Catholic view on utilitarianism

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Okay, so formally explain the difference. You keep leaving that bit out so for all we know you are just going by intuition.
 
Okay, so formally explain the difference. You keep leaving that bit out so for all we know you are just going by intuition.
Do you mean you want me to put on my tux and retype the post?

If you cannot see it then I cannot help you.
 
I see you are back to equivocation. My meaning was clear.
 
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I see you are back to equivocation. My meaning was clear.
And I see your are back to the extreme skepticism that makes further discourse worthless.

Let me show you how it works. You say, “My meaning was clear.” The extreme skeptic says, “Not to me, now tell me, what did you really mean?” Get it?
 
It is not extreme skepticism to expect you to understand the word ‘formal’ in this context. On the off chance you really don’t know what it means, I was asking for a clear explanation for why one killing is direct and the other is indirect. It’s the same thing we’ve asked you for over and over and over again (without success), so it was obvious even if you were unfamiliar with the word itself.

To state it clearly, your example does not clarify your position. There are multiple reasons you might think one death is direct and the other not. Unless you provide an explanation your meaning is ambiguous at best.
 
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It is not extreme skepticism to expect you to understand the word ‘formal’ in this context.
Well, I was trying to be charitable with the skeptic comment.

Did you ever try to teach a child how to to calculate the derivative of a quadratic when the kid doesn’t yet know his multiplication tables? All the kid can do is say, “I don’t get it. Tell me again”. Which is, of course, pointless.
There are multiple reasons you might think one death is direct and the other not.
Oh, I did not know that. By all means, then give us “those multiple reasons”. Why keep us in suspense?
 
Well, I was trying to be charitable with the skeptic comment.

Did you ever try to teach a child how to to calculate the derivative of a quadratic when the kid doesn’t yet know his multiplication tables? All the kid can do is say, “I don’t get it. Tell me again”. Which is, of course, pointless.
@Inquiry, the comments directed toward o_mlly saying “I don’t see…” and “I don’t understand…” are themselves only charitable ways of saying “o_mlly has no clear explanation of…
 
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Well, I was trying to be charitable with the skeptic comment.
But were you trying to be charitable with your tuxedo comment? Because that is where you equivocated.
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Inquiry:
There are multiple reasons you might think one death is direct and the other not.
Oh, I did not know that. By all means, then give us “those multiple reasons”. Why keep us in suspense?
You want me to list various reasons you might have rather than you just saying your actual reasons? Who is keeping whom in suspense here?

But okay, since you asked.

Reasons o_mlly might have for why one killing is direct and the other indirect:

Disclaimer: I don’t actually know o_mlly’s reasons and this would be much simpler if they would just state their reasons directly. I am only listing these because they specifically asked me to and I do so under protest.
  1. o_mlly might be assuming direct killing must involve something physically contacting the target and indirect must not.
  2. o_mlly might think that once the first person is affected by an action any future impacts are indirect.
  3. o_mlly might think that because the trolley death is instant and the deprivation death is lingering that the former is direct and the latter not.
  4. o_mlly might not have an actual explanation but is instead relying on intuition to determine direct vs indirect.
  5. None of the above.
Well?
 
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Look up “self-evident”. A claim is not self-evident if other evidence, that is other facts, are necessary to support the claim. Note: what is necessary are more facts, not principles. Now, tell us what additional facts do you think are missing?
 
True. After all, a child struggling to understand calculus might be struggling because the subject is beyond them, or they might be struggling because the teacher is not explaining it well.

Side note: I’ve actually successfully explained rudimentary calculus to elementary school students before. It can be done.
 
Good point. Clearly your definition of ‘direct’ is not so self evident as you thought.

Also, I apologize for any confusion about ‘Well?’ Let me expand: Are any of the listed reasons your actual reasons? If not, please list your actual reasons.
 
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I gather in your construct that “final end” and “proximate end” and “intended end” are synonymous. No?
No, they are absolutely not the same, at least in this case. I would accept “final end” and “intended end” as probably synonymous, but the proximate end is different. The proximate end (singular) refers to the immediate end of the act, and not all the ends to which it will lead.

