Closing the Gap from "First Cause" to "God"

[bridgeforsale]

Thank you for the link. You may wish to present one or two of your concerns here, so we are not jumping from thread to thread.

One thing you mentioned that stood out to me was Stephen Hawking’s cosmological model of the universe. It needs to be stressed that whichever model of the universe we assume is true, the universe may still have a First Cause. See my reply to Dameedna for my description of what “first” implies. So, if we grant that the universe is finite but without beginning, or even infinitely-old, a First Cause is still needed to ground the universe’s existence, just as a foundation is required to prevent a house from collapsing.

Does this distinction make sense?

I think I did mention this in my OP (in the aforementioned thread); but yes I do concede it just pushes the argument further back (in other words, if pre-bang it all started as energy in a vacuum, and a random quantum fluctuation triggered inflation to form our current universe) then where did that energy come from? Where did that vacuum come from? What causes quantum fluctuations?

While we do know quantum fluctuations happen everywhere, all the time in the natural world, to my knowledge no one knows why. They seem random, although we may assume eventually physicists will discover a cause for these fluctuations (or at least come up with a good theory, if one doesn’t exist already). Nevertheless, all this gets us no closer to an answer, what was the “first cause”? The only thing it does say is energy pre-existed the big-bang (or something pre-existed the big bang); and consequently the law of energy conservation pre-existed the big bang (and we can therefore assume that no new energy was created by the big bang). This means as far as we know all the energy that has ever existed, always existed (and always will exist, even if or when our current universe becomes extinct). It places “energy” as a possible first cause (since as far as we know it fits most of the parameters the logical argument requires). Energy cannot be created, it cannot be destroyed, it now appears likely it “always” existed, etc. The only thing energy is not (as far as we know) is sentient. Nonetheless, it is a possible solution to the logical argument.

However, I also realize this won’t end the argument. Moreover, my previous post didn’t try to say energy always existed, therefore god doesn’t exist. In fact I didn’t take a position on whether or not god exists at all (or a hard stance on the physics involved); but rather I pointed to the inconsistencies between claims made about “the nature of” god & the facts science has shown to be true. For example, why would an all powerful (omnipotent) god go through such a drawn out process to create a universe? A process that has taken at least tens of billions of years (perhaps much longer, we simply don’t know how long “pre-bang” conditions existed, whether there were previous universes, other dimensions, etc.)?

I know theologians have elaborate philosophical arguments. A simple one is – perhaps tens of billions of years is like the snap of a finger to an eternal god. However, it seems apparent that the outer limits of god’s power can be explained by physics, since even if at the beginning of time god triggered a first cause that has no other possible explanation, everything that happened after that event is amenable to a scientific explanation (using physics). In other words if a god or invisible sentient being of some sort put it all in motion, he or she or it triggered a causal chain that we might assume they knew would begin a series of “physical events” leading to the state of our current universe.

This being could not literally snap his holy fingers and poof – earth, trees, water, men and women, etc. all simply popped into existence. It required a process spanning tens of billions of years. Therefore, it seems logical to say, even if a god or invisible sentient being of some sort exists, it “cannot” be omnipotent (or have limitless power). It seems that it must operate within the parameters of physics, or at least the random natural method described by physics was the best possible means this being had at his disposal to set it all in motion. The argument usually goes that god limits his own power in the interest of free will, but does that really make sense? That might explain why he went through the trouble of biological evolution, but it’s certainly a weak explanation for his choice to build a universe through a long drawn out method that appears to have been completely random.

If a god does exist, then it seems that he possibly stood at the beginning of time in an empty vacuum, and kept trying and trying to trigger the inflation of a universe through quantum fluctuations (for an unknown period of time, perhaps longer than we could possibly imagine); until one finally took. He’s certainly an extremely smart god, because he must have known that quantum fluctuations in a vacuum, like the one which may characterize the pre-bang universe, would eventually trigger an inflation (even if the odds were one in several trillion, he knew all he had to do was keep at it). However, given this, it must also be true that god understands randomness is the best way to create things, even if he had the power to set something in motion he knew would travel in one general direction.

It’s said of omnipotence that it encompasses more power than we could possibly imagine. Yet I can certainly imagine more power than god must have. The ability to truly snap my fingers and create something from absolutely nothing, through no process (beyond merely snapping my fingers), which would bring into existence something that is already in its perfect form the moment it begins to exist.

Of course this doesn’t even begin to match scientific facts and logic against the claims made by various holy books?

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

Argue something ridiculous, then when someone calls it such claim what a “chord” you’ve struck. Really.

What I’m saying is that we’re just two people who disagree. There’s no need to get upset.

Yeah, and so? Hair color is clearly an accident.

