Closing the Gap from "First Cause" to "God"

[sidbrown]

These infinitesimal divisions are merely abstract objects, …

This presents another problem because it is difficult to convince someone that time is not a real concept, but ptentiality is a real concept and not an abstract concept. Some people might see time as more real and concrete than potientiality.

 

[bridgeforsale]

A circular argument would state that A because B, and B because A. That’s not how the argument goes, however.

Here, you’re assuming the point in controversy (you’re just doing it in a round-a-bout way, but you’re doing it, which is begging the question). The initial point (or at least the point I’m advocating) is god cannot be omnipotent (or there’s at least a very small chance he could be omnipotent). You haven’t demonstrated the necessity of omnipotence (you’ve given sort of a regress argument). I readily concede, for the purposes of this discussion, an “eternal” (or infinite) god is a necessary assumption, and extremely high intelligence is also a necessary assumption IF we’re to define god as god. Nonetheless, just based on the available evidence (how the universe, earth, and biological life was formed) divine omnipotence is demonstrably unlikely. But when considered in tandem with the idea of a loving god, IMHO the probability becomes very low (I’d even argue virtually impossible).

That’s one of the arguments, but I’m talking about the Thomistic Cosmological Argument (TCA).

There’s not a significant difference between these arguments. The Thomistic argument says everything in the universe is dependent or contingent, a sequence of causaly related contingent things cannot be infinite (thus they must be finite), therefore there must be a first cause (or words to that effect). All cosmological arguments usually assume contingent things require a cause (while Kalam is unique only where it postulates all things which “begin to exist” require a cause). I don’t think the distinction is very big, moreover, since I’m willing to concede the conclusions reached by all these arguments (particularly the Thomostic argument), it’s not a very important point I don’t think?

Kalam is an argument many view as discredited (but that’s only based on the expanded assumptions contemporary apologists like William Lane Craig make, where he believes, for example, the argument discounts a variety of leading cosmological theories, which is obviously problematic & is an idea I think flatly rejected by the majority of theologians).

First, I have just a technical correction. The KCA states that whatever begins to exist has a cause, and the TCA states that every dependent thing has a cause. Neither states that everything has a cause.

Yes, but I’m making (or allowing for) this assumption. Obviously discussing divine omnipotence doesn’t make much sense if we don’t act under the assumption god exists

I’ll grant that for now. The TCA doesn’t argue that God is constantly involved with the universe. And, while I’m not a deist, the argument is at least prima facie consistent with the idea of a deistic God who causes the universe in some sense and just lets it go.

Yes, all of these classical cosmological arguments would allow for deism (unless you look at how a small number of contemporary fundamentalists have skewed them). However, I’m not necessarily arguing in support of deism (or even necessarily against any particular religious system, including the one we were all raised in, Christianity). I’m willing to believe we have a soul, there is a conscious existence apart from our physical selves, etc. I don’t even mind thinking that an intangible power that can assist in human healing might be possible (although if this is possible at all, I only believe it can promote self-healing where self-healing is possible).

Looking at the totality of the evidence, these ideas do find some support (unless you close your mind completely to anything of this sort, which I think can be an unreasonable position if it’s too extreme). I’m personally not so sure about the idea of mystical healings (I’m honestly inclined not to believe it’s possible, but I’m at least a little more open to the idea than I have been in the past).

I think we can agree that it is a wonderful thing we live in a free society, where we are allowed to disagree.

We don’t actually have to explain why God allows evil. As long as it is logically possible for God to have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil (a reason we may not even know of), there is nothing that would prevent the existence of a Supreme Being.

Moreover, the definition of “Supreme Being” only requires that God’s power be unlimited. His knowledge, goodness, and so forth, are attributes we will have to consider later.

