Condoms and Zika

[Blue_Horizon]

You made the assertion, but never demonstrated how it can arise when the parents seek to avoid pregnancy in conjugal relations, and how established doctrine would judge the behaviour as moral.

Rau I am merely demonstrating to you at the level of **principle **that current Church teachings do leave theoretic “wiggle room” for possible exceptions. And this on the basis that **indirect intentions to contracept **have not been explicitly denied in Church doctrine on contraception.

(BTW I have also observed that the practical examples of Congo Nuns and free cooperation in the grave sin of one’s partner may well in fact be the valid examples of indirect contraceptive intent you seek from me. It is your invincible ignorance which stops you from admitting this logical possibility).

Therefore your view that the Pope, if he has said what most of us understand him to have said, has incontrovertibly contradicted Tradition is not airtight.

I know of no scenario where contraception to avoid pregnancy in conjugal relations is “indirect” or moral according to doctrine.

See above, your invincible ignorance forces you to see only one solution to these issues
which can in fact be explained in other ways. As the Vatican has given no explanation for the validity of, for example, the right explanation of the Congo Nuns case is still open. I see no reason why its acceptability cannot be based on an indirect intention to contracept made possible by the desire to protect one’s chastity and procreative integrity from unjust attack. You no doubt think it is a case of directly intended use of contraceptives which is legitimate because this is not consensual sex. Both solutions are equally logical and in accord with current doctrine are they not?

Doctrine does not oppose killing an aggressor when necessary to save one’s life.

Rau this does not appear to be a good faith response as you are starting to substitute off the argument “mantras” to try and prove your view when you don’t actually seem to have an argument to counter my point.
You know as well as I do the Church does not accept direct killing of an aggressor is acceptable even in self-defence. Therefore you must accept such a killing is indirect…despite the undeniable fact that the death of the aggressor is the only way my family can be protected. Just as the only way to avoid a zika pregnancy is to indirectly intend the use of a condom.

Please argue to the point of the argument with an openness to possibly being mistaken which alone saves us from a seemingly dishonest evasiveness in “dialogue”.

 

[Rau]

Here you go. Same as I have repeated numerous times previously but you seem unwilling to talk to it:

“Have I not been doing that with you for the last week by suggesting you more seriously distinguish indirect intention from direct intention when it comes to use of contraceptives Just as is the case with killing in self defence.
Killing is intrinsically evil in the same way that contraception is intrinsically evil is it not?”

Blue - yes, you are repeating yourself, but not making ground. Please take your hypothesis to the next step so we can judge if there is substance in it, or if it just a wild speculation. Explain for us - when is contraception in conjugal relations to avoid pregnancy “indirect”, and when is it direct? How do we tell the difference?

We can then compare that answer to established doctrine to discover it it can cooexist. Just as killing in self-defence, medical procedures of contraceptive effect and post-rape treatments can co-exist.

 

[Rau]

Rau I am merely demonstrating to you at the level of **principle **that current Church teachings do leave theoretic “wiggle room” for possible exceptions. And this on the basis that **indirect intentions to contracept **have not been explicitly denied in Church doctrine on contraception.

The wiggle room you reference is to use a descriptive term “indirect” but so far, you are unable to articulate how in the relevant context, the contraception could ever be “indirect”. Why is it hard to do this? In so many other areas of morality, we can understand and explain such situations easily. We understand why treating ectopic pregnancy is not the moral ill of abortion (though it is called indirect abortion). We understand why necessary killing in self-defence is not the moral ill of murder. Why can we not understand how/why contracepting conjugal relations to avoid a pregnancy could be indirect, that is, might not be the moral ill of contraception?

It is your invincible ignorance which stops you from admitting this logical possibility.

Ad hominem. Please refrain from speculating about me. It’s not about me.

See above, your invincible ignorance forces you to see only one solution to these issues

As above. Further, I yearn repeatedly for another solution to be offered.

