Condoms, STDs, and abstinence

[Rau]

The USCCB text is not an act of the Magisterium. It is a website FAQ. There’s a bias sometimes in online discussions where people give excess weight to a source whose views they like, and too little weight to magisterial documents.

As a general rule, I’d agree with you. We all favour information that matches our predisposition. But, as Catholics, we have a right to expect the USCCB site to provide reliable guidance. If it is not, we should complain loudly!

The text on the USCCB site addresses a specific scenario, whereas the Magisterial documents state the applicable ‘theory’ (if I can call it that). As you and others have pointed out, applying the theory is not always straightforward.

I think the “bias” in this instance arises from the fact that the USCCB site OUGHT to be reliable, and the information is SPECIFIC to the question. We have a right to expect it to have correctly applied magisterial teaching.

 

[Ron_Conte]

1. A woman has a non-trivial medical condition. The only effective treatment also has the effect of preventing ovulation. She takes the medication. May she and her husband engage in marital relations while taking this medication?
2. A man contracts a serious communicable STD. He believes it is inappropriate to have marital relations with his wife due to the risk of infecting her. He is receiving treatment, but the risk of infecting his wife will remain. May this couple utilise a condom to eliminate the risk of infection transfer.

Since contraception is intrinsically evil, the moral analysis is the same as for abortion. The act remains intrinsically evil, even when the person has a good “end in view” (the first font: intention). The means of using a contraceptive pill or device, which deprives the marital act of its procreative meaning, is not justified by the good end. And this is particularly clear in the case of marital relations, since the spouses can refrain from relations, thereby allowing the wife to take a medication, or the husband to refrain from communicating a disease.

A good intention and a difficult circumstance each have no effect on the moral object, which makes the act intrinsically evil.

 

[Rau]

Since contraception is intrinsically evil, the moral analysis is the same as for abortion. The act remains intrinsically evil, even when the person has a good “end in view” (the first font: intention). The means of using a contraceptive pill or device, which deprives the marital act of its procreative meaning, is not justified by the good end. And this is particularly clear in the case of marital relations, since the spouses can refrain from relations, thereby allowing the wife to take a medication, or the husband to refrain from communicating a disease.

A good intention and a difficult circumstance each have no effect on the moral object, which makes the act intrinsically evil.

This answer accords with what you have published previously. Your point is that the Act ‘done’ by the couple (which can be viewed as “take this medication while intending to have marital relations” or “have marital relations given that the medication was taken”) IS the Act of “contraception”.

You are familiar with the quote:

*On the other hand, the Church **does not consider at all illicit *the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should result there from—provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever. (Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, 15) I believe he is saying that contraception is not merely the physical, observable act. The intention of the will (in connection with the Act, the 2nd font, not the first!) matters.

If you disagree Ron, then can you please say what treatments Paul VI was alluding to as not being illicit?

 

[Ron_Conte]

This answer accords with what you have published previously. Your point is that the Act ‘done’ by the couple (which can be viewed as “take this medication while intending to have marital relations” or “have marital relations given that the medication was taken”) IS the Act of “contraception”.

You are familiar with the quote:

*On the other hand, the Church **does not consider at all illicit ***the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should result there from—provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever. (Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, 15) I believe he is saying that contraception is not merely the physical, observable act. The intention of the will (in connection with the Act, the 2nd font, not the first!) matters.

If you disagree Ron, then can you please say what treatments Paul VI was alluding to as not being illicit?

Catholic moral teaching is based on the three fonts of morality. If you don’t understand the fonts, you won’t be able to arrive at a correct moral judgment of a difficult question. The three fonts are intention, moral object, circumstances. A change in intention or circumstances cannot transform an intrinsically evil act into a good act.

The inherent moral meaning of the act is determined by its moral object. The act is chosen by the will. All three fonts involve the will. But in the second font, the will chooses an act, and the act is, in and of itself, good or evil based on its ordering toward a proximate end.

The act of wearing a condom while having marital relations is inherently contraceptive; it thwarts the procreative end of the act. The act of taking a contraceptive pill and then engaging in marital relations is inherently contraceptive because the pill thwarts the procreative end. The intentional choice of a disordered act is intrinsically evil. The reason for choosing the act cannot make the act good.

The intended end might be to avoid procreating a child, or it might be to treat a medical disorder, or it might be to please a spouse, or it might be some other motivation. But the disordered act remains intrinsically evil.

The same thing occurs with direct abortion. When the intention is to save the life of the mother, the direction killing of the innocent prenatal is still gravely immoral.

“The deliberate decision to deprive an innocent human being of his life is always morally evil and can never be licit either as an end in itself or as a means to a good end.” EV 57

However, when the act is NOT the direct killing of an innocent, but rather the removal of a cancerous uterus, then the act is not intrinsically evil. But we still must evaluate intention and circumstances to see if the overall act is moral.

