object”. (Although, that horse has already been flogged to death in this thread.)

And, if “object”, couldn’t it just as validly be written “switching the trolley toward the one”?

Hope this helps.

The specific intent must be contained in the moral object font. But the moral object font may contain objects not intended, only deliberated (See prior post explaining the moral difference between “deliberate” and “intend”.) One cannot intend what is not foreseen. So, at least one of the objects that are true for all actors becomes the intent for any particular actor.

In the trolley case, the OP specifies two moral objects:

1. Throw the switch, direct the trolley at an innocent person, kill him.
2. Throw the switch, re-directing the trolley away from five innocent persons, save their lives.

The OP states the bystander intends moral object #2.

However, moral object #1 is intrinsically evil and vitiates the act regardless of the intent.

 

[Ender]

? I did not merely assert. Please reread my post. After showing the logical error in your argument, I made the argument that the general criteria of “target” distinguishes the direct and indirect outcomes of an act. I repeat the argument below.

This argument simply shifts the question from one term to another. “Target” used to distinguish direct from indirect is hardly useful when it contains the terms it is trying to clarify in its definition.

Bystander → throws switch → directs trolley at innocent person → innocent person dies.

It ought to be apparent from your own definition that you are not legitimately dealing with what is actually happening. You define the action as “directs trolley at innocent person” even though it is in fact perfectly clear that the real action is “directs trolley away from the five”. Yes, the trolley ends up heading at the innocent person, but that consequence is not desired; it is accepted, and it distorts the nature of the action to define it solely as if the unwanted consequence was its purpose.

Explain the how the bystander does not, like the gunman, target an innocent person.

I cannot give an explanation using a term (target) that is itself undefined. As I showed above, your definition includes the use of the very terms it is itself trying to define.

No. You continue in this confusing of the font of intent as modifying the font of object. You fail to contrast the two fonts.

Let me repeat myself: the intention font differs from the object font. The object font, however, includes its own intention. Again: murder is an intrinsically evil object, but for a killing to be considered murder it has to be deliberate. That is, it has to be intended. The intention that makes a killing a murder is entirely separate from the intention behind the choice to commit the murder.

The ends in view belong to the object font and are the foreseeable outcomes…

Yes, and that we intend those outcomes is an intent separate from why we intend them.

Only if you can show an essential difference between pulling the trigger/throwing the switch can you argue an innocent man is not the target of both acts. (You have already agreed the gunman targets his victim.)

Part of the difficulty in making a distinction is your insistence that all foreseeable consequences are intended. That may in fact be true, but it makes no distinction between effects that are desired and those that are tolerated. Given that actions with double effects can be valid, this distinction is clearly important. It is therefore inappropriate to dismiss that distinction, which seems to be what you have done in the discussion of the trolley even as it is assumed in the example of the operation.

 

[o_mlly]

This argument simply shifts the question from one term to another. “Target” used to distinguish direct from indirect is hardly useful when it contains the terms it is trying to clarify in its definition…I cannot give an explanation using a term (target) that is itself undefined.

I introduced “target” in hopes of further illuminating what is already self-evident. If “target” as defined does not do so for you then you may dismiss it. But that does not change the self-evident fact that an effect is direct if the outcome is in a direct causal relationship.

I did not use the word “target” in my previous posts that compare the direct death of an innocent.

Bystander → throws switch → directs trolley at innocent person → innocent person dies.

Gunman – > pulls trigger → directs bullet at innocent person → innocent person dies.

So, (again) please explain the essential difference in the two acts that render the first death an indirect death and the latter (as you have already agreed) a direct death.

Part of the difficulty in making a distinction is your insistence that all foreseeable consequences are intended.

It would be better if you quote me as rather than incorrectly paraphrase as the above is a gross misrepresentation of my position. Cite any post from me that reads “all foreseeable consequences are intended.”

That may in fact be true, but it makes no distinction between effects that are desired and those that are tolerated.

Most of the difficulty is that you insist incorrectly on melding the fonts of object and intent. All that is foreseen is in the objective font. Only what is desired is in the intention font.

A summary of the explanations needed to support justification of the bystander’s action:

• Show that the moral object of the gunman’s act is essentially different than the bystander’s act.
  (We may assume that neither actor intends the death of the innocent because intent has no bearing either way on the moral object of an act.)
• Show that the innocent person has no right to self-defense as that right is proper only against an unjust aggressor.
• If one claims the death of the innocent is an indirect effect then identify the direct cause. (Remember that a physical evil causes harm only in the order of nature, that is without a moral agent’s intervention.)
• If the bystander cannot be certain that the death of the innocent is not caused by his hand then he may not act. True also for you or anyone who claims the act is moral. Therefore, the burden to prove the indirectness of the innocent one’s death falls on you, not me. Show us the proof that is certain.

 

[Elf01]

Bystander → throws switch → directs trolley at innocent person → innocent person dies.

Gunman – > pulls trigger → directs bullet at innocent person → innocent person dies.

