Is it not intrinsically evil to steer a plane …
The only defense offered by o_mlly is a the cover of a term that only o_mlly may define, in this case, “directly”. So in the case of a plane landing on a street where an innocent child is playing, thus striking the child and killing him, is that directly or indirectly?
- If o_mlly answers “directly” that leads to a contradiction where o_mlly has said that the pilot may morally steer the plane away from the apartment building, even if it means foreseeing that some other innocent person will be killed.
- If o_mlly answers “indirectly” that leads to the impossibility of distinguishing the plane case from the trolley case, making the trolley case also “indirectly” and therefore moral.
In the trolley case, what is the direct cause of the innocent one’s death?
I would say being struck by a trolley, and indirectly by the trolley being diverted from those on the other track. Of course o_mlly would dispute this based on a private and variable definition of “direct.”
What is your definition of “direct”? Mine is self-evident from the act in se .
In other words, o_mlly won’t commit to a firm definition, which is probably why the term has been so useful.
Who has not explained sufficiently? It is up to the one who proposes a case and claims identity to show how the scenarios are the same.
These two scenarios are morally the same: a bystander steers a trolley away from five people and toward one person. A pilot steers a plane away from an apartment building and toward a street where one child is playing. They are the same because
- Both actors have limited options, all of which result in some death.
- Both actors foresee the good and the evil ends.
- Both actors make deliberate choices.
It is now up to o_mlly to show how they are different. The “kill zone” difference has been debunked. The “merely physical evil” difference has been debunked. Name-calling (“red-herring”, “too many what-ifs”) doesn’t work. What will we see next?