Closing the Gap from "First Cause" to "God"

[punkforchrist]

Suppose one accepts that a First Cause exists. I believe we can, using some rather benign modal axioms, close the gap between First Cause and God (“God” here defined as a Supreme Being of some sort). Here’s what I’m thinking:

Given that a First Cause exists:

1. Every limited thing is possibly caused.
2. A First Cause cannot be caused.
3. Hence, a First Cause must be unlimited.
4. Whatever is unlimited is supreme.
5. Therefore, a Supreme Being exists.

(1)-(3), I think, are analytical truths. Nevertheless, I’m open to discussion. This leaves us with (4). We define “supremacy” as entailing two qualities: a) if a thing is unlimited; and b) if a thing is unique. In order for a being to be supreme, it must satisfy the conditions of both (a) and (b). Our focus, then, will be on the demonstration that a First Cause must be unique.

Consider the possibility that two or more unlimited beings exist. If this is so - let’s call two of these entities X and Y - then in order for them to be distinct, X must lack something that Y possesses, or vice-versa. However, a thing can only lack something if it is limited. Therefore, the unlimited First Cause must be unique.

Thoughts? Questions? Predictions for BCS games?

 

[stenlis]

Some thouths:

1. A First Cause cannot be caused.
2. Hence, a First Cause must be unlimited.

‘Unlimited’ is a problematic thing. You can consider things that are unlimited in some respect but limited in another. You probably don’t believe God is a being of unlimited foolishness.

What properties of that ‘first cause’ have to be ‘unlimited’ in order for it to be the ‘first cause’?

1. Whatever is unlimited is supreme.

We define “supremacy” as entailing two qualities: a) if a thing is unlimited; and b) if a thing is unique

So you could reword the point 4:
4. Whatever is unlimited is unlimited (a) and unique (b)

Or to avoid the obvious:

1. Whatever is unlimited is unique

Why bother with the word ‘supreme’ then? It’s just a loaded term.

Consider the possibility that two or more unlimited beings exist. If this is so - let’s call two of these entities X and Y - then in order for them to be distinct, X must lack something that Y possesses, or vice-versa. However, a thing can only lack something if it is limited. Therefore, the unlimited First Cause must be unique.

The ‘unlimited’ problem again - would you say that god is a being both of unlimited ‘order’ and of unlimited ‘chaos’? That would be illogical.

1. Every limited thing is possibly caused.

Are all physical things limited?
The first law of thermodynamics says that energy/matter cannot be created or destroyed. That would mean it is timeless.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Suppose one accepts that a First Cause exists. I believe we can, using some rather benign modal axioms, close the gap between First Cause and God (“God” here defined as a Supreme Being of some sort). Here’s what I’m thinking:

Given that a First Cause exists:

1. Every limited thing is possibly caused.
2. A First Cause cannot be caused.
3. Hence, a First Cause must be unlimited.
4. Whatever is unlimited is supreme.
5. Therefore, a Supreme Being exists.

(1)-(3), I think, are analytical truths. Nevertheless, I’m open to discussion.

There is a modal fallacy in 2. You’ve tried to go from 2. Necessarily, a thing which is a first cause is not caused (which is analytic) to 2. A thing which is a first cause is necessarily not caused.

If you keep the right modal status you can’t make the jump to 3. You cannot even infer 3. Possibly, a First Cause is unlimited.

Also, the danger lurks of a modal fallacy in 1 due to imprecision of language. “Possibly, every limited thing is caused” could be taken to mean either that for every limited thing there is a possible world in which it is caused (an analytic truth) or that there is a possible world in which every limited thing is caused (which does not follow).

 

[punkforchrist]

Thank you both for your replies.

stenlis:

‘Unlimited’ is a problematic thing. You can consider things that are unlimited in some respect but limited in another. You probably don’t believe God is a being of unlimited foolishness.

“Foolishness,” or maybe “ignorance,” is generally seen as a privation, rather than some positive actuality.

What properties of that ‘first cause’ have to be ‘unlimited’ in order for it to be the ‘first cause’?

