Catholic view on utilitarianism

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While being under threat may be justification for indirectly killing someone it does not play a role in determining if they are killed directly or indirectly. Indeed, if it matters whether it is one of the five or a bystander who pulls the lever that would imply the killing is indeed indirect.
I wish we all would be more careful in our use of words. Words in moral theology have precise meanings and misusing those words only adds to the muddling of the issues we are trying to sort out in this thread.

The lethal self-defense act (e.g., shoots the attacker in the head) directly kills the attacker. The defender does not intend the death of the attacker, but does intend to preserve his own life. Therefore, the defendant’s indirectly intends to kill the attacker. The lethal act, however, is quite direct just as the bystander’s act of throwing the switch parallels the defendant’s pulling the trigger. Both acts directly kill.

One poster claims quite repeatedly that I introduced the notions of direct and indirect acts into this thread. That’s not true. Interestingly, it is the one who assigns it to me that introduced ectopic pregnancy – the rare case that has special treatment in Catholic morality and not much at all to do with the trolley case. To wit:
And please, do not quote any more treatises on the morality of removing a tubal pregnancy
Well, you initiated the comparison way back in post#144. You got it almost right then. What happened? I only corrected your misuse of terms. (The correct description of the death of the infant via salpingectomy is an “indirect abortion”, not as you wrote “an inessential consequence”.)
 
And yet you used the same entry, 2264, to cover people protecting themselves from physical situations that did not involve an aggressor.
That’s is not correct.

I did not cite 2264 as teaching that one ought to protect their own lives from physical evils but that one’s obligation to protect their own life is greater than their duty to protect another’s. The teaching justifies the mother’s act of indirect abortion.
Clearly the same principles that allow someone to defend themselves from an aggressor also allow them to defend their lives in situations that don’t.
Sorry, friend, it is not clear at all. Please finish your sentence. “that don’t” what?

And what principles are you referring to? One does not defend with “lethal action” against a tornado, the tornado does not will itself into your backyard, the tornado is not an aggressor.

Are you just avoiding agreeing that self-defense principles do not apply to physical evils?
Almost any virtue can be a fault if taken too far. If you are so careful with your wording that you make distinctions that other people would not automatically follow then you really just made yourself more difficult to understand.

I can totally understand how the distinction was so clear in your mind that you did not feel the need to explain it. Now that you know that’s not how I was using the term, though, why are you still arguing as if I was?
If you are charging me with being precise, I plead guilty. But the charge that I did not “explain it” is outrageous. After 300 + posts, numerous citations to authoritative documents, I have explained it well to those who have eyes and ears. For those who choose not to do their home work, their ignorance is willful.

You agreed that the innocent one has a right to self-defense. The axiomatic corollaries in Catholic moral theology for self-defense are clear. Perhaps more homework is in order.
False. You can’t say that we agree on something when we were clearly taking different meanings from it.
It is not what I say but your own words – the admission of the innocent one’s right to self-defense – that preclude anything other than our agreement: the bystander who acts is an evil aggressor.
 
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And yet you used the same entry, 2264, to cover people protecting themselves from physical situations that did not involve an aggressor.
That’s is not correct.

I did not cite 2264 as teaching that one ought to protect their own lives from physical evils but that one’s obligation to protect their own life is greater than their duty to protect another’s. The teaching justifies the mother’s act of indirect abortion.
You applied it to situations where protecting one’s life came at the cost of another person’s, even where an aggressor wasn’t involved. Clearly it doesn’t just apply when there is an aggressor.
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Clearly the same principles that allow someone to defend themselves from an aggressor also allow them to defend their lives in situations that don’t.
Sorry, friend, it is not clear at all. Please finish your sentence. “that don’t” what?
…that don’t involve an aggressor.

Also, you misunderstand. I am saying that the principles that allow someone to defend their life against an attacker also allow them to defend their life in general. You said it yourself, people clearly have a greater obligation to protect their own lives than those of others. The mother does get to defend her life, though her options are more constrained because the baby is not attacking her.

