Catholic view on utilitarianism

[LeafByNiggle]

o_mlly:

To demonstrate the error in imposing a particular bystander’s intent into the moral object, consider the following.

Presently, in the trolley case we assume a disinterested bystander. Suppose rather than disinterested that the bystander hated the lone man on the track and could care less about the five. He foresees that throwing the switch kills his arch enemy and intends to do just that. As argued above, you must modify your statement of object to include the deliberated decisions implicit in the act. How do you define the moral object for the trolley case for the disinterested bystander and for the one described above?

This is not any different than hearing on the news that your arch enemy has just died of natural causes. You might rejoice in this death. And while that response to hearing of the demise of your arch enemy is not praise-worthy, neither is it immoral.

In the case of this modification of the trolley problem, we can assume that the bystander realizes that saving the five people is morally good, and simply rejoices in his good fortune to be able to save them while at the same time enjoying the demise of his enemy.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

OK; so, you want to define the baby’s death in the tubal pregnancy example as a “remote end”. Got it. Still, Aquinas would point out that both your “proximate end” and “remote end” have moral content. (I think that I would call both as “proximate”, but as long as we know what each other are saying, I guess…)

Yes, they both have moral content. That is why they both need to be taken into account in the proportionality condition in double effect. If the remote end is much more serious than the good accomplished by the proximate end, that would be the reason for declaring the whole act immoral.

All I’m saying is that, since both the mother and the baby are already involved in their scenario, the doctor is trying to find an approach to save his patients. (He’s unfortunately unable to do so.) In the trolley situation, however, the switch-puller only accomplishes “saving five people” by bringing in an otherwise-uninvolved bystander and killing him.

I would not call him uninvolved. Certainly he is involved in a different manner than the baby because if the switch is not thrown, the one man would not die, but if the tube is not cut out, the baby would very likely die in a few days (along with the mother). That is a difference, I agree. But I don’t think it is enough of a different to call the one man “uninvolved”. The bystander did not introduce him into the scenario. He was already there. He was not “brought in” in order to kill him.

 

[Gorgias]

The bystander did not introduce him into the scenario. He was already there. He was not “brought in” in order to kill him.

The bystander introduced him into the dilemma, however. And, in essence, the bystander introduces him by virtue of his action to direct the trolley his way, killing him.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

The bystander did not introduce him into the scenario. He was already there. He was not “brought in” in order to kill him.

The bystander introduced him into the dilemma, however. And, in essence, the bystander introduces him by virtue of his action to direct the trolley his way, killing him.

Whoever tied the man to the tracks introduced him to the dilemma. (It was probably the same one who tied the other five to the other tracks.) The distinction you are drawing has no moral relevance. Why do you think it does?

If you look at other examples of double effect you can see that involving people who might not have been affected does not disqualify an act from being legitimate double effect. For example:

In modern warfare it’s difficult to ensure that only soldiers get hurt. Despite the effectiveness of precision weapons, civilians are often hurt and killed. But in a just war, the harming of civilians can be justified if there was no way to avoid it. However the civilians so affected can share the same degree of non-involvement that the man on the tracks had. In both cases they would not have been killed if the action were not taken (launching an attach in the case of war and switching the trolley in the present problem). In both cases the innocent person or people were in the situation they were in for reasons other than the moral agent. In the case of war, the forces being attacked may have embedded themselves within a civilian population to use them as human shields. In the case of the trolley problem, the man was tied to the tracks by some other agent than the bystander.

Now I’m sure you can come up with some difference between war and trolley problem, but this at least addresses the one objection you raised.

 

[Gorgias]

But if you can foresee a result, and you have the ability to thwart that result - by an action, then you are culpable for your inaction.

I would agree, but only if we inserted a critical phrase: “But if you can foresee a result, and you have the ability to thwart that result - by an action without acting immorally, then you are culpable for your inaction.”

Otherwise, we totally agree.

Just imagine: the same scenario, except there is no one on the other track. You have the option to switch the lever, but you don’t do it. And then you try the defense:

Right. I would never endorse that stance. But it’s a nice straw man to attempt to set up…

By the way, you and everyone else uses the utilitarian, consequentialist approach - even if you are not able to realize it… But the underlying principle is the same - always choose the best available option.

