P
pnewton
Guest
Yes. I think that is one example. I do not think conscience would every cause us an issue if we developed humility along with morality. We would always be conscious of the possibility of being wrong.
Chicago's Cupich on divorce: Pastor guides decisions, but person's conscience inviolable
- Status
P
pnewton
Guest
You* believe *the Church disagrees with him. Be careful. You are coming dangerously close to accusing an Archbishop of heresy for an allowable rephrasing of doctrine straight from the Catechism.
P
pnewton
Guest
As I said, one’s conscience should also include humility, which allows for the possibility one might be wrong. In such a case where one might be wrong, it is useful to examine one’s motives. Is an act being considered because it is personally edifying? If so, then why not simply postpone the action until you understand more fully the conflict with Church teaching. You might learn there is no actual conflict, or come to understand why the Church teaches this thing.
So much of what we call conscience is justification. We say to ourselves, “I do not see anything wrong with this.” That is the wrong thinking. The question should be where we see anything morally good in an action. Take for example remarriage. One may believe, in good conscience, they have the right to remarry without an annulment. Okay, perhaps I see that in one that was raised as I was. What I do not see people believing though is that one has a moral* obligation *to re-marry without an annulment. Therefore, there is a clear path to follow that does not violate either Church law, or one’s conscience. Simply wait.
P
PaulinVA
Guest
Exactly. Someone wants to use artificial birth control, and, surprise, their conscience tells them it’s okay! What a coincidence!
I think the better example of the primacy of the conscience is that the Church says that if you have irregular periods or whatever, you may use hormone therapy that could render you unable to achieve pregnancy. The Church says you can still have marital relations, but your conscience tells you that in your case, you should abstain from relations. That’s what I’ve always thought about the conscience - it can be more stringent than Church, but never less stringent…
L
LongingSoul
Guest
A case that might engage the conscience more deeply is one where a person is told they could die if they became pregnant. The negative result of a death to some peoples minds outweighs the Church’s opposition to contraception. This is an example of what I said earlier highlights how younger people don’t really understand the concept of ‘intrinsic’ evil.
E
Ender
Guest
It is not enough simply to repeat this phrase without an explanation of what it means in practice. If I disagree in good faith with a doctrine of the church am I free to act contrary to it? Yes or no?
As I asked before: if conscience is king am I not free to do what I believe is right, whatever that is? Further, if the church actually teaches this, then I should expect not to be held accountable for my errors. So why does the church teach that I may in fact be held to account?
The interpretation that the individual’s conscience takes precedence over the doctrines of the church sets up an impossible situation. It cannot be a valid understanding of that passage.
Ender
P
ProVobis
Guest
That’s why in many cases IMO it is wiser to state “IMO.” Just sayin.
P
pnewton
Guest
Sometimes the conscience is more strict, sometimes not as strict. In either case, most of the time there is a path that accommodates both.
E
Ender
Guest
I think the problem is with the word “certain.” It seems you are equating it with “true”, as in “how could we be certain of something if it wasn’t true?” But in fact just because we are certain in our own minds that what we do is right, this doesn’t make it so. Certainty on our part is not a guarantee of rightness. The conscience can err and certitude does not change that.
Ender
E
Ender
Guest
"Brendan 64:
Ender
If we are “conscious of the possibility of being wrong”, and we know that the act we have chosen is forbidden by the church, in what sense can it be said that our conscience is “certain” we are justified in acting? Do you seriously believe our consciences permit us to disregard church doctrines?
Ender
E
Ender
Guest
This implication is no more accurate coming from an archbishop than from anyone else on this forum. This is precisely the issue we have been debating, and if we are justified in rejecting your position as contrary to doctrine then we are equally justified in rejecting the same position from anyone else who suggests it.
I cannot conceive of a more disastrous teaching than “do whatever you think is right.”
Ender
T
Thomas_White
Guest
No. As CCC 1776 explains, God’s law is inscribed on the conscience. The conscience is innate and inherently a part of man’s nature.
No, and this is not the teaching of the Church. This is not to say Catholic teaching is not formative with respect to adhering to Catholic teaching. It certainly ought to be for a Catholic, **but it is learned behavior, ** and this is the critical difference. For a given person, it is the difference between heredity and environment. It is difficult to grasp, but to say that the environment is the determinative factor is what results in moral relativism, and in consequence there are inevitably endless disputes about what is good and what is evil. It is the philosophical perspective of secularism, and I say this charitably in an attempt to explain.
