Catholic view on utilitarianism

[njlisa]

Here’s a very Catholic answer. A righteous person would shove the bystander aside and throw the switch to save the people. If throwing the switch put him/her in peril, he’d run flat out to get away from the trolley. If he weren’t fast enough, he would accept his death.

 

[o_mlly]

The consequences are included in the circumstances, and neither JPII nor Aquinas say otherwise. I really don’t think there is any other way to understand this statement:

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act… .

No, Aquinas corrects your error (Post #693). Consequences with moral dimensions , especially those with dire moral consequences, never belong in the circumstance font but in the moral object font.

St. Thomas Aquinas states, “A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential
difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it
must needs be so whenever a circumstances transforms an action from good to evil; for a
circumstance would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.”
Summa theologiae I-II.18.5 ad 4.

And JP II in VS soundly corrects your multiple errors in analyzing the case, beginning with your incorrect definition of moral object in which you attempt to report only the changes in the physical world brought about by the act. The moral object by definition contains the act’s moral effects.

[Adherents to Physicalism] would not be able to constitute reference points for moral decisions, because the finalities of these inclinations would be merely “physical” goods, called by some “pre-moral” (p. 48).

And specifically to the casuistry of consequentialism, JP II wites in VS:

[S}ome authors have proposed a kind of double status of moral truth. Beyond the doctrinal and abstract level, one would have to acknowledge the priority of a certain more concrete existential consideration. The latter, by taking account of circumstances and the situation, could legitimately be the basis of certain exceptions to the general rule and thus permit one to do in practice and in good conscience what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law (p. 56).

By trying incorrectly to bury the death of an innocent man in the circumstance font, your erroneous analysis of the direct cause of the innocent man’s death follows like a coroner’s (physicalist’s) statement as to the cause of death (“trauma caused by impact with a trolley”). Whereas JPII teaches the correct analysis ought to to be from the perspective of a detective (moralist) who asks, “Who threw that switch that killed that innocent man?”

 

[o_mlly]

Clearly the pilot can choose between evil and good.

The pilot case is irrelevant. He faces the simple choice of doing good or doing evil. The answer is just as simple: choose the good. Nothing here to instruct anyone in the trolley case which involves a moral dilemma.

mor·al di·lem·ma

noun

noun: moral dilemma ; plural noun: moral dilemmas

1. a situation in which a difficult choice has to be made between two courses of action, either of which entails transgressing a moral principle.

If you would lay out the entire pilot’s case explaining what is the moral object, intention and circumstances then it would also be clear to you that the two cases are different in kind.

Everyone would rightfully condemn a pilot who took no action to avoid killing large numbers of people. How is it not a moral choice not to act in such a situation?

Please read what you write. Yes, everyone condemns a vicious act. So what? If it’s a human act then the choice has moral dimensions. But the pilot’s choice is not a moral dilemma.

What? Talk about undefined terms. What is “danger that is natural”? Do you mean “physical evil”? What is a “contrived danger”?

What’s your point? You criticized me for using undefined terms when I wrote “kill zone” to your more favored “crash zone” which criticism I thought trivial.

“Kill (crash) zone” is another undefined, irrelevant term.

Especially trivial since you regularly invent new terms hoping that the reader defines them in ways favorable to your argument. I called you out on a few and I get a meaningless tautology as your reply?

It appears you simply wish to argue for the sake of arguing.

 

[Inquiry]

If you would lay out the entire pilot’s case explaining what is the moral object, intention and circumstances then it would also be clear to you that the two cases are different in kind.

Then go ahead, lay it out. You intimate that you know this issue better than anyone here and that we should trust your judgement, so show us your analysis. That’s what debate is. . . .

Now, looking at these two scenarios I see the following similarities:

• Both cases have a large piece of machinery that will kill whoever it hits.
• In both cases the machinery is bearing down on a group of people.
• In both cases the machinery can be redirected towards a smaller group of people by means of a mechanism (switch in one case, stick in another).
• In both cases there is someone at the mechanism who can choose to redirect the machinery or leave it on its current path.
• In both cases the operator did not choose the machine’s current target.
• In both scenarios the smaller group of people will be safe if the machine operator does nothing.
• There are no other options in either case.
• In both cases, if it matters, there is very little time to make a decision.

