Catholic view on utilitarianism

[o_mlly]

I’ve responded to that multiple times.

Indulge me, please.

Where is the indirection? If you claim the act only indirectly causes the innocent man’s death then what is the direct cause? The innocent man on the track was in no peril before the bystander’s act.

Do you, like Gorgias think removing the tube is moral because the baby will die anyway?

The perilous situation, indeed, the terminal situation of the child bears on but does not determine the morality of the act. Excising the mother’s diseased tissue that threatens her life is the motivating force that justifies the act.

The reason I believe removing the tube is moral is because it would be the correct treatment if the baby was not there.

Examine another type of ectopic pregnancy, the hepatic pregnancy to see a crucial difference. The trolley case is akin to this type of pregnancy, not the tubal implantation.

 

[o_mlly]

While the circumstances are different I do think that examining the good effect only scenario points to the object.

Your analysis of determining the moral object would justify direct abortion. See:

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Evangelium Vitae points out that “the killing of innocent human creatures, even if carried out to help others, constitutes an absolutely unacceptable act” ( paragraph 63).

 

[Ender]

In your analysis, the moral object would be one thing for an actor who intended to save the five and another thing for an actor who intended to kill the innocent one thus making the moral object not objective, as the catechism teaches, but subjective and dependent on the intent of a particular actor.

No, you haven’t understood my point. The object, according to JPII, includes the proximate end of the action. That end, however, is intended; it is why the specific action was chosen, and it is separate and distinct from the intention font.

In my analysis the moral object would be identical whether there was anyone on the track or not, or whether he intended to kill or to save. The object is “throw the switch to reroute the trolley”. Why he wants the trolley rerouted is the intent font, and what happens afterwards are the consequences and part of the circumstances font.

Suppose these four cases:

1. No one on either track
2. Five on the right track, no one on the left
3. Five on the right track, one on the left
4. Five on the left track, one on the right

A person walks up and throws the switch to route the trolley from the right to the left track and this is all you can see, you have no idea which of the four scenarios you are watching. Can you describe the object of his action? Given that the object is the physical action and its proximate end, and you have witnessed the action (throwing the switch) and the seen the result (trolley goes left) I think you can. You cannot know the remote ends of the act or the intent, but you have seen everything that defines the action (object) itself, so it seems to me the object is known and is identical in every case.

 

[o_mlly]

In my analysis the moral object would be identical whether there was anyone on the track or not, or whether he intended to kill or to save. The object is “ throw the switch to reroute the trolley ”. Why he wants the trolley rerouted is the intent font, and what happens afterwards are the consequences and part of the circumstances font.

Your object as stated above ( “ throw the switch to reroute the trolley ”) lacks any moral content and is, as JPII teaches, merely the premoral statement of the physical act. From Veritas Splendor:

There thus appears to be established within human acting a clear disjunction between two levels of morality: on the one hand the order of good and evil, which is dependent on the will, and on the other hand specific kinds of behaviour, which are judged to be morally right or wrong only on the basis of a technical calculation of the proportion between the “premoral” or “physical” goods and evils which actually result from the action.

If you see someone taking my TV then do you know the moral object? No. You must also know to what end is the act directed? Stealing is a taking against the reasonable will of the owner. But taking my TV to repair it as authorized by me is quite a different end.

 

[Inquiry]

Elf01:

While the circumstances are different I do think that examining the good effect only scenario points to the object.

Your analysis of determining the moral object would justify direct abortion. See:
https://apologeticacatolicasite.fil...ectopic_pregnancy_methotrexate_gray_paper.pdf

Does it? Whether or not we can say injecting methotrexate itself is morally neutral, it still fails the means-end condition. Methotrexate saves the mothers life by killing the baby. The good comes directly from the evil.

Examining the morality of the action in a vacuum only matters for the purposes of the first condition, we still have to examine the resulting effects when considering the other three.

 

[o_mlly]

Does it? Whether or not we can say injecting methotrexate itself is morally neutral, it still fails the means-end condition. Methotrexate saves the mothers life by killing the baby. The good comes directly from the evil.

? Elf01 would in error examine only the good effect is determining the moral object. Doing so would permit all sorts of intrinsically evil acts because an actor has a good intention.

“Injecting methotrexate” is not a human act. “Injecting methotrexate to heal psoriasis” is a human act.
“Injecting methotrexate to kill an innocent human being” is a human act. The former may by moral, the latter is never permissible.

 

[Inquiry]

Correct, the latter is never permissible. It will fail the second or third conditions even if “injecting methotrexate” is itself morally neutral.

Any scenario you can reasonably describe as “Injecting methotrexate to kill an innocent human being” is either going to carry the intent to “kill an innocent human being” or only accomplish a good by “killing an innocent human being.”

 

[o_mlly]

Aquinas distinguished between what he calls actus hominis (an act of a human being) and actus humanus (a human action).

