Catholicism and Circular Reasoning: Take Two

[Sarpedon]

I’m not an expert on this by any means- I’m an undergraduate student of philosophy. Nevertheless, I’ll cite relevant explanations from Gilson and the citations he provides to St. Thomas.

Do you have some info (e.g., a Thomas cite) about the relationship between actus essendi and ens? Is the actus essendi of a creature the same as God’s esse? Do creatures “participate” in God’s esse?

To understand this doctrine in its proper nature, it is necessary to remember that esse, like every verb, designates an act* and not a state. The state in which the esse places that which receives it is the state of ens, that is to say, of that which is a “being.” Because essenses are the proper object of human understanding, we tend ceaselessly to step down from the plane of the act-of-being to that of things (res). This is a natural inclination, but the metaphysician must make every effort to remount, that is to emphasize that being has meaning only in relation to actual existence**. Beyond that is most perfect and most profound in the real, there is nothing. Now, what is the most perfect is the act-of-being (ipsum esse) “since it is related to all things as their act. In fact, nothing has any actuality save in that it exists. The act-of-being (ipsume esse) is the actuality of everything else, even including forms. Its relation to other things therefore is not that of receiver to received but of received to receiver. Indeed, when I say of a man, or of a horse, or of anything else: that exists, the act-of-being (ipsum esse) is taken as formal and recieved, and not as that to which the act-of-being belongs.”*** St. Thomas is here noticeably making, as it were, a supreme effort, so much so that the meaning fairly rings through the formulae, to express the unique character of ipsum esse and its transcendence. But precisely because it is the summit of the real, it is also its heart. “The act-of-existing is more intimate to anything whatsoever that is what determines it.”**** (pg 34)

• Contra Gentiles I, 22.
  ** Summa, I, 5, I, to 1.
  *** Summa, I, 4, I, to 3
  **** In II Sent., I, I, 4.

 

[JDaniel]

Here is my new toy. Lets see if we can break it.

A common statement of the infinite regress objection is something like this.

**
…since the chain of events is eternal, the chain itself does not need a cause…**

1. …since… This word can be expressed as an equality from its context, (=)

2…the chain of events is eternal,…

This statement can be expressed as infinite series of contingent beings, let this statement be (x)

3…the chain itself does not need a cause…

This statement can be expressed as necessary being let this statement be

Therefore this statement can be reduced to…x=y (A=notA)!!!

Applying the Law of Identity we see an immediate contradiction. Therefore infinite regress arguments that fit the form of the statement since the chain of events is eternal, the chain itself does not need a cause" are logical contradictions.

Anyone interested feel free to beat on it a bit so I can see if its worth pursuing this line of argumentation. My standard response now is to refuse to talk about a single element of the set and refer to the entire set as a being contingent on the person who posed the argument to me. That works, but I would like a more elegant and brief demonstration so I can pass it around.

Warp:

The thing that people seem to always forget is that actual infinity simply does not exist. (God is the only extant being that we are compelled to understand as being infinite.) It is merely a “thing” of the imagination, i.e., a “thought.” Nothing more and nothing less. It is a grammatical extrapolation from potential infinity. But, at any point in a potentially infinite chain it is no more than finite, i.e., it has nothing to do with infinity any longer. At this very instant, if we were a point in potentially infinite time, or potentially infinite motion, or potentially infinite causing, we summarily define the reality of whatever number we are, which infinity can never do. The number 7 denotes the name of the set “7.” Infinity is not a number, rather, it is an indeterminate. The mere fact that we make it a noun, as a part of speech, does not ipso facto make it ontologically real, i.e., does not instill in it any actuality, i.e., any “being-ness.”

Our friend is trying to treat infinity as something that can regress - from where we are right now. But that is merely a finity, regardless of whether or not we expect it to progress into the future. You cannot have, for example, an infinite past time if that continuum ends at the interior wall of said continuum: which is the Now. The Now is neither past nor future. The Now is that which separates the two continua: that neither drags the past into the future, nor pulls any part of the future into the past.

Part of the problem with this is that we are want treat “infinity” as a noun, i.e., the name of a person, place, or thing, but, we can’t treat “finite” that same way. We have to add something to the word that we are not used to doing, which is, a “-ty.” (Of course, only after removing the “e.”) Trying to make the adjective a noun presents a problem, as we can see.

(This is a good example of how illogical language can be and why we must be so careful in philosophy.)

God bless,
jd

 

[Sarpedon]

There is the principle that “esse” is received according to the “mode” of the essence.
Does this mean that the creature’s esse is ontologically distinct from God’s esse?

Partially addressed above, but additionally below. This may be addressed more fully later (I haven’t finished the whole book, and I may have missed some critical passages as I was reviewing for these posts).

When it is thus related to existence, form ceases to appear as the ultimate determination of the real. Let us agree to call “essential” every ontology, or doctrine of being, for which the notion of essence and the notion of being are equivalent. We will then say that in an “essential ontology” the form element, which achieves the completion of substance, is the very core of reality. But this can no longer hold for an “existential ontology” where the form is further actuated by existence. From this second point of view, the substantial form appears as a secondary quo est subordinated to this primary quo est which is the act of existing. Beyond form which makes a being be such a being belonging to a given determined species, we must therefore place “to be” or the act-of-being, which makes the substance thus constituted “a being.” As St. Thomas says: “The act-of-being (ipsum esse) is like the act itself with regard to the form itself. For if we say that in composites of matter and form the form is the principal of existence (principium essendi), it is because it achieves the substance whose act is the act-of-being (ipsum esse).”* Thus form is only the principle of existence to the extend that it achieves substance, which is that which exists. (pg. 33)

• Contra Gentiles. 2, 54.

