Closing the Gap from "First Cause" to "God"

[Spirithound]

1. Every apple is possibly red.
2. An orange cannot be red.
3. Therefore, an orange cannot be an apple.

So far so good, it seems, but if the argument is valid it should be valid for anything you might substitute for “orange” in which 2 is correct. But, this is not the case:

1. Every apple is possibly red.
2. A green apple cannot be red.
3. Therefore, a green apple cannot be an apple.

I would dispute the efficacy of this example because your first premise, “Every apple is possibly red” is false. Granny Smith apples are not red.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic, allow me to put the original claim next to your counter-argument in order to illustrate the disanalogy between the two.

1. Every existing thing is either limited or unlimited.
2. Necessarily, every limited thing is possibly caused.
3. A First Cause cannot be caused.
4. Therefore, a First Cause must be unlimited.

1*. Every existing apple is either red or not-red.
2*. Necessarily, every apple is possibly red.
3*. A green apple cannot be red.
4*. Therefore, a green apple cannot be an apple.

Notice that while (2) is arguably true, and that it introduces a new term (“caused”), (2*) suffers from the defect I already mentioned.

Edit: The disanalogy can be illustrated even clearer.

1. Every A is either B or ~B.
2. Necessarily, every B is possibly C.
3. D cannot be C.
4. Therefore, D must be ~B.

1*. Every A is either B or ~B.
2*. Necessarily, every A is possibly B.
3*. C cannot be B.
4*. Therefore, C cannot be A.

The difference between the two is unambiguously shown in the respective notations of each syllogism.

 

[punkforchrist]

I would dispute the efficacy of this example because your first premise, “Every apple is possibly red” is false. Granny Smith apples are not red.

That’s correct. What NowAgnostic is saying is that while Granny Smith apples must be green in this world, in some other possible world they may be red. However, this only pushes the problem back a step, since in this other possible world, the apple no longer has the same essence. By implication, then, “a green apple in W is identical to a non-green apple in W*.” This, of course, is a contradiction.

 

[AlbertBall]

From the OP:

Consider the possibility that two or more unlimited beings exist. If this is so - let’s call two of these entities X and Y - then in order for them to be distinct, X must lack something that Y possesses, or vice-versa. However, a thing can only lack something if it is limited. Therefore, the unlimited First Cause must be unique.

X is defined as supreme if and only if X is unlimited and unique. Given that X is unlimited and unique (as argued above), X is a Supreme Being.

Thats not what i asked, i want to know how you get from there is an unlimted cause - to that cause is a being.

So again say i grant you there is an unlimited cause, how do you get from that to there is a supreme being???

 

[punkforchrist]

Well, if we’re just talking semantics, then here’s one of the relevant definitions of “being” from the Encarta Dictionary:

“2. existence: the state of existing”

Philosophers use “being” to describe anything that exists. If there is some existing thing that is supreme, that’s what we mean by “Supreme Being.”

If you prefer, you can call it a “Supreme Entity,” or something else.

 

[AlbertBall]

Well, if we’re just talking semantics, then here’s one of the relevant definitions of “being” from the Encarta Dictionary:

“2. existence: the state of existing”

Philosophers use “being” to describe anything that exists. If there is some existing thing that is supreme, that’s what we mean by “Supreme Being.”

If you prefer, you can call it a “Supreme Entity,” or something else.

No i still object. Being and entity imply consciousness. “being: conscious, mortal existence; life: Our being is as an instantaneous flash of light in the midst of eternal night.”

Words can have more than one meaning you know, when you say supreme being you are referring to a life force, not a state of existence.

If you are just referring to something exists that is unlimited e.g. energy, then I’m fine with that. However you posted closing the gap to god. God implies consciousness, so if that is what you mean i see no logical method for getting from step 4 to step 5 and i’m interested to know how you do so.

 

[Thing]

No i still object. Being and entity imply consciousness. “being: conscious, mortal existence; life: Our being is as an instantaneous flash of light in the midst of eternal night.”

Words can have more than one meaning you know, when you say supreme being you are referring to a life force, not a state of existence.

If you are just referring to something exists that is unlimited e.g. energy, then I’m fine with that. However you posted closing the gap to god. God implies consciousness, so if that is what you mean i see no logical method for getting from step 4 to step 5 and i’m interested to know how you do so.

The very first cause of everything has to be conscious. It is very nearly the least requirement for creation. In my view.

 

[AlbertBall]

The very first cause of everything has to be conscious. It is very nearly the least requirement for creation. In my view.

Well other than the fact the first cause does not = the cause of everything. Why does it have to be conscious?? If it was it would go against everything we know about nature.

