Catholic view on utilitarianism

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

It’s not morally evil to starve someone to death?

If we had the technology to bring a weeks-old embryo to full term, yes, it would be. As we do not have that ability, I’m not sure where you’re seeing the evil. (Except as a means to try and justify killing a person on a track. )

And if the bystander had the technology to save the one man on the track after saving the 5 others and failed to use that technology, that would have been evil too. But since he didn’t have any means of saving the one man, he is in the same position as the surgeon who wishes he could save the baby whose life lines he just cut, but he just can’t.

 

[Gorgias]

But since he didn’t have any means of saving the one man, he is in the same position as the surgeon who wishes he could save the baby whose life lines he just cut, but he just can’t.

Actually, he isn’t. If he does nothing, both mother and child die. His choice of action doesn’t doom the child. On the other hand, the person at the track actively decides to kill someone who isn’t in peril. “Evil object.”

 

[Elf01]

Actually, he isn’t. If he does nothing, both mother and child die.

So you do think the fact the child will die anyway is morally relevant.

 

[Gorgias]

So you do think the fact the child will die anyway is morally relevant.

I think it distinguishes the cases. If the question is “aren’t these the same thing”, then the answer is “no”.

 

[Elf01]

I think it distinguishes the cases. If the question is “aren’t these the same thing”, then the answer is “no”.

The next question is why are they not?

 

[Gorgias]

The next question is why are they not?

Seriously? I just said why.

 

[Elf01]

Seriously? I just said why.

Nope. You’e said that the fact the child will die distinguishes the cases and assert that is not the samr as it being morally relevant without explaining why.

 

[Gorgias]

Nope. You’e said that the fact the child will die distinguishes the cases

Yep.

They’re different. Glad we could establish that.

But no, I’m not going to say that the reason that one is Double Effect and the other isn’t is because the baby will die either way. You want to argue for or against that claim? Have at it. It’s not my claim, and I’m not gonna defend it.

 

[Elf01]

But no, I’m not going to say that the reason that one is Double Effect and the other isn’t is because the baby will die either way. You want to argue for or against that claim? Have at it. It’s not my claim, and I’m not gonna defend it.

It’s you who keeps bringing the fact that the baby will die anyway up.

Why is one double effect and the other not in your opinion?

 

[Gorgias]

surely the position of the man tied to the track is the direct killer of that man, since that is also a very unnatural place for a man to be tied up. In both cases, if the bystander did not throw the switch and the surgeon did not cut the tube, the man on the track would have gone on living for another day at least, and the baby in the tube would have gone on living for another day at least

Clever. Yet, without a trolley bearing down on ya’ll, it’s trivial to see that you’d go over to the folks on the tracks and free them from their bonds. Problem solved.

It’s you who keeps bringing the fact that the baby will die anyway up.

Not in the context that you keep attempting to use that assertion.

Why is one double effect and the other not in your opinion?

Why do I have to keep repeating this? It’s getting tedious: Evil object. Sending a trolley down the track toward an innocent bystander is not “morally good or at least indifferent.”

 

[Ender]

Yes. Direct cause.
Let B = death of an innocent man.
Let A = throw switch.
Or Let A = pull trigger.

Now let B = death of the fetus
Let A = operation (either the legitimate or the illegitimate one)
B flows directly from A in all examples, yet in one case (of the operation) B is direct and in the other it is indirect. Again, direct and indirect are left undefined. The simple “A causes B” is inadequate.

Your citation from Veritas Splendor is paragraph 78. The first sentence describes the scope of the teaching on moral object , not intent.

Yes, exactly, and it says that the moral object “is the proximate end of a deliberate decision.” That end is intended. As I said, there is an intent separate from the intent font contained within the object font. It is the “proximate end.”

Show that the moral object of the gunman’s act is essentially different than the bystander’s act. (We may assume that neither actor intends the death of the innocent because intent has no bearing either way on the moral object of an act.)

The proximate end of the gunman’s act is shooting an innocent man. The proximate end of the bystander’s act is redirecting the trolley away from the five.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

surely the position of the man tied to the track is the direct killer of that man, since that is also a very unnatural place for a man to be tied up. In both cases, if the bystander did not throw the switch and the surgeon did not cut the tube, the man on the track would have gone on living for another day at least, and the baby in the tube would have gone on living for another day at least

Clever. Yet, without a trolley bearing down on ya’ll, it’s trivial to see that you’d go over to the folks on the tracks and free them from their bonds. Problem solved.

That’s true. But there is a trolley bearing down on them. So you solved a different problem.

 

[o_mlly]

Now let B = death of the fetus
Let A = operation (either the legitimate or the illegitimate one)
B flows directly from A in all examples, yet in one case (of the operation) B is direct and in the other it is indirect. Again, direct and indirect are left undefined. The simple “A causes B” is inadequate.

The difference between direct and indirect causation is self-evident to me. But if you are not certain then you also may not act. Either way, the innocent one lives. Deo Gratias.

Yes, exactly, and it says that the moral object “ is the proximate end of a deliberate decision .” That end is intended. As I said, there is an intent separate from the intent font contained within the object font. It is the “ proximate end. ”

No, not exactly. “Deliberate” does not mean “intend” in moral theology. In your mistaken analysis, the moral object of the act would become dependent on the intent of a particular actor thus corrupting the objectivity of the act in se.

The proximate end of the gunman’s act is shooting an innocent man. The proximate end of the bystander’s act is redirecting the trolley away from the five.