If you looked at the problem of evil in isolation then sure, it’s feasible for god to let it happen (you could say god doesn’t interfere with human free will because subordinating suffering and evil to liberty serves our greater interest). And this would be fine if god never intervened in human history at any other time. But if we’re going to say god heals people, miracles happen, and providence may intervene in human affairs and soften hearts (another way of saying god moves the hearts and minds of men) then free will cannot be an excuse for ignoring evil. I’m not arguing against free will, I just acknowledge the fallacy of this idea many seem to have that for the sake of unfettered free will, god allows constant human suffering, except in selective cases. Imagine all the people who have prayed for loved ones in futility, who were great Christians and loved god with all their hearts and souls. What possible excuse does god have for ignoring their prayers while answering others? Sure, there’s an apologetic grab-bag we could reach into and pull out any number of arguments. Answering their prayers must not have fallen within god’s plan. Well, apparently god’s plan must have also required the savage murder of six million Jews, since he stood by as a spectator while they were marched into gas chambers. I for one don’t think this is logically feasible.

 

[Spirithound]

I disagree. Angels are a philosophical concept, not intrinsically unique to Judaism or Christianity (as say, the parting of the Red Sea or the Incarnation would be). And, even to the extent it is Judeo-Christian, I’m certainly free to borrow the concept and yet disagree with what theologians have had to say on it. That’s not a strawman - a strawman is misrepresenting someone’s argument. But anyway, it’s neither here nor there.

We only accept the Catholic understanding of angels. How Muslims see angels is irrelevant to this conversation. So you really do need to deal with what Catholic theologians say in order to really meet our arguments.

If you remember, you offered as support for your assertion that “every limited thing is possibly caused” the fact that you can add and/or take away from limited things, thereby causing new limited things. My counter-argument regarding limited FAEs successfully refutes this point, since you can’t add or subtract from anything else and end up with a FAE. Now, are you going to have the intellectual honesty to admit this or not, and, if you can’t find another justification for this premise, admit your argument is not sound.

It seems to me that angels are not “Fully Actualized Entities”. One thing that they increase in is knowledge. There is hierarchy in Heaven, as shown by our understanding of the 9 choirs of angels. Perhaps the higher angels, such as the cherubim and seraphim, on account of their residing closer to the Throne of God, are more privy to God’s plan for the world than the angels and archangels.

 

[NowAgnostic]

A necessary precondition of a thing’s actualization is that it is composed of a potentiality capable of actualization.

The thing doesn’t exist prior to its actualization and therefore can’t be “composed of a potentiality”. And, there is nothing that exists prior that can be transformed into a FAE. All you are really saying here is that for something to exist it is necessary for it be logically possible for it to exist (that’s what “potentiality” means in this context). That’s true of every thing, including God. If this is not what you mean by “potentiality” then please explain.

God can will an angel, or an FAE, to no longer exist.

A questionable claim (AFAIK it’s part of angelic nature to exist forever, and God can’t do the logically impossible, such as create an angel without an angelic nature), but not really relevant so I’ll let it go.

We will have to keep in mind the inductive argument offered in support of the claim that every limited thing has the potential to be caused. Even the term, “fully actualized potentiality” presupposes potentiality.

Potentiality to exist, not necessarily potential to be caused - and all that this “potentiality” is is merely a logical possibility.

As mentioned above, an FAE has a potentiality that is fully actualized. If this doesn’t entail causation, I don’t know what does.

It doesn’t entail causation, though maybe I should have been more precise and defined an FAE as a “fully actual entity” instead of a “fully actualized entity” as though some other entity actualized it to avoid confusion. Note that God is also a “fully actualized potentiality” by this understanding of “potentiality” though.

However, all your premise claims is the possibility of causation so that’s what we need to look at.

And, of course, that’s not what’s being done. You will recall that I offered an inductive argument that infers that limited things are potentially caused. The sun is just one example, but we can pile on many many instances in which this is the case. Saying that FAE’s are an exception, when no reason for that exception is offered, is a case of special pleading.

But this is not special pleading. A reason for that exception was offered. FAEs are different from your instances. All your instances consisted of items which could either be broken down into parts, or joined together with another item to produce something else - and in fact, this is precisely how your examples are caused in real life, which is what leads you to conclude they are potentially caused.

And I can show that FAEs constitute a defeater for your inductive argument. It’s in this form:

1. Every A that we have observed is also B, therefore we induce A → B.
   (Obviously a single example of an A which is not a B is enough to defeat the inference.)
2. Every A that we have observed is also a C.
3. Now we observe another A which is not a C and are unable to determine if it is a B.