 

[Thing]

Well other than the fact the first cause does not = the cause of everything. Why does it have to be conscious?? If it was it would go against everything we know about nature.

The first cause, by which I mean, that which was before there was anything material in existance. In other words my first cause is that force which bridged the transition from nothing to everything. When nothing exists what can come into existance. The first cause is that force which can, and has obviously, created from nothing.
This force is not in any way a material force, since nothing existed before it was created. So we’ll give this force the descriptive ‘Super Natural’ to distinguish it from the natural, material, created things.
What else could I say about this force, other than it is supernatural. It is not made of matter, it will then be given the descriptive Spirit.
This creator is now, so far, a supernatural spirit.
Anything else, I can say?
Well… what is the very, very least attribute we need to give this force or first cause. Since it, the force is neither material nor part of nature and that it is the first cause of everything, the very very least attribute this force needs to create things from nothing is the Will to create things from nothing. This is the very least necessary attribute of this first cause. Without at least a will to make something from nothing, nothing would happen.

So our first cause is; a supernatural spirit with the will to create. Since we exist, beyond question, this supernalural spirit has also created us. It has willed us into existance. This creative force is our Father as well as the Father of all creation.
Since this Spirit existed befor anything was created, this Spirit is outside of time. It always is and always will be even if creation returns again to nothing, the creative spirit still is.
So He is our Eternal Father, a supernatural Spirit, a creative Spirit, all powerfull - He always is, He created everything that exists.
What else could I say, He created other things, things that did not exist before anything was created, strange things like intelligence, love, personality, mercy and so on.
In what our Father created we see parts of Him. In the most complex and elusive parts of His creation we see deeper into its creator.
The human heart, who can understand it, as the wise man said once. In the human heart too we also see reflected the heart of its creator.
Our Creator is our Father, Supernatural Spirit, all powerfull, Eternal, the perfection of Love, Personality, Goodness, Kindness, Intelligence.
These qualities are qualities beloved by the human heart. They are a description of heaven for the human heart. But they are also real, as real as our Creator. So this heaven is also a reality, an Eternal reality. Is our purpose the ability to understand this reality. To understand an Eternal reality is a tantalizing idea; why would such a possibility exist but to offer also the fulfillment of that idea, eternal life in heaven with our Father.

If I’ve left anything out, let me know…

 

[NowAgnostic]

Your argument is clearly shown to be invalid yet you defend it anyway. I guess this is just another example of how critical thought tends to disappear when there is an ideology to defend. You have made several frankly ridiculous assertions in an effort to salvage it.

Difference in hair color results in a difference of essence.

Every time a woman dyes her hair she changes her essence? Get real. Hair color is not essence, for it is not that which makes a human a human. Hair color is an accident.

An only child is still the firstborn. Likewise, if only God exists in W*, then He is still First Cause (“cause” is being used as a noun, not a verb).

He is not a cause of anything, as there is no effect.

I’ve added an asterisk by your new set of premises. There actually isn’t any parity between the original argument and your counter-example. (2*) entails an accidental property, since we’re now talking about finite attributes. This is an instance of equivocation between necessity simpliciter and necessity accidentia.

You’re clearly begging the question here, and using fancy Latin terms doesn’t get you off the hook. You haven’t **justified **your premise (2) as referring to an infinite being or a case of necessity simpliciter. The only justification you’ve given is that “A first cause is not caused” is an analytic proposition. So it is, just as “a green apple is not red” is an analytic proposition. You’re just **assuming **that a non-caused status of a first cause is a case of necessity simpliciter and necessity accidentia, whereas it is different for the non-red status of a green apple. Just saying it is an analytic truth does not imply a case of necessity simpliciter - that is what my counter-example is meant to show.

(1*) is also suspect, since we might add an additional premise: “every existing apple is either red, green, yellow, etc.”

This implies that, “necessarily, every apple is possibly red,” is incorrect. If A is an apple in W, and A is red, but the same apple is not-red in W*, we arrive at the same type of contradiction I illustrated earlier.

So it’s not the same apple if I spray-paint it green? You have a very curious understanding of accidents and essences.

□(A → B) entails (A → □B), where B is exemplified in any world in which A exists.

No it doesn’t, □(A → B) entails (□A → □B). If A doesn’t necessarily exist, neither does B.

This brings us back to the question of whether or not a First Cause can possibly be caused.

Yes, and the burden of proof is on you to show this.

Attempting to say, the first cause is not caused, therefore necessarily, it is not caused, is a modal fallacy.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I would dispute the efficacy of this example because your first premise, “Every apple is possibly red” is false. Granny Smith apples are not red.

