Catholic view on utilitarianism

[o_mlly]

From the article, “Moral theological analysis of direct versus indirect abortion” showing the correct application of the Principle of the Double Effect to the killing of a fetus by dilation/curettage.

The removal of the child by dilation/curettage would not meet the conditions of the principle of double effect. First, as indicated, the act itself could not be seen as morally licit. The dismemberment of the fetus would constitute a direct, deadly assault on the life of the child. Admittedly, it would be done for a good reason, but it would still constitute the direct, intentional killing of an innocent human being. Second, the procedure, the dismemberment of the fetus, can have no other immediate effect than the death of the child. Therefore, the death of the child is not simply foreseen but intentionally and directly brought about. Third, the unavoidable death of the child resulting from the procedure is the means by which the mother is saved. In this case, evil would be done that good might come from it. Since all conditions of the principle of double effect must be met, the condition of proportionality cannot even be invoked. In fact, it can be said that since the first condition is not met, because the act itself is not a morally good act, the principle of double effect cannot even be applied. The act being performed can be understood as a “direct” abortion because it is an unmediated death-dealing action taken against an innocent unborn child.

In order to preserve the principles and reasoning of the author, one may substitute innocent one for child and fetus, killing for abortion, mother for others and the act of dilation/curettage and procedure to dismemberment by trolley and apply the same to the trolley case:

The killing of the innocent one by dismemberment via trolley would not meet the conditions of the principle of double effect. First, as indicated, the act itself could not be seen as morally licit. The dismemberment of the innocent one would constitute a direct, deadly assault on the life of the innocent one . Admittedly, it would be done for a good reason, but it would still constitute the direct, intentional killing of an innocent human being. Second, the procedure, the dismemberment of the innocent one , can have no other immediate effect than the death of the innocent one . Therefore, the death of the innocent one is not simply foreseen but intentionally and directly brought about. Third, the unavoidable death of the innocent one resulting from the dismemberment via trolley is the means by which the others are saved. In this case, evil would be done that good might come from it. Since all conditions of the principle of double effect must be met, the condition of proportionality cannot even be invoked. In fact, it can be said that since the first condition is not met, because the act itself is not a morally good act, the principle of double effect cannot even be applied. The act being performed can be understood as a “direct” killing because it is an unmediated death-dealing action taken against an innocent one .

 

[LeafByNiggle]

In order to preserve the principles and reasoning of the author, one may substitute innocent one for child and fetus, killing for abortion , mother for others and the act of dilation/curettage and procedure to dismemberment by trolley and apply the same to the trolley case:

That would be inappropriate, because in the dilation/curettage, the action on the baby is the means by which the desired end is achieved, and not merely a consequence. But in the trolley problem, the death of the one on the tracks is not the means to anything. So the principle of double effect, that good cannot be brought about by means of evil, is not violated in the trolley problem. Will someone explain that to o_mlly, since o_mlly has decided to hide all my responses?

 

[Ender]

I would like to hear responses from those still following this thread on my comments here.

The morality of any action is determined by the morality of its three moral fonts: intent, object, and circumstances. The difficulty in resolving the trolley problem stems from the difficulty in defining the object. According to JPII:

By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. (VS #78)

Using the standard definition of the words…
proximate: (especially of the cause of something) closest in relationship; immediate.
end: a goal or result that one seeks to achieve.

…I understand the object to be an action and its immediate consequence. So if there was a row of dominoes such that if the first one fell into the second they would all be knocked over how would we describe the act according to its moral components? The intent would be to watch all the dominoes fall (plus whatever happens when the last one falls), but what would the object be?

Wouldn’t it be pushing the first domino (act) to knock over the second one (proximate end)? One could imagine all sorts of scenarios where the chain of events leads to benign or very harmful consequences, but isn’t the object the same regardless of the final end and all the intermediate steps?

 

[o_mlly]

I would like to hear responses from those still following this thread on my comments here.

I guess I belong to that group. Thinking the request more likely directed to others to elicit new thinking, I delayed responding.

Using the standard definition of the words…
proximate: (especially of the cause of something) closest in relationship; immediate .
end: a goal or result that one seeks to achieve .

…I understand the object to be an action and its immediate consequence.

