Catholic view on utilitarianism

[Elf01]

The moral object is twofold – save five and directly kill one.

We still have to define directly killing.

 

[o_mlly]

We still have to define directly killing.

The distinctions made against Fr. Tad’s definitions of direct and indirect has now been refuted. Specifically, 1) the moral object is independent of any particular agent’s intention, and 2) the proximate end of the act includes all deliberated moral outcomes.

Clearly the innocent person is killed by the trolley, the trolley was sent down the track when the switch was thrown, and throwing the switch with knowledge of that consequence was deliberate. *If my distinction between direct and indirect is valid then “ saving the five ” is the direct effect, and all subsequent effects - including running over the one - are indirect. The object of the action would be “ switching the trolley away from the five ”. The effect on the five is therefore direct since they are defined in the object. The effect on the one is indirect because he is not part of the object.

The moral object discloses what the act targets, the intentions of any particular actor notwithstanding. The object of the act is the same for the disinterested bystander as it is for another bystander who hates the innocent one and intends to kill.

From the OP:

I can switch a lever and direct the train to another rail where only one person is. Should I do it even though I would be directly responsible for one death?

No, you should not.

 

[Elf01]

The distinctions made against Fr. Tad’s definitions of direct and indirect has now been refuted. Specifically, 1) the moral object is independent of any particular agent’s intention, and 2) the proximate end of the act includes all deliberated moral outcomes.

What post are they in again?

 

[Ender]

You persisted in this misinterpretation that the proximate end not only proceeded from the agent’s intent but was identical to it, throughout this thread (and in 2017) even when several challenged you.

I have never made such a farcical claim. What I said was, that since the object included the proximate end, and an end is in fact intended, there is an intent in the object. That is not the final end, which would be the intent font.

But, OK. Let’s move on to the error in the idea that “the proximate end” must be singular.

You mean this error?

One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end … (Aquinas)

The moral object is twofold – save five and directly kill one.

You apparently don’t distinguish object from objectives. The objectives would be the intent, not the object, and nowhere is there an intent to kill one. “Save five” is not an object in the sense the word is used in this discussion. An object is an act and its proximate end.

In fact the object is neither of these, let alone both of them. The intent is to save the five. The object is to divert the trolley away from the five. The consequences are that five are saved and one dies.

 

[o_mlly]

What post are they in again?

Now that we agree that the moral object has two effects, we can apply Ender’s rule for “direct” vs. “indirect”.

The definition of the object includes an effect and that effect is direct, subsequent/consequent effects are indirect.

Clearly the innocent person is killed by the trolley, the trolley was sent down the track when the switch was thrown, and throwing the switch with knowledge of that consequence was deliberate.

 

[o_mlly]

You apparently don’t distinguish object from objectives. The objectives would be the intent, not the object, and nowhere is there an intent to kill one. “Save five” is not an object in the sense the word is used in this discussion. An object is an act and its proximate end.

In fact the object is neither of these, let alone both of them. The intent is to save the five. The object is to divert the trolley away from the five. The consequences are that five are saved and one dies.

You apparently do not read the authoritative citations provided.

I don’t know how it is possible to make such a hash out of my comments …

Perhaps reading your own posts would show how it is possible to make such hash. Hash in, hash out.

Whatever does this last post mean?

Debate with one is fruitless if one employs, “I choose to ignore that” for any citation that exposes their arguments as contrary to Catholic morality. Your explicitly decided to ignore the last citation which makes nonsense of your latest post:

The primary determinant or source of the moral status of
an act is the act’s “moral object.”1 The object of a moral
act is the specific kind of action or behavior chosen.
The moral status of an act’s object is independent of the
person choosing.

To which you replied:

Your citation of The Moral Fonts of Action and Decision Making is interesting but not clarifying …

Ignoring that citation, you proceed to once again define the moral object font as dependent on the intent of the actor, the actor whose intent you prefer.

If you become a serious student of Catholic morality, look me up. These high school debating tactics are tiresome.

 

[Ender]

1. the moral object is independent of any particular agent’s intention, and
2. the proximate end of the act includes all deliberated moral outcomes.

(1) and (2) cannot both be true as the one contradicts the other. What is a deliberated moral outcome if not and end, an objective…an intent? In fact you’ve already contradicted (1) in post #863:

The intended end is always part of the moral object – one cannot intend what one cannot foresee.

If the moral object includes the intended end then clearly the moral object is not independent of the agent’s intention.

The object of the act is the same for the disinterested bystander as it is for another bystander who hates the innocent one and intends to kill.

