Catholic view on utilitarianism

[Ender]

Is this a fair analysis of your argument on the morality of the bystander’s act?

Moral object: Throw the switch to divert the trolley.
Intent: Save five.
Circumstances: Foresees five saved.
Foresees one killed.

I agree on the intent. I struggle to define the object so I’m open to adjustments here, but at the moment this seems right (I could also accept “Throw the switch to divert the trolley away from the five.”)

As for the circumstances, I don’t think this covers it. The circumstances are all the aspects of the situation: two tracks, one switch, five here, one there, no other option than the switch, but OK, let’s go with this.

While we wait for @Ender would you care to give us your definition of “indirect”? Ender has so far dodged the question.

I don’t dodge questions. I do, however, occasionally have other things to attend to.

 

[o_mlly]

I agree on the intent. I struggle to define the object so I’m open to adjustments here, but at the moment this seems right (I could also accept “Throw the switch to divert the trolley away from the five.”)

As for the circumstances, I don’t think this covers it. The circumstances are all the aspects of the situation: two tracks, one switch, five here, one there, no other option than the switch, but OK, let’s go with this.

Thank you.

As an aside, if you were the bystander would you agree that you must refrain from throwing the switch due to your uncertainty as to the moral objects in the act?

Testing this moral analysis against Catholic teaching,

Moral object: To divert the trolley.

There is nothing “ moral ” in this moral object. “To divert the trolley” describes the physical object of the act: the trolley was going one way and the act causes the trolley to go another. JPII in VS warns against this cosequentualist’s manipulation of the moral object in its attempts to eliminate any evil moral content from the object font. They do so to eliminate the possibility of disclosing any intrinsically evil acts.

By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world (VS p. 80).

To comply with JPII’s teaching that a “moral object” contain “moral” content, you propose elevating from the circumstance font (elevate because circumstances cannot change the species of an act) only one of the two effects, the intended good end. But leaving the evil effect, the death of an innocent one, in the circumstance font is contrary to Aquinas’ teaching.

“A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstances transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.”

Consequentialists who deny that any act is intrinsically evil must relegate all evil effects to the circumstance font. Why? As stated above, the circumstance font cannot change the moral species of the act. This consequentialist clever, but fallacious manipulation of the moral object and circumstance fonts effectively eliminates the moral object from ever disclosing an intrinsically evil act thus eliminating the moral object font as a source for judging the morality of the act. The consequentialists play nothing more than word games to circumvent the constant Catholic moral teaching on judging human acts, three fonts, all must be good to judge the act good.

(Continued)

 

[o_mlly]

Circumstances: Foresees five saved.
Foresees one killed.

As cited above, JPII and Aquinas instruct us to record all the important including “repugnant” moral effects in the moral object font. Therefore:

Circumstances: None

The moral object and circumstance fonts are thus reordered comply to VS and Aquinas.

We are left with the font of intention. The font of intention, unlike the moral object font, is subjective (see previous Catechism citations) and changes for any particular actor. In VS, JPII warns against elevating this subjective font over and against the objective font which describes the species of the act for all actors:

In point of fact, the morality of human acts is not deduced only from one’s intention … Judgments about morality cannot be made without taking into consideration whether or not the deliberate choice of a specific kind of behaviour is in conformity with the dignity and integral vocation of the human person … Once the moral species of an action prohibited by a universal rule is concretely recognized, the only morally good act is that of obeying the moral law and of refraining from the action which it forbids. (VS p. 67 emphasis mine).

Is the species of the act intrinsically evil? I see the act directly killing an innocent one. Such an act is always under any circumstances evil in se. Others claim the innocent one dies indirectly but do not explain the physics that can warrant such a claim. What are the immediate and mediate causes that allow such a conclusion?

Only if the innocent one dies indirectly can the act be judged moral. The simple line of physical causality is self-evident (to me at least) that throwing the switch > directs a trolley > that lethally impacts the body-person of the innocent one. If not true then what does directly cause his death? Simply truncating the physics to “the trolley did it” or using the euphemism of the passive voice “the man was killed by the trolley” is not helpful.

Our intrepid interlocutors in vain try to “Catch 22” me with claims of either “merely asserted” and when cited toss out “fallacy of an appeal to authority” not realizing that the Catholic position must always appeal to authority.