If you’re correct that there is no essential difference between a naturally red apple and a naturally green apple, then given our ability to paint a green apple red you have contradicted the premise that “no green apple can be red.”

This is a red herring, and I was using “cause” as noun anyway. If there is no effect there is (by definition) no cause (noun).

Acorns cause oat trees. Assuming some possible world in which there are no oak trees (no effect of the acorns), it doesn’t follow that there are no acorns.

No you didn’t. The only argument you made was that it was an analytical truth.

The conclusion is brought about by that analytic truth in conjunction with the possibility of each limited thing being caused.

So you’re saying an apple can be essentially red, but accidentally green. This is nonsense.

Lampooning isn’t an argument. Nevertheless, your counter-argument is unsound even granting that colors are necessarily accidents. We can paint a green apple red, so it’s not true that a green apple cannot be red.

In any world in which A is instantiated, B is instantiated - not necessarily instantiated. If A is not necessarily, but only contingently, instantiated, then likewise, B is only contingently instantiated.

You may have misunderstood what I was saying. Let’s not use the word “necessary,” since that has the connotation of logical modality. In any world in which A is instantiated, B is instantiated. There is no world in which A is instantiated, but B is not.

If unlimited is a non-accidental property, then so is limited.

I don’t know how you would come to this conclusion. If a thing is composed of accidents, it is limited in some sense. An unlimited thing need not be composed of accidents.

No, it doesn’t suffice, because you are the one who has put the equivocation of essences in there. Let’s put it down one more time. Remember that you have added premises 1 and 1*.

I shouldn’t have put so much stress on “form.” I agree that your counter-argument is logically valid; I just don’t believe it’s sound.

No. What accidents do angels have?

Angels exist in a sphere that is neither timeless nor temporal-qua-physical time. The fact that they can become bodies illustrates how they are composed of accidents, since those bodies are not essential to the angels.

Now I know you think that being caused is an essential property of something, and so that means you can justify “A First Cause cannot be caused” as an analytic truth. I want to know, then, how you justify “Necessarily, every limited thing is possibly caused”. This is not an analytic truth if being caused is an essential property.

I think it’s a reasonable inference to make given what we observe about limited things. The sun is limited, and yet we postulate some cause for its existence. This process could be multiplied so we have a good inductive argument. Notice I never claimed this was a strictly deductive argument. In fact, I’ve always argued that a First Cause exists based on induction.

 

[punkforchrist]

I think I did mention this in my OP (in the aforementioned thread); but yes I do concede it just pushes the argument further back (in other words, if pre-bang it all started as energy in a vacuum, and a random quantum fluctuation triggered inflation to form our current universe) then where did that energy come from? Where did that vacuum come from? What causes quantum fluctuations?

That’s not quite what I mean, although these are definitely important issues. I can grant that the universe is the result of a spontaneous quantum fluctuation (I don’t believe it is, but I’ll agree for the sake of argument). Assuming that this is true, the “First Cause” is not postulated to be first in time necessarily, just first in terms of rank or source.

. . . It places “energy” as a possible first cause (since as far as we know it fits most of the parameters the logical argument requires). Energy cannot be created, it cannot be destroyed, it now appears likely it “always” existed, etc. The only thing energy is not (as far as we know) is sentient. Nonetheless, it is a possible solution to the logical argument.

We might postulate energy, or some part of energy, as the First Cause. However, in conjunction with the conclusion that the First Cause is unlimited (and not just eternal), this contention is highly unlikely. Energy is something physical, and physical things have limits (even if it is not a temporal limit). So, for example, any bit of energy is restricted to its own power and location. It doesn’t exist everywhere and with unlimited power.

However, I also realize this won’t end the argument. Moreover, my previous post didn’t try to say energy always existed, therefore god doesn’t exist. In fact I didn’t take a position on whether or not god exists at all (or a hard stance on the physics involved); but rather I pointed to the inconsistencies between claims made about “the nature of” god & the facts science has shown to be true. For example, why would an all powerful (omnipotent) god go through such a drawn out process to create a universe? A process that has taken at least tens of billions of years (perhaps much longer, we simply don’t know how long “pre-bang” conditions existed, whether there were previous universes, other dimensions, etc.)?

I appreciate your candor. What your question presupposes is that we should expect God to be efficient - that is, we should expect God to get as much productivity out of as little effort as possible. Notice, though, that if God is omnipotent, then He has unlimited resources and unlimited time to accomplish any task. I would simply ask: why should we believe that God ought to create quickly, rather than gradually?

In fact, as I’m thinking about it, this assumption almost seems counter-intuitive to me. The vast existence of the universe, in both space and time (it’s past time, especially), illustrates the splendor of its Creator. If the universe is so great, then how much greater God must be!

