Condoms and Zika

[surritter]

I am simply observing that if TPODE can potentially apply then the very presence of “a direct contraceptive act” (as opposed to use of contraceptives) may not be on the table at all.

But here’s what you’re glossing over: What is the actual action being engaged in? Sexual intercourse.
Even if the woman is pregnant, we must keep in mind the integrity of the actual, direct action before we look at indirect actions and double effects.

If TPODE is potentially applicable it is then a matter of deciding prudentially whether the
harm allowed is less than the good attained by means of that harm.

There is consideration of proportionality when discussing the principle of double effect, but the principle of double effect only applies if the integrity of the direct act (intercourse) is preserved.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I agree that the notion of good flowing from “evil” is too loosely stated. Good may not flow from moral evil - it may however flow from harm such as amputation.

I’m happy to receive a correct summary of PDOE from you. And then to ask we return to the subject of the thread, and the question I put to you, which is on-point, in post #108.

Come on Rau, I am not the one getting dogmatic over TPODeffect.
I just raised the possibility of unusual cases of contraceptive use that **may **be capable of anchoring indirect intention.

That may be explained by the PODE.
I also suggested it **may **be explained by TPOTLEvil.
The two principles are not the same.

If YOU want to deny justification by the PODEffect it is really you that needs to mount a better definition I think .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

But here’s what you’re glossing over: What is the actual action being engaged in? Sexual intercourse.
Even if the woman is pregnant, we must keep in mind the integrity of the actual, direct action before we look at indirect actions and double effects.

There is consideration of proportionality when discussing the principle of double effect, but the principle of double effect only applies if the integrity of the direct act (intercourse) is preserved.

Not quite sure what you are getting at here. If the use of contraceptives is in some cases able to be only indirectly intended then there is no direct contraceptive intent.

If there is no substantial contraceptive intent then there is no substantially intended separation of the ends of the marital act…if that is the direction you are suggesting?

 

[Rau]

Come on Rau, I am not the one getting dogmatic over TPODeffect.
I just raised the possibility of unusual cases of contraceptive use that **may **be capable of anchoring indirect intention.

That may be explained by the PODE.
I also suggested it **may **be explained by TPOTLEvil.
The two principles are not the same.

If YOU want to deny justification by the PODEffect it is really you that needs to mount a better definition I think .

I take that to mean you won’t return to topic? Or will you respond to post #108?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I take that to mean you won’t return to topic? Or will you respond to post #108?

Give me a break! Only just catching up and now its time for bed.
I’ll check out 108 next visit .

 

[surritter]

Not quite sure what you are getting at here. If the use of contraceptives is in some cases able to be only indirectly intended then there is no direct contraceptive intent.

If there is no substantial contraceptive intent then there is no substantially intended separation of the ends of the marital act…if that is the direction you are suggesting?

No, it has nothing to do with how “substantial” the intent is. It’s about the actions themselves, objectively speaking.

Here’s the difference: If a woman takes contraceptives for the purpose of regulating her cycle, then it can be moral. Why? Because she wants to regulate her cycle as she goes about living her everyday life. It’s not being taken for any reason related to sexual intercourse.
If she happens to engage in sexual intercourse, the indirect effect of the pill is that conception is avoided.

Now to your scenario of zika: You seem to be saying that a couple can use a condom so that when they engage in sex, the virus won’t be transmitted. See the difference? The condom is not being done for a non-sexual reason; it is by its very definition destroying the integrity of the sex act as a direct, desired action.

 

[Rau]

…Now to your scenario of zika: You seem to be saying that a couple can use a condom so that when they engage in sex, the virus won’t be transmitted. See the difference? The condom is not being done for a non-sexual reason; it is by its very definition destroying the integrity of the sex act as a direct, desired action.

You actually express it as Blue views it. The intention is to prevent a virus spreading and the side effect is semen not being transferred. That’s Blue’s take on it I believe.

I put that aside and note that conjugal acts are required to be apt in themselves for procreation; to be a one flesh Union. When the penis is encased in latex, the act is not that.

 

[surritter]

You actually express it as Blue views it. The intention is to prevent a virus spreading and the side effect is semen not being transferred. That’s Blue’s take on it I believe.

I put that aside and note that conjugal acts are required to be apt in themselves for procreation; to be a one flesh Union. When the penis is encased in latex, the act is not that.

No! What I wrote in that last paragraph was indeed intended to show his view, but then meant to show why it is NOT a moral act (for the very reason you cite).

Notice how I contrasted that immoral action to the woman who takes the pill to regulate her cycle, which can be a moral action.

Sorry if I wasn’t clear, though.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

No, it has nothing to do with how “substantial” the intent is. It’s about the actions themselves, objectively speaking.