Looking at the two scenarios I see a few things that could be the same or different based on assumptions. In a good faith analysis we should assume them to be the same:

• In real life pilots have more control than switch operators. However there are situations where a malfunctioning plane would not. Given what we are analyzing here we should assume this is one of those situations.
• Neither problem gives a firm answer on how this situation came to be. If it matters, equivalent reasons should be assumed in both cases.

I see two differences:

• In the trolley problem we know the specific people who will be killed in either option. In the plane problem we only know that a non-zero number of people will die if it is redirected and a greater number will die if it isn’t. This has no bearing on the problem that I can see. Were there the possibility that nobody would die in the redirect, that would change things, but anonymity alone does not.
• In the plane problem the operator himself will die. Since that is outside his control it has no effect on the morality of the problem.

Now given the above I see no significant difference between moral object, intention, or circumstances. If you think I missed an important element or distinction, please point it out.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

“Kill (crash) zone” is another undefined, irrelevant term.

Especially trivial since you regularly invent new terms hoping that the reader defines them in ways favorable to your argument. I called you out on a few and I get a meaningless tautology as your reply?

It is important to note that o_mlly first introduced this concept in post #710:

Your plane scenario differs in that all the people in the range of the falling plane are at risk of the physical evil of that plane falling on their heads. Whatever the pilot does intending to mitigate the loss of human life does not put anyone into peril who was not already in danger. The innocent one on the track is in no peril until the bystander throws the switch.

It has subsequently been abbreviated to “kill zone” or “crash zone”. But the label is not what counts. What counts is the meaning that label represents, and for purposes of argument, we may as well try to conform to whatever meaning o_mlly had in mind in post #710 and call that the “kill zone”.

With that understanding, we can see that o_mlly’s response in post #710 totally failed to distinguish between the plane and the trolley problem. In the plane problem o_mlly includes all the people that the plane might possibly hit, allowing for changes of course by the pilot. In the trolley problem o_mlly includes only the people in danger assuming that no changes are made by the bystander. This is clearly an inconsistent definition meant to produce the desired judgment o_mlly has in mind. If the “kill zone” in the trolley problem only includes people who are in danger if no changes are made to the course of the trolley, then the “kill zone” in the airplane problem would have to include only those people who are in danger of the descending plane if the direction of the plane is not changed. In that case, only the apartment building dead ahead is in the “kill zone” and no one else. When the pilot turns the plane to avoid the apartment building, he changes who is in the kill zone just as the bystander changes who is in the kill zone when he diverts the trolley.

So the main problem for o_mlly’s position remains: The pilot’s actions diverting the plane is moral. The bystander’s actions are immoral. But they are morally equivalent.

It has been mentioned that the plane problem is a “purely physical evil.” This need not be. We can assume that the plane is running out of fuel because someone cut the fuel line. Now it is the result of an evil human agency, just as with the evil person who created the trolley problem by tying people to the tracks. This of course does not change the moral calculus for the pilot because at the time he has to make his moral decision, he has no way of knowing if the fuel exhaustion was accidental or deliberate.

 

[Lion_IRC]

All this nonsense about direct and indirect killing only detracts from an analysis of the actual problem. The problem is that sometimes the circumstances FORCE you to choose between two unpalatable options . (Usually one of the options is non-action) Both of them will cause harm to someone else, one greater harm, the other lesser harm. Or one of them will cause harm to more people, the other one will cause to fewer people

Yes,

When faced with a truly unavoidable forced choice I think the most moral option is to save as many lives as possible.

Most ‘trolley’ dilemmas throw in a lot of red herrings which can almost always be navigated if you have this basic guiding principle.

As IQ170 pointed out in the “Forget the “trolley”, look at the basic principle” thread, the thought experiment dilemma invariably gives you no option other than - bad thing “A” or really bad thing “B”.

You literally have to choose the lesser of two evils. It’s that simple.