I know theologians have elaborate philosophical arguments. A simple one is – perhaps tens of billions of years is like the snap of a finger to an eternal god. However, it seems apparent that the outer limits of god’s power can be explained by physics, since even if at the beginning of time god triggered a first cause that has no other possible explanation, everything that happened after that event is amenable to a scientific explanation (using physics). In other words if a god or invisible sentient being of some sort put it all in motion, he or she or it triggered a causal chain that we might assume they knew would begin a series of “physical events” leading to the state of our current universe.

I’m very excited about the theories of physics. What I would say is that the laws of physics are the result of God’s providence. I use the word “nature” as a blanket term for the laws of physics and its various processes. I don’t believe it makes sense to say that nature is unlimited, since nature is physical.

This being could not literally snap his holy fingers and poof – earth, trees, water, men and women, etc. all simply popped into existence. It required a process spanning tens of billions of years. Therefore, it seems logical to say, even if a god or invisible sentient being of some sort exists, it “cannot” be omnipotent (or have limitless power). . . .

I wouldn’t agree that the laws of physics exist necessarily. We can conceive of possible worlds in which there are different laws of physics. If God has created the laws of physics, then it was His own choice to create gradually.

It’s said of omnipotence that it encompasses more power than we could possibly imagine. Yet I can certainly imagine more power than god must have. The ability to truly snap my fingers and create something from absolutely nothing, through no process (beyond merely snapping my fingers), which would bring into existence something that is already in its perfect form the moment it begins to exist.

I think God could do this if He wanted to. But, the fact that He hasn’t doesn’t suggest any inability to do so.

 

[NowAgnostic]

If you’re correct that there is no essential difference between a naturally red apple and a naturally green apple, then given our ability to paint a green apple red you have contradicted the premise that “no green apple can be red.”

Indeed so. Because my counter-argument relies on an equivocation of the meaning of “can”. Or, there is a possible world in which a genetic mutation causes what would have been a green apple to be red, or vice-versa. Your original argument relies on the same equivocation if being caused is only an accidental property. “A First Cause cannot be caused” does not mean that an uncaused entity could not be caused in some other possible world.

Acorns cause oat trees. Assuming some possible world in which there are no oak trees (no effect of the acorns), it doesn’t follow that there are no acorns.

No, but in that world acorns are not the cause of oak trees, because oak trees don’t exist. I’m not even clear on why you are arguing this point, exactly. That a first cause must be unlimited (what you are trying to prove) doesn’t imply an unlimited entity must be a first cause, so it doesn’t disprove your case to admit this point.

The conclusion is brought about by that analytic truth in conjunction with the possibility of each limited thing being caused.

But that possibility is just what you need to prove, if being caused is an essential property. Because, that possibility is not itself an analytic truth.

Lampooning isn’t an argument.

It wasn’t a lampoon. I repeated what you stated.

Nevertheless, your counter-argument is unsound even granting that colors are necessarily accidents. We can paint a green apple red, so it’s not true that a green apple cannot be red.

Well of course my counter-argument is unsound, or at least invalid. It comes about for a different reason if redness is an essential quality, as opposed to an accidental one.

To reiterate:

1. Each apple is possibly red.
2. A green apple cannot be red.
3. Therefore, a green apple cannot be an apple.

If redness is an accidental quality premise 2 is false (premise 1 is analytically true). If redness is an essential quality premise 1 is false (premise 2 is analytically true).

So, similarly:

1. Each limited entity is possibly caused.
2. A First Cause cannot be caused.
3. Therefore, a First cause cannot be limited.

If being caused is an accidental quality premise 2 is false (premise 1 is analytically true). If being caused is an essential quality premise 1 is false if there are uncaused limited entities (premise 2 is analytically true).

You may have misunderstood what I was saying. Let’s not use the word “necessary,” since that has the connotation of logical modality. In any world in which A is instantiated, B is instantiated. There is no world in which A is instantiated, but B is not.

True.

I don’t know how you would come to this conclusion. If a thing is composed of accidents, it is limited in some sense. An unlimited thing need not be composed of accidents.

Well, the conclusion follows unless you hold that being composed of accidents itself is only an accidental property, and the same essential thing could exist in another possible world not being composed of accidents.

I shouldn’t have put so much stress on “form.” I agree that your counter-argument is logically valid; I just don’t believe it’s sound.

It relies on an equivocation so it’s either invalid or unsound depending on how you interpret the word in question.

Angels exist in a sphere that is neither timeless nor temporal-qua-physical time. The fact that they can become bodies illustrates how they are composed of accidents, since those bodies are not essential to the angels.

Angels can’t become bodies. They can only assume a corporeal form temporarily.