Ah, I think this might be helpful: is the object the same in both cases? From the viewpoint of someone watching the action there would be no way to differentiate the actions of the bystander who throws the switch to save the five, and the person who throws it to kill the one. From his perspective the actions are identical.

From my perspective, however, they are very different. I have already defined the object in the first case as throwing the switch to reroute the trolley away from the five. In the second case (intentionally killing the one) the object would be throwing the switch to reroute the trolley at the one. The act is the same but the proximate ends are different so the objects are different.

Clearly both effects occur in both cases: the trolley moves away from the five and toward the one, but inasmuch as the object includes an end, and ends are intentional, the objects in the two cases are different because the proximate ends are different. It is the proximate end that is part of the object, not the proximate effect.

 

[Ender]

Now that we agree that the moral object has two effects, we can apply Ender’s rule for “direct” vs. “indirect”.

You cannot properly apply “my” rule where I have explicitly rejected your condition - that is, your contention that a moral object has two effects. I have never accepted that.

Me: The definition of the object includes an effect and that effect is direct, subsequent/consequent effects are indirect.

Conclusions based on my definition of the object are totally inapplicable when based on your definition.

The moral status of an act’s object is independent of the person choosing.

I think this is the comment that you misperceive. Take murder for example. Murder as an object is always immoral regardless of who does it, or why, but what constitutes murder? In fact murder is defined as intentional killing; intent is a key part of what makes an act murder.

No. 2263, the first in the subsection, introduces double-effect reasoning to show that not all actions which result in killing are intentional killing and forbidden by the Commandment; indeed, the teaching that controls the whole of the subsection is that what the Commandment excludes as murder is intentional killing. (Cardinal Dulles)

While it is surely true that the morality of a murder is independent of the person who chooses to do it, the definition of what constitutes a murder is determined by the proximate end - which is an intent, an objective, and very much not independent of the person involved.

 

[o_mlly]

I think this is the comment that you misperceive. Take murder for example. Murder as an object is always immoral regardless of who does it, or why, but what constitutes murder? In fact murder is defined as intentional killing; intent is a key part of what makes an act murder.

A bit of straw in this post. No one has contended that the bystander intends to kill.

What I think you misunderstand is than any act evil in its object is, by definition, intrinsically evil.

The consequentialists argue, as you do, (incorrectly) that the moral object includes subjective content and excludes moral content. Such casuistry eliminates the moral object font, the primary font according to JPII, from any meaningful (name removed by moderator)ut into the analysis of the morality of an act. Ample citations to VS have been given and ignored. But at least I tried.

 

[Economist]

The consequentialists argue, as you do, (incorrectly) that the moral object includes subjective content and excludes moral content.

There is no such thing as “moral” object. There is only the “object”, which may or may not be “moral” - based upon all the circumstances, the intent, and means. And, of course the “ethical system” one subscribes to. To call the “object” to be “moral object” automatically skews the whole concept, making it invalid.

But there is almost no hope that the opposition will understand and accept this problem.

 

[o_mlly]

There is no such thing as “moral” object. There is only the “object”, which may or may not be “moral” - based upon all the circumstances, the intent, and means. … To call the “object” to be “moral object” automatically skews the whole concept, making it invalid.

Well said – as a consequentialist.

The moral object is just the physical stuff and can be based on one’s intent. Thanks for confirming my understanding of the errors in the consequentialist’s argument.

 

[Economist]

Well said – as a consequentialist.

The moral object is just the physical stuff and can be based on one’s intent. Thanks for confirming my understanding of the errors in the consequentialist’s argument.

I wish you would really think it through. The object, the intent, the means, the outcome, the circumstances are all part of the “moral object”, if and only if TOGETHER they form a morally right action. Moral, of course according to the ethical system one subscribes to.

If the word “consequentialist” would mean that one ONLY cares about the outcome, that would be equally invalid. But that is NOT what the word “consequentialist” means. The proper way is to take everything into consideration, the object = the intent, the means and (to a certain, but lesser degree) the outcome.

Be as it may, the word salad of “moral object” unacceptable, because it confuses the separate parts or fonts.

The “trolley” problem is separated into the parts:

1. the object (saving the five people)
2. the means (flipping the switch)

OR

1. the object (killing the standalone person)
2. the means (flipping the switch).

What separates them? the intent. If you don’t understand it, there is nothing to talk about.

 

[o_mlly]

… there is nothing to talk about.

What made you think there was anything to talk about with me?

If you are an atheist then consequentialism is consistent with your disbelief. I would expect at least consistency in your ethics.

If one is a Catholic then one must believe that the moral object is not only one of the fonts, it is the most important of the three. You don’t. So, what’s your point?

 

[Economist]

What made you think there was anything to talk about with me?