BTW Aquinas would disagree with your view it is “the actions themselves”.
There are some cases where the outward deed of both murder and self-defence are exactly the same and the difference in moral acts resides in the “inner act” of the subject.

If a woman takes contraceptives for the purpose of regulating her cycle, then it can be moral. Why? Because she wants to regulate her cycle as she goes about living her everyday life. It’s not being taken for any reason related to sexual intercourse.
If she happens to engage in sexual intercourse, the indirect effect of the pill is that conception is avoided.

There are varying degrees of “indirect intention” … some very clear and some very subtle.
Yes in your example it would be clear for an unmarried older woman but maybe not so much for a young newly married woman.

For the Congo Nuns the contracepting clearly relates to sexual activity. Sure, it is unwanted sexual activity but, in your analysis, that would not be the point. The purpose is definitely to contracept a sexual act which you seem to believe may never be done. But I see this as just a more subtle form of indirect intention. The direct intention is to repell an unjust aggressor.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Ahhh, progress. Please clarify - the physical evil argument then can be invoked for condom use, but not for use of the Pill? Is that what you are saying?

Not progress but back-tracking to my first post here which quickly got overtaken by the Zika stuff.

My argument for Zika has primarily been about the possibility of validly indirectly intending to use contraceptives.

Re the legitimacy of using a condom in pregnant sex I thought that we did that to death from post #6 below?

 

[Rau]

…My argument for Zika has primarily been about the possibility of validly indirectly intending to use contraceptives.

I am asking you simply: can the above argument you have raised in connection with Zika…can it (in your opinion) be upheld for use of the Pill, or only for condom use?

 

[surritter]

BTW Aquinas would disagree with your view it is “the actions themselves”.
There are some cases where the outward deed of both murder and self-defence are exactly the same and the difference in moral acts resides in the “inner act” of the subject.

This is true. I guess I wrote that, though, because you are advocating (academically, maybe not actively) something based on its indirect effects, double effect, etc.
My continual point is that none of that secondary stuff is even on the table until we establish that the objective action is one that has the ability to be moral in itself, and whose integrity is preserved throughout.

A hammer blow to the head can be objectively moral if you are doing it not voluntarily but because you have no other way to fend off a murderer. You are doing what you need to do to complete the act of self-defense. In other words, you don’t want to be there, yet the situation was foisted upon you.

In the case of a condom, what is the act? It is sexual intercourse. If you are there voluntarily, then there is no “self-defense.” You either have sex or you don’t; there’s the option.
In the Congo nuns analogy, they are not engaging in a voluntary act of intercourse. They DON’T want to be there; the situation IS foisted up them. They are not doing the “action” of sexual intercourse.

I think it boils down to this: you think that the main “action” is the putting on of a condom. It’s not. Compare these three…

Self-defense scenario:
The principal “action” — self-defense
The “indirect effect” – loss of the perp’s life
“Cause” – hammer blow (an objectively neutral action)
Does the cause violate the intrinsic good of the principal action? No; thus it passes the moral test.

Zika scenario:
The principal “action” — sexual intercourse
The “indirect effect” – stave off deadly virus
“Cause” – putting on a condom (an objectively neutral action)
Does the cause violate the intrinsic good of the principal action? Yes; thus, it doesn’t pass the moral test.

Nuns in Congo:
The principal “action” — self-defense
The “indirect effect” – stave off semen/pregnancy
“Cause” – putting on a condom (an objectively neutral action)
Does the cause violate the intrinsic good of the principal action? No; thus it passes the moral test.

 

[surritter]

I should clarify – in the last scenario of my post above, the cause is the taking of the pill, not putting on a condom.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I am asking you simply: can the above argument you have raised in connection with Zika…can it (in your opinion) be upheld for use of the Pill, or only for condom use?

Of the two only the condom I would think.

 

[Rau]

Of the two only the condom I would think.

And for that scenario, I *understand *your reasoning at least, because you have expressed that idea before and we discussed at length. (another thread).

Now, from all I’ve read, the Pope’s comments were not limited to condoms, and thus those interpreting him to be giving a nod toward contraception generally understand him to be suggesting that, with discernment (whatever that means) one could also use the pill to avoid becoming pregnant for the reason of not wanting to have one’s baby Zika-afflicted.

It seems therefore that we both agree fail to see how such a course can be reconciled with the existing Church teachings on *contraception *(let alone any abortifacient concerns).

Which is why for now I’ll stick with my assessment of having no idea what the Pope was trying to say…

 

[Blue_Horizon]

And for that scenario, I *understand *your reasoning at least, because you have expressed that idea before and we discussed at length. (another thread).

Now, from all I’ve read, the Pope’s comments were not limited to condoms, and thus those interpreting him to be giving a nod toward contraception generally understand him to be suggesting that, with discernment (whatever that means) one could also use the pill to avoid becoming pregnant for the reason of not wanting to have one’s baby Zika-afflicted.