One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its species but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. (Aquinas ST I-II 1 3 ad 3)

This (unsurprisingly) agrees with JPII’s comment that the object includes the proximate end of the act.
The intended end is always part of the moral object – one cannot intend what one cannot foresee.
Not according to Aquinas. The intended (remote) end is expressly not part of the object; only the proximate end is. As for “intending” that surely is the intent font and is not part of the object either.

And again, an end (objective) is not the same as a consequence, which is the entire meaning of the phrase “law of unintended consequences”. Our intent defines our objective, the object is the act we select to achieve it, and the consequences are the effects of that action, whatever they are and whether they satisfy the objective or not.

Your citation of The Moral Fonts of Action and Decision Making is interesting but not clarifying as far as this point is concerned.
 
The proximate end (singular) refers to the immediate end of the act, and not all the ends to which it will lead.

One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end , from which it has its species but it can be ordained to several remote ends , of which one is the end of the other. (Aquinas ST I-II 1 3 ad 3)

The intended (remote) end is expressly not part of the object; only the proximate end is. As for “intending” that surely is the intent font and is not part of the object either.
Your interpretation of Aquinas confuses the moral distinction between the finis proximus and the finis remotus, or the equivalent, between the finis operis and the finis operantis.

The proximate end, finis operis is typically translated as “the end of the act” and the remote end, finis operantis is typically translated as “the end of the agent (intent)”. When JPII refers to the proximate end in VS, he refers to the end of the act, not to the end or intent of the agent. Wrongly incorporating intent into the object is the basis for the errors of proportionalism condemned in VS.

A reading of the entire following article which explains the error, would be worthwhile. I copy selected quotes as they relate to the misuse of proximate end in Aquinas.

http://www.eticaepolitica.net/eticafondamentale/dsl_moral_object(en).pdf

This vision is the basis of Richard McCormick’s famous expanded notion of object, which is one of the fundamental pillars of proportionalism, and which makes the moral species of the human act derive only from the intentio, understood always as the finis operantis or remote end of the agent. Janssens knows St. Thomas’s texts well, and believes to have found in them the basis for his interpretation. Commenting on Quodlibet III, q. 12, a. 2, Janssens implicitly identifies the materiam obiecti (the matter of the object) with the chosen means, and the ratio obiecti (the rationale or aspect of the object) with the intention of the agent, because only with this reading can the words of Aquinas provide a confirmation for his interpretation.78

78. With the Catechism of the Catholic Church and the encyclical Veritatis splendor, this interpretive possibility met with serious reservations on the part of the Magisterium .


A first group sees the moral object as a physical object transposed to the moral order by a relation with reason. These authors tend to describe the object of the human act departing from metaphysical considerations; moral considerations are then developed on this basis.

A second group is formed by the proportionalist interpretation of the moral object. Of this group we considered only Janssens, because it was he who attempted to found this vision more thoroughly and systematically on the texts of St. Thomas. For these authors, the object of the human act can only be considered in its totality, that is, also considering the further intentions of the acting subject, and the circumstances.

(continued)
 
Finally, a third group is comprised mostly of more recent authors, who in some way distinguish themselves from the “classical” interpretation more frequently held by the authors of the first group. These authors understand the object of the act as a proposal of action conceived by the practical reason, which as such has a constitutive relation of agreement or disagreement with the ends appropriate to the human person.

The moment has now arrived for posing the crucial question: which of these three groups of interpreters is correct? With respect to the second group, those who believe to have found in St.Thomas the basis to defend proportionalism, it seems to us sufficient to say that for Aquinas, it is enough that the object of the electio– or if we prefer, the materia circaquam– be contrary to the order of reason for the entire action to be corrupted. If what one does is evil in itself, it is already unnecessary to consider the goodness or malice of the finis operantis. The proportionalist interpretation, therefore, does not truly reflect the thought of the Angelic Doctor. It is only fair to point out, however, that many of the texts of Aquinas that are relied on by proportionalist authors as a basis for their reading are not easily interpreted; specifically, it is often not clear whether, by the term finis, St. Thomas is referring to the finis proximus of the election or the finis operantis of the intentio.

