Catholic view on utilitarianism

[o_mlly]

To @Elf01 and @Ender:

Those who believe the bystander may kill the innocent person must provide two rationales to be in accord with Catholic teaching:

1. Using the pulling trigger/throwing switch comparison, explain how the bystander’s act merely indirectly kills the innocent person. (Direct killing an innocent is intrinsically evil.)
2. Explain why the innocent person has no right of self-defense against the bystander. (The bystander cannot be both just and unjust in the same act in the same circumstances. Self-defense is only employed against an unjust aggressor. Remember, intent has nothing to do with whether an act is just or not, in its the moral objects.)

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Those who believe the bystander may kill the innocent person must provide two rationales to be in accord with Catholic teaching:

1. Using the pulling trigger/throwing switch comparison, explain how the bystander’s act merely indirectly kills the innocent person. (Direct killing an innocent is intrinsically evil.)

The bystander’s act redirects the trolley away from the 5 people. Later on, the trolley hits the one man, making it indirect. It is moral by double effect.

The pulling of the trigger fires a bullet. Later on, that bullet hits the target. The effect is also indirect. But it is immoral for a different reason, unrelated to the directness or indirectness of the effect. It is immoral if the the killing of the target was the intended effect. While intention alone cannot make an act moral, intention alone can make an act immoral.

1. Explain why the innocent person has no right of self-defense against the bystander. (The bystander cannot be both just and unjust in the same act in the same circumstances. Self-defense is only employed against an unjust aggressor. Remember, intent has nothing to do with whether an act is just or not, in its the moral objects.)

The innocent person does maintain his right of self-defense, which under some conditions may be used even against a just aggressor. So the fact that the innocent person has a right to self-defense does not prove the bystander is unjust.

That was easy!

 

[CarmeliteKnight]

Really? OK: let’s see how you reason that one out. 'Cause, “murdering an innocent person at the behest of a terrorist” sure sounds like an immoral action…!

Easy. The life of the king represents the stability of the nation. As long as the king lives his leadership and stability he brings to the nation will live as well. If he dies then it opens up the whole can of worms of who’s going to succeed after him. Which will cause instability. You as his loyal subject have the duty and the incentive to keep the king alive. If he dies and let’s say no heir was named after him, it can cause a succession crisis and possibly a civil war, which will lead to the deaths of more than just one person. It could lead to the deaths of many people.

So if it was literally impossible for you to kill the terrorists ( let’s say he was holding the king hostage behind the bulletproof glass or in a completely different room and communicating to you via computer screen) it would be your duty to not only to your king but to your fellow citizens to give in to the demands but maybe delayed as long as you can ( opening up the possibility of his Majesty’s Secret Service coming to the rescue)

It’s the lesser of two evils, but this is also assuming the terrorist actually keeps his word and let’s the king go ( realistically speaking is doubtful).

 

[Ender]

Those who believe the bystander may kill the innocent person must provide two rationales to be in accord with Catholic teaching:

1. Using the pulling trigger/throwing switch comparison, explain how the bystander’s act merely indirectly kills the innocent person. (Direct killing an innocent is intrinsically evil.)
2. Explain why the innocent person has no right of self-defense against the bystander. (The bystander cannot be both just and unjust in the same act in the same circumstances. Self-defense is only employed against an unjust aggressor. Remember, intent has nothing to do with whether an act is just or not, in its the moral objects.)

I don’t think (2) is relevant so I will ignore it.

How do we define direct and indirect effects? The whole question comes down to this. In doing this I would disagree with LeafByNiggle that in shooting someone the effect is indirect; I think it is direct because the effect is contained within the definition of the object. Defining the object of an action turns out to be anything but simple.

If I put a gun to a person’s head and pull the trigger it seems the object is more than just shooting a gun; I believe it is “shooting a person in the head”. In that case the effect is clearly direct. The definition of the object includes an effect and that effect is direct, subsequent/consequent effects are indirect.