As the Vatican has given no explanation for the validity of, for example, the right explanation of the Congo Nuns case is still open. I see no reason why its acceptability cannot be based on an indirect intention to contracept made possible by the desire to protect one’s chastity and procreative integrity from unjust attack. You no doubt think it is a case of directly intended use of contraceptives which is legitimate because this is not consensual sex. Both solutions are equally logical and in accord with current doctrine are they not?

Indirect contraception, or self-defence from an attack which continues beyond withdrawal of the attacker - they are the same thing. “Directly intended use of contraceptives” is not itself a moral problem. Apparently the pill can ease a bad case of acne (so, I’m told).

…you don’t actually seem to have an argument to counter my point.

I think you’ve got that mixed up. You’ve not been able to make your point. You have only hypothesis. When you can explain how/ when contraception in conjugal relations to avoid pregnancy is “indirect” and when it is “direct” (see post #182) you will have made a point that can considered and potentially challenged. Right now, you only have hypothesis.

Just as the only way to avoid a zika pregnancy is to indirectly intend the use of a condom.

No it isn’t. Sex is not mandatory.

Please argue to the point of the argument with an openness to possibly being mistaken which alone saves us from a seemingly dishonest evasiveness in “dialogue”

I am bursting with openness to examine an argument. If only there was more than hypothesis without substance…

 

[Ron_Conte]

1. intention – your intended end; the purpose for choosing the act.
2. object – the end toward which the knowingly chosen act is intrinsically ordered. There is always a “direct” relationship between the chosen concrete act and its object.
3. consequences – the reasonably anticipated good and bad effects. When a bad effect is ONLY in the consequences, and not also in the object, then it is said to be indirect, i.e. the knowingly chosen act is only indirectly related to that end.

Catechism of the Council of Trent: “married persons who, to prevent conception or procure abortion, have recourse to medicine, are guilty of a most heinous crime nothing less than wicked conspiracy to commit murder.”

 

[Rau]

1. intention – your intended end; the purpose for choosing the act.
2. object – the end toward which the knowingly chosen act is intrinsically ordered. There is always a “direct” relationship between the chosen concrete act and its object.
3. consequences – the reasonably anticipated good and bad effects. When a bad effect is ONLY in the consequences, and not also in the object, then it is said to be indirect, i.e. the knowingly chosen act is only indirectly related to that end.

Catechism of the Council of Trent: “married persons who, to prevent conception or procure abortion, have recourse to medicine, are guilty of a most heinous crime nothing less than wicked conspiracy to commit murder.”

Ron, this is true but will not persuade Blue that what a couple fearing Zika do is “direct contraception”. He wants to assert that it must be “indirect”, for that would allow the common interpretation of the Pope’s statements to not conflict with doctrine.

I have asked many times how can it be indirect? What then is the moral object of the “act” if the contraception is considered “indirect”. Blue has not answered yet. It seems to me he would need to assert that the moral object is the same as the “Intention”.

Can you shed further insight here?

 

[Ron_Conte]

The will is the source of all three fonts, and each font is a type of end.

1. the will chooses an intended end. This end resides in the subject (the person who acts).
2. the will chooses a concrete act (the act in the particular case). But every act has a moral nature (the moral species or moral type of the act), which consists in its ordering toward its moral object. The object is an end which resides in the act itself, since the act is inherently directed toward that proximate (morally-immediate) end. The choice of the act is the choice of its nature and its object.

The act is intentionally (deliberately, voluntarily) chosen. This explains why the Magisterium sometimes uses terms such as intentional or deliberate when referring to intrinsically evil acts, such as contraception. But in this font, the will is intentionally choosing an act, and the choice of the act necessarily always includes, at least implicitly, the choice of its nature and its object.

The intentional choice to contracept sexual acts is ordered, by the nature of the act, toward the deprivation of the procreative meaning, and is therefore immoral, even when the intended end is to prevent disease transmission or to prevent birth defects.

1. the will chooses the act in the knowledge that actions have consequences. So the choice of the act is also, indirectly, a choice of its end results, the reasonably anticipated good and bad effects.

Only when a bad effect is solely in the consequences, and not also in the object, can that evil (physical evil) be said to be indirect.