I don’t dodge questions. I do, however, occasionally have other things to attend to.

Me too. That’s a wrap for me. See you in a couple of years, I’m sure, on the Trolley Case Redux.

 

[Ender]

As an aside, if you were the bystander would you agree that you must refrain from throwing the switch due to your uncertainty as to the moral objects in the act?

No. Uncertainty works both ways, whether to throw the switch or not to throw it. The choice is not between an (in)action that is good and an act that is doubtful, but between two acts one of which is less doubtful than the other.

There is nothing “ moral ” in this moral object. “To divert the trolley” describes the physical object of the act: the trolley was going one way and the act causes the trolley to go another. JPII in VS warns against this cosequentualist’s manipulation of the moral object in its attempts to eliminate any evil moral content from the object font. They do so to eliminate the possibility of disclosing any intrinsically evil acts.

Well this is just disappointing, but it is also why I suggested extending the object to “throw the switch to divert the trolley away from the five.” I have been trying to debate this topic in good faith, but it appears your approach is concerned more with simply labeling me and not addressing my comments at all. I have said that defining the object is difficult, but at least I have tried.

you propose elevating from the circumstance font (elevate because circumstances cannot change the species of an act) only one of the two effects, the intended good end. But leaving the evil effect, the death of an innocent one, in the circumstance font is contrary to Aquinas’ teaching.

It’s as if words have lost their meaning. The consequences, good and bad, are part of the circumstance font, and cannot be included in the object or the intent fonts. Our intent goes to what consequence we want to achieve, and the object includes the action we take that we hope will lead to that end.

You would have a lot less trouble with my arguments if you stopped trying to force them to mean something other than what they say. You have decided I am a “consequentialist” and interpret everything I write to conform to that (mis)judgment.

Consequentialists who deny that any act is intrinsically evil must relegate all evil effects to the circumstance font.

I believe acts can be intrinsically evil. Does this prove I am not a consequentialist?

 

[Ender]

Continued…

As cited above, JPII and Aquinas instruct us to record all the important including “repugnant” moral effects in the moral object font. Therefore:

Circumstances: None

No circumstances? You eliminate one of the three fonts of morality and you think you find support from JPII and Aquinas?

Is the species of the act intrinsically evil? I see the act directly killing an innocent one.

Yes, well that’s what the debate is all about, and asserting it isn’t the same as demonstrating it.

The simple line of physical causality is self-evident (to me at least) that throwing the switch > directs a trolley > that lethally impacts the body-person of the innocent one.

This “simple” line of physical causality can be equally applied to the operation and the plane:

• turn the stick → direct the plane → that lethally impacts the body-person of the innocent one
• wield the scalpel → remove section of the tube → that lethally impacts the body-person of the innocent one.

 

[Inquiry]

Note that Aquinas says that this circumstance (death of the one) must be a moral object if it changes the action from good to evil. You cannot use this quote to show that the action is intrinsically evil without showing how the man’s inclusion makes it so. Again we are back to the difference between direct killing, which is always intrinsically evil, and indirect killing, which can be morally licit. For your argument here to have any meaning you have to show that killing the man is direct.

You certainly do assert that it is direct, but your reasoning does not match your reasoning in other cases and so your argument is incomplete.

 

[o_mlly]

There is nothing “ moral ” in this moral object. “To divert the trolley” describes the physical object of the act: the trolley was going one way and the act causes the trolley to go another. JPII in VS warns against this cosequentualist’s manipulation of the moral object in its attempts to eliminate any evil moral content from the object font. They do so to eliminate the possibility of disclosing any intrinsically evil acts.

Can’t let this deflection go. Instead of reporting your emotional state, please try arguing why the teachings of JPII and Aquinas do not refute your argument.

As to labeling you, the only reference to “you” in the entire post is to acknowledge your most recent revision to the moral object.

If JPII’s and Aquinas’ explanations of the errors of consequentialism bother you then tell us how your arguments are different than the errors cited by the two saints. I cannot see any differences.

It’s as if words have lost their meaning. The consequences, good and bad, are part of the circumstance font, and cannot be included in the object or the intent fonts. Our intent goes to what consequence we want to achieve, and the object includes the action we take that we hope will lead to that end.

You would have a lot less trouble with my arguments if you stopped trying to force them to mean something other than what they say. You have decided I am a “consequentialist” and interpret everything I write to conform to that (mis)judgment.