Hope of some level of rationality. But actually I wanted to expose your incorrect views.

If you are an atheist then consequentialism is consistent with your disbelief.

If only you would understand the term of “consequentialist”. I tried to explain, but maybe I failed. Only someone wearing “blinders” would say that ONLY the outcome (the consequences) count, the rest being irrelevant.

If one is a Catholic then one must believe…

Being a Catholic cannot impose a “must” on someone’s beliefs or opinion.

 

[o_mlly]

Being a Catholic cannot impose a “must” on someone’s beliefs or opinion.

The Church only propose the truth. Faithful Catholic assent. You’re not Catholic. So, again – what’s your point?

 

[Ender]

A bit of straw in this post. No one has contended that the bystander intends to kill.

Nor was that the point of the comment. It was to demonstrate that there is an intent included in the object. Given that murder is an object, and that for an act to be considered murder the killing has to be intentional it ought to be clear that it must include the intent to kill. In the object. This is not the intent of the killing - why one does it - but the intent that makes it murder in the first place.

i What I think you misunderstand is than any act evil in its object is, by definition, intrinsically evil.

No one is confused about this, nor has it ever been questioned.

The consequentialists argue, as you do, (incorrectly) that the moral object includes subjective content and excludes moral content.

I don’t know what consequentialists argue, but I do know this is not an argument I’ve ever made. Just stick to my comments; don’t attribute someone else’s claims to me.

 

[o_mlly]

Nor was that the point of the comment. It was to demonstrate that there is an intent included in the object. Given that murder is an object, and that for an act to be considered murder the killing has to be intentional it ought to be clear that it must include the intent to kill. In the object. This is not the intent of the killing - why one does it - but the intent that makes it murder in the first place.

No, the moral object is corrupted if intent is injected, especially when preferentially injected which is what your latest argument does. That very casuistry is the method the utilitarians use to justify direct abortion.

Definitions matter. The difference between “murder” and “directly killing an innocent” is the former specifies intent and the latter does not. But both acts are intrinsically evil. “Murder” is just the special case of “directly killing an innocent”. No one accuses the bystander who acts of murder so introducing “murder” into the debate does not clarify any points about “intent in the object” but does introduce “some straw”.

So, the intrinsically evil act is so because the act’s moral object is evil. We need not even evaluate the intent or circumstance fonts. The act is already vitiated.

The road to hell is paved with good intentions (Saint Bernard of Clairvaux).

I don’t know what consequentialists argue, but I do know this is not an argument I’ve ever made. Just stick to my comments; don’t attribute someone else’s claims to me.

I simply am applying the “duck” principle to your argument. Yes, your argument is precisely consequentialism. At the risk of being ignored once again, I point out your arguments consequentialist errors. Your last candidates for moral object are:

I struggle to define the object so I’m open to adjustments here, but at the moment this [Throw the switch to divert the trolley] seems right (I could also accept “Throw the switch to divert the trolley away from the five.”)

Examine your argument. Read Vertias Splendor’s condemnation of consequentialism. Your first choice at defining the moral object is purely physical lacking moral content (condemned in VS p. 78). Your second choice injects a particular agent’s intention and neglects the inclusion of the evil end foreseen by all agents (condemned in VS p. 79).

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Ender:

I struggle to define the object so I’m open to adjustments here, but at the moment this [ Throw the switch to divert the trolley ] seems right (I could also accept “Throw the switch to divert the trolley away from the five.” )

Read Vertias Splendor’s condemnation of consequentialism. Your first choice at defining the moral object is purely physical lacking moral content (condemned in VS p. 78).

I suppose o_mlly means this from Veritas Spendor:

By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person.

which suggests Ender’s second definition is more appropriate, of which o_mlly says:

o_mlly:

Your second choice injects a particular agent’s intention and neglects the inclusion of the evil end foreseen by all agents (condemned in VS p. 79).

First of all, VS does not condemn the injection of the agent’s intention, as VS even says “deliberate decision” and “act of willing”, both of which relate to intention. But the “condemnation” o_mlly speaks of would be this from VS:

One must therefore reject the thesis, characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species — its “object” — the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or specific acts, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned.