Certainly, there is something like a real distinction between esse and essence (for created ens).

Absolutely, for only in God is essence equivalent to esse- I AM WHO AM.

To source Gilson’s work, I’m referring to the following book, which is excellent:
amazon.com/Christian-Philosophy-St-Thomas-Aquinas/dp/0268008019/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1311739557&sr=8-1

 

[Perplexity]

Guys, I apologize but as I said earlier I’m going to have to bow out of the discussion. I just don’t have the time to do justice to the topic and everyone’s posts. There are too many good points to consider, to address and respond to. My argument seems more like the kind of thing I will discuss one on one with a Catholic. Otherwise, I’m simply doing an injustice to the topic and not considering your guy’s points in the way they deserve. Thanks for your objections, critiques and efforts though, they’ve greatly helped clarify the argument, expose some of its weaknesses, refined it and just made for a good debate.

Peace guys

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Warp:

The thing that people seem to always forget is that actual infinity simply does not exist. (God is the only extant being that we are compelled to understand as being infinite.) It is merely a “thing” of the imagination, i.e., a “thought.” Nothing more and nothing less. It is a grammatical extrapolation from potential infinity. But, at any point in a potentially infinite chain it is no more than finite, i.e., it has nothing to do with infinity any longer. At this very instant, if we were a point in potentially infinite time, or potentially infinite motion, or potentially infinite causing, we summarily define the reality of whatever number we are, which infinity can never do. The number 7 denotes the name of the set “7.” Infinity is not a number, rather, it is an indeterminate. The mere fact that we make it a noun, as a part of speech, does not ipso facto make it ontologically real, i.e., does not instill in it any actuality, i.e., any “being-ness.”

Our friend is trying to treat infinity as something that can regress - from where we are right now. But that is merely a finity, regardless of whether or not we expect it to progress into the future. You cannot have, for example, an infinite past time if that continuum ends at the interior wall of said continuum: which is the Now. The Now is neither past nor future. The Now is that which separates the two continua: that neither drags the past into the future, nor pulls any part of the future into the past.

Part of the problem with this is that we are want treat “infinity” as a noun, i.e., the name of a person, place, or thing, but, we can’t treat “finite” that same way. We have to add something to the word that we are not used to doing, which is, a “-ty.” (Of course, only after removing the “e.”) Trying to make the adjective a noun presents a problem, as we can see.

(This is a good example of how illogical language can be and why we must be so careful in philosophy.)

God bless,
jd

Excellent exposition of the argument. I am looking for a more elegant and direct method of refutation. More tools in my job box.

 

[jochoa]

Guys, I apologize but as I said earlier I’m going to have to bow out of the discussion. I just don’t have the time to do justice to the topic and everyone’s posts. There are too many good points to consider, to address and respond to. My argument seems more like the kind of thing I will discuss one on one with a Catholic. Otherwise, I’m simply doing an injustice to the topic and not considering your guy’s points in the way they deserve. Thanks for your objections, critiques and efforts though, they’ve greatly helped clarify the argument, expose some of its weaknesses, refined it and just made for a good debate.

Peace guys

You have an excellent essence my friend! You have excellent thoughts from your post, you are sincere and considerate, and appreciative! Continue to always be patient and kind, and when you can’t do it on your own, seek the Holy Trinity!

Your questions were very good questions that helped me consider my faith! Thank you for helping me grow and find greater peace, happiness, and energy.

 

[levinas12]

Partially addressed above, but additionally below. This may be addressed more fully later I haven’t finished the whole book, and I may have missed some critical passages as I was reviewing for these posts).

• Contra Gentiles. 2, 54.

Thank for the cites. They’re very helpful. You are a very advanced undergraduate.

My question about whether the creature’s esse is identical with God’s esse came up in previous postings in this forum. The argument turned on the “oneness” of esse. I was supporting the position that the creature’s esse was not identical, i.e., that the actus essendi was exercised by the creature, belonged to the creature, and could be considered as separate from God’s esse. But apart from finding quotes in the ST about God not having a real relation to the creatures, I could not nail the issue down. In fact, there is a lot of Thomist commentary about the creature’s esse being a “participation” in the Divine Esse. Would “participation” mean identity?

 

[Sarpedon]

Thank for the cites. They’re very helpful. You are a very advanced undergraduate.

My question about whether the creature’s esse is identical with God’s esse came up in previous postings in this forum. The argument turned on the “oneness” of esse. I was supporting the position that the creature’s esse was not identical, i.e., that the actus essendi was exercised by the creature, belonged to the creature, and could be considered as separate from God’s esse. But apart from finding quotes in the ST about God not having a real relation to the creatures, I could not nail the issue down. In fact, there is a lot of Thomist commentary about the creature’s esse being a “participation” in the Divine Esse. Would “participation” mean identity?

I haven’t yet reached the part of the book where I think he talks about this directly. I skimmed looking for quotes, but didn’t find any off the bat. I’m interested in this myself, so I’ll let you know when I come across it.