Keep in mind, back when I answered your question I specified that people could defend themselves provided the requirements of double effect were met. I did not give the man on the track carte blanche to do whatever he had to, only whatever he could morally do.
But the charge that I did not “explain it” is outrageous. After 300 + posts, numerous citations to authoritative documents, I have explained it well to those who have eyes and ears. For those who choose not to do their home work, their ignorance is willful.
Don’t overgeneralize. I am saying that your arbitrary distinction between self defense and self protection was not clear when you asked the question. Not making that clear before you asked was fine so long as you accept that I did not answer with that distinction in mind.
It is not what I say but your own words – the admission of the innocent one’s right to self-defense – that preclude anything other than our agreement: the bystander who acts is an evil aggressor.
Both my original answer and my subsequent comments make it clear I was neither saying nor accepting that the innocent man was allowed to treat the bystander as an unjust aggressor, merely defend himself from injury and death with any available moral means. Trying to shoehorn my words into a context that was not apparent when they were said is disingenuous. Even moreso when you continue doing so after you’ve already been corrected.

You set a decent verbal trap, but it didn’t work. Move on.
 
You applied it to situations where protecting one’s life came at the cost of another person’s, even where an aggressor wasn’t involved. Clearly it doesn’t just apply when there is an aggressor.
And your point is?
I specified that people could defend themselves provided the requirements of double effect were met. I did not give the man on the track carte blanche to do whatever he had to, only whatever he could morally do.
I wrote that only “morally licit” means could be employed. But, apparently, you think something in the principles of the double effect prevent the innocent one from acting in self-defense. So run us through the principles and show us how they conclude the innocent man on the track may not defend himself.
I am saying that your arbitrary distinction between self defense and self protection was not clear when you asked the question. Not making that clear before you asked was fine so long as you accept that I did not answer with that distinction in mind.
Why do you think my distinction is arbitrary? I gave the reasons. Point out the flaw in the logic. That the distinction was not clear to you is not my failing but rather yours. I once had a peer who managed a group that was failing in its task. He blamed the group for poor advice. When his subordinates showed that he was properly advised, his response was, “You should have told me harder.” He was fired.
Trying to shoehorn my words into a context that was not apparent when they were said is disingenuous.
Well, the real you displays itself again. “Shoehorn”? “Trap”? Wow, anything other than admit your ignorance. Friend, it is your own ignorance that keeps you from seeing the truth. Back to the no-fly list. Do your homework.
 
I’ll deal with the rest of your reply in another post, but let me get this taken care of first.
Well, the real you displays itself again. “Shoehorn”? “Trap”? Wow, anything other than admit your ignorance. Friend, it is your own ignorance that keeps you from seeing the truth. Back to the no-fly list. Do your homework.
@o_mlly, there’s nothing wrong with setting a verbal trap. It’s a perfectly legitimate rhetorical device meant to catch people in a mistake. You asked your question hoping I’d give an answer you could use to trip me up. There’s nothing wrong with that. The only problem is you tried to spring it anyways even though the answer I gave wasn’t what your trap needed. Hence the shoehorning.

On the other hand there’s nothing admirable at all about your ad hominems. This is the behavior that makes it difficult to talk with you for any length of time. Far from making you seem learned, they make you seem petty and ill informed, which is a shame because you’ve obviously studied.
 
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Clearly the same principles that allow someone to defend themselves from an aggressor also allow them to defend their lives in situations that don’t.
Sorry, friend, it is not clear at all. Please finish your sentence. “that don’t” what?
From the context of the sentence just before the one you quoted, the meaning is clear, to wit:
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And yet you used the same entry, 2264, to cover people protecting themselves from physical situations that did not involve an aggressor. Clearly the same principles that allow someone to defend themselves from an aggressor also allow them to defend their lives in situations that don’t.
Therefore the way to understand “don’t” is “don’t involve an aggressor”. Here “aggressor” is taken to mean a person who is intending harm. So for our purposes this means one may defend against a threat in which a person is the physical cause of the threat even if that person is not an aggressor in the sense just described. In particular, the one man on the track may legitimately defend himself against a threat caused by the bystander without having to conclude that the bystander is an unjust aggressor.