 

[surritter]

Keep at it, guys. I’ve given up – Blue clearly doesn’t accept basic Catholic tenets, so I see no point in trying to discuss the deeper stuff.
It’s like he wants to discuss the fine points of calculus when he doesn’t even agree with basic arithmetic.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Blue - yes, you are repeating yourself, but not making ground. Please take your hypothesis to the next step so we can judge if there is substance in it, or if it just a wild speculation. Explain for us - when is contraception in conjugal relations to avoid pregnancy “indirect”, and when is it direct? How do we tell the difference?

Rau you still don’t get it.
The Church doesn’t seem to have one for justifying killing in self-defence does it? You do accept the killing is indirect don’t you? Below you attempted to use a version of the modern PODE to show it was indirect yet failed to make your case. Yet we know it is indirect because Church pastoral practice and teaching is clear on this truth even if there still isn’t a clear and coherent philosophic system (as you desire) "justifying this.

I am merely opining that “thou shalt not contracept” can be well understood in much the same way as “thou shall not kill.” The latter in pastoral practice has some rare exceptions and I see no valid argument from you or anyone else to say the same cannot potentially hold for the former.

I have asked you to provide a Magisterial statement that explicitly states that not only can use of ABC never be directly intended, it may never be indirectly intended.

I have observed to you that the Vatican statement on Confessional advice for an opposed spouse cooperating in her spouse’s sin of contraception in principle allows the possibility of the opposed spouse choosing to cooperate in this use of ABC. You seem to take the highly unlikely view that this would be “allowed” ONLY because it is a case of extreme duress and freedom is lacking (ie its not a moral act at all). I find that view preposterous as the document cannot readily be understood that way. It seems transparent to me you lean to this unlikely view is because you are in principle unwilling to concede the spouse could ever be able to do so as a good moral act on the basis of indirect contraceptive intention (her direct intention being the unitive purpose of the act and “paying the marital debt” to her husband).

I reasonably show therefore that you are in/vincibly ignorant on this point and so will not be discussing this further with you for the moment.

Having made the case for the **possibility **of cases of indirect contraceptive intent (and actuality in the Confessional Advice above re cooperation in evil) … that does not mean I am sure the Pope is actually taking that angle with Zika.

I do believe it is the most natural reading of his seemingly disjointed statements.
However, as you have observed in my other posts, there may be another reading of where the Pope is coming from. Namely, he does not condemn conscience decisions that persons in a zika situation, after ruminating on current Church doctrines, may make that are at odds with that doctrine. Unlike in the case of abortion which merits auto-excommunication. And the reason is that contraception is not “an absolute evil”.
We can discuss this reading if you wish?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Catechism of the Council of Trent: “married persons who, to prevent conception or procure abortion, have recourse to medicine, are guilty of a most heinous crime nothing less than wicked conspiracy to commit murder.”

Ron, medieval biology was not able to comprehend that “contraception” did not actually involve killing a potential baby in the same way that abortion does.
They had no understanding of eggs and sperm and how human life does not exist until they come together. We only got that in the 1800s?

For this reason I also question the use of the English word “conception” in the English translation of the above article of Trent. There is no doubt in my mind that the latin word from which it is derived has a significantly different meaning from what we biologically educated people understand today.

Therefore the nature of the “object” (preventing conception) that Trent was speaking of above has substantially changed by reason of these new biological circumstances we now comprehend better today.

That is why the above teaching that preventing conception is on the same level as abortion (murder) is now seen to be a few bridges too far. Its still an evil of course, but its not the same as abortion by any means.

The principles have not changed, they just no longer apply to both abortion and contraception in the same way as was once thought.

At least Pope Francis was clear and correct on that point, surely.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

No it isn’t. Sex is not mandatory.

Again, I believe this is a trivialising of the unitive purpose of marriage and the obligation of a spouse to “pay the marital debt”, even to a non Christian husband who may not accept Church teaching.

That is exactly why the Vatican issued the Confessional Advice (on the acceptability of freely engaging in contracepted sex even when opposed under some circumstances) that you seemd to have trouble understanding below.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Well I’m not sure how to answer some of these. The simplest way to state my frame of reference is this:
An act (using that word generically for now) committed by a person may be moral or immoral, depending on several things. First, some things are outright immoral; what the Church would call intrinsically immoral. The classic example is direct abortion – it can’t be done for any reason, even if the intent is good.
(Did you get that last part? Even if the intent is good in itself.)