But I could color them red. QED.

 

[NowAgnostic]

NowAgnostic, allow me to put the original claim next to your counter-argument in order to illustrate the disanalogy between the two.

All I can say is, come on. I’ll try a third time.

1. Every existing thing is either limited or unlimited.
2. Necessarily, every limited thing is possibly caused.
3. A First Cause cannot be caused.
4. Therefore, a First Cause must be unlimited.

1*. Every existing apple is either red or not-red.
2*. Necessarily, every apple is possibly red.
3*. A green apple cannot be red.
4*. Therefore, a green apple cannot be an apple.

Your original claim was 2 - 4 and my counter-argument was 2* - 4*. You’ve added premises 1 and 1* here, which are irrelevant to the argument. Thus you’ve only added different analytic truths to both sets of premises. Honestly, you’re a better logician than this.

If you change 1 to Every existing thing is either caused or uncaused the forms are identical. If you wish to keep 1 as is, I can formulate another counter-argument with a different 1* Every existing fruit is either an apple or not an apple. Or, if you insist on keeping 1 and 1* as above, I can make the arguments analogous again by adding another set of analytic truths, as I demonstrate below.

Notice that while (2) is arguably true, and that it introduces a new term (“caused”), (2*) suffers from the defect I already mentioned.

Both 2 and 2* are of the same form Necessarily, every a is possibly b. (Let’s assume S5 where this is equivalent to “every a is possibly b”). What this means that for every member of class a, there is a possible world in which it is b. Hope we’re agreed on this.

Now the difference that you are referring to is whether b is an accidental property or an essential one. If b is an accidental property, it does not mean there is not a possible world in which an a is ~b; it could even be ~b in the actual world. It also does not mean there is a possible world in which every a is b. If b is an essential property, then “every a is possibly b” is equivalent to “Necessarily every a is b”, because, if an a were not b, it would not be an a. Hope we’re agreed on this too.

Now the problem is that you’ve attempted to justify your premises as analytic truths, but you can only justify one, but not the other, as an analytic truth depending on whether being caused is an accidental or an essential property.

The horns of the dilemma are these:

1. if b is an accidental property, your argument is unsound because you cannot justify “A First Cause cannot be caused” as an analytic proposition in the modal sense in which you need it. A First Cause is not caused, that’s analytic, yes; but it does not follow there is no possible world in which that cause isn’t caused; in fact, if being caused or uncaused is an accidental property, the reverse follows. It’s only if being caused is an essential property that it follows that there’s no possible world in which the cause isn’t caused.

You challenge my statement “Every apple is possibly red” on the grounds that redness is an essential property of an apple; if the apple were green, it would be a different apple. I dispute that; I don’t think the apple changes identity if I bleach out its red color or color it green using food coloring or whatever. However, apples are really irrelevant; for any single class of objects a with an accidental property b my counter-example works.

1. Every member of a is possibly b. (True, because if b is an accidental property there is by definition a world in which a is b.)
   (1a. Every member of a is possibly ~b. (True, because if b is an accidental property there is by definition a world in which a is ~b.))
2. If c is an a which is ~b, then c cannot be b.
3. Therefore, c cannot be an a.

Like this:

1. Every member of order *lepidoptera *is possibly a caterpillar.
2. A butterfly cannot be a caterpillar.
3. Therefore, a butterfly cannot be a member of order *lepidoptera *.

1. if b is an essential property, your argument is unsound because you cannot justify “Every limited thing is possibly caused” as an analytic proposition. It is only analytic if being caused is an accidental property, for then by definition there are possible worlds in which a thing is caused and ones in which it is not. If being caused is an essential property, then it is (epistemically) possible that there are limited things which are uncaused. The same counter-argument holds, although the error is different:

2*. Necessarily, every apple is possibly red.
3*. A green apple cannot be red.
4*. Therefore, a green apple cannot be an apple.

If being red is an essential, rather than an accidental, quality, of being an apple, then the error is in 2* rather than 3*. 2* is no longer analytically true.

You just can’t get around proving that all limited things must be caused through logistic legerdemain. Now, if you actually could prove this, then your argument would be sound. If all limited things must be caused, then an uncaused entity must be unlimited by MT. That is certainly valid.

Edit: The disanalogy can be illustrated even clearer…
.

2 - 4 and 2* - 4* have identical form. The only difference is in the analytic statements presented in 1 and 1*. Note that 1 is completely unrelated to the rest while 1* is simply an analytic truth less informative than 2*.