I don’t think you are a consequentialist, if that helps calm you. But your arguments certainly are. Please defend them, not against what I write, but against what the two saints write.

To wit:
“The consequences, good and bad, are part of the circumstance font, and cannot be included in the object or the intent fonts.”

That claim not only ignores Aquinas, but violates your own rule in your most recent revision of the moral object in which you elevate only the good consequence from circumstance to your moral object.

“the object includes the action we take that we hope will lead to that end.” And, you choose to ignore JPII as well.

You would have a lot less trouble with my arguments if you stopped trying to force them to mean something other than what they say. You have decided I am a “consequentialist” and interpret everything I write to conform to that (mis)judgment.

Ahh, another poster who can read my mind. I don’t interpret your arguments; I quote your arguments directly from your posts.

 

[o_mlly]

(Continued)

Do you recall @Rau referring us to the Handbook of Moral Theology? I suggest you spend some more time with the Handbook. It will help you immensely. The correct expression of an act’s moral object is the act’s inherent ends, not the intended end of any particular actor. I have put this to you before and you chose to ignore it as you choose to ignore any teaching that conflicts with your argument. No reason to think you will not ignore it again but at least I have tried.

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Rau

Dec '17

I am not aware of many on-line reference sources on (Catholic) Moral Theology. But I came across this one recently care of another CAF poster:
Handbook of Moral Theology

@Ender and @o_mlly : You may be interested in the definition of moral object found inside, noting our debate on that point on a recent thread. The definition there reads very much along the lines of the one I used in the debate, which is also the consistent with the one Ron Conte uses. [I mention RC because his website is so readily encountered when one googles terms such as moral object or the three fonts of morality etc.].

“The end of an action (the intrinsic and objective end) is that to which the action tends of its very nature directly and immediately: for example, the natural end of an act of almsgiving is the relief of the neighbour’s need…The end of the action is known also as the moral object of the action…”

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Ender

Dec '17

Thank you for posting this. I shall bookmark this so I can refer to it. I’ll look through it before I comment again about the distinction between the end of the object and the end of the act.

 

[Inquiry]

Can’t let this deflection go. Instead of reporting your emotional state, please try arguing why the teachings of JPII and Aquinas do not refute your argument.

Because at least in the case of Aquinas, you haven’t shown that your quote applies yet.

 

[Elf01]

Is the species of the act intrinsically evil? I see the act directly killing an innocent one. Such an act is always under any circumstances evil i n se . Others claim the innocent one dies indirectly but do not explain the physics that can warrant such a claim. What are the immediate and mediate causes that allow such a conclusion?

Only if the innocent one dies indirectly can the act be judged moral. The simple line of physical causality is self-evident (to me at least) that throwing the switch > directs a trolley > that lethally impacts the body-person of the innocent one. If not true then what does directly cause his death? Simply truncating the physics to “the trolley did it” or using the euphemism of the passive voice “the man was killed by the trolley” is not helpful.

Can you give a definition of direct that applies to the trolley problem but not to removing a tube with a baby who cannot live outside his or her mothers body in it?

 

[o_mlly]

Because at least in the case of Aquinas, you haven’t shown that your quote applies yet.

That you cannot see it does not mean that it has not been demonstrated. Lookup “communication theory”, it seems you may have a decoding problem.

 

[Inquiry]

No, seriously, you left an important step out when you quoted Aquinas and until you address it the quote doesn’t apply.

 

[o_mlly]

Can you give a definition of direct that applies to the trolley problem but not to removing a tube with a baby who cannot live outside his or her mothers body in it?

Can you give a definition of indirect that applies to the trolley problem that parallels the causal chain in salpingectomy?

 

[o_mlly]

No, seriously, you left an important step out when you quoted Aquinas and until you address it the quote doesn’t apply.

No, seriously, the quote was quite accurate.

 

[Ender]

“The consequences, good and bad, are part of the circumstance font, and cannot be included in the object or the intent fonts.”

That claim not only ignores Aquinas, but violates your own rule in your most recent revision of the moral object in which you elevate only the good consequence from circumstance to your moral object.

“the object includes the action we take that we hope will lead to that end.” And, you choose to ignore JPII as well.