Next – some things that may be moral on the surface can become immoral (or perhaps amoral at best) for various reasons. One reason could be if the motive is immoral. Another may be if any foreseen downstream effects will be too adverse (this is the notion of proportions that was floated earlier).

The flip side of this is that some things that may seem immoral on the surface can occasionally become moral. The classic example here is a stop sign: If I sail through without stopping that is immoral. But, there may be a reason for me to willingly violate the stop sign and have it be a moral action. Suppose I have an emergency (serious wound) and I or my driver need to get to the hospital ASAP. And maybe it’s 4am and nobody is within miles. In that case any reasonable judge would dismiss a citation on the grounds that the normal rules can be suspended for good reason. Why? Because a stop sign is a man-made rule; it can be altered for good reason.

No to bring us back to the topic at hand: Directly separating the love-giving and life-giving aspects of sexual intercourse is intrinsically immoral, along the lines of abortion (much less evil on the sliding scale, of course). This is what it’s all about in the Zika condom scenario. Using a condom – even for a good, intended effect – is immoral in and of itself.
No need to bring Aquinas into this, which is why I stated that you’re making this harder than it needs to be.

So I’ll bring you back to the two simple questions (which I’m sure you’ll attempt to answer, now that I’ve attempted to answer yours)…

S I think it fairly clear that the most important and easiest question I was really needing you to answer was:
“If you could explicitate what Catholic PDE definition you are working from …”
and " What “moral test” exactly are you applying?".

It doesn’t matter, from your answer above I can see even more clearly that we have very different levels of understanding of Church moral theology vocab and concepts. I would like to discuss the points you raised but experience tells me too much will get “lost in translation.”

Thankyou for taking the time to reflect on my hypotheses and engage me.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I have asked many times how can it be indirect? What then is the moral object of the “act” if the contraception is considered “indirect”. Blue has not answered yet.

Its easy Rau.
Its indirect in the same way that “killing” is indirect in justified self-defence.

Please don’t use the phrase “moral object”, its ambiguous, try using the phrase “what is the object of the moral act”.

The object of the moral act of “killing in self defence”? … well its self-defence (or protection of ones family) isn’t it?

The object of the moral act of “marital sex avoiding a seriously deformed baby” … well its paying the marital debt (unitive purpose) and wisely waiting for a better time to conceive a normal baby.

The analytical difficulty it seems to me is deciding if the above object (the matter) actually is able to “anchor” the direct and indirect intentions stated (the form).

Its the same philosophic problem as how much “damage” a body (matter) can sustain and still “anchor” a soul (form).

That is, how much indirectly willed physical evil can be tolerated in the object of a moral act before it is never able to anchor, by intrinsic teleology, a good intention.

If the matter (object) is too disordered then it is impossible to be “formed” (given good moral quality/life) by any alleged “good” intention. It will then be an intrinsically evil object.

The Church (Augustine) once thought “killing” was such an intrinsically evil object. Not even an object involving self-defence mitigated the disorder enough to justify it. Augustine was wrong, but he was right that the killing cannot be “directly” intended. Only indirectly.

Strangely, the modern day PODEffect seems unable to justify the Church’s current stance on self-defence. It falters on the “means condition”. Aquinas, who is said to have justified lethal self-defence on grounds of the PODEffect did not actually define the modern “means condition” as part of his PODE.

That is why I do not see the argument (that the PODE cannot justify any indirect contracepting) as sound.
If it is said that the good of zika contraception (avoiding a seriously deformed baby) can only be had through the evil of the physical contracepting of a marital act (and so it fails the “means condition”) … what then of lethal self-defence?

At the level of physical causality the situation is the same. Protection of me or my family can only be had by the evil of a physical killing.

However lethal self-defence (as indirect killing) is accepted by the Church even in the face of this failed condition. (Which condition Aquinas never posited from what I can discern).