Obviously the inference A → C is refuted, but what about A → B? Well it depends on whether we would have inferred !C → !B, or conversely B → C. If we can infer this, this is a defeater - we have an inductive inference that there is an A which is not a B. We would need, however, every B we’ve observed to be also a C. This is of course the case if the only Bs and Cs we’ve observed are the As we’ve observed.

In this case A = limited entity, B = potentially caused, C = composite object, or entity which can be joined to create a composite object.

You’re saying every limited entity you’ve pointed out is potentially caused. I’m saying those limited entities are also composite, or potentially composite. I’m pointing out there are also limited, though simple, entities - their status of potential causation being unknown. I’m saying this is a defeater for your inductive inference because we would also have inferred, using the same process of induction, that every potentially caused entity is composite or potentially composite, since every one we’d observed up to that point was so.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Let’s see if I can put the question differently. What actualizes an angel’s potentiality?

It cannot be nothing, since nothing causes nothing. It cannot be the angels themselves, since self-causation is presumed to be a metaphysical absurdity - that is, a thing would have to exist before it causes its own existence. This means that an angel is actualized by something external to itself, and the activity of this external entity is what we understand by a “cause.”

Do you disagree with any of this? If so, what?

The problem is that “potentiality” or “angel’s potentiality” has no meaning except for logical possibility of existence in this context. It’s not like a block of marble, which has potency to be a statue of Michelangelo but a sculptor is needed to actualize it. There is literally nothing which has the potency to become an angel. And, when we are talking about mere logical possibility of existence, your question becomes meaningless, for then what actualizes God’s potentiality?

If you wish to say that angels are not composed of any potentiality whatsoever, then I’m having a hard time distinguishing this from “pure actuality.”

Indeed, angels have no potency and are purely actual. Something “fully actual” can’t have potency by definition. Of course angels have “potentiality” insofar as there is the logical possibility for their existence.

 

[NowAgnostic]

We only accept the Catholic understanding of angels. How Muslims see angels is irrelevant to this conversation. So you really do need to deal with what Catholic theologians say in order to really meet our arguments.

This is a philosophy forum and neither the truth of Catholicism, nor of what Catholic theologians say is assumed a priori. So I’m free to disagree with those theologians and construct my own arguments on whichever lines I choose. Nevertheless I’ll use them below insofar as I agree.

It seems to me that angels are not “Fully Actualized Entities”. One thing that they increase in is knowledge.

In that case an angel would have potency to change and yet still remain the same angel. Which would mean, an angel would have accidents. Which is impossible, even according to those same Catholic theologians. There’s not really an angelic “essence” - each angel has its own separate essence - there’s no “matter” in which forms can be multiply instantiated yet with different accidents.

And, if angels could increase in knowledge, then some of the bad angels could conceivably repent, yes? Yet again these Catholic theologians hold that this is not merely a metaphysical impossibility (e.g. God only died for man, not for the angels) but a logical impossibility (an angel understands everything pertaining to its action, so there is nothing “new” that could cause it to change its mind).

There is hierarchy in Heaven, as shown by our understanding of the 9 choirs of angels. Perhaps the higher angels, such as the cherubim and seraphim, on account of their residing closer to the Throne of God, are more privy to God’s plan for the world than the angels and archangels.

That just shows they are limited.

 

[sidbrown]

This is a philosophy forum and neither the truth of Catholicism, nor of what Catholic theologians say is assumed a priori. So I’m free to disagree with those theologians and construct my own arguments on whichever lines I choose. Nevertheless I’ll use them below insofar as I agree.

In that case an angel would have potency to change and yet still remain the same angel. Which would mean, an angel would have accidents. Which is impossible, even according to those same Catholic theologians. There’s not really an angelic “essence” - each angel has its own separate essence - there’s no “matter” in which forms can be multiply instantiated yet with different accidents.

And, if angels could increase in knowledge, then some of the bad angels could conceivably repent, yes? Yet again these Catholic theologians hold that this is not merely a metaphysical impossibility (e.g. God only died for man, not for the angels) but a logical impossibility (an angel understands everything pertaining to its action, so there is nothing “new” that could cause it to change its mind).