This sort of situation where two people are both in a position to do something that could harm the other without either of them being unjust has a precedent in times of war. Soldiers fighting in a duly constituted army are sometimes brought into conflict with soldiers from the opposing side in a war between nations. In complicated cases, soldiers on the front lines are not liable for making the full determination of whether their nation’s cause follows the Catholic principles of a just war. That responsibility falls on the leaders, and especially on the top leaders who made the decision to declare war. But the soldiers may now know all the facts that the leaders know. It is morally permissible for soldiers to trust their superiors on this question. The Church has never declared that individual low-level soldiers are responsible for making the decision to go to war. Therefore we can have the situation where two opposing soldiers are both trying to harm the other. Both of them have the right of self-defense. But neither of them are necessarily unjust in the eyes of the Church. This is just one example, but it is a common one. Therefore the whole argument that the right of self-defense of the one man on the track proves the bystander acts unjustly is a bogus argument without any foundation.
 
… there’s nothing wrong with setting a verbal trap … to catch people in a mistake.
Apparently, you equate clever with being wise. I don’t. Being clever might be OK for high school debaters on some trivial topic but it is wrong for truth seekers on Catholic Answers. I see in another forum that some Catholics are arguing from the same errors posted here that adultery may be licit if one just has a good intention. Shame on those here, especially those who claim to be Catholic, that give currency to the errors of consequentialism for they scandalize the children.

Our conversation is over.
 
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… there’s nothing wrong with setting a verbal trap … to catch people in a mistake.
Apparently, you equate clever with being wise. I don’t. Being clever might be OK for high school debaters on some trivial topic but it is wrong for truth seekers on Catholic Answers. I see in another forum that some Catholics are arguing from the same errors posted here that adultery may be licit if one just has a good intention. Shame on those here, especially those who claim to be Catholic, that give currency to the errors of consequentialism for they scandalize the children.

Our conversation is over.
It certainly is. You couldn’t even make it a day before going back to the accusations and labels.
 
I was neither saying nor accepting that the innocent man was allowed to treat the bystander as an unjust aggressor, merely defend himself from injury and death with any available moral means.
What are you saying then about the concrete options the One may (or may not) take to prevent the bystander from throwing the lever? May the One act against the bystander?
 
He is as constrained in his choice of actions as the doctor and mother in the ectopic problem, which is to say if he has actions he can take short of directly killing the bystander (or other inherently evil actions) he can use them to save his life.

I can make this clearer with the second modified trolley problem where the innocent man is in the trolley and the bystander is on the track. If the bystander redirects the trolley he lives and the innocent man dies, if he does not he dies and the innocent man lives. The innocent man, if he had an override switch, could stop the redirect and run over the bystander. He could not just shoot the bystander to stop him, though.
 
The innocent man, if he had an override switch, could stop the redirect and run over the bystander. He could not just shoot the bystander to stop him, though.
In a case of self defense one may use lethal force when necessary. Why is it not allowed in this case? I accept that the innocent man cannot preemptively shoot the bystander on the possibility that he might throw the switch, but if he makes a move toward the switch that can reasonably be interpreted as intent then why is it not an act of legitimate self defense to shoot him?

I recognize this as a completely different case than the one being discussed for so long.
 
I wouldn’t say completely different. I only chose this modified version because it was easier to demonstrate the innocent doing something that killed the bystander. In the regular trolley problem if the innocent uses an override switch it is the five that die, not the bystander, but he can still use it. He can’t shoot the bystander, though.

The reason is the same as in the ectopic pregnancy case, neither the baby or the the bystander are attacking, they are just doing things that will lead to death. Therefore the doctor, mother, and innocent man can’t directly kill to save themselves.
 
The consequentialist argues that the moral quality (species) of the act does not matter, only outcomes in determining the morality of the act. If the bystander’s mother were the one tied to the sidetrack then the moral act would be matricide (for the true consequentialist).