Therefore I conclude there is no intrinsic reason why the physical evil of a contracepted marital act (as the causal means to the good sought) must on principle bring down the Zika case as denying a valid double effect scenario.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Blue Horizon has badly misunderstood the basic principles of ethics taught by Veritatis Splendor and the CCC, and Church teaching on contraception.

Every moral act consists of three elements: the objective act (what we do), the subjective goal or intention (why we do the act), and the concrete situation or circumstances in which we perform the act. All three aspects must be good – the objective act, the subjective intention, and the circumstances – in order to have a morally good act.

The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object.

Circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act subjectively good or defensible as a choice.

If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain irremediably evil acts.

Legitimate intentions on the part of the spouses do not justify recourse to morally unacceptable means (for example, direct sterilization or contraception).

Every action which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible is intrinsically evil.

Contraception is so profoundly unlawful as never to be, for any reason, justified.

It is necessary that each and every marriage act remain ordered per se to the procreation of human life.

A doctrine which dissociates the moral act from the bodily dimensions of its exercise is contrary to the teaching of Scripture and Tradition.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Blue Horizon has badly misunderstood the basic principles of ethics taught by Veritatis Splendor and the CCC, and Church teaching on contraception.

Every moral act consists of three elements: the objective act (what we do), the subjective goal or intention (why we do the act), and the concrete situation or circumstances in which we perform the act. All three aspects must be good – the objective act, the subjective intention, and the circumstances – in order to have a morally good act.

The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object.

Circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act subjectively good or defensible as a choice.

If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain irremediably evil acts.

Legitimate intentions on the part of the spouses do not justify recourse to morally unacceptable means (for example, direct sterilization or contraception).

Every action which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible is intrinsically evil.

Contraception is so profoundly unlawful as never to be, for any reason, justified.

It is necessary that each and every marriage act remain ordered per se to the procreation of human life.

A doctrine which dissociates the moral act from the bodily dimensions of its exercise is contrary to the teaching of Scripture and Tradition.

Ron Conte has badly misunderstood what is being said here.

Ron, as a starter, please supply an explicit Magisterial statement that says indirect use of contraceptives is intrinsically evil, whether sought as an end or a means?

Yes directly intended use of contraceptives is intrinsically evil…just as killing is.
But indirect killing is not.
You join the dots…

 

[surritter]

S I think it fairly clear that the most important and easiest question I was really needing you to answer was:
“If you could explicitate what Catholic PDE definition you are working from …”
and " What “moral test” exactly are you applying?".

It doesn’t matter, from your answer above I can see even more clearly that we have very different levels of understanding of Church moral theology vocab and concepts. I would like to discuss the points you raised but experience tells me too much will get “lost in translation.”

Thankyou for taking the time to reflect on my hypotheses and engage me.

Not so fast.
If we are at different levels of understanding, then the logical thing to do is dial it back until we find where we have common ground, right? Then we can analyze subsequent diverging points to see which path makes more sense.

So if I’m unable to “explicitate” my understanding to the level you require, you need to come down to my level (sorry if that’s degrading for you) answer my more-basic questions.

Therefore…
Do you agree that it is automatically immoral to intentionally engage in sex while intentionally taking any action to divorce the unitive and procreative aspects?

You seem to be side-stepping this question (what, 4 times now?) so I can only surmise that you disagree. But if you do agree, please say so and then we can see why your understanding of “intent” may differ from mine.

 

[Ron_Conte]

The use of contraception in cases of rape is not intrinsically evil because the object of the act is the moral interruption of the rape. The deprivation of the procreative meaning is only in the consequences, not in the object. That is an example of what might be called indirect contraception (similar to indirect sterilization or indirect abortion).

However, what makes it indirect is not the intended end, but the moral species and moral object of the intentionally chosen act.

 

[Rau]

…Ron, as a starter, please supply an explicit Magisterial statement that says indirect use of contraceptives is intrinsically evil, whether sought as an end or a means?..

Such a statement is not relied upon by me or by Ron Conte. We note quite the reverse - there are valid scenarios where “indirect contraception” arises and involves no moral evil - see Post #196 re: rape as an example.