I can therefore make the arguments analogous by adding an analytic statement (1a and 1a*) to both:

1. Every A is either B or ~B.
   1a. Every B is either C or ~C.
2. Necessarily, every B is possibly C.
3. D cannot be C.
4. Therefore, D must be ~B.

1a*. Every Z is either A or ~A.
1*. Every A is either B or ~B.
2*. Necessarily, every A is possibly B.
3*. C cannot be B.
4*. Therefore, C cannot be A.

 

[sidbrown]

1. Every member of a is possibly b. (True, because if b is an accidental property there is by definition a world in which a is b.)
   (1a. Every member of a is possibly ~b. (True, because if b is an accidental property there is by definition a world in which a is ~b.))
2. If c is an a which is ~b, then c cannot be b.
3. Therefore, c cannot be an a.
   .

I don;t follow this because suppose that a is the set of children and b is has been baptised. Suppose that c is a child who has not been baptised, then I don’t see where it would be true that c would always remain a ~b, because tomorrow c could be baptised. So the fact is that c has been both b and ~b.
Also things here seem to be pretty fuzzy. For another example, suppose that b is the quality of vbeing angry. Well Charles could be both b and ~b at the same time, since he is angry in one sense but not in another.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

Your argument is clearly shown to be invalid yet you defend it anyway. I guess this is just another example of how critical thought tends to disappear when there is an ideology to defend. You have made several frankly ridiculous assertions in an effort to salvage it.

Sounds like I’ve struck a chord!

Every time a woman dyes her hair she changes her essence? Get real. Hair color is not essence, for it is not that which makes a human a human. Hair color is an accident.

Notice how your example makes use of causation in order to make the change from one hair color to another. There is a clear distinction between essences with accidents and essences without accidents.

He is not a cause of anything, as there is no effect.

You’re knocking down a strawman at this point, since you’re superimposing your own definition of cause (verb) onto my own (noun).

You’re clearly begging the question here . . . You’re just assuming that a non-caused status of a first cause is a case of necessity simpliciter and necessity accidentia, whereas it is different for the non-red status of a green apple. Just saying it is an analytic truth does not imply a case of necessity simpliciter - that is what my counter-example is meant to show.

I would be begging the question if I didn’t offer any argument, but I did. What we should focus on is whether a First Cause can be not-First in some possible world. That was the additional argument I made to the analytical truth you mention above.

So it’s not the same apple if I spray-paint it green? You have a very curious understanding of accidents and essences.

If in W, the apple is essentially red, you may spray paint it green. In this case, though, it would be a red apple painted green. If, however, it is already green in W*, then there is an essential difference between the two apples. The apple is naturally and essentially red in W, but naturally and essentially green in W*.

No it doesn’t, □(A → B) entails (□A → □B). If A doesn’t necessarily exist, neither does B.

That objection only works if it implies that A necessarily doesn’t exist, not merely that it doesn’t necessarily exist. Are you committing yourself to the idea that a First Cause cannot possibly exist? In any world in which A is instantiated, B is necessarily instantiated.

Your original claim was 2 - 4 and my counter-argument was 2* - 4*. You’ve added premises 1 and 1* here, which are irrelevant to the argument. Thus you’ve only added different analytic truths to both sets of premises. Honestly, you’re a better logician than this.

I added them in order to show more clearly how the original argument and parody had different structures. It’s not necessary, but it draws out the differences more. We have in the original (1): accidental (limited) or non-accidental (unlimited). Then, in (1*): accidental (red) or accidental (not-red). This should already suffice to raise a red flag, since we have an equivocation of essences.

You challenge my statement “Every apple is possibly red” on the grounds that redness is an essential property of an apple; if the apple were green, it would be a different apple. I dispute that; I don’t think the apple changes identity if I bleach out its red color or color it green using food coloring or whatever. However, apples are really irrelevant; for any single class of objects a with an accidental property b my counter-example works.

See above.

2 - 4 and 2* - 4* have identical form. The only difference is in the analytic statements presented in 1 and 1*. Note that 1 is completely unrelated to the rest while 1* is simply an analytic truth less informative than 2*.

They don’t have an identical form. The original (1) and (2) go like this:

1. Every A is either B or ~B.
2. Necessarily, every B is possibly C.

The counter-argument is this:

1*. Every A is either B or ~B.
2*. Necessarily, every A is possibly B.

Out starting points result in differences between (3)-(4) and (3*)-(4*).

(2*) is dubious, since there is nothing to justify the inference from A to possibly B, given the accidental nature of both B and ~B. In the original argument, the negation of B is strictly non-accidental, and may be justified in light of the negation of C. Does a thing’s possibility of being caused not require some accident in that thing?