It seems therefore that we both agree fail to see how such a course can be reconciled with the existing Church teachings on *contraception *(let alone any abortifacient concerns).

Which is why for now I’ll stick with my assessment of having no idea what the Pope was trying to say…

Let me think this through a little more … been having a few drinks on Sat night and my above answer may have been a little premature .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Let me think this through a little more … been having a few drinks on Sat night and my above answer may have been a little premature .

On reflection I am thinking that if use of contraception to prevent a zika conception is legitimate (probably on the basis that the intention is indirect) then it shouldn’t matter what form of contraception was used as long as it wasn’t also abortafacient.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

This is true. I guess I wrote that, though, because you are advocating (academically, maybe not actively) something based on its indirect effects, double effect, etc.
My continual point is that none of that secondary stuff is even on the table until we establish that the objective action is one that has the ability to be moral in itself, and whose integrity is preserved throughout.

A hammer blow to the head can be objectively moral if you are doing it not voluntarily but because you have no other way to fend off a murderer. You are doing what you need to do to complete the act of self-defense. In other words, you don’t want to be there, yet the situation was foisted upon you.

In the case of a condom, what is the act? It is sexual intercourse. If you are there voluntarily, then there is no “self-defense.” You either have sex or you don’t; there’s the option.
In the Congo nuns analogy, they are not engaging in a voluntary act of intercourse. They DON’T want to be there; the situation IS foisted up them. They are not doing the “action” of sexual intercourse.

I think it boils down to this: you think that the main “action” is the putting on of a condom. It’s not. Compare these three…

Self-defense scenario:
The principal “action” — self-defense
The “indirect effect” – loss of the perp’s life
“Cause” – hammer blow (an objectively neutral action)
Does the cause violate the intrinsic good of the principal action? No; thus it passes the moral test.

Zika scenario:
The principal “action” — sexual intercourse
The “indirect effect” – stave off deadly virus
“Cause” – putting on a condom (an objectively neutral action)
Does the cause violate the intrinsic good of the principal action? Yes; thus, it doesn’t pass the moral test.

Nuns in Congo:
The principal “action” — self-defense
The “indirect effect” – stave off semen/pregnancy
“Cause” – putting on a condom (an objectively neutral action)
Does the cause violate the intrinsic good of the principal action? No; thus it passes the moral test.

I have delayed answering only because I am trying to fill in the gaps on various fine points so as to get a handle on where you are coming from.

none of that secondary stuff is even on the table until we establish that the objective action is one that has the ability to be moral in itself, and whose integrity is preserved throughout.

I have finally decided I cannot understand this - at least not from a Thomistic perspective.
This suggests we are each working out of very different philosophic frameworks so discussion is probably going to be very tortured as we try to grapple with necessarily different vocabs as well!

A hammer blow to the head can be **objectively moral **

As above.

You are doing what you need to do to complete the act of self-defense. In other words, you don’t want to be there, yet the situation was foisted upon you.

I think this an extraneous matter from the traditional approach (Aquinas). Though it may be consequential for “the principle of the lesser of two evils” approach rather than the PDE. (Not that I have researched PLTE).

In the case of a condom, what is the act? It is sexual intercourse. If you are there voluntarily, then there is no “self-defense.” In the Congo nuns analogy, they are not engaging in a voluntary act of intercourse. They DON’T want to be there; the situation IS foisted up them.

A lot to unambiguate here.
I notice you keep alternating between the words “act” and “action” as if they were equivocal. For a Thomist the words are worlds apart. That’s quite a deep rabbit hole.
Also, I don’t really understand what part of the complete moral act you are trying to identify here by the word “action” (or “act”) or “principal act”?
And re the Congo Nuns you define it as “self defence” and that the situation is “foisted upon them” and presumably “they don’t want to be there” (the 1st example of self defence). Yet it could also be argued they do want to be there. They had a choice of leaving the mission or staying (and being reasonably certain they would get raped.) So, as others have commented, analysis of “actions” in cases of PDE can get loose and arbitrary, each protagonist “shaping” the elements in accord where their own desired final outcomes .

I think it boils down to this: you think that the main “action” is the putting on of a condom. It’s not. Compare these three…

I have always considered the primary intent re zika sex is to enagage in marital sex avoiding conception of a severely unhealthy baby.

I am interested in those three cases you’ve analysed but I don’t know what moral principles or vocab you are working from. Obviously its one of the many versions of the PDE. What "moral test exactly are you applying?

If you could explicitate what Catholic PDE definition you are working from and where it may be sourced in Magisterial docs that would be helpful.