Actus hominis describes the merely physical act without deliberation or reflection. Actus hominis describes an infant before the age of reason who throws the switch to reroute his toy train.

Actus humanus is deliberative and goal-directed and results from a process of practical reasoning.

 

[Ender]

Your object as stated above ( “ throw the switch to reroute the trolley ”) lacks any moral content and is, as JPII teaches, merely the premoral statement of the physical act. From Veritas Splendor :

“Premoral” as JPII defines it is the physical goods and evils which result from the action, and judging the morality of the action solely on those criteria. That’s not really applicable to my comments.

If you see someone taking my TV then do you know the moral object? No. You must also know to what end is the act directed?

Isn’t the end to which the act is directed an intent? Isn’t that what an “end” is - a condition we want (intend) to achieve? When you say “the end to which an act is directed” what exactly does that mean? Does it include all the foreseen consequences that flow from the act or just the immediate (proximate) consequence normal to the act itself?

Stealing is a taking against the reasonable will of the owner.

Stealing is immoral, but an act is not stealing unless it includes the intent to steal, and that intent is part of the object (stealing), distinct from the intent font. It is the difference between what I have done (steal) and why I have done it.

But taking my TV to repair it as authorized by me is quite a different end.

You could reasonably argue that the ends (intention font) are the same. The thief hopes to sell it and earn money from the sale; the helper expects to be paid for his trouble. In both cases the end is profit. The thief’s act is wrong not because his end (intent) is immoral, but because his means (object) were. The difficulty is defining the object of two actions that are externally indistinguishable that differentiates stealing from helping.

 

[Inquiry]

If you want examples of where the act is clearly inherently evil, the form of the trolley problem where you save the five by throwing an innocent man in front of the trolley is one. Ending an ectopic pregnancy by cutting out the baby itself would be another. In both the core act is the murder itself, which is inherently evil. You can’t evaluate the morality of your action if the man or the baby aren’t there because they need to be there for you to take the action at all. They are fundamental to your actual action, not just foreseeably affected by it.

But not every impermissible act is impermissible because the act is inherently evil.

 

[Elf01]

? Elf01 would in error examine only the good effect is determining the moral object. Doing so would permit all sorts of intrinsically evil acts because an actor has a good intention.

No, what I did waa ask if the action would achieve the good effect under other circumstances.

It does seem that that methotrexate would be an appropriate treatment for cancer so I concede my rule fails there. I also see it as failing on the object condition and not the good effect flowing from the bad effect condition.

I’m still not convinced that pulling the switch is immoral but I’m leaning in that direction.

 

[o_mlly]

“Premoral” as JPII defines it is the physical goods and evils which result from the action, and judging the morality of the action solely on those criteria. That’s not really applicable to my comments.

The teaching applies to the determination of the act’s moral object. As I understand your comment, you limit the moral object to the physical events that follow excluding the foreseen moral ends. JPII distinguishes between the physical, or premoral, or nonmoral objects of the act’s physical description and the greater importance of identifying the moral consequences of the human act (actus humanus as opposed to merely actus hominis) in order to determine the act’s moral object(s).

The acting subject would indeed be responsible for attaining the values pursued, but in two ways: the values or goods involved in a human act would be, from one viewpoint, of the moral order (in relation to properly moral values, such as love of God and neighbour, justice, etc.) and, from another viewpoint, of the pre-moral order, which some term non-moral, physical or ontic (in relation to the advantages and disadvantages accruing both to the agent and to all other persons possibly involved, such as, for example, health or its endangerment, physical integrity, life, death, loss of material goods, etc.). In a world where goodness is always mixed with evil, and every good effect linked to other evil effects, the morality of an act would be judged in two different ways: its moral “goodness” would be judged on the basis of the subject’s intention in reference to moral goods, and its “rightness” on the basis of a consideration of its foreseeable effects or consequences and of their proportion.

Yes, JPII teaches intention is its own font. But so is the moral object its own font, that is the “rightness” of the act itself must be judged independent of the actor’s intent.

Isn’t the end to which the act is directed an intent? Isn’t that what an “end” is - a condition we want (intend) to achieve? When you say “the end to which an act is directed” what exactly does that mean? Does it include all the foreseen consequences that flow from the act or just the immediate (proximate) consequence normal to the act itself?

The intent is always one of the foreseen moral outcomes of the act. What is not foreseen cannot be intended. Again, I think your interpretation of “proximate” as used in Veritas Splendor is incorrect. An act usually but not exclusively has one proximate end. The principle of the double effect only applies to acts which have two proximate ends, one being good and the other evil.

 

[o_mlly]

Stealing is immoral, but an act is not stealing unless it includes the intent to steal, and that intent is part of the object (stealing), distinct from the intent font. It is the difference between what I have done (steal) and why I have done it.