You don’t distinguish between an objective and a consequence. Our intent is the objective we wish to achieve, and is directed at a final end. The object is the action we take (including the proximate end) that we expect will lead to that final end. The consequences are the effects of that action. Those consequences, desired or not, are all part of the circumstance font, and belong neither to the intent nor the object.

This is why you think I’ve put the good consequence in the object font when in fact what I put there was the proximate end of the act of throwing the switch: to redirect the trolley away from the five. That is not a consequence; it is an end, an objective.

As for JPII and Aquinas, my arguments are contradicted by neither one. I accept JPII’s definition that the object includes the proximate end of the act. You’ve tried to include all the consequences of the act, which clearly don’t belong there, and you cited Aquinas speaking of circumstances in support of that claim, a claim so spurious I wondered if I had in fact found the right citation.

 

[Inquiry]

The quote isn’t the issue, o_mlly. You haven’t applied it. The quote takes the form of If X then Y, in this case If the circumstance as an object makes the action evil then you must treat the circumstance as an object. That’s great.

Now show X.

 

[o_mlly]

The object is the action we take (including the proximate end) that we expect will lead to that final end.

If we proceed, let’s agree to narrow the exchange to singular issues which I think your latest post does.

I asked for your definition of “final end”. The term is used in moral theology with quite a different meaning than I think you are using the term. I gather in your construct that “final end” and “proximate end” and “intended end” are synonymous. No?

The intended end is always part of the moral object – one cannot intend what one cannot foresee. But the moral object for acts that inherently have more than one foreseeable moral effect must also include those other effects. Those effects also flow from the act naturally. In your construct, the moral object would become the moral subject. The moral object of the act would lose its objectivity and be dependent on the subjective intent of a particular actor (another bystander hates the innocent one and intends not to save but to kill). Thus making the moral object font merely a redundant restatement of the intent font.

The Moral Fonts of Action and Decision Making​

https://www.ncbcenter.org › index.php › download_file › force
(If the link does not take you to the PDF doc search on ncbcenter and the title.)

The Catholic moral tradition has identified three
basic factors that shape the morality of an act: the object,
the intention, and the circumstances of the act. The
primary determinant or source of the moral status of
an act is the act’s “moral object.”1 The object of a moral
act is the specific kind of action or behavior chosen.
The moral status of an act’s object is independent of the
person choosing. The object is the substance of an act
and is a datum as objective as any physical aspect of
the act. The moral object of an act provides the basis on
which moral acts are distinguished from one another.
The object defines the substance of the act as being, for
example, an act of charity, self-defense, adultery, theft,
or life conservation. Depending on its definition, the
object of an act is something that either truly fulfills and
completes human nature or detracts from, and is contrary
to, its integral unity.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Elf01:

Can you give a definition of direct that applies to the trolley problem but not to removing a tube with a baby who cannot live outside his or her mothers body in it?

Can you give a definition of indirect that applies to the trolley problem that parallels the causal chain in salpingectomy?

That’s easy. I define indirect to mean the same thing as unintentional. It applies to the trolley problem because the bystander flips the switch which causes the trolley to divert away from five people. That is the end of the intention. After that, the trolley strikes one man, which was not intended, and therefore is indirect.

In salpingectomy, the surgeon cuts out the tube, thus saving the mother’s live. That is the end of the intention. After that the cut made in the tube has interrupted the nutrition supply for the baby, and so the baby dies. That is unintentional, and therefore indirect.

You did say we would define indirect however we want, and that is how I want to define it.

 

[Elf01]

Can you give a definition of indirect that applies to the trolley problem that parallels the causal chain in salpingectomy?

In other words no.

I will define indirect as the death was not necessary to save the lives.

 

[o_mlly]

In other words no.

I will define indirect as the death was not necessary to save the lives.

The trolley case does not parallel the tubal excision. However, one can modify the trolley case to simulate an indirect death.

Inside the trolley is a terminal person in a vegetative state on a ventilator being transported from one hospital to another. The bystander foresees that the five tied to the track are stacked in such a manner that although the trolley on impact will abruptly stop, the trolley will not derail losing all power. The bystander also sees that the one is tied to the other track in such a way that on impact the trolley will derail and the passenger on the ventilator will die as the ventilator shuts down.

If the bystander throws the switch he directly kill the innocent one on the track and indirectly kills the passenger inside the trolley.