“Unlimited” is really just the negation of “limited,” and we’re considering the power to act. We might just focus on unlimited power, then, for now.

Why bother with the word ‘supreme’ then? It’s just a loaded term.

It’s easier to say “Supreme Being” or “God” than it is to say “unlimited and unique First Cause.” Considering that that is a very common definition of a Supreme Being, I think it’s suitable.

The ‘unlimited’ problem again - would you say that god is a being both of unlimited ‘order’ and of unlimited ‘chaos’? That would be illogical.

Right, and that would depend on which of the two is an actuality, and which is just a privation of that actuality. “Order” is the fullness of harmony and intelligibility, whereas “chaos” is merely a lack of these.

Are all physical things limited?
The first law of thermodynamics says that energy/matter cannot be created or destroyed. That would mean it is timeless.

Technically, an eternal universe would imply that matter and energy are omnitemporal, but not timeless (re: existing outside of time). However, matter and energy may still be caused even on an eternal model of the universe. Consider an eternal house. Such a structure would still require a foundation; so, the foundation causes the house to remain standing, even though it has always done so from eternity.

 

[punkforchrist]

There is a modal fallacy in 2. You’ve tried to go from 2. Necessarily, a thing which is a first cause is not caused (which is analytic) to 2. A thing which is a first cause is necessarily not caused.

I might just be tired, but I don’t see the difference between the two. Could you symbolize them?

Also, the danger lurks of a modal fallacy in 1 due to imprecision of language. “Possibly, every limited thing is caused” could be taken to mean either that for every limited thing there is a possible world in which it is caused (an analytic truth) or that there is a possible world in which every limited thing is caused (which does not follow).

We need only assume the former. This is just Leibniz’s Law - two distinct objects cannot share all of the same qualities. If any particular finite entity is possibly caused, it must be distinct from the First Cause, which is not possibly caused.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I might just be tired, but I don’t see the difference between the two. Could you symbolize them?

I don’t know how to make the symbols here.

Let’s see if I can get you to agree on this for an entity A:

A is a first cause in a possible world does not imply that A is necessarily a first cause - there are possible worlds in which A is caused.

We need only assume the former. This is just Leibniz’s Law - two distinct objects cannot share all of the same qualities.

Agreed.

If any particular finite entity is possibly caused, it must be distinct from the First Cause, which is not possibly caused.

Not agreed. “Not possibly” slips in an illegitimate modal status to the first cause, which is not caused, indeed, but not necessarily not caused.

 

[sidbrown]

Suppose one accepts that a First Cause exists. I believe we can, using some rather benign modal axioms, close the gap between First Cause and God (“God” here defined as a Supreme Being of some sort). Here’s what I’m thinking:

Given that a First Cause exists:

1. Every limited thing is possibly caused.
2. A First Cause cannot be caused.
3. Hence, a First Cause must be unlimited.
4. Whatever is unlimited is supreme.
5. Therefore, a Supreme Being exists.

(1)-(3), I think, are analytical truths. Nevertheless, I’m open to discussion. This leaves us with (4). We define “supremacy” as entailing two qualities: a) if a thing is unlimited; and b) if a thing is unique. In order for a being to be supreme, it must satisfy the conditions of both (a) and (b). Our focus, then, will be on the demonstration that a First Cause must be unique.

Consider the possibility that two or more unlimited beings exist. If this is so - let’s call two of these entities X and Y - then in order for them to be distinct, X must lack something that Y possesses, or vice-versa. However, a thing can only lack something if it is limited. Therefore, the unlimited First Cause must be unique.

Thoughts? Questions? Predictions for BCS games?

If the First Cause were unlimited in his powers, would He be able to create a universe where innocent children were not tortured or otherwise harmed, such as we have seen in the wars in Palestine, Iraq and Rwanda.

 

[punkforchrist]

I don’t know how to make the symbols here.

Let’s see if I can get you to agree on this for an entity A:

A is a first cause in a possible world does not imply that A is necessarily a first cause - there are possible worlds in which A is caused.

