Catholic view on utilitarianism

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Again, I’m not disagreeing with you on the what the surgeon may and may not cut. Your misattribution is revealed when you try to apply your understanding to other issues, such as the Trolley Problem.
The reason it is a misattribution is that the authoritative sources o_mlly cites are addressing the ectopic pregnancy problem, not the trolley problem. And the application of those principles from the authoritative sources to the trolley problem is based entirely on personal assumptions of o_mlly - things like “direct” and “indirect.”
Yes, I should have inserted the word “direct” before the word “death”.
Of course, because without the inclusion of a word o_mlly gets to interpret willy-nilly as necessary, the proper distinctions cannot be drawn.
 
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If you had added ‘direct’ then yes your citations would make more sense. Note that only moves the issue, though. Instead of conflating two concepts you were begging the question of if the foreseen end is the direct death of an innocent.

Also, can you break down your purposes in quoting VS p. 50? Were you showing that sometimes it is okay to leave out the word ‘direct’? If so, I should point out that context matters. His passage was about self sacrifice so the distinction between direct and indirect was tangential. In your case the difference between direct and indirect is crucial to whether something is inherently evil or not, so you need to specify.
 
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The question is rhetorical, right? I provided the quotation from Aquinas and cited the Summa source in my post. So, obviously that is what I refer to.
Here was your assertion: "Consequences with moral dimensions , especially those with dire moral consequences, never belong in the circumstance font but in the moral object font."

Since your Aquinas reference discussed only circumstances and not consequences it in no way supports your claim, which is why I asked.
Have you not claimed that the death of the innocent is merely a circumstance?
Everything that happens as a result of an act is a consequence of the act. The consequences are part of the circumstances, therefore the death of the innocent is a circumstance (as would be the death of the five).
This is scandalous. Once again you have mined VS, taken out of context and misinterpreted JPII.
The comment I cited is virtually identical with what is in the catechism in describing the three fonts of a moral act.

Is it the intention of the acting subject, the circumstances —and in particular the consequences — of his action, or the object itself of his act? (JPII)

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act.

It seems self evident that both sources place the consequences within the circumstance font.
Is not the saving of the five also a consequence?
Of course.
Why does that consequence not belong in the circumstance as well?
It does. By definition.
 
If you had added ‘direct’ then yes your citations would make more sense. Note that only moves the issue, though. Instead of conflating two concepts you were begging the question of if the foreseen end is the direct death of an innocent.
Please be specific. Beg what question?

Which of these human acts if foreseen as lethal does not directly kill the one acted on?
It is not intrinsically evil to throw a knife.
It is not intrinsically evil to fire a gun.
It is not intrinsically evil to throw a rock.
It is not intrinsically evil to steer a car.
Is it not intrinsically evil to stick a scalpel.
Is it not intrinsically evil to steer a trolley.
Also, can you break down your purposes in quoting VS p. 50? Were you showing that sometimes it is okay to leave out the word ‘direct’?
Yes, in the absence of the adjective “indirect” the reasonable presumption is “direct” when the topic is killing innocent human beings. To wit:

“Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia … are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice, and they are a negation of the honour due to the Creator” (VS p. 80 emphasis mine).
 
Is not the saving of the five also a consequence?
Good. We can skip how we got here because this is an important part of your analysis as far as I can tell not explicit in the prior 800 posts.

Is this a fair analysis of your argument on the morality of the bystander’s act?

Moral object: Throw the switch to divert the trolley.
Intent: Save five.
Circumstances: Foresees five saved.
Foresees one killed.
 
Which of these human acts if foreseen as lethal does not directly kill the one acted on?
Is it not intrinsically evil to stick a scalpel.
Is it not intrinsically evil to steer a trolley.
This is the point. Your definition of direct is suspect. You aren’t seeing it because you are going straight from random motion to deliberately killing. Yes, foreseen lethality is a necessary condition of direct killing. That doesn’t make it a sufficient one. Indeed we know that indirectly putting someone in mortal peril can be licit if there is sufficient reason, so merely foreseeing lethal consequences is not proof of directness.