In the operation the legitimate object is “removing a section of the tube”. In this case the impact on the fetus is indirect because it is not part of the object. The invalid object is “removing the fetus”, because there the impact is direct. With regard to the trolley it seems the object is “switching the trolley away from the five” which is clearly legitimate and direct. If the object was “switching the trolley at the one” that would be direct and illegitimate. Now in both cases, both sets of consequences occur, but the direct/indirect distinction depends on the definition of the object.

 

[Gorgias]

It’s the lesser of two evils, but this is also assuming the terrorist actually keeps his word and let’s the king go ( realistically speaking is doubtful).

So, not only do you assent that it is committing an evil act, but also, you admit that it is one that is essentially fruitless. (Why are you advocating for it, then? )

 

[LeafByNiggle]

How do we define direct and indirect effects? The whole question comes down to this. In doing this I would disagree with LeafByNiggle that in shooting someone the effect is indirect; I think it is direct because the effect is contained within the definition of the object. Defining the object of an action turns out to be anything but simple.

I don’t have a strong opinion on what “direct” and “indirect” mean in this discussion, and o_mlly has declined to define them, so I can accept your definition. But I have long felt that the way o_mlly uses “direct”, it is a proxy for “intended effect”. In other words, it is another way of expressing intention. This can be seen by considering another scenario in which a bullet is fired and it kills someone. I am at target range shooting at paper targets. Unbeknownst to me, someone strays behind the target and my bullet strikes them. The only difference between that and holding a gun to someone’s head is the intention. I had no intention of shooting the person wandering behind the target.

 

[Ender]

I don’t have a strong opinion on what “direct” and “indirect” mean in this discussion, and o_mlly has declined to define them, so I can accept your definition. But I have long felt that the way o_mlly uses “direct”, it is a proxy for “intended effect”. In other words, it is another way of expressing intention. This can be seen by considering another scenario in which a bullet is fired and it kills someone. I am at target range shooting at paper targets. Unbeknownst to me, someone strays behind the target and my bullet strikes them. The only difference between that and holding a gun to someone’s head is the intention. I had no intention of shooting the person wandering behind the target.

I had tried several times to devise a useful definition of direct/indirect, so far this is the best I’ve come up with. It’s work in progress. I do think the true object of an action is more than the simplest physical act involved, otherwise shooting someone in the head could be reduced to pulling a trigger, or even moving a finger, which clearly does not capture the real nature of the act.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

I don’t have a strong opinion on what “direct” and “indirect” mean in this discussion, and o_mlly has declined to define them, so I can accept your definition. But I have long felt that the way o_mlly uses “direct”, it is a proxy for “intended effect”. In other words, it is another way of expressing intention. This can be seen by considering another scenario in which a bullet is fired and it kills someone. I am at target range shooting at paper targets. Unbeknownst to me, someone strays behind the target and my bullet strikes them. The only difference between that and holding a gun to someone’s head is the intention. I had no intention of shooting the person wandering behind the target.

I had tried several times to devise a useful definition of direct/indirect, so far this is the best I’ve come up with. It’s work in progress. I do think the true object of an action is more than the simplest physical act involved, otherwise shooting someone in the head could be reduced to pulling a trigger, or even moving a finger, which clearly does not capture the real nature of the act.

Do you see any way at all of totally divorcing the concept of directness, or “true object” from intention? I don’t.

 

[Ender]

Do you see any way at all of totally divorcing the concept of directness, or “true object” from intention? I don’t.

The last time I was involved in a discussion over the meaning of the “object” font I discovered that it was a great deal more complicated than I initially imagined. As I recall the object actually included an intention, which was different than the “intention” font. I still struggle with this.

So for example “murder” is an act - the object - which is intrinsically evil, so we have to be able to define the object in such a way as to capture all the elements that make it murder. I agree that intent cannot be fully separated from the object, but I think there is an intent inherent in the object that is different than that which defines the intent font.