Therefore, bearing in mind St. Thomas’s texts that we presented at the beginning of this essay, together with these final considerations, it seems to us that the interpretation of the third group is more in agreement with Aquinas’s thought ,i.e., that the object of the human act must be understood precisely as a specific actio, and not as a res physica regulated by reason.
 
Your interpretation of Aquinas confuses the moral distinction between the finis proximus and the finis remotus , or the equivalent, between the finis operis and the finis operantis .

The proximate end, finis operis is typically translated as “the end of the act”…
This is just getting painful. I don’t know how it is possible to make such a hash out of my comments, and Aquinas for that matter.

You: "The proximate end, finis operis is typically translated as “the end of the act…"
Me: "The proximate end (singular) refers to the immediate end of the act…"

Really? These are different and my version is wrong?
When JPII refers to the proximate end in VS, he refers to the end of the act, not to the end or intent of the agent.
Yes, this has always been my position. I’m not the one who tried to include all the ends in the object.
the moral object for acts that inherently have more than one foreseeable moral effect must also include those other effects.
Wrongly incorporating intent into the object is the basis for the errors of proportionalism condemned in VS.
Well I’m not the one who suggested it belonged there:
The intended end is always part of the moral object…
 
This is just getting painful. I don’t know how it is possible to make such a hash out of my comments, and Aquinas for that matter.

You: " The proximate end, finis operis is typically translated as “the end of the act…"
Me: " The proximate end (singular) refers to the immediate end of the act…"

Really? These are different and my version is wrong?
Again, I can’t argue with how one feels, only with how they think. I acknowledge that when one’s belief turns out to be false, it can be quite painful.

You can walk away from your previous posts on what the “proximate end” is but writing to the effect, “I never said that and I’ll never say it again” is incredible. So for the record, do you recant from these posts. If so, perhaps we can move on:
Yes, exactly, and it says that the moral object “ is the proximate end of a deliberate decision .” That end is intended. As I said, there is an intent separate from the intent font contained within the object font. It is the “ proximate end.
“Proximate end” in this case means what is done because of its immediate consequence.
It does not. It means that it proceeds from the act.
I just don’t think it is the way JPII used the term in his encyclical.
 
I’m really starting to think that #4 on my list was right: @o_mlly doesn’t have an actual explanation of what direct is and is just relying on intuition. And that’s not meant as an insult, intuition is a very good starting point for examining moral issues. The key word is starting point. They still have to show that their intuition actually is valid in the situation at hand.
 
So for the record, do you recant from these posts. If so, perhaps we can move on:
I tried several ways of explaining the proximate end, the last of which was almost word for word the same as the definition you (finally) provided, and you even called that one wrong, so no, I don’t recant anything.
 
I tried several ways of explaining the proximate end, the last of which was almost word for word the same as the definition you (finally) provided, and you even called that one wrong, so no, I don’t recant anything.
? Somehow it’s now my fault that you misinterpreted Aquinas?

You persisted in this misinterpretation that the proximate end not only proceeded from the agent’s intent but was identical to it, throughout this thread (and in 2017) even when several challenged you.

But, OK. Let’s move on to the error in the idea that “the proximate end” must be singular.
" The proximate end (singular)
Yes, the subject is singular but a singular subject does not limit the predicate to the same singularity you claim. A singular subject may have a compound predicate as in:

The Eucharist is the Body, Blood, Soul and Divinity of our Lord.
The end is the resurrection of the body and union with the Trinity.
The present time is of the Spirit, of witness, of “distress” and the trial of evil.
The proximate end of throwing the switch is the death of an innocent one and the saving of five.

From back in August, post #341
The moral object is twofold – save five and directly kill one.
 
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