The proximate cause, as defined above, I see as the act. The proximate end must by definition stand next to its proximate cause in the causal chain. If the act is the proximate cause then the proximate end is the direct effect(s) as foreseen by the human agent.

The vocabulary can clarify or confuse. Consequentialism looks to consequences (ultimate or remote ends or the indirect effects) to justify human acts. Catholic morality places all consequences in the circumstance font. So, would you agree to define the object font without using the word “consequence”? If so, I submit that the object font is the act and its direct effect(s) (proximate end).

So if there was a row of dominoes such that if the first one fell into the second they would all be knocked over how would we describe the act according to its moral components? The intent would be to watch all the dominoes fall (plus whatever happens when the last one falls), but what would the object be?

Wouldn’t it be pushing the first domino (act) to knock over the second one (proximate end)? One could imagine all sorts of scenarios where the chain of events leads to benign or very harmful consequences, but isn’t the object the same regardless of the final end and all the intermediate steps?

The act, pushing first domino, has as its proximate end (direct effect) the falling of the first domino. All the other felled dominoes would be indirect effects. No? The cause of the second domino falling is the first domino, the third is the second, etc.

If some moral good is foreseen after the last domino falls then that effect would also be indirect to the act of pushing the first domino.

 

[Gorgias]

There is no such thing as “moral” object. There is only the “object”, which may or may not be “moral” - based upon all the circumstances, the intent, and means.

I think you’re misunderstanding: there is an object, and it has moral content. That’s what meant by “the moral object.” It doesn’t mean that all objects are ‘moral’, per se – some might be ‘immoral’, and others largely ‘neutral’. Nevertheless, we can talk about the morality of an object. (And yes, that discussion will necessarily revolve around the particular moral system of the interlocutors. Ancient Aztecs would assert the morality of killing captives as sacrifices to the Sun God as a ‘moral action’. Doesn’t make that so, though…)

 

[Ender]

The proximate cause, as defined above, I see as the act. The proximate end must by definition stand next to its proximate cause in the causal chain. If the act is the proximate cause then the proximate end is the direct effect(s) as foreseen by the human agent.

OK, I can accept this.

Consequentialism looks to consequences…

Please, no more of this.

The act, pushing first domino, has as its proximate end (direct effect) the falling of the first domino. All the other felled dominoes would be indirect effects.

Again, I agree with this.

If some moral good is foreseen after the last domino falls then that effect would also be indirect to the act of pushing the first domino.

Yes, the final effect(s) would be indirect so the morality of the action would depend on the intent of the actor in bringing about that (final) end. Regardless of whether the foreseeable consequences are good or evil the object (pushing over the first domino) is itself not immoral.

 

[o_mlly]

Yes, the final effect(s) would be indirect so the morality of the action would depend on the intent of the actor in bringing about that (final) end.

This logic escapes me. Do you mean to say that any act which has indirect effects, ipso facto, has no moral object to consider? That cannot be true.

The primary determinate of the morality of an act is the act’s moral object (VS) and that moral object must be good. That the final or remote effect is indirect does not, in itself, make the moral object either good or unknowable (allowing us to then move on to examine the intent font).

Regardless of whether the foreseeable consequences are good or evil the object (pushing over the first domino) is itself not immoral.

We do not know whether “pushing the domino over” is immoral or not. The description is merely the physical object of the act. To know the moral object we need to know the foreseeable effects of that act that have moral content.

If the object of this domino exercise is to separate the act of throwing the switch from the direct effect of killing an innocent then it smacks of casuistry. The surgeon who performs a direct abortion could invoke the same logic and claim the child’s death was indirect and permissible.

 

[Ender]

The primary determinate of the morality of an act is the act’s moral object (VS) and that moral object must be good. That the final or remote effect is indirect does not, in itself, make the moral object either good or unknowable (allowing us to then move on to examine the intent font).

What is the definition of the object? Here is your own definition (with which I agree…except I contend there is only one direct effect):

I submit that the object font is the act and its direct effect(s) (proximate end).

By this (your) definition the indirect effects are not part of the object. This has always been my contention.

We do not know whether “pushing the domino over” is immoral or not. The description is merely the physical object of the act.

There is no physical object as distinct from moral object; there is only one object, which is the act and its proximate end which you have already explained.