I think it’s a reasonable inference to make given what we observe about limited things. The sun is limited, and yet we postulate some cause for its existence. This process could be multiplied so we have a good inductive argument. Notice I never claimed this was a strictly deductive argument. In fact, I’ve always argued that a First Cause exists based on induction.

Then there’s a good inductive counter-argument. The acts of our free will are limited, and yet we (many of us, anyway, those who hold libertarian free will) hold that they exist without cause. Yes, we cause them, but nothing causes us to cause them. Or quantum events happen without cause as far as we can tell (yes, quantum vacuums, etc., are necessary causes, but not sufficient causes, which is the meaning of “cause” in your argument).

 

[bridgeforsale]

I appreciate your candor. What your question presupposes is that we should expect God to be efficient - that is, we should expect God to get as much productivity out of as little effort as possible. Notice, though, that if God is omnipotent, then He has unlimited resources and unlimited time to accomplish any task. I would simply ask: why should we believe that God ought to create quickly, rather than gradually?

Well, yes I would expect efficiency (particularly if omniscience is also an attribute of god).

I think God could do this if He wanted to. But, the fact that He hasn’t doesn’t suggest any inability to do so.

You’re right to say failing to do something doesn’t always infer an inability to do something; but in this case I think it does beg the question. If a universe could have been created instantaniously, already in its desired form from the moment it begins to exist, then why not create it that way?

Certainly it’s easy enough to say it was god’s perogative to create the universe through a gradual process (and leave it at that); but that seems like a cop out to me.

If I argue by analogy and say something like, if I were an omnipotent being set out to create a world, I would usher it into existence without a drawn out process requiring billions of years, your response might be how can the finite juxtapose their expectations onto the infinite? In other words how can I possibly impose my reasoning onto god (and think him less powerful for not following it)? But is that really a valid response, or is it circular reasoning?

I guess the problem I’m having buying into the typical religious version of a god is it’s such a philosophically difficult proposition. It demands that I satisfy myself with simple (sometimes illogical) answers to profound questions (that deserve real answers). I think if there is a god he whispers (he doesn’t shout); and not because he chooses to whisper, but rather because his power is limited. I think that’s what the evidence points to.

I don’t think it’s logical to assume god could have created the universe instantaniously, but rather chose to create it through a 14 billion year process. I think it’s far more logical to believe a spiritual entity has limitations on its ability to manipulate the physical world.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

Indeed so. Because my counter-argument relies on an equivocation of the meaning of “can”. Or, there is a possible world in which a genetic mutation causes what would have been a green apple to be red, or vice-versa. Your original argument relies on the same equivocation if being caused is only an accidental property. “A First Cause cannot be caused” does not mean that an uncaused entity could not be caused in some other possible world.

I understand what you’re saying. The only issue, I think, is not formal validity, but whether “A First Cause cannot be caused” is true. We agree that a green apple can be red (at least in appearance), so we can leave that aside for now.

No, but in that world acorns are not the cause of oak trees, because oak trees don’t exist. I’m not even clear on why you are arguing this point, exactly. That a first cause must be unlimited (what you are trying to prove) doesn’t imply an unlimited entity must be a first cause, so it doesn’t disprove your case to admit this point.

I’m using “First Cause,” since that is a convenient short-hand for “the being that is the First Cause in W, but still exists in W*, only not as a the first of causes.” Of course, I don’t believe this being can be anything other than first in those worlds in which it exists.

But that possibility is just what you need to prove, if being caused is an essential property. Because, that possibility is not itself an analytic truth.

X has the potential to be caused.
Y does not have the potential to be caused.

This may seem like a question with an obvious answer at this point, but is it your position that X and Y do not have a substantial difference in essence?

It wasn’t a lampoon. I repeated what you stated.

Calling something “nonsense” without elaboration is a lampoon.

If being caused is an accidental quality premise 2 is false (premise 1 is analytically true).

How would that make (2) false?

If being caused is an essential quality premise 1 is false if there are uncaused limited entities (premise 2 is analytically true).

Again, I’ll need some elaboration.

Angels can’t become bodies. They can only assume a corporeal form temporarily.

Is this temporary corporeal form essential to the angels?

Then there’s a good inductive counter-argument. The acts of our free will are limited, and yet we (many of us, anyway, those who hold libertarian free will) hold that they exist without cause. Yes, we cause them, but nothing causes us to cause them. Or quantum events happen without cause as far as we can tell (yes, quantum vacuums, etc., are necessary causes, but not sufficient causes, which is the meaning of “cause” in your argument).

My argument doesn’t require that the First Cause be a “sufficient cause.” Nevertheless, for any indeterminate event, it is perfectly reasonable to infer a possible world in which these events are fully determined.

 

[Spirithound]

Well, yes I would expect efficiency (particularly if omniscience is also an attribute of god).