 

[o_mlly]

I don’t think (2) is relevant so I will ignore it.

How do we define direct and indirect effects? The whole question comes down to this. In doing this I would disagree with LeafByNiggle that in shooting someone the effect is indirect; I think it is direct because the effect is contained within the definition of the object. Defining the object of an action turns out to be anything but simple.

If I put a gun to a person’s head and pull the trigger it seems the object is more than just shooting a gun; I believe it is “shooting a person in the head”. In that case the effect is clearly direct. The definition of the object includes an effect and that effect is direct, subsequent/consequent effects are indirect.

In the operation the legitimate object is “removing a section of the tube”. In this case the impact on the fetus is indirect because it is not part of the object. The invalid object is “removing the fetus”, because there the impact is direct. With regard to the trolley it seems the object is “switching the trolley away from the five” which is clearly legitimate and direct. If the object was “switching the trolley at the one” that would be direct and illegitimate. Now in both cases, both sets of consequences occur, but the direct/indirect distinction depends on the definition of the object.

Thank you for an argument in support of your conclusions.

Before I post a comment, please complete your analysis by identifying what you believe to be the direct cause of the death of the innocent one on the track and the direct and/or indirect causes that save the five.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Since the concept of directness and indirectness has been referred to so much in this thread, it might be instructive to review every occurrence of “direct” or “indirect” in the section of the Catechism dealing with the 5th commandment. That would be paragraphs 2258-2330:
CCC2258:

" Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves the creative action of God and it remains for ever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end. God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being."

Note that the unintended destruction of a life as an unintended consequence of another act is not the same thing as claiming the “right to destroy” that life. That act would be justified or not justified according to the principles of double effect.
CCC2268:

The fifth commandment forbids direct and intentional killing as gravely sinful. The murderer and those who cooperate voluntarily in murder commit a sin that cries out to heaven for vengeance.

Forbids only “direct and intentional killing”.
CCC2269:

The fifth commandment forbids doing anything with the intention of indirectly bringing about a person’s death. The moral law prohibits exposing someone to mortal danger without grave reason, as well as refusing assistance to a person in danger.

The acceptance by human society of murderous famines, without efforts to remedy them, is a scandalous injustice and a grave offense. Those whose usurious and avaricious dealings lead to the hunger and death of their brethren in the human family indirectly commit homicide, which is imputable to them.

Unintentional killing is not morally imputable. But one is not exonerated from grave offense if, without proportionate reasons, he has acted in a way that brings about someone’s death, even without the intention to do so.

This reasserts the principles of double effect in addition to showing the relative unimportance of “directness” since this forbids even “indirect” killing in most circumstances.
CCC2271:

Since the first century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every procured abortion. This teaching has not changed and remains unchangeable. Direct abortion, that is to say, abortion willed either as an end or a means, is gravely contrary to the moral law:

Specific to abortion, and reasserts the importance of intention or means.
CCC2271:

Whatever its motives and means, direct euthanasia consists in putting an end to the lives of handicapped, sick, or dying persons. It is morally unacceptable.

Specific to euthanasia.

There are a few others, but they are unrelated to killing of any kind.

 

[Ender]

Before I post a comment, please complete your analysis by identifying what you believe to be the direct cause of the death of the innocent one on the track and the direct and/or indirect causes that save the five.

Clearly the innocent person is killed by the trolley, the trolley was sent down the track when the switch was thrown, and throwing the switch with knowledge of that consequence was deliberate. If my distinction between direct and indirect is valid then “saving the five” is the direct effect, and all subsequent effects - including running over the one - are indirect. The object of the action would be “switching the trolley away from the five”. The effect on the five is therefore direct since they are defined in the object. The effect on the one is indirect because he is not part of the object.

 

[o_mlly]

Clearly the innocent person is killed by the trolley, the trolley was sent down the track when the switch was thrown, and throwing the switch with knowledge of that consequence was deliberate.