(IQ170 - my email lionirc@gmail.com)

 

[HomeschoolDad]

I don’t have time to read 792 posts to see if this has already been covered, but here’s an interesting article from Politico:

https://www.politico.com/magazine/s...a-cultural-divide-red-state-blue-state-228111

Apologies in advance for the rude lapel button about Columbus (I assuming they mean Christopher, not Ohio), even though the Planned Parenthood button beside of it is far, far more offensive.

As far as the trolley dilemma is concerned, I don’t see what’s so hard about it. You redirect the trolley to save the five people, and killing the one person is the unfortunate, but less tragic, unintended effect. It is not intrinsically evil to redirect a trolley. What if someone is riding a motorcycle and they can either ride into harm’s way, killing themselves, or not ride into harm’s way and get other people killed in the process. This really happened in South Carolina a few years back. The only difference is that the person who dies is oneself.

A similar “trolley dilemma” provides an interesting way to come to terms with one’s own prejudices. Let’s say you have two trolleys. Each one has twenty people on it. One has to crash and kill everyone in it. One can be saved. Allowing both to crash isn’t an option. Which trolley do you save if:

• Trolley 1 has 20 people of your race on it, and Trolley 2 has 20 people of that race you don’t like
• Trolley 1 has 20 people of your nationality, and Trolley 2 has 20 people of random nationalities (I asked this once to someone who was an ardent Polish nationalist, and she didn’t want to answer)
• Trolley 1 has 20 straight people on it and Trolley 2 has 20 gay people
• Trolley 1 has 20 of your relatives on it and Trolley 2 has 20 strangers

… and so on.

 

[o_mlly]

It is not intrinsically evil to redirect a trolley.

One would expect that atheist consequentialists and proportionalists would redirect the trolley that kills an innocent. Doing so would be consistent with their world view.

The description of the merely physical act does not determine the moral object of that act. It is not intrinsically evil to throw a knife. It is not intrinsically evil to fire a gun. It is not intrinsically evil to throw a rock. It is not intrinsically evil to steer a car. But if the foreseen end is the death of an innocent human then all those acts are intrinsically evil whether that death is intended or not.

Catholics ought to square their moral compasses to the Church teaching. Those who would kill the innocent must explain at least to themselves how such an act accords with the our Catechism:

1753 A good intention does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as … [directly destroying an innocent human being]*. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.

• CCC#2258

 

[Inquiry]

And yet in the ectopic pregnancy there is a foreseen end that is the death of an innocent and yet, provided the action in question is meant to accomplish something else (removal of the tube) the action is considered morally permissible by double effect. That means either that there is an element you are not taking into account or you are wrongly conflating two ideas. Given that you use the ‘foreseen end of an innocent’ and ‘direct destruction of an innocent’ interchangeably, I think it is the latter.

The foreseen end of an innocent is something that is permissible by double effect provided it meets all four conditions.

 

[o_mlly]

Given that you use the ‘foreseen end of an innocent’ and ‘direct destruction of an innocent’ interchangeably, I think it is the latter.

I have not use the terms interchangeably. What I have posted is the teaching.

CCC#2258 “… no one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being.”

The surgeon who extracts a child directly kills the child. The surgeon who extracts a diseased tube indirectly kills a child. These conclusions are not mine but Pius XII, USCCB, and other notable Catholic theologians.

I do not expect non-Catholics and, certainly not atheists, to agree with the Church’s teaching.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

The surgeon who extracts a child directly kills the child. The surgeon who extracts a diseased tube indirectly kills a child. These conclusions are not mine but Pius XII, USCCB, and other notable Catholic theologians.

Once again o_mlly is inconsistent in the application of the words “indirect” and “direct”. None of these “official” citations refer to the trolley problem. So don’t let o_mlly’s appear to authority confuse you on what this may or may not mean for the trolley problem. It means nothing.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

The description of the merely physical act does not determine the moral object of that act. It is not intrinsically evil to throw a knife. It is not intrinsically evil to fire a gun. It is not intrinsically evil to throw a rock. It is not intrinsically evil to steer a car. But if the foreseen end is the death of an innocent human then all those acts are intrinsically evil whether that death is intended or not.

o_mlly has cherry-picked examples in which the “non-intrinsical evil act” is still immoral. The logical error here is that o_mlly relies on the “foreseen end” to claim these acts are immoral. But that is incorrect. These acts are immoral (most of the time), but not for the reason o_mlly gives. They are immoral because of the intention of the actor. Every single one of them. That is why none of these examples have anything to say about either tube removal for ectopic pregnancy or the trolley problem, both of which are moral because of the intention.