Leaving that particular consequentialist’s dilemma aside, the proportionalists argue in a similar way emphasizing their ability to know the value of outcomes. Having measured the outcomes, the morality of the act becomes a simple math exercise. Their calculus in the trolley case relies on an ability to measure the value of a human life. Is that possible? Can one claim that four lives are more valuable than one? In Evangelium Vitae , St. JPII teaches on the value of human life and the separateness of persons:
Man is called to a fullness of life which far exceeds the dimensions of his earthly existence, because it consists in sharing the very life of God. The loftiness of this supernatural vocation reveals the greatness and the inestimable value of human life even in its temporal phase.

the sacred value of human life from its very beginning until its end

the incomparable value of every human person

how priceless the value of his life.

Such an attitude [accepts selective abortion] is shameful and utterly reprehensible, since it presumes to measure the value of a human life

Life certainly has a sacred and religious value
The transcendent value of the person disallows valuing that life by any numeric calculation. Even though inestimable, does the inestimable value of one life equal the inestimable value of another’s life? Are four infinities greater than one infinity? No. The separateness of persons prevents the aggregation of many lives to be superior to one life.
the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.
If true, what about the mother/fetus case? How is the mother/fetus case different than the bystander/innocent one case? The cases are not identical. The mother’s moral standing is categorically different than the bystander’s for her life is in jeopardy. She does not make a calculation that her life is of greater value than her unborn fetus. Her right to life, not the value of her life, is as sacred as her child’s right. She is not obliged to prefer the life of the fetus to her own. The mother’s life is threatened by the body of another. She decides to separate herself from the imminent threat. Prudentially, she knows the fetus will die as a result. Prudentially, she knows also that neither she nor her fetus will survive if she does not act.

The innocent one’s body poses no threat to the bystander, lethal or otherwise. The proportionalist bystander presumes to measure what is beyond measuring. Catholics believe that human lives do not have an additive property. So do our enlightened secular friends who accept the same premise: human life is invaluable:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/
For if the deaths of the five cannot be summed, their deaths are not worse than the death of the one …
 
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If true, what about the mother/fetus case? How is the mother/fetus case different than the bystander/innocent one case? The cases are not identical. The mother’s moral standing is categorically different than the bystander’s for her life is in jeopardy. She does not make a calculation that her life is of greater value than her unborn fetus. Her right to life, not the value of her life, is as sacred as her child’s right. She is not obliged to prefer the life of the fetus to her own. The mother’s life is threatened by the body of another. She decides to separate herself from the imminent threat. Prudentially, she knows the fetus will die as a result. Prudentially, she knows also that neither she nor her fetus will survive if she does not act.
So if one of the 5 could reach the swutch they could morally throw it?
 
So if one of the 5 could reach the swutch they could morally throw it?
If any of the five could reach the switch and doing so does not remove the lethal threat by the trolley then yes.
… a human being must be recognized as having the rights of a person - among which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life.
The bystander’s whose life is not threatened may not act to protect a right that is not at risk. She is innocent until she wills to throw the switch and becomes an aggressor.
 
In the regular trolley problem if the innocent uses an override switch it is the five that die, not the bystander, but he can still use it. He can’t shoot the bystander, though.
What are the moral objects of the 2 actions (of the one) you mention here, viz:
  • press button to direct the train at the 5;
  • shoot bystander who is in the process of directing the train at the one.
 
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The reason is the same as in the ectopic pregnancy case, neither the baby or the the bystander are attacking, they are just doing things that will lead to death.
The difference between “attacking” and “doing things that will lead to death” is pretty thin. It seems that if a person is doing something that will lead to my death I have a right to defend myself whether or not I know why the action is taken, and it is motivation alone that distinguishes a deliberate attack from an incidental but deadly action.
Therefore the doctor, mother, and innocent man can’t directly kill to save themselves.
I think at this point the similarity between the pregnancy and the trolley case breaks down. The fetus is not an active participant doing anything at all; it’s existence is the threat, not its actions.
 
If any of the five could reach the switch and doing so does not remove the lethal threat by the trolley then yes.
Is there a typo here or can you rephrase? If there is no mistake I don’t get what you’re trying to say.
 
He’s allowing the possibility that merely reaching the switch sounds like it eliminates the threat to the 5. He’s saying if the 5 remain in mortal danger, they may act to defend themselves.
 
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