I agree. That is one of the two moral objects in the case. But I would, as is usually done, state the moral object as a foreseen outcome in the bystander’s mind in the active voice: “Throwing the switch directs the trolley onto the track that will kill the innocent person.”

The trolley case, as do all cases subject to the double effect analysis, has two moral objects. One moral object is intended, the other is not. But, both objects are deliberate, that is willed by the bystander.

The object of the action would be “ switching the trolley away from the five ”.

I agree.

The effect on the five is therefore direct since they are defined in the object. The effect on the one is indirect because he is not part of the object.

I disagree. All moral objects include the physical act and its effects on moral agents (Veritas Splendor p. 78). The five, just like the one, are all moral agents. The one is just as much part of the moral object that affects him as are the five a part of the other moral object that affects them.

I don’t think (2) is relevant so I will ignore it.

If you believe the innocent one does not have the right to self-defense, please argue the point.

If I put a gun to a person’s head and pull the trigger it seems the object is more than just shooting a gun; I believe it is “shooting a person in the head”. In that case the effect is clearly direct. The definition of the object includes an effect and that effect is direct, subsequent/consequent effects are indirect.

In the operation the legitimate object is “removing a section of the tube”. In this case the impact on the fetus is indirect because it is not part of the object. The invalid object is “removing the fetus”, because there the impact is direct. With regard to the trolley it seems the object is “switching the trolley away from the five” which is clearly legitimate and direct. If the object was “switching the trolley at the one” that would be direct and illegitimate. Now in both cases, both sets of consequences occur, but the direct/indirect distinction depends on the definition of the object.

Therefore, the objects properly stated always include the outcomes affecting moral agents. Directness is not determined by manipulating the phrasing of the moral objects. Directness is determined by the chain of causation. “Target” is the operative word that determines to what the act is directed.

(continued)

 

[o_mlly]

To what does the act as described target itself? Target, not as intention, but as a description of the moral agent(s) directly affected by the act, determines the act’s direct outcome. Moral agents affected, but not as targets, are the indirect outcome. The surgeon who directs a scalpel that cuts the fetus, targets the fetus. One who fires a gun that directs a bullet at an innocent person, targets the innocent person. One who directs a trolley at an innocent person, targets that innocent person.

Perhaps, the moral distinction between deliberate and intend would be helpful.

The difference between deliberated outcomes and the intended outcome.

De liberatus – Latin, (down) from free will.

Intedere – Latin, aiming in a certain direction.

Deliberation is an objective process, that occurs in any and all actors.

Intention is a subjective process, that is specific for a particular actor and may differ for another.

The moral object of an act includes the physical act and all the reasonable foreseeable moral outcomes, that is, the ends in view.

These outcomes are known to any and all actors through operation of intellect.

The intellect moves foreseen outcomes to the will.

In the will, any and all actors then deliberate on all the outcomes and freely choose to act or not act.

Any and all actors who choose to act, act deliberately knowing and willing all foreseeable outcomes, because both are present to the intellect and the will.

No actor who acts can claim to have not deliberated and therefore not freely willed all the moral outcomes.

A particular actor may prefer one outcome as primary over another. That outcome then becomes that actor’s intended or primary end.

Any and all actors remain the material cause of all the act’s outcomes, not just the intended outcome. Some may be excused from formal culpability but those excused from formal culpability still remain responsible for bad outcomes, e.g., for any restitution, if not in justice, certainly in charity.

 

[Ender]

I agree. That is one of the two moral objects in the case. But I would, as is usually done, state the moral object as a foreseen outcome in the bystander’s mind in the active voice: “Throwing the switch directs the trolley onto the track that will kill the innocent person.”

The knowledge that the fetus will die is also foreseen yet is an acceptable outcome. You still have yet to distinguish why that death is indirect and legitimate; you have merely defined it that way. I also dispute your definition of the moral object in the trolley case. Clearly what is uppermost in the actor’s mind is saving the five yet your definition ignores this altogether. There are two effects of his action, and you are defining his action with regard only to the unwanted effect, which can in no way be seen as what motivates him.