I would agree (tentatively anyways ) with you that efficiency is an attribute of God. But what does efficiency mean? It could mean that God makes no wasted movements. This would imply that everything happens for a reason, and that is consistent with Catholic teaching.

Another possible definition of efficiency is a more relative one, the amount of work done in a specified period of time. There are a couple problems with this. Firstly, who will you compare God to to find out whether he was more or less efficient? How many universes have you created? The second objection builds on the first. What is the formula for efficiency? It is work divided by time. Well, God made one universe in an infinite amount of time. I suppose dividing a finite number by infinity makes for a very low efficiency rate, but refer back to the first objection.

Because of the problems inherent in the second definition of efficiency, I propose that the first definition be applied, and thus there is no problem.

 

[punkforchrist]

bridgeforsale:

. . .

I don’t think it’s logical to assume god could have created the universe instantaniously, but rather chose to create it through a 14 billion year process. I think it’s far more logical to believe a spiritual entity has limitations on its ability to manipulate the physical world.

What would your response be to the argument, then? Assuming that a First Cause exists:

1. Every existing thing is either limited or unlimited.
2. Every limited thing is possibly caused.
3. A First Cause cannot be caused.
4. Therefore, a First Cause must be unlimited.

 

[sidbrown]

Indeed To reiterate:

1. Each apple is possibly red.
2. A green apple cannot be red.
3. Therefore, a green apple cannot be an apple.
   .

This is fuzzy thinking. An apple which is on the tree and which is green now, may in a month from now be red. So a green apple can be red. Also, there are some green apples which fall to the ground and are eaten by an animal, those apples could not possibly be red, since they had vanished and were eaten up while they were green.

 

[bridgeforsale]

What would your response be to the argument, then? Assuming that a First Cause exists:

1. Every existing thing is either limited or unlimited.
2. Every limited thing is possibly caused.
3. A First Cause cannot be caused.
4. Therefore, a First Cause must be unlimited.

I think it has a speculative premise i.e. everything is either limited or unlimited (and begs the question at issue here e.g. circular reasoning)? There’s no proof that anything “unlimited” exists (unless you consider energy unlimited). Although I’ve heard logical arguments used to try & “prove” the existence of god, I don’t think they can. The most recent attempts have tried to use Bayesian statistical models, but in this sort of thing the (name removed by moderator)uts are inherently subjective (Bayesian probability is an excellent statistical tool where you have (name removed by moderator)uts derived from frequency statistics that are objective and we know are true, however, where the (name removed by moderator)uts are subjective it’s little more than “elaborate” guess work).

Deductive reasoning (that you’re using here) can only only be as good as the premises it relies on. If I say:

All men are fish
I’m a man
Therefore I’m also a fish

My argument fails, because all men are not fish (faulty premise). With your example “every existing thing is either limited or unlimited” it begs the question. The assumption it makes is two fold. First it assumes there is a god, and second it assumes that god is “unlimited.” Since the second question (whether or not god is unlimited) is the very question at issue here, and there’s no proof that anything “unlimited” exists (or can exist); it only gets us back to square one (is god omnipotent, or is he an unlimited being with unlimted power)?

I think it’s reasonable to say there could be a god. A good apologetic argument would say although our observations tend to show a universe (and life) which evolved through randomness, it has still traveled in one general direction (and the “macro” events have been remarkable in how well they facilitate life on earth).

However, it also shows that even God knows “randomness” is the best possible way to design a self-perfecting machine or organism (e.g. that continually improves as it evolves). Even though there’s many things inefficient about evolution (i.e. virtually all living organisms that have ever existed are now extinct), it is still the “most efficient” means available in terms of the functionality of extremely large things (like a country, planet, or universe) or things that occur and evolve over long periods of time.

There’s no way I could apply a statistical number to this (or even say it’s more probable than not that god exists). I also can’t apply a statistical number to support the proposition that god isn’t omnipotent. I can say given the evidence it doesn’t make much sense. I can also point out omnipotence wouldn’t be a necessary characteristic of a creator (infinite existance might be, along with sentience, but not omnipotence). God could have less than all encompassing power and still exist, still have created the universe (or “put the ball in motion”), and still have entered our history in subtle ways.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I understand what you’re saying. The only issue, I think, is not formal validity, but whether “A First Cause cannot be caused” is true. We agree that a green apple can be red (at least in appearance), so we can leave that aside for now.

If being caused is an **essential *property (of some object A, say), then “A First Cause cannot be caused” is analytically true. If being A is uncaused in W, then there is no W in which A is caused - a “caused A” would in fact, not be A, but something else, since it is essentially different.