I can therefore make the arguments analogous by adding an analytic statement (1a and 1a*) to both:

. . .

The point isn’t that it’s analytic. What I was stressing was a difference of form and the equivocation of accidental and non-accidental in one syllogism, versus accidental and accidental in the other.

 

[punkforchrist]

AlbertBall:

No i still object. Being and entity imply consciousness. “being: conscious, mortal existence; life: Our being is as an instantaneous flash of light in the midst of eternal night.”

Words can have more than one meaning you know, when you say supreme being you are referring to a life force, not a state of existence.

. . .

I agree that words can have more than one meaning, but it is the prerogative of the proponent of the argument to choose which meaning a given word has. With that said, I’ve defined “being” merely as a state of existence.

 

[sidbrown]

Sounds like I’ve struck a chord!

Notice how your example makes use of causation in order to make the change from one hair color to another. There is a clear distinction between essences with accidents and essences without accidents.

You’re knocking down a strawman at this point, since you’re superimposing your own definition of cause (verb) onto my own (noun).

I would be begging the question if I didn’t offer any argument, but I did. What we should focus on is whether a First Cause can be not-First in some possible world. That was the additional argument I made to the analytical truth you mention above.

If in W, the apple is essentially red, you may spray paint it green. In this case, though, it would be a red apple painted green. If, however, it is already green in W*, then there is an essential difference between the two apples. The apple is naturally and essentially red in W, but naturally and essentially green in W*.

That objection only works if it implies that A necessarily doesn’t exist, not merely that it doesn’t necessarily exist. Are you committing yourself to the idea that a First Cause cannot possibly exist? In any world in which A is instantiated, B is necessarily instantiated.

I added them in order to show more clearly how the original argument and parody had different structures. It’s not necessary, but it draws out the differences more. We have in the original (1): accidental (limited) or non-accidental (unlimited). Then, in (1*): accidental (red) or accidental (not-red). This should already suffice to raise a red flag, since we have an equivocation of essences.

See above.

They don’t have an identical form. The original (1) and (2) go like this:

1. Every A is either B or ~B.
2. Necessarily, every B is possibly C.

The counter-argument is this:

1*. Every A is either B or ~B.
2*. Necessarily, every A is possibly B.

(2*) is dubious, since there is nothing to justify the inference from A to possibly B, given the accidental nature of both B and ~B. In the original argument, the negation of B is strictly non-accidental, and may be justified in light of the negation of C. Does a thing’s possibility of being caused not require some accident in that thing?

The point isn’t that it’s analytic. What I was stressing was a difference of form and the equivocation of accidental and non-accidental in one syllogism, versus accidental and accidental in the other.

|Does everyone agree on what are accidental and non-accidental or are they fuzzy concepts?

 

[punkforchrist]

sidbrown:

Does everyone agree on what are accidental and non-accidental or are they fuzzy concepts?

An accident is really just a non-essential attribute. “The pope wears a hat.” The fact that the pope is a hat-wearer is an instance is accident, since the pope need not wear a hat essentially, or but his very nature.

 

[punkforchrist]

Sid, let me know if I’m not explaining this as well as possible. Here is how the distinction is relevant.

My claim is that a thing is either, by its essence, limited or unlimited. Limited things are composed of accidents, as we have seen with various examples. The reason why NowAgnostic’s counter-argument is disanalogous to the original argument is because there is an equivocation involved in his first premise. If a thing is either red or a color that is not-red, then we are talking about accidental versus accidental, as opposed to accidental versus non-accidental. An unlimited thing must be non-accidental, since there is nothing to add or take away from that which is unlimited.

Does this make sense? Let me know.

 

[sidbrown]

Sid, let me know if I’m not explaining this as well as possible. Here is how the distinction is relevant.

My claim is that a thing is either, by its essence, limited or unlimited. Limited things are composed of accidents, as we have seen with various examples. The reason why NowAgnostic’s counter-argument is disanalogous to the original argument is because there is an equivocation involved in his first premise. If a thing is either red or a color that is not-red, then we are talking about accidental versus accidental, as opposed to accidental versus non-accidental. An unlimited thing must be non-accidental, since there is nothing to add or take away from that which is unlimited.

Does this make sense? Let me know.

I am not sure.
Take for example the following sets:
{1, 2, 3}
{1,2,3,4,5…}
{…,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,…}
which are accidental and which are non-accidental?

 

[punkforchrist]

Numbers and sets are abstract objects, and since abstract objects don’t stand in causal relations, we wouldn’t say that they are the types of things that are composed of accidents.