That just shows they are limited.

The angel Gabriel came down from heaven and appeared to Mary announcing that she would become the Theotokos. Would this not be a change as far as the angel Gabriel was concenred. Before the Annunciation, the angel Gabriel had not spoken to Mary, after the Annunciation, things had changed in the life of the angle, since Gabriel had spoken to Mary. And did not the knowledge of the angel increase, since before the announcement it was not known if Mary would accept because she had free will and was able to decline.

 

[NowAgnostic]

The angel Gabriel came down from heaven and appeared to Mary announcing that she would become the Theotokos. Would this not be a change as far as the angel Gabriel was concenred. Before the Annunciation, the angel Gabriel had not spoken to Mary, after the Annunciation, things had changed in the life of the angle, since Gabriel had spoken to Mary. And did not the knowledge of the angel increase, since before the announcement it was not known if Mary would accept because she had free will and was able to decline.

The same arguments could conceivably apply to God. Before, the Holy Ghost had not conceived, afterwards it did. Therefore something changed in the life of God. And the knowledge of God increased, since before the announcement it was not known if Mary would accept.

Of course these arguments don’t apply to God, and so they need not apply to the angel, which could know and will unchangeably from eternity (or from the first moment of existence).

That being said, I’ve read a bit more and apparently angels are supposed to have potency - how they can have potency and yet be “fully actualized” is beyond me.

 

[Areopagite]

That being said, I’ve read a bit more and apparently angels are supposed to have potency - how they can have potency and yet be “fully actualized” is beyond me.

It depends what you mean by “fully actualized.” If that means “pure act” then angels are not fully actualized. They, in fact, have some kind of potency in them. Aquinas would say this as well:

Summa Theologica, P.1, Q. 54, A.1

Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act.

Now perhaps “fully actualized” can apply to angels in some other way, I don’t know. I can’t remember actually.

In that case an angel would have potency to change and yet still remain the same angel. Which would mean, an angel would have accidents. Which is impossible, even according to those same Catholic theologians. There’s not really an angelic “essence” - each angel has its own separate essence - there’s no “matter” in which forms can be multiply instantiated yet with different accidents.

Why would it be impossible for an angel to have accidents? And what Catholic theologians told you that? Thomas Aquinas would disagree with them:

Summa Theologica, P.1, Q. 54, A.1

A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the form—whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.

According to Aquinas at least, angels have both potency and accidents.

And, if angels could increase in knowledge, then some of the bad angels could conceivably repent, yes? Yet again these Catholic theologians hold that this is not merely a metaphysical impossibility (e.g. God only died for man, not for the angels) but a logical impossibility (an angel understands everything pertaining to its action, so there is nothing “new” that could cause it to change its mind).

The reason, I believe, why an angel can’t repent is the nature of its will and not its knowledge. A demon can be given as much knowledge until the cow comes home, but that doesn’t mean it’ll ever repent because it has chosen to eternally forsake God.

 

[punkforchrist]

I’ll reply to everyone in more detail tomorrow, but I have to make this brief. NowAgnostic, I’m afraid you’re misusing the term “fully actualized potentiality” if you’re using it as a synonym with “pure actuality.” I’m very surprised you would want to take the route of saying that angels are pure actuality, since pure actuality simply is unlimited actuality. That’s just what the term means in Aristotelian language.

As for how a fully actualized potentiality can also be caused, this can be easily demonstrated by the house analogy I’m so fond of. Suppose a house has been standing from all eternity. In other words, its potential to stand is fully actualized, and it always has been actualized. Even if such a scenario were the case, the house is still held up (e.g. “actualized,” “caused”) by its foundation.

 

[sidbrown]

It depends what you mean by “fully actualized.” If that means “pure act” then angels are not fully actualized. They, in fact, have some kind of potency in them. Aquinas would say this as well:

Now perhaps “fully actualized” can apply to angels in some other way, I don’t know. I can’t remember actually.