Should a priest tell a person to kill someone, I am sure a secular atheiest would know as well as anyone else that this was wrong. It would be a very perilous world indeed if humans did not know, as a result of conscience, that murder is wrong. Would a legitimate defense against the charge of murder be that the defendant had no knowledge of Catholic teaching? Consider for a moment ISIS and the wanton killing of Christians. Is this behavior inherent in the nature of every person in this group? Or is it learned behavior that is malleable?
It is safe to say that a person is allowed to have an abortion in spite of Church teaching. This is permitted by law and the important factor of conscience cannot be known with respect to a given person, i.e., how such a person truly feels about having an abortion. To act against conscience certainly does occur, and I would suggest that only a sociopath would not have a sense of right and wrong in the instance of abortion.
With all due respect, what was presented in the comment pretty well provides the perspective of legalism. I would not usually respond in such a direct fashion, but it is a question that today is a serious discussion within the Church.
T
Thomas_White
Guest
CCC 1800 provides the following: “A human being must always obey the certain judgment of his conscience” (emphasis added).
The word ‘certain’ speaks for itself, and I am not equating it to any other word. If one accepts CCC 1776, what is certain is God’s law inscribed on the conscience. CCC 1800 presents a moral imperative and is what a person ought to do. It is thus prescriptive.
Z
zz912
Guest
I wonder if the Archbishop will respect the consciences of those priests in his diocese that determine they must not give Communion to those who are divorced and remarried? Will he allow each pastor to follow his conscience on this matter?
L
LongingSoul
Guest
It’s a heavy read but Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologica explains the question Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?
As stated in the I, 79, 13, conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil; for it is written (Romans 14:23): “All that is not of faith”–i.e. all that is against conscience–“is sin.” Therefore the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the I, 19, 13), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire “whether an erring conscience binds.” On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent; some are evil generically. And they say that if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not to do something which is evil generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is evil. On the other hand if a man’s reason or conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man’s reason or conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of indifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say that when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or conscience is not evil.
But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (Article 3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that “properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not follow false reason.” We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.
newadvent.org/summa/2019.htm#article5
As stated in the I, 79, 13, conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil; for it is written (Romans 14:23): “All that is not of faith”–i.e. all that is against conscience–“is sin.” Therefore the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the I, 19, 13), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire “whether an erring conscience binds.” On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent; some are evil generically. And they say that if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not to do something which is evil generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is evil. On the other hand if a man’s reason or conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man’s reason or conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of indifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say that when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or conscience is not evil.
But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (Article 3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that “properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not follow false reason.” We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.
newadvent.org/summa/2019.htm#article5
T
Thomas_White
Guest
E
Ender
Guest
Your understanding means that a person may do whatever he feels is right.*It is safe to say that a person is allowed to have an abortion in spite of Church teaching.
*You have taken one passage from the catechism, provided your own interpretation of it, and ignored everything else the church says. Given your understanding, the church becomes irrelevant. Why would anyone bother learning what the church teaches if what the individual believes is all that matters? If I think contraception is acceptable - and it becomes so for me simply because that’s what I believe - then why would I want to investigate what the church teaches when it might cause me to doubt myself? What happens if I am convinced by the church’s teaching and change my mind? Now contraception becomes sinful because that is my new belief, but this means the act of contraception (and by extension, every act) is morally neutral because all that matters is my belief about it.
This is why Cupich’s comments are so damaging: it strengthens the belief that right and wrong do not actually exist. It is solely the individual’s belief that matters.
Ender
T
Thomas_White
Guest
In repIy, I will be as frank as you have been. The response was expected, and to say I have ignored everything the Chuch teaches by relying on what the CCC teaches about conscience was no surprise either. Is this contradiction not also a condemnation? That too is viewed as inevitable and as its own truth.
T
Thomas_White
Guest
In repIy, I will be as frank as you have been. The response was expected, and to say I have ignored everything the Chuch teaches by relying on what the CCC teaches about conscience was no surprise either. Is this contradiction not also a condemnation? This too is viewed as inevitable and is its own truth.
L
LongingSoul
Guest
But Aquinas is not saying anything different to the Catechism here. He affirms that if the will is at odds with an erring conscience, then that will is evil.
“We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.”
- Status