So, potentially, all of them.
Yes, in the absence of the adjective “indirect” the reasonable presumption is “direct” when the topic is killing innocent human beings. To wit:

“Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia … are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice, and they are a negation of the honour due to the Creator” (VS p. 80 emphasis mine).
No, there is no such presumption, especially since the distinction between direct, indirect, and killing in general has been a major topic of the thread. Your post changes its meaning entirely when you add ‘direct’ into it, so it was a very necessary word. There’s no problem with you clarifying your intent after the fact, but the word needed to be there.

Also note that even in VS p 80 is about things that are intrinsically evil, and so already established the context was already narrowed down by the time we get to your quote.
 
… if foreseen as directly killing an innocent?
Yes.

I also challenge the scalpel. That implies that the scalpel is used on the baby. Even in the immoral scenario it isn’t. It is used on the tube and the baby is removed alive.
 
This is the point. Your definition of direct is suspect. You aren’t seeing it because you are going straight from random motion to deliberately killing. Yes, foreseen lethality is a necessary condition of direct killing. That doesn’t make it a sufficient one. Indeed we know that indirectly putting someone in mortal peril can be licit if there is sufficient reason, so merely foreseeing lethal consequences is not proof of directness.

So, potentially, all of them.
All foreseen effects of one’s acts are deliberated, that is known to reason and willed by the actor who acts.

In the trolley case, what is the direct cause of the innocent one’s death?
 
Let’s try this, I’ll remove the line so we don’t get bogged down in equivocation:

“This is the point. Your definition of direct is suspect. You aren’t seeing it because of how you are wording the problem. Yes, foreseen lethality is a necessary condition of direct killing. That doesn’t make it a sufficient one. Indeed we know that indirectly putting someone in mortal peril can be licit if there is sufficient reason, so merely foreseeing lethal consequences is not proof of directness.”

So, potentially, all of them.
 
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Yes.

I also challenge the scalpel. That implies that the scalpel is used on the baby. Even in the immoral scenario it isn’t. It is used on the tube and the baby is removed alive.
I don’t follow. Direct abortion attacks the body-person of the child.

The plane case is a red herring at worst and a poorly explained case at best. How do we know that to be true? When posters respond with all kinds of “what ifs” or “assumes this or that” then the case is poorly defined.

Ask the one whose case it is (as I did) to tell us what is the pilot’s act, what are the foreseeable moral outcomes, what is the pilot’s intention, what are all the significant circumstances that may effect the morality of the act. Then we can analyze the case.
 
It is not intrinsically evil to redirect a trolley.
In the trolley example, you are not directly killing anyone. You can either not throw the switch, let the 5 people die, and save the one person. Or you can throw the switch, you save the 5 people, and the one person dies. You would much prefer the other track didn’t have the one person on it. But it does. It’s an unwanted consequence of throwing the switch. Those are the only two choices you have.

Again, I don’t think it’s that complicated. You are performing a morally neutral act, the unwanted consequence of which is that the one person dies. It is not quite the same thing as firing a gun (a morally neutral act) and knowing that the bullet that comes out will kill a man. The analogy doesn’t hold.
 
The plane case is a red herring at worst and a poorly explained case at best. How do we know that to be true? When posters respond with all kinds of “what ifs” or “assumes this or that” then the case is poorly defined.

Ask the one whose case it is (as I did) to tell us what is the pilot’s act, what are the foreseeable moral outcomes, what is the pilot’s intention, what are all the significant circumstances that may effect the morality of the act. Then we can analyze the case.
You seemed to have enough context here
Does the pilot face a moral choice in limiting the number of deaths? No, only a prudential choice. The case is irrelevant.
And have not explained sufficiently why the scenarios are different.
 
Let’s try this, I’ll remove the line so we don’t get bogged down in equivocation:

“This is the point. Your definition of direct is suspect. You aren’t seeing it because of how you are wording the problem. Yes, foreseen lethality is a necessary condition of direct killing. That doesn’t make it a sufficient one. Indeed we know that indirectly putting someone in mortal peril can be licit if there is sufficient reason, so merely foreseeing lethal consequences is not proof of directness.”

So, potentially, all of them.
I think we are getting bogged down in ambiguity not equivocation.

What else is needed that is missing?

“Potentially”? What potency is not actual in, “To steer a trolley at an innocent person foreseeing that doing so kills him.”

How am I wording the problem so that I’m unable to see the truth?