I find it interesting that Aquinas is allegedly sourced as the originator of the PDE in his justification of self defence against Augustine (who denied same). Yet many of the allegedly “Catholic” formulations of the last 100 years are decidedly evolved beyond what Aquinas appears to have ever stated. Particularly with the “means” condition (often presented in modern times as “the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect”.) There is much modern confusion over the exact defining this condition and little consensus.

 

[Rau]

On reflection I am thinking that if use of contraception to prevent a zika conception is legitimate (probably on the basis that the intention is indirect) then it shouldn’t matter what form of contraception was used as long as it wasn’t also abortafacient.

The “if” you mention is the key issue! Is it, or can it conceivably be legitimate?

The acts we are talking about are acts to eliminate the procreactive meaning from conjugal relations as the chosen means to ensure there can not be a child afflicted with Zika resulting.

The act chosen (involving a pill, say) would appear to be identically that defined by teaching as moral evil, though motivated by a good Intention. The moral object of this chosen act is to remove the procreative aspect from sexual relations (a moral evil); the couple chooses this means (rather than another moral course) in order to pursue good intentions.

If one can legitimately choose to remove the procreative aspect from one’s conjugal relations, for a good intention, then when is that behaviour ever immoral? Only for a bad intention? That would undo the deep Catholic moral teaching that acts can be evil irrespective of Intentions and Circumstances.

 

[surritter]

My quote from earlier: “none of that secondary stuff is even on the table until we establish that the objective action is one that has the ability to be moral in itself, and whose integrity is preserved throughout.” Your reply:

I have finally decided I cannot understand this - at least not from a Thomistic perspective.
This suggests we are each working out of very different philosophic frameworks so discussion is probably going to be very tortured as we try to grapple with necessarily different vocabs as well!

This really isn’t as hard as you’re making it to be. If you read my quote again, I was summarizing pretty basic stuff: Catholic morality is very clear that you cannot do an objectively immoral act even if it is intended to bring about a good effect. (May I assume that you assent to that? If not, then I apologize – I thought the discussion was already within the accepted framework of established Catholic moral teaching. If so, then I apologize for making a simple concept sound confusing.)

I notice you keep alternating between the words “act” and “action” as if they were equivocal. For a Thomist the words are worlds apart. That’s quite a deep rabbit hole.
Also, I don’t really understand what part of the complete moral act you are trying to identify here by the word “action” (or “act”) or “principal act”?

True – I was sloppily using them interchangeably. Sorry about that.

And re the Congo Nuns you define it as “self defence” and that the situation is “foisted upon them” and presumably “they don’t want to be there” (the 1st example of self defence). Yet it could also be argued they do want to be there. They had a choice of leaving the mission or staying (and being reasonably certain they would get raped.)

This is twisting things a bit too far, I would think! They are not there seeking sexual union with anyone, right? So the rapists’ actions would not be their “choice.” Come on…

That’s why my three scenarios are useful: If a married couple engages in sex, their main deed is to unify their love as intended by the Creator. The Catholic Church teaches that sexual intercourse is composed of two elements or aspects: the procreative aspect and the unitive aspect. It is intrinsically, automatically immoral to intentionally engage in sex while intentionally taking any action to divorce those two aspects.
(You’ve asked for Magisterial references, but I presume I don’t have to go into that for something so basic to a discussion about sexual morality. In general I would point you to Humanae Vitae and paragraph 19 of Familiaris Consortio.)

In the case of the Congo nuns who are attacked, their main deed is not sexual intercourse but the fending off of an attack. That fending off also carries certain moral requirements (somewhat parallel to just-war requirements).

I have always considered the primary intent re zika sex is to enagage in marital sex avoiding conception of a severely unhealthy baby.

That’s the money quote. You are focusing on avoiding birth defects as the intent, and assessing its morality (which is of course good), but the evil you wish to thwart is unfortunately inextricably tied in with the sexual act. So the only way you can get the good effect and still have sex is to destroy the integrity of sex. That’s why it fails the moral test.

We are to look at the intent, yes, but we must place above that the deeds/actions done and assess the morality of those actions on their own turf – as if the intent were not yet in the picture.
That’s why I will again point you to my first quote pasted into this reply:
“None of that secondary stuff (trying to prevent birth defects) is even on the table until we establish that the objective deed is one that has the ability to be moral in itself, and whose integrity is preserved throughout.”

I am interested in those three cases you’ve analysed but I don’t know what moral principles or vocab you are working from. Obviously its one of the many versions of the PDE. What "moral test exactly are you applying?

I can only ask in reply if you are approaching things from the Catholic perspective. This is the clearest way I can say it: Settled teaching tells us that it is objectively immoral to engage in the sexual act while also divorcing the procreative and unitive aspects of the sexual act.

Can I presume that you assent to that? Since you are drilling so deep on Thomism and double effect, I must question if you agree with the higher-level basics.