That would be a reasonable assertion… if that’s what utilitarianism and/or consequentialism were based on. It’s not. Each of them add to “choose the best available option” with a particular standard that defines the ‘best available option’. Your assertion is kinda like saying that dogs, cats, and humans are all the same species, because we all breathe. Not so.

Whoever tied the man to the tracks introduced him to the dilemma.

You were the one who caused him to go from “tied-down guy” to “guy at risk of being squished”, though.

In the case of war, the forces being attacked may have embedded themselves within a civilian population to use them as human shields.

In which case it’s immoral to target them. Duh!

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

In the case of war, the forces being attacked may have embedded themselves within a civilian population to use them as human shields.

In which case it’s immoral to target them. Duh!

That’s not true. Not using the definition of “target” that you imply in your other posts.

If “target” means to make into an immediate moral object, then “target” includes all the foreseen direct consequences of the act. If the act is to point the bombs at a military bunker, and if that military bunker is close to some civilians houses, then the bombs are also pointed at those civilian houses. The civilians are not being targeted on purpose, but they are targeted in the sense that you and o_mlly have been saying that the bystander is targeting the one man on the track. But it may be moral to drop those bombs, even though it is known that some civilians will die.

 

[Ender]

OK; so, you want to define the baby’s death in the tubal pregnancy example as a “remote end”. Got it. Still, Aquinas would point out that both your “proximate end” and “remote end” have moral content. (I think that I would call both as “proximate”, but as long as we know what each other are saying, I guess…)

Yes, I think the baby’s death is both a remote (in that it is not proximate), and an indirect (in that it is accepted but not desired) end. This is significant. Remember the objection to throwing the switch is that the act (object) is evil per se, but if in fact the death is not part of the object (which it would not be if it is not proximate) then the act is not immoral.

The distinction comes by virtue of the application of double effect. In making my statement, I’m not attempting to use it to prove the case, but rather, just point out a difference in the two scenarios.

There is nothing in PODE that includes a distinction between involved and uninvolved. That is no part of its definition.

 

[Ender]

In context, your citation from JPII emphasizes not that the act has only one proximate end but rather that the object must include, beyond the merely physical effects, the effects of deliberated decision , that is, known and willed by any moral agent. The proximate ends are those inherent to the act in se . The proximate ends are unrelated to any particular moral agent

Your assertion that there are multiple proximate ends (plural) is rather significantly weakened by the fact that JPII spoke of “the proximate end”, which is pretty clearly singular. That and the fact that Aquinas explicitly said there was one.

Proximate means not remote . Proximate does not mean immediate , proximate means unmediated .

Dictionaries understand it to mean immediate.

immediately preceding or following (as in a chain of events, causes, or effects) (Merriam-Webster)

next; nearest; immediately before or after in order, place, occurrence, etc. (Dictionary.com)

The object is “ throw the switch to reroute the trolley ”.

Show us what is not merely in the physical order in the above.

The claim fails as an object because in contradicts JPII’s teaching. The statement merely assesses the act’s object on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world.

What is willed is to reroute the trolley; throwing the switch was the means. That was the proximate end of a deliberate decision. If I defined the object as merely throwing the switch your objection would be valid.

Presently, in the trolley case we assume a disinterested bystander. Suppose rather than disinterested that the bystander hated the lone man on the track and could care less about the five. He foresees that throwing the switch kills his arch enemy and intends to do just that. As argued above, you must modify your statement of object to include the deliberated decisions implicit in the act. How do you define the moral object for the trolley case for the disinterested bystander and for the one described above?

I would not define the objects any differently; they are the same in both cases. In the second case the action is immoral because the intent is immoral.

 

[Gorgias]

But it may be moral to drop those bombs, even though it is known that some civilians will die.

Sorry… now you’re conflating military tactics with moral behavior. It may be militarily feasible to drop them, but that doesn’t make it moral.

Who says what is immoral? And don’t even think that you (or the catholic church) are the ones who are qualified to decide it.

Let me get this straight: your claim is that a Church doesn’t have any business in asserting a morality?

Yeah. Ok.

The ethics you subscribe to is just one of the many ethical systems. The same act is evaluated differently if considered from the viewpoint of different ethical systems.

So?
This is the one I’m arguing for.