Missed this comment.

All acts whose moral object is to take property against the reasonable will of the owner is stealing. The intent may be good such as to feed the hungry but that does not change the moral object of the act. The act is intrinsically evil.

CCC#1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec . 6). The end does not justify the means.

 

[Ender]

As I understand your comment, you limit the moral object to the physical events that follow excluding the foreseen moral ends.

By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. (JPII, VS #78)

The object cannot include all of the foreseeable ends, the inclusion of “proximate” eliminates that possibility. I think you’re trying to force “premoral” on my position where it doesn’t fit. I do not in any way judge the validity of an action solely by its premoral or nonmoral consequences. I am trying to apply JPII’s definition of moral object to the trolley situation. If the object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision then tell us what you think the object is in this case.

Yes, JPII teaches intention is its own font. But so is the moral object its own font, that is the “rightness” of the act itself must be judged independent of the actor’s intent.

But the object is the proximate end of a deliberately chosen act, and that very choice involves its own intent separate from the intent font, which is directed at a final end.

An act usually but not exclusively has one proximate end. The principle of the double effect only applies to acts which have two proximate ends, one being good and the other evil.

There is nothing to support this contention; Aquinas was specific in saying there was one, but how would this apply to the cases of the trolley and the operation such that the former is deemed immoral and the latter is not?

I have tried to apply my definition of object to both cases; I would like you to do the same.

 

[o_mlly]

The object cannot include all of the foreseeable [moral] ends.

Need citation to support that assertion.

In context, your citation from JPII emphasizes not that the act has only one proximate end but rather that the object must include, beyond the merely physical effects, the effects of deliberated decision, that is, known and willed by any moral agent. The proximate ends are those inherent to the act in se. The proximate ends are unrelated to any particular moral agent. (See below).

Deliberated means willed, it does not mean intend.

Proximate means not remote. Proximate does not mean immediate, proximate means unmediated. The object of a human act includes all the reasonable (known) proximate (unmediated) moral ends deliberated (willed) by any actor.

JPII’s teaching does have problems with your statement of object:

By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order (Veritas Splendor)

The object is “ throw the switch to reroute the trolley ”.

Show us what is not merely in the physical order in the above.

The claim fails as an object because in contradicts JPII’s teaching. The statement merely assesses the act’s object on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world.

Direct means the act targets the body-person of a moral agent. Indirect means the act does not target the body-person of a moral agent. It is the bystander’s act (not the bystander) that targets the innocent man. The act directly kills an innocent person.

To demonstrate the error in imposing a particular bystander’s intent into the moral object, consider the following.

Presently, in the trolley case we assume a disinterested bystander. Suppose rather than disinterested that the bystander hated the lone man on the track and could care less about the five. He foresees that throwing the switch kills his arch enemy and intends to do just that. As argued above, you must modify your statement of object to include the deliberated decisions implicit in the act. How do you define the moral object for the trolley case for the disinterested bystander and for the one described above?

 

[Gorgias]

If the proximate end (that is, the intended effect) of cutting the tube is the death of the baby, then cutting the tube is never licit.

‘Proximate’ doesn’t imply ‘intended’. It merely implies that it’s an end that proceeds from the act itself. We might say that it’s ‘foreseeable’, but the fact that it’s a proximate end doesn’t imply that it’s an intended end, necessarily.

This is why it is so important to not confuse foreseeable effects with the action itself.

LOL! That’s kinda what you’re doing, brother…!

Because you are conflating the two you are stuck making arguments that some actions are okay because you can’t save the baby anyways.

No, that’s not my argument. I’m not saying “it’s ok because the baby’s gonna die otherwise” – although Elf01 keeps trying to pin that assertion on me!

All I’m saying is that, since both the mother and the baby are already involved in their scenario, the doctor is trying to find an approach to save his patients. (He’s unfortunately unable to do so.) In the trolley situation, however, the switch-puller only accomplishes “saving five people” by bringing in an otherwise-uninvolved bystander and killing him. It’s not “the baby’s gonna die anyway, so let’s go kill him now” so much as it’s an observation that the baby’s already part of the scenario, so the doctor isn’t introducing him into it in order to kill him.

Inquiry:

It is only when you correctly separate the action from it’s conditional effects that you can correctly apply double effect.

Actually, it’s only when you invalidly separate action and effects that you run the risk of seeing double effect in every scenario.

1. The life of the mother is proportional to the life of the child.

Be careful with the particular application of the ‘proportionality’ test – handled poorly, it becomes a ‘consequentialist’ test…

. If you don’t touch the lever, you actively participate in the death of the people on the trail.

That’s the whole point: by not taking action, you’re not “actively participating” in anything.

I understand that you see it differently, but maybe that’s the lesson you’ve gleaned from this discussion: you might not agree, but some recognize a difference between “action” and “inaction”, and “inaction” doesn’t necessarily imply culpability.