I say it is cherry-picking because what is assumed is that the knife is thrown with the intention of causing harm. The gun is fired with the intention of causing harm. The rock is thrown with the intention of causing harm. And the car is directed with the intention of causing harm (or else this scenario would not apply to the problem.) The question is, can any of these initial actions be performed with the knowledge of the foreseen evil outcome, but without the intention to cause that evil outcome? Yes, they can. It would be very rare - about as rare as finding yourself in the bystander’s situation in the trolley problem. But it could happen. Let’s take steering a car. Somehow you find yourself on a busy street with the gas pedal jammed full on and the brakes disabled. The car is speeding up and you can’t slow it down. It is headed straight toward a large group of pedestrians. But if you steer slightly to the right, there is a path out of that congestion that has only one person standing there. It is not immoral to turn toward that one person. This too is like the trolley problem.

 

[Inquiry]

The surgeon who extracts a child directly kills the child. The surgeon who extracts a diseased tube indirectly kills a child. These conclusions are not mine but Pius XII, USCCB, and other notable Catholic theologians.

I agree with this statement. So do many of the people you’ve been arguing with. The issue is that you misattribute why one is direct and the other is indirect and what that means.

Inquiry:

Given that you use the ‘foreseen end of an innocent’ and ‘direct destruction of an innocent’ interchangeably, I think it is the latter.

I have not use the terms interchangeably. What I have posted is the teaching.

You are though. You specifically said that if the foreseen end is the death of an innocent then it is intrinsically evil. Then you supported that with CCC#2258 which only refers to direct destruction of an innocent (and 1753 doesn’t change that). CCC#2258 would only support your assertion if you thought the two were the same.

 

[Ender]

No, Aquinas corrects your error (Post #693). Consequences with moral dimensions , especially those with dire moral consequences, never belong in the circumstance font but in the moral object font.

Is this what you are referring to?

“A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstances transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.”

If so, he doesn’t discuss consequences, so unless you are claiming that circumstances are part of the object font instead of the, um, circumstance font I don’t think that citation makes your point.

Anyway, JPII said this in which he clearly separates the consequences from the object:

But on what does the moral assessment of man’s free acts depend? What is it that ensures this ordering of human acts to God? Is it the intention of the acting subject, the circumstances —and in particular the consequences — of his action, or the object itself of his act? (VS #74)

The moral object by definition contains the act’s moral effects.

According to JPII “that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision.” The proximate end may or may not have a moral effect, but it surely does not include all of the effects, moral or otherwise. There is in fact only one proximate end.

You criticized me for using undefined terms when I wrote “kill zone” to your more favored “crash zone” which criticism I thought trivial.

Undefined terms are meaningless, especially as you use them differently when applied to the pilot and the bystander. Either it (they) mean(s) “where the object will go if no action is taken” or the meaning is “all the places the object could go if action is taken.” It doesn’t matter to me which definition you take as long as it applies in both cases, because if you apply the same definition you end up with the same moral situation.

 

[o_mlly]

The issue is that you misattribute why one is direct and the other is indirect.

Not true. This from my post #295 in September.

• The surgeon may not cause the scalpel to be the instrument that kills the child – that is a direct attack on the body-person of the child.

 

[o_mlly]

You are though. You specifically said that if the foreseen end is the death of an innocent then it is intrinsically evil. Then you supported that with CCC#2258 which only refers to direct destruction of an innocent (and 1753 doesn’t change that). CCC#2258 would only support your assertion if you thought the two were the same.

Please be kind enough to cite my posts in which you think I am inconsistent.

 

[Inquiry]

Inquiry:

The issue is that you misattribute why one is direct and the other is indirect.

Not true. This from my post #295 in September.

Again, I’m not disagreeing with you on the what the surgeon may and may not cut. Your misattribution is revealed when you try to apply your understanding to other issues, such as the Trolley Problem.