The act, pushing first domino, has as its proximate end (direct effect) the falling of the first domino.

The morality of the object is not determined by its indirect consequences, but only by what defines it, which is the act and its proximate end, therefore pushing over the first domino to have it fall by definition cannot be intrinsically evil, but if it is not intrinsically evil then any evil in the action must originate in the intent.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

I think you’re misunderstanding: there is an object, and it has moral content.

Looks like Economist has been suspended, but the question is too important to let it fade away.

You should have said that there is an object (which is not piece of matter! it is an objective of an action) and it MAY have a moral aspect or not. You correctly observed that the aspect MAY be moral, immoral or neutral - based upon the ethical system one subscribes to. The same actions MAY be considered moral in one ethical system, and immoral or neutral in another one.

So the expression “moral object” is incorrect to be used in a general manner. One must examine the action, its object(s) (or objective(s)), and all the circumstances and means, even the possible means… and only then can one declare: “this object is moral in my ethical system”.

There is a major impediment in having a conversation. You guys assert that only your ethical system is qualified to declare if an object is “moral” or not, and refuse to realize that there are many ethical systems with different principles. And since there is no epistemological method to declare that ethical system “A” is better than ethical system “B” (whatever the word “better” may be) all have if declaring our subjective opinions… which does not lead anywhere.

 

[Ender]

There is a major impediment in having a conversation. You guys assert that only your ethical system is qualified to declare if an object is “moral” or not, and refuse to realize that there are many ethical systems with different principles. And since there is no epistemological method to declare that ethical system “A” is better than ethical system “B” (whatever the word “better” may be) all have if declaring our subjective opinions… which does not lead anywhere.

The debate here is based on the Catholic moral system. As you say, other moral systems come up with different conclusions, and such a debate would be useless. It would be like applying the rules of football to a baseball game.

 

[o_mlly]

By this (your) definition the indirect effects are not part of the object. This has always been my contention.

There is no physical object as distinct from moral object; there is only one object, which is the act and its proximate end which you have already explained.

Properly defined, the proximate end include moral outcomes, not merely physical (which I have always contended).

The act, pushing first domino, has as its proximate end (direct effect) the falling of the first domino.

No, that does not describe the moral proximate end, only the physical proximate end (of an actus hominis). The moral proximate end (of an actus humanus) must include to what moral good or evil does that act inherently move toward.

The morality of the object is not determined by its indirect consequences …

No. Please re-read Aquinas regarding a “repugnant” consequence.

… pushing over the first domino to have it fall by definition cannot be intrinsically evil, but if it is not intrinsically evil then any evil in the action must originate in the intent.

We cannot know the moral object of “pushing over the domino” as it describes merely a physical act. What moral outcomes are foreseen?

 

[Thinker_Doer]

The debate here is based on the Catholic moral system. As you say, other moral systems come up with different conclusions, and such a debate would be useless. It would be like applying the rules of football to a baseball game.

I agree. But this is the negation of “absolute” or “objective” morality, which is perfectly fine by me. Morality is fluid, it is neither objective, nor absolute. It changes from place to place and from time to time.

 

[Ender]

I agree. But this is the negation of “absolute” or “objective” morality, which is perfectly fine by me. Morality is fluid, it is neither objective, nor absolute. It changes from place to place and from time to time.

I disagree; it is based on the acceptance that objective morality actually exists, and is explained by Catholic doctrines. If morality is not objective then there is no rational sense in which it can be said to exist as anything other than personal whim.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

I disagree; it is based on the acceptance that objective morality actually exists, and is explained by Catholic doctrines.

So, what are those “other” systems based upon a different systems of ethics? Are they all invalid? You either accept that there are several, different ethical systems, or you deny it. What will it be? The Catholic doctrines describe one possible ethical system. Why should anyone else accept them as valid? Of course the opposite is true. What other people accept as a valid ethical system will be rejected by (most!, but not all) Catholics. The important part is to live in mutual peace, even if we disagree on some principles.

As Voltaire allegedly said: “I disagree with what you say, but will defend your right to say it.”

If morality is not objective then there is no rational sense in which it can be said to exist as anything other than personal whim.

Yes, of course. Except that this personal “whim” is shared by a society. It does not make it anything else. In certain societies certain behaviors are morally acceptable, the same behaviors in a different society are unacceptable. That is all.

