Thanks! IIRC, your question had to do with the way @Ender and I were using the term âproximate endâ with respect to the way JPII uses it in VS, and especially how that he relates that to the humanâs âultimate end.â Is that about right?
Ender and I were using the term âproximate endâ (in slightly different ways, IIRC) to mean something like âthe thing that happens, due to the action taken.â I think Ender looked at it temporally, in terms of when it happened, and I looked at it causally. If I shot an arrow in the air parabolically and it took five minutes to travel to its destination and hit its target, I would label that hitting-of-the-target as âproximate endâ, and I suspect that Ender might not be as willing to make that same assertion. (Iâll let Ender speak for himself, though.)
JPII wrote:
By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person.
Here, I think heâs using âproximate endâ in the way that Iâm thinking about it (even if Iâm not doing a good job of explaining myself). The âmoral objectâ isnât just an event that occurs; itâs the actual result of the decision that a moral actor makes, based on the operation of his will.
So, the moral object
cannot merely be âa lever got switchedâ; the moral object
must be what happens
because that physical event took place â in this case, the moral object is âan otherwise unthreatened innocent was killedâ. (What makes the trolley problem so interesting is that there are two moral objects â âfive savedâ and âone killedâ!)
What about JPIIâs use of the term âultimate endâ, though? Here, heâs speaking to the
telos of the human person, and not the outcome of one particular action. He writes:
To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love.
⌠The human act, good according to its object, is also capable of being ordered to its ultimate end. That same act then attains its ultimate and decisive perfection when the will actually does order it to God through charity.
So, according to JPII, the object of an act is itself âmoralâ when it points to our ultimate goal: pleasing God and attaining to eternal life.
The question, then, becomes, âdoes it please God that I killed a person who otherwise would not have been killed?â I think the answer to that is obvious. Catholic moral theology would explain that, even though you saved five lives, you committed murder in order to do so⌠and therefore, since murder doesnât please God, and it doesnât lead to eternal life, we canât call that act in the trolley problem a âmoral act.â
Is that what you were looking for, from me?