And there is no epistemological method which would be useful to declare that ethical system “A” is superior to ethical system “B”.

Which methods have you attempted, then? Or are you just making a bald assertion, here?

Nonsense. The principle is the same, the details may not be.

Nonsense. The principles are vastly different – both in general outlook and details.

And if that is impossible - due to the circumstances beyond all control, then the best one is which causes the least amount of harm - regardless of the ethical system one subscribes to.

Again, you’re forgetting to specify sufficiently. Each system defines “causes the least amount of harm” differently. Try again.

As I explained, if all the people are in the scenario are “faceless” and “interchangeable” then the only criterion is the number of the victims. (Yes, simple mathematics.)

maths =/= morality.

And if you deny that it is better to have fewer victims then more and your action will reduce the number of victims then you are seriously irrational.

it is better for a moral actor to act morally. if – in a discussion about morality – you deny that, then you are seriously irrational.

Now you are free to declare that you are not “allowed” to choose the best available option , due to your particular concept of “morality”, but then you had better be prepared to be disregarded.

Please. Feel free to disregard. (But, on a Catholic forum, an expression of Catholic morality should be expected.)

And your concept of animal species being relevant in this respect is especially ludicrous and inappropriate.

Nah. Relevant counter-example. Sorry if it shows your point to be ludicrous and inappropriate, though.

 

[Gorgias]

Remember the objection to throwing the switch is that the act (object) is evil per se, but if in fact the death is not part of the object (which it would not be if it is not proximate) then the act is not immoral.

Wait… where’d that come from? So, if I cause collateral damage (such that it’s ‘remote’), then it’s not an immoral act? That doesn’t hold up…

 

[o_mlly]

Your assertion that there are multiple proximate ends (plural) is rather significantly weakened by the fact that JPII spoke of “ the proximate end ”, which is pretty clearly singular. That and the fact that Aquinas explicitly said there was one.

No, I do not see VS refuting multiple ends. But I do see that your argument to define the object in the trolley case simultaneously ignores VS’s main point and strains to extract from the text what is just not there. First, what is not there.

Logically, that there is at least one does not imply there is not more than one. You have taken “the proximate end” out of its context which warns consequentialists that not including a proximate end as a minimum necessary inclusion in the object is somehow now re-interpreted to be a mandated reduction to only one proximate end.

JPII’s reference to the proximate end does not reduce the possible number of ends to one rather, as already posted, emphasizes the error of consequentialism that attempts to define the moral object without including any proximate ends (deliberated decisions that are necessary to define a human act).

Second, what is in VS and ignored.

Your definition of the moral object is exactly what JPII was referring to as the consequentialist error. “Throwing the switch to reroute the trolley” defines the merely physical and ignores the moral order achieved or frustrated in the act itself (in se). Both are necessary to define a human act. JPII warns that a consequentialist who ignores the object’s moral content does so to deny that any act can be intrinsically evil.

Dictionaries understand it to mean immediate.

immediately preceding or following (as in a chain of events, causes, or effects) (Merriam-Webster)

You misunderstand the moral meaning of “proximate.” The proximate ends to the act are all moral outcomes directly or indirectly caused by the act. For instance, if I give a person radioactive tea and he dies 23 days later then that death is a proximate end to the act of poisoning. The victim’s death is not immediate but his death is unmediated by anything else other than the radioactive tea.

What is willed is to reroute the trolley …

Again, the consequentialist’s error that JPII warns against. Ignoring the moral consequences as part of the object and dismissing them to be merely circumstances is not Catholic morality.

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icucourses.com

Some circumstances of a moral action are of such an aggravating nature that they actually alter the moral object itself, for which the scholastic Latin used the phrase “transit in rationem objecti,” viz ., the circumstance passes over into the definition ( ratio ) of the object.

 

[Wozza]

Let me get this straight: your claim is that a Church doesn’t have any business in asserting a morality?

You need to clarify this implied statement.

Are you implying that ‘a church’, meaning any church, can determine morality? In which case, how do we determine which church is correct. Or are you saying that your church is the only one that can do so. In which case we’d need an argument rather than an opinion.

 

[Gorgias]

Are you implying that ‘a church’, meaning any church, can determine morality?