There is no difference between ethical systems and personal tastes of food, or music, or art forms. All are subjective.

 

[Inquiry]

There is no difference between ethical systems and personal tastes of food, or music, or art forms. All are subjective.

Is that a moral claim?

 

[Thinker_Doer]

Is that a moral claim?

No, it is an epistemological claim.

 

[Gorgias]

and only then can one declare: “this object is moral in my ethical system”.

You’re still using the term incorrectly. Every human act has a moral object. The quality of that moral object depends on a number of factors, and can be described as “morally licit”, “morally illicit” (or “immoral”), or “morally neutral”.

By presuming that “moral object” means “an object that is morally licit”, you’re misunderstanding the terms at hand.

You guys assert that only your ethical system is qualified to declare if an object is “moral” or not, and refuse to realize that there are many ethical systems with different principles.

Two thoughts:

• every proponent of an ethical system believes that his system is the one which is qualified to determine the moral content of actions. (Even the system that says “anything goes” is implicitly making this claim, since it claims that it can pass judgment on any act (and, in this case, call every act “OK”).)
• Christians do realize that there are many ethical systems. We just assert that other systems aren’t valid.

And since there is no epistemological method to declare that ethical system “A” is better than ethical system “B”

Prove it. Remember – “freely asserted, freely denied”. (Of course, what you really mean is “in my opinion, you’re wrong”… but that doesn’t sound reasonable, or as sophisticated as “epistemological method”. )

 

[Ender]

So, what are those “other” systems based upon a different systems of ethics? Are they all invalid?

If morality objectively exists then only the ethical system that reflects that objective truth is valid; everything else by necessity is invalid.

You either accept that there are several, different ethical systems, or you deny it.

Clearly there are any number of different ethical systems, and just as clearly at most only one of them can be accurate, although several could be equally inaccurate.

The Catholic doctrines describe one possible ethical system. Why should anyone else accept them as valid?

There is no reason for non-Catholics to accept Catholic doctrine.

There is no difference between ethical systems and personal tastes of food, or music, or art forms. All are subjective.

This position is literally irrational. Morality as a meaningful term cannot exist unless it exists independently of our personal opinions. If all is subjective then it cannot be said that helping an old lady across the street is any more moral than pushing her under a bus. All that can be said is that the people involved have different tastes. The concept of morality is meaningless.

That said, this is a distraction from the topic of the thread. o_mlly and I differ completely on what Catholic doctrine teaches, but we are in agreement that it is Catholic doctrine that clarifies what is or is not moral.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

By presuming that “moral object” means “an object that is morally licit”, you’re misunderstanding the terms at hand.

Well, I have this “bad” habit of using words according to their usual meaning. But, I am amenable to use this definition. However, then you have the problem to find out which object is “morally” licit, which one is illicit and which one is neutral - WITHOUT evaluating all the circumstances, means and results. To call the object a-priori “moral” only serves confusion.

every proponent of an ethical system believes that his system is the one which is qualified to determine the moral content of actions. (Even the system that says “anything goes” is implicitly making this claim, since it claims that it can pass judgment on any act (and, in this case, call every act “OK”).)

Yes, and that is why this approach is unacceptable. If the proponent of an ethical system would ADD: “in my opinion”, that would be fine.

Christians do realize that there are many ethical systems. We just assert that other systems aren’t valid.

Freely asserted, freely denied.

Prove it.

Show me that objective epistemological method, and I will gladly concede. To ask to “prove” a negative is irrational. You assert that there is an objective epistemological method to show that method “A” Is superior to method “B”. So come out and prove it.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

If morality objectively exists then only the ethical system that reflects that objective truth is valid; everything else by necessity is invalid.

The operating word is “IF”.

Morality as a meaningful term cannot exist unless it exists independently of our personal opinions.

That is the point! Morality is NOT a meaningful term. Let me give you a physical example: The “mass” of an object is objective. The “weight” of the object is not, it is also contingent upon the gravitational field where the object resides. The “heaviness” of the object is even less objective, it is contingent upon the “mass”, the “gravitational field” and the strength of the someone who tries to lift it. And here we deal with measurable things… (mass, weight, heaviness) not something as fleeting as “morality”.