Well, A need not be logically necessary. However, in any world in which A exists, A must be a First Cause. It’s like saying that bachelors do not exist in every possible world, but they are still necessarily unmarried in those worlds in which they do exist.

 

[punkforchrist]

If the First Cause were unlimited in his powers, would He be able to create a universe where innocent children were not tortured or otherwise harmed, such as we have seen in the wars in Palestine, Iraq and Rwanda.

This is basically an introduction to the problem of evil, which is a bit off-topic. It’s certainly an important issue, though. For what it’s worth, God may have some morally sufficient reason for allowing these evils. When we say that God’s power is unlimited, it is with respect to concrete things. Logical contradictions, like square-circles, or forcing someone to freely choose something (especially relevant to the problem of evil) are not concrete things.

 

[Thing]

If the First Cause were unlimited in his powers, would He be able to create a universe where innocent children were not tortured or otherwise harmed, such as we have seen in the wars in Palestine, Iraq and Rwanda.

He did. Then He set it free and it decided to go against Him.

 

[Thing]

…

A is a first cause in a possible world does not imply that A is necessarily a first cause - there are possible worlds in which A is caused.

…
.

Because A caused us to exist, we are sure that we have one end of an imaginary string. We know we exist. Something caused us, but, did something cause it which caused us, - possibly, as an idea I will consider it.
So, some thing caused the cause A, and something caused that cause, and something caused that cause, and all the way backwards into infinity, each cause caused by a previous cause traveling back eternally with no beginning.
So our causes are eternal now, though not always the same cause, each cause superseded by another. But the point now is that the cause(s) are eternal. And they must be. But because we are one end of this eternal string the string itself cannot be eternal. I find the string is finite at this end but infinite at the other end. Our universe will not cause anything else. It has expanded beyond the recall of its own gravity. It must continue to expand as it is, indefinitely, and eventually become dead, out of fuel and energy. No more energy to cause something else. That is one end of our string. So the string is not an infinite string. So, logically, not being infinite nor eternal the string has a beginning also at the other end.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Well, A need not be logically necessary. However, in any world in which A exists, A must be a First Cause.

And that’s just what I’m disputing. There are worlds in which A is a first cause and worlds in which A is caused.

 

[sidbrown]

This is basically an introduction to the problem of evil, which is a bit off-topic.

I don’t see why it would be off the topic of closing the gap from first cause to God. First Cause is somewhat abstract, but God is a Personal and All-Loving Being. So why would it not be on the topic of closing the gap of understanding from First Cause to a Personal God?

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

And that’s just what I’m disputing. There are worlds in which A is a first cause and worlds in which A is caused.

That would imply that A’s essence in W is such that it is first, but in W*, A’s essence is intermediate. Given that priority and intermediacy are distinct attributes, we would have to say that if A is the same being in both W and W*, then A=~A, which is a violation of the law of identity, in addition to Leibniz’s Law (LL).

 

[punkforchrist]

I don’t see why it would be off the topic of closing the gap from first cause to God. First Cause is somewhat abstract, but God is a Personal and All-Loving Being. So why would it not be on the topic of closing the gap of understanding from First Cause to a Personal God?

The problem of evil is a separate argument from any cosmological argument. I agree that God is personal and all-loving, but I was just trying to focus on a being whose power is unlimited. I don’t mind you bringing it up or anything, though. Part of what is so great about theology is how so many issues are interconnected.

 

[NowAgnostic]

That would imply that A’s essence in W is such that it is first, but in W*, A’s essence is intermediate. Given that priority and intermediacy are distinct attributes, we would have to say that if A is the same being in both W and W*, then A=~A, which is a violation of the law of identity, in addition to Leibniz’s Law (LL).

No, it wouldn’t, anymore than in W I have brown hair and in W* I have black hair. You’re assuming that something’s being a first cause must be necessary (due to its essence) and not contingent (an accident). I’m challenging that assumption. Even under theism God isn’t necessarily a first cause, for there is a possible world in which He alone exists.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Suppose one accepts that a First Cause exists. I believe we can, using some rather benign modal axioms, close the gap between First Cause and God (“God” here defined as a Supreme Being of some sort). Here’s what I’m thinking:

Given that a First Cause exists:

1. Every limited thing is possibly caused.
2. A First Cause cannot be caused.
3. Hence, a First Cause must be unlimited.

(1)-(3), I think, are analytical truths. Nevertheless, I’m open to discussion.