I’m pointing out that the Church is precisely in the business of “faith and morals”. If not the Church, then whom? The POTUS? The New York Yankees?!?

In which case, how do we determine which church is correct.

Easy…

are you saying that your church is the only one that can do so. In which case we’d need an argument rather than an opinion.

Here ya go, then:

Which Church was founded by a man who claimed to be God and then backed up that claim with healings, raisings from the dead, all sorts of miracles, and then… raised himself from the dead? Which Church is led by a successor to the person whom this God-Man placed in charge of His Church?

That’s the church to follow. And that’s not just an opinion…

 

[Gorgias]

The principle is always the same: “ choose the best option ”. There can be disagreement about the “best option”, however.

OK, but the system of morality isn’t in the “choose the best option”, it’s in the method for choosing it.

Why do I have to repeat it so many times? Don’t you understand this principle?

I do understand what you’re saying. I just think that you’re wrong, that’s all. If you want to keep repeating yourself (and keep getting told that you’re mistaken), be my guest!

If only the number of people is known, (no other details, as in the trolley problem), then “morality” must be based on the number of the affected people.

Meh. I don’t care if it’s two million on one track and one on the other: you cannot commit an evil act in the hopes of creating a good outcome.

This has also been explained ad nauseam, but you don’t get it.

I get it. I just disagree with you. Keep getting nauseous, if that makes you happy: every time you express this notion, I’ll remind you that you’re mistaken.

If all the available options are “immoral” (according to your concept of morality), then you must choose an “immoral” option.

No: in that case, you must choose to defer taking an immoral option. This has been explained ad nauseam, but you don’t get it.

Especially since the catholic morality is under dispute. Then you are supposed to bring up secular arguments for your assertions.

Pardon? Why does the transcendent need to rely on the support of the mundane? You have it backwards, my friend…

(Seriously, though: what’s this “you’re supposed to bring up secular arguments” thing all about? Where’s it coming from?)

Since it refers to “every” act and “everyone”, let’s put some “flesh” on it. It is better that every human (including all the “innocent” newborns and the “innocent” infants and the “innocent” children) and every animal should perish in horrible pain (hell for the humans???) rather than one catholic should voluntarily miss mass for some secular reason.

No, of course not! Now you’re the one flinging red herrings all about!

And you wish to peddle this ethical system among rational people?

Nope – that’s a system of your own imagination. Peddle it yourself, if you wish… but don’t think for a minute that you’re citing the Catholic position – you just made up that last part wholecloth, and we don’t have to answer to it.

 

[o_mlly]

I envy your ability to simultaneously play 3-dimensional chess with some and checkers with others on this thread. I stopped playing those checker matches to maintain my sanity.

 

[Ender]

Wait… where’d that come from? So, if I cause collateral damage (such that it’s ‘remote’), then it’s not an immoral act? That doesn’t hold up…

No, that isn’t what I was saying. One objection to the morality of throwing the switch is that rerouting the trolley is an evil object, which makes the action evil regardless of the intent since one may not do evil that good may come of it. If, however, the object is not immoral, the intent is good, and the good consequences outweigh the bad (and satisfy the rest of the PODE requirements) then rerouting the trolley is in fact a moral action regardless of the fact that an innocent person dies as a consequence.

I’m arguing a fairly narrow point which is solely about the morality of the object.

Logically, that there is at least one does not imply there is not more than one. You have taken “the proximate end” out of its context which warns consequentialists that not including a proximate end as a minimum necessary inclusion in the object is somehow now re-interpreted to be a mandated reduction to only one proximate end.

The inclusion of the proximate end of an act in the definition of the object satisfies JPII’s concern that the object not be defined solely by a mechanical description of the act. There is nothing whatever in his comments that suggest more than one proximate end; the normal meaning of his words in fact preclude that interpretation.

Your definition of the moral object is exactly what JPII was referring to as the consequentialist error. “Throwing the switch to reroute the trolley” defines the merely physical and ignores the moral order achieved or frustrated in the act itself ( in se ). Both are necessary to define a human act. JPII warns that a consequentialist who ignores the object’s moral content does so to deny that any act can be intrinsically evil.

You keep trying to pin the consequentialist label on me, but you have yet to offer your own definition of the object in this case. I think you will find it difficult to do without including the intention behind the action, which is to save the five.