Inquiry:

You are though. You specifically said that if the foreseen end is the death of an innocent then it is intrinsically evil. Then you supported that with CCC#2258 which only refers to direct destruction of an innocent (and 1753 doesn’t change that). CCC#2258 would only support your assertion if you thought the two were the same.

Please be kind enough to cite my posts in which you think I am inconsistent.

Forgive me. Since it was only a post or two upstream I thought it would be obvious. Here you go.

But if the foreseen end is the death of an innocent human then all those acts are intrinsically evil whether that death is intended or not.

Catholics ought to square their moral compasses to the Church teaching. Those who would kill the innocent must explain at least to themselves how such an act accords with the our Catechism:

At which point you reference 1753 and specify 2258 as the specific intrinsically disordered action.

 

[o_mlly]

Is this what you are referring to …

The question is rhetorical, right? I provided the quotation from Aquinas and cited the Summa source in my post. So, obviously that is what I refer to. ??? Or, is this just some more word games?

Here’s your claim that I refuted:

The consequences are included in the circumstances, and neither JPII nor Aquinas say otherwise.

Have you not claimed that the death of the innocent is merely a circumstance? It would seem so:

The effect [death] on the one is indirect because he is not part of the object.

Leaving aside the logical (circular) problem in the above claim, where do you put the death of the innocent one?

If not in the object or intention then the death of the innocent is in your analysis is in the circumstance font. Not so? If not, then where in the three fonts do you put this “repugnant” consequence?

Anyway, JPII said this in which he clearly separates the consequences from the object:

But on what does the moral assessment of man’s free acts depend? What is it that ensures this ordering of human acts to God? Is it the intention of the acting subject, the circumstances —and in particular the consequences — of his action, or the object itself of his act? (VS #74)

This is scandalous. Once again you have mined VS, taken out of context and misinterpreted JPII. Please be more careful. The number of views on this thread require as much.

The subtitle covering this section of Veritas Splendor is " Teleology and teleologism. In this section, the pontiff explains the failures of consequentialism, a teleological ethical system that claims the only important consideration for a moral act are its consequences in direct contradiction to the constant teaching of the Magisterium.

No, JPII does not separate the consequences from the object! He decries ethical systems that manipulate the moral object of an act so as to have no moral content in order to focus solely on consequences and intention to determine the act’s morality. Sound familiar?

Why leave out JPII’s answer – all three must be good to judge the act good.

Is not the saving of the five also a consequence? Why does that consequence not belong in the circumstance as well? Do you say the special treatment of that consequence is in the moral object solely because your bystander intends that consequence? If so then CCC#1753 and CCC#2258 make no sense. Apparently, at least, not to you.

1753 A good intention does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as … [directly destroying an innocent human being]*. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.

• CCC#2258

 

[LeafByNiggle]

It is notable that o_mlly had no answer and could not respond to this from Ender:

Ender:

Undefined terms are meaningless, especially as you use them differently when applied to the pilot and the bystander. Either it (they) mean(s) “ where the object will go if no action is taken ” or the meaning is “ all the places the object could go if action is taken .” It doesn’t matter to me which definition you take as long as it applies in both cases, because if you apply the same definition you end up with the same moral situation.

 

[o_mlly]

Again, I’m not disagreeing with you on the what the surgeon may and may not cut. Your misattribution is revealed when you try to apply your understanding to other issues, such as the Trolley Problem.

Please give me an argument that demonstrates a [sic] missattribution to the Trolley Problem.

Forgive me. Since it was only a post or two upstream I thought it would be obvious. Here you go.

Here’s the full post.

The description of the merely physical act does not determine the moral object of that act. It is not intrinsically evil to throw a knife. It is not intrinsically evil to fire a gun. It is not intrinsically evil to throw a rock. It is not intrinsically evil to steer a car. But if the foreseen end is the death of an innocent human then all those acts are intrinsically evil whether that death is intended or not.

Yes, I should have inserted the word “direct” before the word “death”. The thrust of my post was to call out those who manipulate the moral object of an act to be devoid of moral content.

I note that JPII also tired of the word games that consequentialists play to do so: "While it is always morally illicit to kill an innocent human being … " (VS p. 50).