I see the difference in the design of the trolley and the bullet.

The trolley is designed to transport. The gun is a weapon. Yes, a trolley can be a weapon but that is in the intent, not the object.

 

[o_mlly]

Yes, a trolley can be a weapon but that is in the intent, not the object.

Colonel Mustard did the murder in the library with the candlestick.

Colonel Mustard protests, “Impossible, the candlestick is designed to hold a candle and cannot be the murder weapon.”

 

[LeafByNiggle]

I introduced “target” in hopes of further illuminating what is already self-evident. If “target” as defined does not do so for you then you may dismiss it. But that does not change the self-evident fact that an effect is direct if the outcome is in a direct causal relationship.

Then you would have to conclude that the death of the baby in tubal excision is “direct” because it is in a causal relationship with the cutting out of the tube. But we know that Fr. Tad says it is “indirect”. So you can’t both be right.

o_mlly:

Bystander → throws switch → directs trolley at innocent person → innocent person dies.

Gunman – > pulls trigger → directs bullet at innocent person → innocent person dies.

So, (again) please explain the essential difference in the two acts that render the first death an indirect death and the latter (as you have already agreed) a direct death.

And we should also add the following causal chain:
Surgeon – > cuts tube → nutrients interrupted → innocent baby dies.

It is intention that distinguishes these two cases, not the directness. This can be seen most easily by filling in some details on the gunman scenario. Instead of assuming it is a criminal holding the gun, assume that it is a friend of the victim. And assume that instead of aiming at the victim, he was aiming at a rattlesnake at the victim’s feet. Further assume the bullet missed the rattlesnake, hit a rock, and deflected to cause a fatal blow to the victim. Same causal chain as the first case, but clearly not immoral. Careless perhaps, but not immoral. One may quibble about the part that says “directs bullet at innocent person” since the bullet was directed at the rattlesnake. But that difference is itself only a difference in intention. That can be seen by switching back to the criminal scenario where the shooter wants to kill the victim. But suppose that from where the shooter stands he cannot get a straight shot at the victim, but he hopes that by shooting at a stone wall near the victim he can get a ricochet to strike the victim. (Suppose he has lots of bullets and can get off many tries at this.) And suppose he succeeds. That too is clearly immoral for what reason? Intention. So adding an intervening rock in the causal chain does not change the morality of the outcome. It just makes the chain one link longer.

o_mlly:

• Show that the moral object of the gunman’s act is essentially different than the bystander’s act.

Can you show the moral object of the surgeon’s act is essentially different than the bystander’s act?

o_mlly:

• Show that the innocent person has no right to self-defense as that right is proper only against an unjust aggressor.

As noted before, the issue of self defense has not been shown to be of any relevance.

 

[Elf01]

Colonel Mustard protests, “Impossible, the candlestick is designed to hold a candle and cannot be the murder weapon.”

As I said it’s about intent.

 

[Gorgias]

As I said it’s about intent.

“I intend to save any people that my victim might have harmed later in his life. Therefore, my intent is morally sound. QED.”

 

[o_mlly]

As I said it’s about intent.

Moral object: Shoot an innocent person to death.
Intent: Save the nation.
Circumstances: Any.

Immoral act.

Moral object: Beat an innocent person to death.
Intent: Save the nation.
Circumstances: Any

Immoral Act.

Moral object: Use a candlestick to beat an innocent person to death.
Intent: Save the nation.
Circumstances: Any

Immoral act.

 

[Elf01]

Moral object: Shoot an innocent person to death.
Intent: Save the nation.
Circumstances: Any.

Immoral act.

Moral object: Beat an innocent person to death.
Intent: Save the nation.
Circumstances: Any

Immoral Act.

Moral object: Use a candlestick to beat an innocent person to death.
Intent: Save the nation.
Circumstances: Any

Immoral act.

Or PDE fail on account of the good effect coming from the bad effect and not the act.

 

[Gorgias]

“I intend to save any people that my victim might have harmed later in his life.

If you flip the switch and kill him on the tracks, he ain’t gonna kill anyone later in his life.

 

[Gorgias]

You have absolutely no information about what he MAY do later in his life. "May " and “might” are never arguments.

That’s the point, brother. We can’t use that as a justification for killing an innocent, which is an immoral act when it is the object of the act.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

o_mlly:

Moral object: Shoot an innocent person to death.
Intent: Save the nation.
Circumstances: Any.

“Circumstances: Any.” Insufficient data to render a verdict.

“Circumstances:” The person was about the detonate a dirty bomb. The act can be justified based on the principle of self-defense / defending others.

This is the correct analysis.

It is only the correct analysis if you could not stop him any other way and you tried to shoot to disable him, not to kill him. And what is an innocent person doing trying to detonate a dirty bomb anyway?

 

[o_mlly]

Or PDE fail on account of the good effect coming from the bad effect and not the act.

All results come from the act. ???

If the the good result is a also direct causal result of the bad result then the act is proscribed. Still nothing to do with the actor’s intent.