You misunderstand the moral meaning of “proximate.” The proximate ends to the act are all moral outcomes directly or indirectly caused by the act.

Again, you assert things without providing anything to substantiate your claim, and in this case I absolutely reject your definition. That may be the definition of proximate needed to support your position, but I see no reason to accept it as valid.

Again, the consequentialist’s error that JPII warns against. Ignoring the moral consequences as part of the object and dismissing them to be merely circumstances is not Catholic morality.

You just keep repeating this charge without even trying to substantiate it. Define the object yourself, and we will have something to discuss. Apply that last citation in a way to distinguish the operation from throwing the switch.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Sorry… now you’re conflating military tactics with moral behavior. It may be militarily feasible to drop them, but that doesn’t make it moral.

Do you realize what you are saying? You are implying that almost every bombing campaign in the last 100 years has been immoral. I will agree that Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing was immoral. But what about the bombing of Berlin or Tokyo in WWII? Even when then try as hard as they can to strike only military targets, it is acknowledged that there will be some civilian casualties. To maintain your position on this silly trolley problem you would now go on record as saying that every one of those bombing raids in WWII was immoral. Are you sure you want to imply that?

 

[Wozza]

evil

Wozza:

Are you implying that ‘a church’, meaning any church, can determine morality?

I’m pointing out that the Church is precisely in the business of “faith and morals”. If not the Church, then whom? The POTUS? The New York Yankees?!?

In which case, how do we determine which church is correct.

Easy…

are you saying that your church is the only one that can do so. In which case we’d need an argument rather than an opinion.

Here ya go, then:

Which Church was founded by a man who claimed to be God and then backed up that claim with healings, raisings from the dead, all sorts of miracles, and then… raised himself from the dead? Which Church is led by a successor to the person whom this God-Man placed in charge of His Church?

That’s the church to follow. And that’s not just an opinion…

So you meant ‘the church’ and not ‘a church’ as posted. And this thread is an example of why we need arguments and not just unquestioning acceptance of the church’s moral teachings. I was hoping, but not expecting, for something a little more nuanced than an appeal to authority.

Point being that most of the arguments being presented are just that. Snippets of the catechism, quotes from authority, citations from church leaders. What I have been reading while this thread has developed is not much more than ‘this is what it says so it must be right’.

‘Why didn’t you save the five?’
‘Because it says here…’

 

[o_mlly]

The inclusion of the proximate end of an act in the definition of the object satisfies JPII’s concern that the object not be defined solely by a mechanical description of the act. There is nothing whatever in his comments that suggest more than one proximate end; the normal meaning of his words in fact preclude that interpretation.

Your definition of the moral object fails precisely because it is only mechanical disclosing the willed physical outcome in the act (reroute trolley). The correct definition of the moral object morally specifies the act of the will as directed to be or not be in conformity with the true good. Where is the moral good specified in your definition?

CCC#1751 The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good.

Moral object: Throw switch to direct the trolley at the innocent one saving the five and killing the one.

Intent: Save the five.

Circumstances: None.

You keep trying to pin the consequentialist label on me …

I can only take you at your word which is clearly a consequentialist’s argument that the end justifies any means. Here’s your own quote:

One objection to the morality of throwing the switch is that rerouting the trolley is an evil object, which makes the action evil regardless of the intent since one may not do evil that good may come of it. If, however, the object is not immoral, the intent is good, and the good consequences outweigh the bad (and satisfy the rest of the PODE requirements) then rerouting the trolley is in fact a moral action regardless of the fact that an innocent person dies as a consequence.

Your argument is that of a consequentialist: "… regardless of the fact that an innocent person dies as a consequence." Regardless? A mere circumstance glossed over by a good intention?

Any act whose foreseeable consequence kills a human being, especially an innocent human being, must include that consequence in determining the act’s moral object. Yet you do not.

 

[Inquiry]

Your argument is that of a consequentialist: "… regardless of the fact that an innocent person dies as a consequence." Regardless? A mere circumstance glossed over by a good intention?

Any act whose foreseeable consequence kills a human being, especially an innocent human being, must include that consequence in determining the act’s moral object. Yet you do not.

It was clearly not a consequentialist argument. You may disagree with the application, but Ender was very obviously invoking Double Effect.