Alright, I didn’t succeed in clearly showing the modal fallacy the first time. But the argument is certainly invalid.

Let me try again by illustration. The argument is of this form:

1. Every apple is possibly red.
2. An orange cannot be red.
3. Therefore, an orange cannot be an apple.

So far so good, it seems, but if the argument is valid it should be valid for anything you might substitute for “orange” in which 2 is correct. But, this is not the case:

1. Every apple is possibly red.
2. A green apple cannot be red.
3. Therefore, a green apple cannot be an apple.

What’s the problem? Well, the modal fallacy of equating “Necessarily, if a, then b” with “If a, then necessarily b” has raised its head again combined with the oft inadequacy of normal language to represent modal concepts. Here there’s an equivocation as to what “cannot” means… In the first one with oranges what is meant is “If a is an orange, then, necessarily, a is not red” whereas in the second one with green apples is meant “Necessarily, if a is a green apple, a is not red”.

Now here 2. A First Cause cannot be caused is justified as an analytic truth which only means “Necessarily, if a is a first cause, a is not caused” as in the above example with green apples. Thus, the argument is invalid. QED.

 

[AlbertBall]

Also how on earth to you get from 4-5?

1. Whatever is unlimited is supreme.
2. Therefore, a Supreme Being exists.

Ok lets just for agruments sake i agree with four - that some unlimted first cause exists, how on earth do you jump from that to a supreme being???

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

No, it wouldn’t, anymore than in W I have brown hair and in W* I have black hair.

Difference in hair color results in a difference of essence.

You’re assuming that something’s being a first cause must be necessary (due to its essence) and not contingent (an accident). I’m challenging that assumption. Even under theism God isn’t necessarily a first cause, for there is a possible world in which He alone exists.

An only child is still the firstborn. Likewise, if only God exists in W*, then He is still First Cause (“cause” is being used as a noun, not a verb).

So far so good, it seems, but if the argument is valid it should be valid for anything you might substitute for “orange” in which 2 is correct. But, this is not the case:

1*. Every apple is possibly red.
2*. A green apple cannot be red.
3*. Therefore, a green apple cannot be an apple.

I’ve added an asterisk by your new set of premises. There actually isn’t any parity between the original argument and your counter-example. (2*) entails an accidental property, since we’re now talking about finite attributes. This is an instance of equivocation between necessity simpliciter and necessity accidentia. (1*) is also suspect, since we might add an additional premise: “every existing apple is either red, green, yellow, etc.” This implies that, “necessarily, every apple is possibly red,” is incorrect. If A is an apple in W, and A is red, but the same apple is not-red in W*, we arrive at the same type of contradiction I illustrated earlier.

What’s the problem? Well, the modal fallacy of equating “Necessarily, if a, then b” with “If a, then necessarily b” has raised its head again combined with the oft inadequacy of normal language to represent modal concepts.

□(A → B) entails (A → □B), where B is exemplified in any world in which A exists. The only other valid option is to deduce that (□A → B), in which case A exists by logical necessity. This brings us back to the question of whether or not a First Cause can possibly be caused.

 

[punkforchrist]

Also how on earth to you get from 4-5?

1. Whatever is unlimited is supreme.
2. Therefore, a Supreme Being exists.

Ok lets just for agruments sake i agree with four - that some unlimted first cause exists, how on earth do you jump from that to a supreme being???

From the OP:

punkforchrist:

Consider the possibility that two or more unlimited beings exist. If this is so - let’s call two of these entities X and Y - then in order for them to be distinct, X must lack something that Y possesses, or vice-versa. However, a thing can only lack something if it is limited. Therefore, the unlimited First Cause must be unique.

X is defined as supreme if and only if X is unlimited and unique. Given that X is unlimited and unique (as argued above), X is a Supreme Being.