The debate surrounds your contention that the “object” of an act to “contracept” marital relations can be the defence of a possible future child from a disease/deformity.

 

[Rau]

…The object of the moral act of “marital sex avoiding a seriously deformed baby” … well its paying the marital debt (unitive purpose) and wisely waiting for a better time to conceive a normal baby.

Perhaps that proposal Blue is what JP2 would have called “creative” - see final para below.

The act you describe as "marital sex avoiding a seriously deformed baby” does not expose the means adopted to serve the good intention – it is silent on how one avoids a deformed baby. It is far from a “concrete act” (see Veritatis Splendor) – we have no idea what concrete act is proposed, how therefore is it to be judged? You have left out an essential element of the act, and folded in the Intention. There are a number of options which would make the act (which you describe) concrete and thus allow moral assessment, eg: NFP, abstinence, **Contraception **and hopefully in due course - take a medication/vaccine. By not exposing the means, we cannot properly identify the object. The act (you propose or have in mind, but have not written down) is in fact concrete because a means (“contraception”) has been chosen - and thus the act is properly described as “contracepted marital sex”. When such is knowingly chosen, the moral object is the deprivation of the procreative aspect, a moral evil.

Depriving marital relations of the procreative aspect (as end or means) is moral evil. In your act, this is in the means. It is only when the deprivation is solely in the Consequences that we can say the contraception is “indirect”. [In self-defence, killing the aggressor as means is not moral evil - the aggressor is not innocent. The killing is in the means, but is physical evil only - we don’t require that that be solely in the consequences, though in some instances of self-defence, that is the case.]

If it is said that the good of zika contraception (avoiding a seriously deformed baby) can only be had through the evil of the physical contracepting of a marital act (and so it fails the “means condition”) … what then of lethal self-defence?

As outlined above – the *concrete act *chosen in order to avoid the consequences of Zika is moral evil, not mere physical evil. I can licitly choose, as a means, to break down a door, or amputate an arm, or kill an aggressor [all *physical evils] where the Intention is good, and subject to balance of consequences. It’s OK for the good effect to flow from a physical evil, but not a moral evil. And yes – the typical expression of the PODE is not sufficiently prescriptive on this point.

To quote Pope St John Paul lI

“…the negative moral precepts, those prohibiting certain concrete actions or kinds of behaviour as intrinsically evil, do not allow for any legitimate exception. They do not leave room, in any morally acceptable way, for the “creativity” of any contrary determination whatsoever. Once the moral species of an action prohibited by a universal rule is concretely recognized, the only morally good act is that of obeying the moral law and of refraining from the action which it forbids.” [Veritatis Splendor 67]

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The use of contraception in cases of rape is not intrinsically evil because the object of the act is the moral interruption of the rape. The deprivation of the procreative meaning is only in the consequences, not in the object. That is an example of what might be called indirect contraception (similar to indirect sterilization or indirect abortion).

However, what makes it indirect is not the intended end, but the moral species and moral object of the intentionally chosen act.

I appreciate your insight that the object of a moral act is the goal of the agents direct intention while the indirect intention is of the consequences.
Is this Aquinas or his later commentators?

How would you go about identifying the differing ends of direct and indirect intentionality in a complex moral act? In other words how do we objectively distinguish what is the object and what are consequences in practice.

eg How do we distinguish killing as a indirect consequence of self defence when that killing is integral and directly causes the protection sought. It actually looks like protection is intrinsically the consequence of the killing just as avoiding a badly deformed baby is the
intrinsically a consequence of the contraception.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Such a statement is not relied upon by me or by Ron Conte. We note quite the reverse - there are valid scenarios where “indirect contraception” arises and involves no moral evil - see Post #196 re: rape as an example.

I’ll wait for Ron to speak for himself just to be sure.

The debate surrounds your contention that the “object” of an act to “contracept” marital relations can be the defence of a possible future child from a disease/deformity.

This is a bit clumsily put I think. If you start out by calling the moral act one of contraception before analysing it you have already prejudicialy contaminated the analysis .

In short I have never said this.