Why would it be impossible for an angel to have accidents? And what Catholic theologians told you that? Thomas Aquinas would disagree with them:

According to Aquinas at least, angels have both potency and accidents.

The reason, I believe, why an angel can’t repent is the nature of its will and not its knowledge. A demon can be given as much knowledge until the cow comes home, but that doesn’t mean it’ll ever repent because it has chosen to eternally forsake God.

How can an agel be fully actualised if at one point in time He is in heaven, whereas at another point in time He is asking Mary if she wants to be the Theotokos?

 

[NowAgnostic]

It depends what you mean by “fully actualized.” If that means “pure act” then angels are not fully actualized. They, in fact, have some kind of potency in them.

Yes, that’s what I’ve read.

Now perhaps “fully actualized” can apply to angels in some other way, I don’t know. I can’t remember actually.

I guess we’ll have to ask punkforchrist to clarify then.

Why would it be impossible for an angel to have accidents? And what Catholic theologians told you that? Thomas Aquinas would disagree with them:

According to Aquinas at least, angels have both potency and accidents.

Right, if they have potency they are going to have accidents. Not in the same way as material things, which is why I was confused.

It still doesn’t make sense to me though how a completely simple entity can have potency (or accidents). What “about” it can change?

The reason, I believe, why an angel can’t repent is the nature of its will and not its knowledge. A demon can be given as much knowledge until the cow comes home, but that doesn’t mean it’ll ever repent because it has chosen to eternally forsake God.

Obviously this explanation isn’t correct if an angel’s will and intellect are merely notionally, but not really, distinct entities. But if an angel’s will and intellect are really (not just notionally) distinct entities, then an angel is not a simple entity.

 

[NowAgnostic]

How can an agel be fully actualised if at one point in time He is in heaven, whereas at another point in time He is asking Mary if she wants to be the Theotokos?

The same question could be asked of God (with reference to the Incarnation).

 

[NowAgnostic]

I’ll reply to everyone in more detail tomorrow, but I have to make this brief. NowAgnostic, I’m afraid you’re misusing the term “fully actualized potentiality” if you’re using it as a synonym with “pure actuality.” I’m very surprised you would want to take the route of saying that angels are pure actuality, since pure actuality simply is unlimited actuality. That’s just what the term means in Aristotelian language.

OK, I’m curious as to what “fully actualized potentiality” actually does mean then - and specifically what “potentiality” means in this context. Unlimited actuality follows as an inference from pure actuality, assuming that potency limits act. It obviously does in the material world, which is where Aristotle derived the concepts from. A block of marble can’t be two sculptures at once - if it’s one, it can’t be the other. But this inference doesn’t hold up for immaterial entities. There is no “thing” which can be transformed into an angel - and an angel can’t be transformed into another thing. Hence, actualizing the angel isn’t stopping something else from being actualized in its place. Thus, it seems there can be a completely actual, yet limited, being. Admittedly, these are not angels according to the Catholic understanding, so I’ll need to use another name.

As for how a fully actualized potentiality can also be caused, this can be easily demonstrated by the house analogy I’m so fond of. Suppose a house has been standing from all eternity. In other words, its potential to stand is fully actualized, and it always has been actualized. Even if such a scenario were the case, the house is still held up (e.g. “actualized,” “caused”) by its foundation.

Admittedly, all analogies limp, but the foundation here is a necessary, but not a sufficient, cause for the house, and I assume we mean sufficient causes.

 

[bridgeforsale]

maybe angels are holograms from other dimensions

 

[sidbrown]

The same question could be asked of God (with reference to the Incarnation).

I don’t think that it is claimed that angels are all knowing or all powerful. How would an angel know what Mary’s answer was going to be? Further angels have free will and they can disobey God as we have seen from the fallen anges. So they have the potential to do wrong.

 

[NowAgnostic]

All right, I’m even more confused. In the process of googling around I happened across this debate in which punkforchrist (who I assume is the same poster as here) uses the term “fully actualized potentiality” only in reference to God, not angels. In fact there he says that “pure actuality is fully actualized potentiality”.