I disagree. All moral objects include the physical act and its effects on moral agents (Veritas Splendor p. 78). The five, just like the one, are all moral agents. The one is just as much part of the moral object that affects him as are the five a part of the other moral object that affects them.

Again, this applies equally to the case of the two moral agents involved in the operation.

Directness is determined by the chain of causation.

That conflates direct with inevitable, and you have previously said inevitable consequences are not necessarily direct ones, but this also would condemn the operation since the death of the fetus is part of the chain.

Target , not as intention, but as a description of the moral agent(s) directly affected by the act, determines the act’s direct outcome.

You cannot use the term you are defining as part of the definition of the term.

The moral object of an act includes the physical act and all the reasonable foreseeable moral outcomes, that is, the ends in view.

This is significant as it refutes my definition of the object.

A particular actor may prefer one outcome as primary over another. That outcome then becomes that actor’s intended or primary end.

OK then, clearly the intended end of throwing the switch is saving the five.

Keep this in mind however: you have not provided any distinction between the operation and throwing the switch that justifies one act and condemns the other. In both cases the action saves (a) life and takes a life. Other than defining one as valid and the other as invalid you have not explained what morally distinguishes one from the other.

 

[o_mlly]

The knowledge that the fetus will die is also foreseen yet is an acceptable outcome.

All foreseen outcomes are necessarily accepted. The crucial difference is whether that unintended outcome is direct or indirect to the action. As Fr. Tad has explained, the death of the fetus in tubal excision is foreseen, indirect, unintended and allowed. If you disagree then take your argument to Fr. Tad. I agree with the Fr. Tad. His credentials speak for themselves.

Clearly what is uppermost in the actor’s mind is saving the five yet your definition ignores this altogether.

Again, you must not conflate the font of intent with the moral object. The fonts are independent one to the other. This mistake has continuously flawed your analysis. The former is objective, that is independent of any particular actor. The latter is subjective and absolutely depends on the mind of the particular actor as taught in the catechism.

Again, this applies equally to the case of the two moral agents involved in the operation.

In the ectopic pregnancy, the moral actor who target the fetus always commits an evil act. The surgeon who targets the diseased tissue in the mother may be a moral actor. The bystander target an innocent. His mind is disclosed by the OP; he is an immoral actor – one may never directly take the life of an innocent. Period.

That conflates direct with inevitable, and you have previously said inevitable consequences are not necessarily direct ones, but this also would condemn the operation since the death of the fetus is part of the chain.

No. An inevitable outcome may be direct or indirect. The directness of an act is self-evident through the chain of causation. What the act targets, as explained, discloses what is directly affected by the act.

You cannot use the term you are defining as part of the definition of the term.

? Not so. Please read Pius Xii, Fr. Tad, the USCCB articles cited.

This is significant as it refutes my definition of the object.

Yes. it is significant and refutes your argument because your argument, as I have shown, was in error.

(continued)

 

[o_mlly]

Keep this in mind however: you have not provided any distinction between the operation and throwing the switch that justifies one act and condemns the other. In both cases the action saves (a) life and takes a life. Other than defining one as valid and the other as invalid you have not explained what morally distinguishes one from the other.

Yes, I have shown the distinction between excising the diseased tissue of the mother and excising the child as have Pius XII and Fr. Tad, the former evil effect is indirect and permissible, the latter evil effect is direct and impermissible. And I’ve shown that targeting the child is identical to targeting the innocent one on the tracks. Both are immoral in their object as both directly kill and innocent and are impermissible.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Ender:

The knowledge that the fetus will die is also foreseen yet is an acceptable outcome.

All foreseen outcomes are necessarily accepted. The crucial difference is whether that unintended outcome is direct or indirect to the action. … If you disagree then take your argument to Fr. Tad. …His credentials speak for themselves.