Whom does the act affect directly? In both cases – trigger or switch – the innocent man is directly affected by the act itself. No getting around that fact. “Proximate” in moral theology means “unmediated” that is immediately, not in time but absent any intervening causes.

 

[Elf01]

Why do I have to keep repeating this? It’s getting tedious: Evil object . Sending a trolley down the track toward an innocent bystander is not “morally good or at least indifferent.”

That does not explain why denying the baby nutrients isn’t evil.

Whom does the act affect directly ? In both cases – trigger or switch – the innocent man is directly affected by the act itself. No getting around that fact. “Proximate” in moral theology means “unmediated” that is immediately, not in time but absent any intervening causes.

I also don’t see how that doesn’t apply to the baby.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

The difference between direct and indirect causation is self-evident to me. But if you are not certain then you also may not act.

This idea of uncertainty brings in a whole new dimension to the problem. So far statement of the trolley problem has been in terms of certain death if the switch is left where it is and certain death if the switch is thrown. But in real life, such facts are never certain. The bystander may see what looks like to him to be a man tied to the tracks. An evil villain may even tell him this is so. But he does not know for sure. Maybe the man who looks like he is tied to the tracks is actually working on the tracks and going to get off the tracks as soon as he hears a trolley approaching. Or maybe the observer is mistaken about which track the trolley will take if he throws the switch. If this is a switch yard there may be many different tracks. Or maybe the man tied to the tracks is tied in such a way that he can lie perfectly still between the tracks and not be struck at all (but the five people, being a bigger group, might have trouble doing that). Any real-world scenario is going to have at least one of these uncertainties, and those uncertainties would affect the decision of the bystander who wants to do the right thing.

 

[o_mlly]

I also don’t see how that doesn’t apply to the baby.

I can only suggest that you study and pray on it. The USCCB, Fr. Tad and Pius XII (over 60 years ago) teach in concert on the matter. It is not a novel idea in Church teaching.

 

[Gorgias]

That’s true. But there is a trolley bearing down on them. So you solved a different problem.

That’s because I already solved the original problem: one may not kill the innocent man by directing a trolley to squish him.

That does not explain why denying the baby nutrients isn’t evil.

You didn’t ask that question. You asked “why is one double effect and the other is not?” I answered your question. You’re trying to make the answer to one question function as the answer to another. It won’t work. I’ve answered your questions. You just don’t like the answers.

The proximate end of the gunman’s act is shooting an innocent man. The proximate end of the bystander’s act is redirecting the trolley away from the five.

You seem to be treating “proximate” and “remote” as if they’re talking about distance here. That’s not how these terms are being used. Rather, proximate causes (or ends) proceed from the act itself. Remote causes (or ends) proceed in a way not clearly attributable to the act itself.

In the case of the trolley, the proximate ends of flipping the switch are both “saving the five” and “killing the one.” Think about it for a second: if it is a proximate cause of saving the five… it’s a proximate cause of killing the one. If you assert otherwise, you’re attempting to have your cake and eat it too.

(This also means that, in the tubal ligation example, cutting the tube is the proximate cause of saving the mother and of killing the baby.)

So, to make your claim complete, you’ll have to admit that “the proximate end of the bystander’s act is redirecting the trolley away from the five and directing the trolley toward the one.”

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

That’s true. But there is a trolley bearing down on them. So you solved a different problem.

That’s because I already solved the original problem: one may not kill the innocent man by directing a trolley to squish him.

That’s not solving the problem. That’s just asserting that you have solved it. To solve it you have to prove your analysis is right. And in doing so, make sure your analysis, if applied to the other problems discussed here, doesn’t produce the wrong results in them.

 

[Ender]

You seem to be treating “proximate” and “remote” as if they’re talking about distance here. That’s not how these terms are being used. Rather, proximate causes (or ends) proceed from the act itself. Remote causes (or ends) proceed in a way not clearly attributable to the act itself.

“Proximate end” in this case means what is done because of its immediate consequence.

In the case of the trolley, the proximate ends of flipping the switch are both “saving the five” and “killing the one.” Think about it for a second: if it is a proximate cause of saving the five… it’s a proximate cause of killing the one. If you assert otherwise, you’re attempting to have your cake and eat it too.

Saving the five is the intent. It is why the object (throwing the switch to redirect the trolley) was selected. The proximate end is to redirect the trolley; that is literally what throwing the switch does. Whether there is anyone on the either track the object is the same in all cases: to redirect the trolley. The reasons for redirecting the trolley can be legitimate, but if the act is immoral it is because the intent is immoral, not because the object is.

 

[Ender]

No, not exactly. “Deliberate” does not mean “intend” in moral theology. In your mistaken analysis, the moral object of the act would become dependent on the intent of a particular actor thus corrupting the objectivity of the act in se.

You haven’t come to recognize that the object contains an intent separate from the intent font. Something done deliberately is something “done consciously and intentionally.”

Whom does the act affect directly ? In both cases – trigger or switch – the innocent man is directly affected by the act itself. No getting around that fact. “Proximate” in moral theology means “unmediated” that is immediately, not in time but absent any intervening causes.

Your assertions carry weight only if they are supported by citations suggesting they are accurate, otherwise they are merely your personal opinions. If proximate has a theological meaning other than “an event which is closest to, or immediately responsible for causing, some observed result” you’ll need to show that with something more than your claim that it is so.