If, OTOH, being caused is an **accidental *property, then “A First Cause cannot be caused” is analytically false, in the non-equivocal sense of “cannot”. If being A is uncaused in W, then by definition of what an “accidental” property is there is a W in which it is caused, and in which it is still A. This is the problem with my counterargument, for “a green apple cannot be red” is analytically false if red is an accidental property - there are possible worlds in which a green apple (in the actual world) is red. The premise seems to be true because of an equivocation on “cannot”.

But for your argument to be sound the other premise that “All limited beings are possibly caused” must also be true. And here things switch.

If being caused is an accidental property, then “All limited beings are possibly caused” is analytically true. Again, for a caused A in world W there is a W* in which it is uncaused and yet it still essentially A.

But, if being caused is an essential property, “All limited beings are possibly caused” is not analytically true. For an uncaused limited being A in world W there is no possible W* in which it is caused and still essentially A. So this A is not possibly caused. Thus, for the statement to be true it must be true that there are no uncaused limited beings in any possible world, which is equivalent to stating that “All limited beings are necessarily caused” or that it is logically impossible that a limited being be uncaused.

In this case the premise of my counter-argument “All apples are possibly red” is false, for we know there are green apples, and there is no possible world in which the same apple (green in this world) is red - put another way, it is not logically impossible an apple is not-red. In your case we do not know there are uncaused limited beings, so your premise might be true if it is logically impossible that a limited being is uncaused.

X has the potential to be caused.
Y does not have the potential to be caused.

This may seem like a question with an obvious answer at this point, but is it your position that X and Y do not have a substantial difference in essence?

No, it’s my position that if:
X is caused
Y is not caused
then X and Y are necessarily substantially different only if being caused is an essential property.

Again, I’ll need some elaboration.

I elaborated above. If you don’t understand please say so. It seems absolutely obvious to me.

In which case you still need to prove that it is logically impossible that a limited being is uncaused. If a limited being is necessarily caused, then, an uncaused entity is necessarily unlimited by MT.

Is this temporary corporeal form essential to the angels?

No - I’m not a student of angelology, I’ll admit, but I think if an angel appears as a winged messenger to someone it doesn’t mean that angel has suddenly taken upon itself all the accidents of birds - it means the angel is manipulating the elements to make it appear that a winged messenger is speaking. I’m open to correction on this though.

My argument doesn’t require that the First Cause be a “sufficient cause.”

Yes, it does actually. A First Cause which is only a necessary cause is limited. It cannot determine anything that happens in the world.

Nevertheless, for any indeterminate event, it is perfectly reasonable to infer a possible world in which these events are fully determined.

This is not obvious, given quantum mechanics and the knowledge there can be no local hidden variables. True, you can envision a world with different physical laws, but are these events then the same? Moreover, if being caused is an essential property, and these events are uncaused, then is no possible world in which these events are caused by definition.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic, let’s leave possible worlds semantics aside for now. Consider the metaphysical status of limited versus unlimited beings. We can know through experience that it is possible to add to or subtract from a limited being, and such an action would require some kind of causal relation. To put it more technically, “every limited thing has the potential to be caused.”

I still disagree with your analysis of possible worlds, but I’m happy to focus solely on the inductive merits of the argument. Regarding my argument, you comment:

NowAgnostic:

Yes, it does actually. A First Cause which is only a necessary cause is limited. It cannot determine anything that happens in the world.

Nowhere did I say that the First Cause is necessary, even though I believe it is on other grounds. What I did say was that a First Cause cannot be caused in those worlds in which it exists; and since every limited thing has the potential to be caused, an existing First Cause cannot be limited.

Besides that, however, the First Cause may very well exist necessarily and freely choose to instantiate different states of affairs. We have already talked about this in some length, though.

 

[punkforchrist]

bridgeforsale:

I think it has a speculative premise i.e. everything is either limited or unlimited (and begs the question at issue here e.g. circular reasoning)? . . .

I should clarify that the premise isn’t presupposing that something unlimited exists. Rather, we are simply stating that every existing thing is either limited or unlimited, which is true via the law of excluded middle. Even if an unlimited being doesn’t exist, that premise would still be true, barring any logical contradiction in the very idea of an unlimited being.

 

[bridgeforsale]

I should clarify that the premise isn’t presupposing that something unlimited exists. Rather, we are simply stating that every existing thing is either limited or unlimited, which is true via the law of excluded middle. Even if an unlimited being doesn’t exist, that premise would still be true, barring any logical contradiction in the very idea of an unlimited being.

The original argument was:

1. Every existing thing is either limited or unlimited.
2. Every limited thing is possibly caused.
3. A First Cause cannot be caused.
4. Therefore, a First Cause must be unlimited.