If you are going to appeal to authority on the ectopic pregnancy analysis, you would have to appeal to authority on the trolley problem. You cannot analyze the trolley problem using a different method or else the comparison is not valid.

Again, this applies equally to the case of the two moral agents involved in the operation.

In the ectopic pregnancy, the moral actor who target the fetus always commits an evil act. The surgeon who targets the diseased tissue in the mother may be a moral actor. The bystander target an innocent. His mind is disclosed by the OP; he is an immoral actor – one may never directly take the life of an innocent. Period.

Same problem with “target”. You say the surgeon does not target the fetus, but the bystander does target the one innocent man. You assert this but never prove it.

That conflates direct with inevitable, and you have previously said inevitable consequences are not necessarily direct ones, but this also would condemn the operation since the death of the fetus is part of the chain.

No. An inevitable outcome may be direct or indirect. The directness of an act is self-evident through the chain of causation.

If you mean the usual physical sense of causation, then you would have to say that the tubal excision causes the death of the baby too. There is no doubt that the baby was alive before the operation and would have remained alive for perhaps another week without the operation. The immediate physical cause of death (in the normal sense) is the interruption of nutrients and warmth. If the chain of causation is the definition of directness, this would mean the death was direct, and according to you not allowed. But of course according to Fr. Tad it is allowed. So by reductio ad absurdum the definition or role of directness must be flawed.

You cannot use the term you are defining as part of the definition of the term.

? Not so. Please read Pius Xii, Fr. Tad, the USCCB articles cited.

This is basic logic. You can’t use the term you are defining as part of the definition of the term. If you see some passage in Pius XII, or Fr. Tad, or the USCCB articles that seem to define something using the same term, it is likely not a definition at all.

This is significant as it refutes my definition of the object.

Yes. it is significant and refutes your argument because your argument, as I have shown, was in error.

No, it just means you and Ender do not agree on the definition.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Ender:

Keep this in mind however: you have not provided any distinction between the operation and throwing the switch that justifies one act and condemns the other. In both cases the action saves (a) life and takes a life. Other than defining one as valid and the other as invalid you have not explained what morally distinguishes one from the other.

Yes, I have shown the distinction between excising the diseased tissue of the mother and excising the child…

Those are not the two things you needed to show are different. You were asked to show the difference between the tubal excision and throwing the switch for the trolley.

 

[Ender]

All foreseen outcomes are necessarily accepted. The crucial difference is whether that unintended outcome is direct or indirect to the action. As Fr. Tad has explained, the death of the fetus in tubal excision is foreseen, indirect, unintended and allowed. If you disagree then take your argument to Fr. Tad. I agree with the Fr. Tad. His credentials speak for themselves.

This is not an explanation, this is an assertion. I have insisted all along that unless the distinction between direct and indirect can be explained in a way that it can be applied in general it is useless. Give me something other than an assertion that we can discuss.

Again, you must not conflate the font of intent with the moral object.

Let me remind you of what you said earlier:

"The moral object of an act includes the physical act and all the reasonable foreseeable moral outcomes, that is, the ends in view.

The object includes an intent, and that intent is to achieve the ends in view. This is different than the intent font, which is about why we choose those ends. Murder is an intrinsically evil act separate from the intent which motivates it, but killing is not murder unless it is intentional. That intent is part of the object which is murder.

What the act targets, as explained, discloses what is directly affected by the act.

What is targeted by throwing the switch are the five being saved by the action. It is the exact same action that would be taken if there was no one on the other track. It is a hard case to make that the same act done for the same reason has two different targets depending on the consequences.

I have shown the distinction between excising the diseased tissue of the mother and excising the child as have Pius XII and Fr. Tad, the former evil effect is indirect and permissible, the latter evil effect is direct and impermissible.

You have still not done anything other than declare “this is direct, that is indirect”. You have yet to provide an explanation that would allow the application of those terms in general.