This may be confusing and requires some careful parsing. But it is very well summarized by the paragraph heading: "Intrinsic evil": it is not licit to do evil that good may come of it. It is also sometimes described as “the ends do not justify the means”. But what are the means? They are events that serve to bring about the desired end. Here we must distinguish between means that bring about desired ends and consequences that follow the act, but do not bring about the desired ends. VS only condemns evil means that bring about the desired ends. It does not condemn evil consequences that follow the act but do not bring about the desired ends. In the trolley problem, the death of the one man is clearly in the second category. Yes, it is evil. Yes, it happens as result of diverting the trolley. But the trolley striking the one man dead is not the means of saving the five. It contributes nothing to their safety. It does not assist the bystander in any way in accomplishing the desired end. This makes it just a consequence, not any different from the death of a baby in an ectopic pregnancy after the tube has been removed. By contrast, cutting the baby out of the tube, or dissolving the baby with methotrexate does make the death of the baby the means by which the life of the mother is saved. Therefore that act would be condemned by p. 79 of VS.

 

[o_mlly]

What post are they in again?

The debate in this thread is about the application of Catholic moral theology to an abstract, some would say, frivolous case. Not so. The consequentialist arguments from those who would allow the direct killing of an innocent on the track are identical to those who would allow direct abortions. One such proponent is Rhonheimer:

Rhonheimer states that the killing of the infant through a craniotomy [the crushing of the child’s head] is

the unwilling consequence of an act that is good in itself—saving the life that can be saved—and perhaps even required. Therefore, the killing should be called non-intentional because it cannot even determine the act on the level of object, since it is not intended. (Rhonheimer 2009b, 40)

However, this begs the question again, because he simply declares the craniotomy to be an act good in itself because it saves the life that can be saved.

The publication below shows Rhonheimer arguments are the same arguments as my interlocutors. The article also clarifies the real difference between “direct” and “indirect” as I posted back in #522:

“Proximate” in moral theology means “unmediated” that is immediately, not in time but absent any intervening causes.

After reading the article, please let me know if the clarification you asked for on “direct” and “indirect” is resolved. If not then identify the mediating cause that would allow the innocent one’s death to be “indirectly” caused by the bystander’s act.

Moral theological analysis of direct versus indirect abortion

Cases of a vital conflict, where the lives of both the mother and child are at risk during pregnancy, have been the subject of recent vigorous debate. The basic principles put forth in the Ethical and Religious Directives are reviewed, as is the principle ...

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

Frankly, a debate over action theory and the meaning of “direct” and “indirect” has been going on for thirty years and during that time it was an interesting debate among highly respected theologians and philosophers. However, it is no longer a topic for debate among theoreticians.

If the action theory proposed by Rhonheimer is accepted, it could be very difficult to avoid death-dealing actions from taking place in Catholic hospitals.

Rhonheimer appears to be saying that a chosen human action can be indifferent; that is, it can have no inherent moral character. However, this assumption simply does not comport with any moral theory developed and utilized by the magisterium.

Rhonheimer continues to confuse the moral issues by the way in which he formulates them.

Rhonheimer wants to make his moral judgment solely on the basis of intention, prescinding from what actually occurs in the physical world of cause and effect. … This simply cannot be a correct interpretation of the encyclical.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

The debate in this thread is about the application of Catholic moral theology to an abstract, some would say, frivolous case. Not so. The [consequentialist] arguments from those who would allow the direct killing of an innocent on the track are identical to those who would allow direct abortions.

Not so. A distinction has been shown again and again. It is has to do with the distinction between the means to an end a consequence that is not a means. In direct abortion, the death of the baby is the means to some end. In the trolley problem the death of the one on the track is not the means to anything. It is a consequence. Lumping the the two uses together is over-simplification as it ignores this difference.

After reading the article, please let me know if the clarification you asked for on “direct” and “indirect” is resolved. If not then identify the mediating cause that would allow the innocent one’s death to be “indirectly” caused by the bystander’s act.

The article cited did not define “indirect” in terms of a mediating cause. Indeed the word “mediating” only appears once in the article, and not in the context of defining “indirect”. However the article does mention “indirect” 16 times, and in all those 16 times it appears consistent with the bystander’s action in the trolley problem.

The publication below shows Rhonheimer arguments are the same arguments as my interlocutors.

No, if anything the article by Mr. Hass supports the arguments of o_mlly’s interlocutors. Indirect is used by Mr. Hass to describe the removal of a cancerous uterus:
John Hass:

An example of a so-called indirect abortion would be the case of a pregnant woman who is suffering from uterine cancer. The cancerous uterus must be removed to save the life of the mother even though it is foreseen that the child will die. Such an intervention would be permitted by the principle of double effect.

The death of the child when the uterus is removed is foreseen just as the death of the man on the tracks is foreseen when the bystander throws the switch. One might try to argue that the two cases are different because the man would not die if the switch were not thrown, whereas the child is expected to die. However that is not a significant difference, as the fate of the child in the uterus is not known, only surmised. If the cancer is small enough, it is entirely possible that he might be born alive if left alone.