What is your definition of “direct”? Mine is self-evident from the act in se.

And I ask again, What is the direct cause of the innocent person’s death? Will no one give me an answer other than “the trolley” did it which is nonsense.
No, there is no such presumption, especially since the distinction between direct, indirect, and killing in general has been a major topic of the thread.
Well, maybe not for you but for JPII and me it is.
Also note that even in VS p 80 is about things that are intrinsically evil, and so already established the context was already narrowed down by the time we get to your quote.
I have no idea what that means.
 
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You seemed to have enough context here
You take what is given. What’s your point?
And have not explained sufficiently why the scenarios are different.
Please use complete sentences. Who has not explained sufficiently? It is up to the one who proposes a case and claims identity to show how the scenarios are the same. That has not been done. But this is an open forum. Feel free to fill in the blanks yourself and take some ownership in “your” plane case.

I will make no more replies on the plan scenario until the case is fully explained by anyone who cares to do so showing act, moral object, intent, circumstances.
 
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In the trolley example, you are not directly killing anyone. You can either not throw the switch, let the 5 people die, and save the one person. Or you can throw the switch, you save the 5 people, and the one person dies
The innocent one does not need “saving”. He’s fine. That is until the bystander throws the switch. I note the passive voice used to explain his death. But something kills him.

What is the direct cause of the innocent one’s death?
You are performing a morally neutral act …
I reference my first post in this thread … I think it was last year:grimacing:😬 but it was only last August.
The end never makes moral an act evil in its object. Only in the abstract may one consider a human act as neutral. In the concrete, all human acts are moral or immoral. To be a moral human act the act must be good in all three of its sources – object, intent and circumstances.

Your description of the train trolley dilemma may be considered concrete if no other circumstances than those given exist bear on the determination of the morality of the act.

The direct effect of the act is the unintended killing of an innocent life. Is this ever permissible? No, “the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation” (CCC#1753).

The teaching seems counter intuitive to a consequentialist. This may be so if the consequentialist believes the highest moral good is human life. But if one sees that minimizing moral evil, the offenses against God, is a higher good then the teaching makes sense.
See any number of Catholic morality books to substantiate the bold text. The literature is ample.
 
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The innocent one does not need “saving”. He’s fine. That is until the bystander throws the switch. I note the passive voice used to explain his death. But something kills him.

What is the direct cause of the innocent one’s death?
The trolley running over him.
 
Is it not intrinsically evil to steer a plane …
The only defense offered by o_mlly is a the cover of a term that only o_mlly may define, in this case, “directly”. So in the case of a plane landing on a street where an innocent child is playing, thus striking the child and killing him, is that directly or indirectly?
  • If o_mlly answers “directly” that leads to a contradiction where o_mlly has said that the pilot may morally steer the plane away from the apartment building, even if it means foreseeing that some other innocent person will be killed.
  • If o_mlly answers “indirectly” that leads to the impossibility of distinguishing the plane case from the trolley case, making the trolley case also “indirectly” and therefore moral.
In the trolley case, what is the direct cause of the innocent one’s death?
I would say being struck by a trolley, and indirectly by the trolley being diverted from those on the other track. Of course o_mlly would dispute this based on a private and variable definition of “direct.”
What is your definition of “direct”? Mine is self-evident from the act in se .
In other words, o_mlly won’t commit to a firm definition, which is probably why the term has been so useful.
Who has not explained sufficiently? It is up to the one who proposes a case and claims identity to show how the scenarios are the same.
These two scenarios are morally the same: a bystander steers a trolley away from five people and toward one person. A pilot steers a plane away from an apartment building and toward a street where one child is playing. They are the same because
  • Both actors have limited options, all of which result in some death.
  • Both actors foresee the good and the evil ends.
  • Both actors make deliberate choices.
It is now up to o_mlly to show how they are different. The “kill zone” difference has been debunked. The “merely physical evil” difference has been debunked. Name-calling (“red-herring”, “too many what-ifs”) doesn’t work. What will we see next?
 
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The innocent one does not need “saving”. He’s fine. That is until the bystander throws the switch.
The child playing in the street was fine too. That is until the pilot turned his plane away from an apartment building and landed right on top of him. (Again showing that every argument that can be used on the trolley problem can be used for the plane running out of fuel.)
 
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