If punkforchrist wishes to clarify, that’s fine with me, but it’s taking us far afield from the topic of this thread. Otherwise I can just admit I was wrong about angels and let’s move on to the main topic.

 

[punkforchrist]

In my debate on the KCA, I used the term “fully actualized potentiality” incorrectly. I should have used “pure actuality” and that alone.

NowAgnostic:

OK, I’m curious as to what “fully actualized potentiality” actually does mean then - and specifically what “potentiality” means in this context. Unlimited actuality follows as an inference from pure actuality, assuming that potency limits act.

That’s correct. A fully actualized potentiality serves as a limit to what is potentially actualizable. This is illustrated in the house analogy, since it’s not as if the house is something unlimited in power.

Admittedly, all analogies limp, but the foundation here is a necessary, but not a sufficient, cause for the house, and I assume we mean sufficient causes.

Only a necessary cause is required in order for the argument to work, at least in my estimation. We may need to clarify that this is a metaphysical necessity, and not necessarily a logical one. We have already talked about that, but for those following along, it may serve as a helpful reminder.

If punkforchrist wishes to clarify, that’s fine with me, but it’s taking us far afield from the topic of this thread. Otherwise I can just admit I was wrong about angels and let’s move on to the main topic.

Your candor is well appreciated. I do hope I’ve clarified my position. It’s unfortunate that my own mistake is permanently on the freeratio debate archive.

 

[punkforchrist]

This presents another problem because it is difficult to convince someone that time is not a real concept, but ptentiality is a real concept and not an abstract concept. Some people might see time as more real and concrete than potientiality.

Eventually we get into Planck time and these divisions no longer have any physical instantiation, even though they may be abstracted. In any case, this is an instance in which one thing is unlimited in its divisibility, but we shouldn’t equivocate between this and something unlimited in power.

 

[punkforchrist]

bridgeforsale:

Here, you’re assuming the point in controversy (you’re just doing it in a round-a-bout way, but you’re doing it, which is begging the question). The initial point (or at least the point I’m advocating) is god cannot be omnipotent (or there’s at least a very small chance he could be omnipotent). You haven’t demonstrated the necessity of omnipotence (you’ve given sort of a regress argument). . . .

But which premise is question-begging? It seems to me that I’ve at least offered some kind of argumentation, rather than mere assertion, for each of the premises.

There’s not a significant difference between these arguments. The Thomistic argument says everything in the universe is dependent or contingent, a sequence of causaly related contingent things cannot be infinite (thus they must be finite), therefore there must be a first cause (or words to that effect). All cosmological arguments usually assume contingent things require a cause (while Kalam is unique only where it postulates all things which “begin to exist” require a cause). I don’t think the distinction is very big, moreover, since I’m willing to concede the conclusions reached by all these arguments (particularly the Thomostic argument), it’s not a very important point I don’t think?

The major difference between the two arguments is that the TCA allows for an eternal universe. The reason I like the TCA so much is that many skeptics are sympathetic to an eternal universe and, while I disagree with such a concept, the TCA allows us to grant that assumption and still come to the conclusion that a First Cause exists.

Yes, all of these classical cosmological arguments would allow for deism (unless you look at how a small number of contemporary fundamentalists have skewed them). However, I’m not necessarily arguing in support of deism (or even necessarily against any particular religious system, including the one we were all raised in, Christianity). I’m willing to believe we have a soul, there is a conscious existence apart from our physical selves, etc. I don’t even mind thinking that an intangible power that can assist in human healing might be possible (although if this is possible at all, I only believe it can promote self-healing where self-healing is possible).

That’s very interesting. Thanks for your thoughts.

. . . What possible excuse does god have for ignoring their prayers while answering others? Sure, there’s an apologetic grab-bag we could reach into and pull out any number of arguments. Answering their prayers must not have fallen within god’s plan. Well, apparently god’s plan must have also required the savage murder of six million Jews, since he stood by as a spectator while they were marched into gas chambers. I for one don’t think this is logically feasible.

I’m just letting you know that I’m not ignoring this aspect of the discussion. The problem of evil is something we may need to come back to later. For now, I’m only arguing that an omnipotent being exists. Its goodness is something that will have to be examined later.