I think you need to establish whether all unlimited things are uncaused? It still could be true (under this argument) that every unlimited thing is “either” caused or uncaused. So I guess the main issue is (looking at it with fresh eyes) the argument structure. The conclusion doesn’t follow from the premise. You’re right; the first premise is true under the law of excluded middle (thanks for the correction). Moreover, I have no problem with the assumptions made in two or three. I just don’t think the conclusion follows (although I think the argument structure can be changed to allow for your conclusion).

1. Every existing thing is either caused or uncaused
2. Everything that is uncaused is unlimited
3. A first cause cannot be caused
4. Therefore a first cause must be unlimited

But even establishing this doesn’t help us in any material way. It doesn’t establish a definition for unlimited. It implies an unlimited existence, or an eternal being who always existed (which was an assumption I made anyway). It doesn’t say or infer anything about the scope of gods power.

I think it’s probably only possible to discuss this issue with the underlying assumption god exists, because if we assume god doesn’t exist then there’s no definitive basis to ground an argument on. Two people leave the debate floor, neither having proven anything, except people like to argue about stuff. If we assume god does exist (for the sake of argumentation, whether one really believes it or not) then there’s numerous things that can be discussed in a real way. For instance, acting under the assumption that we all agree science is generally reliable (at least insofar as the assumption that it’s a field, which genuinely seeks the truth; and every individual involved in it has every incentive to discover the truth, even at the expense of debunking his peers), if we assume god exists then everything science discovers about the universe, its origins, its operations, our biology, evolution, etc. tells us something about god. In the first instance it tells us how he did things. Under the assumption that god exists we actually have something to go on (versus lofty metaphysical arguments, fuzzy math, and overall a set of facts no one agrees on, which makes problem resolution impossible).

When we look at our universe and its origins, we can say God used a very slow and apparently random process to create it. He didn’t snap his fingers, and he didn’t call it into existence from nothing. It was a 14 billion year process. Not only that but in every single other instance where god has created anything it involved this same very slow and random process. We could assume god really does has the power to call things into existence (and they would immediately exist in their perfect form, rather than requiring billions of years to evolve), and would do so if he wanted to, but for whatever reason he hasn’t ever elected to do this. Yet there’s not a single case of god using a different method to create anything. Everything we see, everything science discovers, leads us to one conclusion. It tells us this very slow and random method is how god creates things in every case. The probability that god can create things in any other way is, as far as we know, zero.

 

[NowAgnostic]

NowAgnostic, let’s leave possible worlds semantics aside for now.

That’s not really possible (pardon the pun). You in fact have reference to them below.

Consider the metaphysical status of limited versus unlimited beings. We can know through experience that it is possible to add to or subtract from a limited being, and such an action would require some kind of causal relation. To put it more technically, “every limited thing has the potential to be caused.”

This does not follow.

If we are talking only about adding or subtracting accidental qualities from a limited being, this would be irrelevant - as no new being is being caused. It’s possible for an uncaused limited being to have accidental qualities which can be added to or subtracted from, which don’t change the essence of the being.

So what you might mean here is a reference to composite beings - if a being C is the joining together of beings A and B then A, B, and C have the potential to be caused - A and B by breaking down of C or C by joining together A and B. However, there could be a type of being D which cannot be broken down further and yet cannot be joined with an E to produce an F. An example is an angel, or a human soul as that is understood in Catholic philosophy.

I still disagree with your analysis of possible worlds, but I’m happy to focus solely on the inductive merits of the argument.

I cannot understand why you would disagree with my analysis of possible worlds; what I wrote seems obvious, self-evident. But anyway.

Nowhere did I say that the First Cause is necessary, even though I believe it is on other grounds.

Don’t confuse “necessary” in this context with the context of “necessary cause”. Arguments that go to a First Cause use chains of sufficient causes, not necessary ones, as they must, as circular configurations of necessary causes are possible.

What I did say was that a First Cause cannot be caused in those worlds in which it exists; and since every limited thing has the potential to be caused, an existing First Cause cannot be limited.

See there you go using modal logic terminology. It just can’t be helped.

Anyway, I dispute both your premises; you have proven neither.

What you need to prove are these:

1. For any uncaused being A which exists in some possible world W, there is no possible world W* in which it is caused.
2. For any limited entity A which exists in some possible world W, there is a possible world W* in which it is caused.

Now should 1. and 2. be proven, then

1. An uncaused limited entity is impossible

follows validly.

Besides that, however, the First Cause may very well exist necessarily and freely choose to instantiate different states of affairs. We have already talked about this in some length, though.

Yes, I believe that to be impossible, but let’s let that go for now.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

That’s not really possible (pardon the pun). You in fact have reference to them below.

I’m not using “can” and “cannot” in terms of possible worlds, but in terms of a thing’s metaphysical status.