If I would be the bystander and if I would not pull the lever, I would feel (5 – 1 = 4) the blood of four innocent people are on my hands!!!

So, you would rather actively participate in directly causing the killing of one person, so that you wouldn’t “feel the blood of four innocent people” on your hands?

There is nothing to support this contention; Aquinas was specific in saying there was one

Ahh, but he was also specific in saying that there could be multiple moral objects…

 

[Ender]

‘Proximate’ doesn’t imply ‘intended’. It merely implies that it’s an end that proceeds from the act itself. We might say that it’s ‘foreseeable’, but the fact that it’s a proximate end doesn’t imply that it’s an intended end, necessarily.

I think the proximate end is always intended. I don’t see how it could be otherwise since that really is why that particular act was selected. This does not mean that all the remote, foreseeable ends are intended, but the act that sets off the chain of (expected) events is surely deliberate.

All I’m saying is that, since both the mother and the baby are already involved in their scenario, the doctor is trying to find an approach to save his patients. (He’s unfortunately unable to do so.) In the trolley situation, however, the switch-puller only accomplishes “saving five people” by bringing in an otherwise-uninvolved bystander and killing him.

You make a distinction between involved and uninvolved but don’t otherwise explain how we may morally do something in one case but not in the other. I’m unaware of where the church teaches that the moral laws that apply to the uninvolved don’t apply to the involved.

Ahh, but he was also specific in saying that there could be multiple moral objects.

Nor have I disputed this. I was addressing solely what constituted the proximate end, and whether there could be more than one.

 

[Elf01]

No, that’s not my argument. I’m not saying “it’s ok because the baby’s gonna die otherwise” – although Elf01 keeps trying to pin that assertion on me!

All I’m saying is that, since both the mother and the baby are already involved in their scenario, the doctor is trying to find an approach to save his patients. (He’s unfortunately unable to do so.) In the trolley situation, however, the switch-puller only accomplishes “saving five people” by bringing in an otherwise-uninvolved bystander and killing him. It’s not “the baby’s gonna die anyway, so let’s go kill him now” so much as it’s an observation that the baby’s already part of the scenario, so the doctor isn’t introducing him into it in order to kill him.

Same thing in different words unless you care to explain better.

 

[Gorgias]

I think the proximate end is always intended. I don’t see how it could be otherwise since that really is why that particular act was selected. This does not mean that all the remote, foreseeable ends are intended

OK; so, you want to define the baby’s death in the tubal pregnancy example as a “remote end”. Got it. Still, Aquinas would point out that both your “proximate end” and “remote end” have moral content. (I think that I would call both as “proximate”, but as long as we know what each other are saying, I guess…)

You make a distinction between involved and uninvolved but don’t otherwise explain how we may morally do something in one case but not in the other.

The distinction comes by virtue of the application of double effect. In making my statement, I’m not attempting to use it to prove the case, but rather, just point out a difference in the two scenarios.

Same thing in different words

Says you.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Ender:

The object cannot include all of the foreseeable [moral] ends.

Need citation to support that assertion.

Actually, a citation is needed to support the negative of that statement. VS doesn’t say that an object includes all foreseeable moral ends. VS says “…that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person.” There is no evidence in VS or in Aquinas cited so far that the mediate end of an act includes consequences that were not intended.

I think if you look at Aquinas in how he talks about more than one end, or object, of a moral act, it is always in the context of one of those ends being a means to the other. For example, theft to feed the hungry. Theft as an end is immoral while feeding the hungry is good. But that does not excuse the theft. However there is no question that both of these things are intended. The thief who steals to feed the poor really does intend to take what is reasonably not his to take.

This is not the case for the trolley problem. The bystander does not intend to strike the one man dead. And the striking of the one man dead is not the means of achieving the good end of saving five like the theft is the means of feeding the poor. In the trolley example, there is only one proximate end, and that is preventing the trolley from hitting five people, and I don’t think JPII or Aquinas would say otherwise.

Consider that in the case of theft to feed the poor, one must steal first before he can feed the poor. That makes the theft immediate. However in the trolley problem, the five are saved the moment the trolley passes the switch point. At this point in time, the one man is not yet struck. So striking the one mad dead could not have been an immediate end of the bystander. The problem does not say how far the six people are from the switch point. It does not say that they are even the same distance from the switch point. We may assume that the distances are short enough that the bystander is convinced there is no way to intervene other than throwing the switch. But that could still be a considerable distance. This shows that the death of the one man on the track happens some time later after the five people have been saved. This, and the fact that it is not intended, supports the idea that the death of the one man is remote, just like the death of the baby in a tubal excision, which happens some time after the life of the mother has been saved. The chronological sequence distinguishes these examples from examples where the immoral end is the means to some other good.