If we are talking only about adding or subtracting accidental qualities from a limited being, this would be irrelevant - as no new being is being caused. It’s possible for an uncaused limited being to have accidental qualities which can be added to or subtracted from, which don’t change the essence of the being.

Of course, but we’re also talking about causing things that are completely different than previous essences. The specific example I alluded to was the sun.

So what you might mean here is a reference to composite beings - if a being C is the joining together of beings A and B then A, B, and C have the potential to be caused - A and B by breaking down of C or C by joining together A and B. However, there could be a type of being D which cannot be broken down further and yet cannot be joined with an E to produce an F. An example is an angel, or a human soul as that is understood in Catholic philosophy.

I contest such an understanding of angels and the soul. Angels, for example, are fully actualized potentialities, so they are limited things that are caused.

I cannot understand why you would disagree with my analysis of possible worlds; what I wrote seems obvious, self-evident. But anyway.

What I wrote seems obvious to me, too, but that only means we are at an impasse. That’s why I want to focus our attention on the inductive element of the argument.

Don’t confuse “necessary” in this context with the context of “necessary cause”. Arguments that go to a First Cause use chains of sufficient causes, not necessary ones, as they must, as circular configurations of necessary causes are possible.

I’m not confusing the two. My only point was that the TCA allows the First Cause to be logically contingent.

See there you go using modal logic terminology. It just can’t be helped.

Would you prefer if I said, “the First Cause does not have the potential to be caused, and therefore doesn’t have the potential to be limited”?

 

[sidbrown]

Rather, we are simply stating that every existing thing is either limited or unlimited, which is true via the law of excluded middle. .

This is not true. A person can be unlimited in his desires for money, but limited in his ability to earn more than $50,000 per year. this person is then both limited and unlimited.

 

[punkforchrist]

This is not true. A person can be unlimited in his desires for money, but limited in his ability to earn more than $50,000 per year. this person is then both limited and unlimited.

Limited in one sense, and unlimited in another, yes. The premise that “every existing thing is either limited or unlimited,” however, refers to just one meaning - a thing’s level of power.

 

[sidbrown]

Limited in one sense, and unlimited in another, yes. The premise that “every existing thing is either limited or unlimited,” however, refers to just one meaning - a thing’s level of power.

Everyone’s power is limited in one way or another. Even the Supreme Being would not be able to create a second Supreme Being.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I’m not using “can” and “cannot” in terms of possible worlds, but in terms of a thing’s metaphysical status.

Yeah, in this case “cannot” means “there is no (metaphysically) possible world in which…”

Of course, but we’re also talking about causing things that are completely different than previous essences. The specific example I alluded to was the sun.

Right, the sun is formed by a composition of smaller entities (hydrogen atoms mainly). To get a different essence you are adding something or taking something away.

I contest such an understanding of angels and the soul. Angels, for example, are fully actualized potentialities, so they are limited things that are caused.

As a matter of fact, your understanding of angels bolsters my argument, not yours. Remember what you wrote above was in response to my statement that:

So what you might mean here is a reference to composite beings - if a being C is the joining together of beings A and B then A, B, and C have the potential to be caused - A and B by breaking down of C or C by joining together A and B. However, there could be a type of being D which cannot be broken down further and yet cannot be joined with an E to produce an F. An example is an angel, or a human soul as that is understood in Catholic philosophy.

Let’s be clear on the meaning of “actualized potentiality”. Something is either in act (in a given respect) or it can be in potency, but not both at the same time. If an angel is “fully actualized” then it has no potency. If it has no potency, then no change, whether substantial or essential, is possible. It is therefore a simple (not composite) being - it cannot be broken into parts - and it also cannot form something else by being joined with something else. Will you agree that something or somethings can’t change into an angel, and that an angel can’t change into something or somethings else.

Therefore, it’s impossible for an angel to exist in potency. There isn’t anything that can change into an angel, and “nothing” can’t change into an angel either.

The only thing that “potentiality” could mean here is the logical possibility of the angel existing, but that doesn’t say anything about causation.

It seems to me completely possible an angel could exist eternally, and uncaused.
Whereas saying an angel is possibly caused is at best problematic. It certainly isn’t caused by adding or subtracting from something else.

What I wrote seems obvious to me, too, but that only means we are at an impasse.

Yeah, but I took the trouble to elaborate about precise meanings, and look at possible worlds scenarios. You did not. Of course that’s not an intrinsic guarantee I am correct, but still…

That’s why I want to focus our attention on the inductive element of the argument.

If you want to justify the premises by inductive means, realizing of course at the end you don’t have a deductive proof, fine with me.

I’m not confusing the two. My only point was that the TCA allows the First Cause to be logically contingent.

OK.

Would you prefer if I said, “the First Cause does not have the potential to be caused, and therefore doesn’t have the potential to be limited”?

You’re still referencing possibility.