The idea that HV 15 permits condoms and abortifacient contraception is ridiculous. It is a recent innovation. If Paul VI meant to permit contraception in those cases, it would have been big news long ago, it would have been seized by the early opponents of HV as a way to permit contraception (for there are many possible medical intentions).

Church teaching on this more general point has been clear for along time. Some types of acts are intrinsically evil and always immoral, regardless of intention or circumstances. It does not transform into a good act by a change of intention.

HV 15 refers to indirect sterilization, such as a hysterectomy to treat a grave medical condition. The act is ordered toward treating the disorder, and so it is not intrinsically evil.

You said “The intention of the will (in connection with the Act, the 2nd font, not the first!) matters.”

But this contradicts the teaching of the CCC and Veritatis Splendor that some acts are immoral regardless of intention or circumstances. The second font is the intentionally chosen act with its inherent ordering toward a good or evil end (the moral object). The first font is the purpose for which the act is chosen. The thing to understand about all intrinsically evil acts is that they are immoral by the nature of the act, not due to a bad intention or bad consequences.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Some quotes from Church teaching on this subject:

II. Good Acts and Evil Acts

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”). The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.

1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

IN BRIEF

1757 The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three “sources” of the morality of human acts.

1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.

1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). the end does not justify the means.

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

1761 There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it

[The above quotes are from the CCC.]

Pope Pius XI: “But no reason, however grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and morally good.” (Casti Connubii, n. 54.)

Pope John Paul II: “No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church.” (Evangelium Vitae, n. 62)

Pope John Paul II: “In teaching the existence of intrinsically evil acts, the Church accepts the teaching of Sacred Scripture…. If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain ‘irremediably’ evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person. ‘As for acts which are themselves sins (cum iam opera ipsa peccata sunt), Saint Augustine writes, like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives (causis bonis), they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?’.” (Veritatis Splendor, n. 81)

The CDF, in a document on ethical standards for hospitals, refers to contraception as “actions which are in themselves (that is, by their nature and condition) ordered toward a contraceptive end” [Quaecumque Sterilizatio, March 13, 1975, AAS 68 (1976) 738-740; DOCUMENTA 25]

 

[Rau]

…The idea that HV 15 permits condoms and abortifacient contraception is ridiculous.

Noone suggests abortifacient medications Ron. Please refer to my post - we speak of a therapeutic medication taken for the Intention (first font) of treating a medical condition and an unintended consequence (3rd font) of preventing ovulation.

The question then is - are marital relations morally permissible while taking this medication?

If Paul VI meant to permit **contraception **in those cases, it would have been big news long ago, it would have been seized by the early opponents of HV as a way to permit contraception (for there are many possible medical intentions).

I’m quite sure he is not inviting people to **contraception **should they simultaneously happen to have a medical condition. But rightly or wrongly Ron, even the US Catholic Bishops have stated that it is moral to use a medication that impedes procreation for a medical purpose. [Their statement is in a context that requires us to understand that marital relations continue.]

Your question I quote here draws our attention to the crux of the issue - what exactly is the moral substance of contraception? Is it “choosing to have sex in the knowledge that conception is impeded”, or is it “willing the thwarting of conception”?

HV 15 refers to indirect sterilization, such as a hysterectomy to treat a grave medical condition. The act is ordered toward treating the disorder, and so it is not intrinsically evil.

Do you have an objective basis for such a narrow interpretation of “the use of those therapeutic means” (which are the words the Pope used)? It is far narrower than a clinician or the dictionary would suggest.

The taking of a pill prescribed by a doctor to cure a medical condition is, I would suggest, ordered toward healing. Acts which are identical to an observer can have different moral meanings.

You said “The intention of the will (in connection with the Act, the 2nd font, not the first!) matters.” But this contradicts the teaching of the CCC and Veritatis Splendor that some acts are immoral regardless of intention or circumstances.

The Act in debate is marital relations at a time when a medical treatment has rendered the woman not fertile. Is this an act that seeks to thwart conception, any more than an act with a woman who has had a medically required hysterectomy? They are both sterile acts. The can either be chosen or rejected. Why might one be OK and the other Not OK?

 

[Rau]

The CDF, in a document on ethical standards for hospitals, refers to contraception as “actions which are in themselves (that is, by their nature and condition) ordered toward a contraceptive end” [Quaecumque Sterilizatio, March 13, 1975, AAS 68 (1976) 738-740; DOCUMENTA 25]

Here is a quote from that document which I think makes clear the type of Act it is concerned about:

*Any cooperation which involves the approval or consent of the hospitals to actions which are in themselves, that is, by their nature and condition, directed to a contraceptive end, namely, in order that the natural effects of sexual actions deliberately performed by the sterilized subject be impeded, is absolutely forbidden. *The CDF appears to be very carefully identifying the proper moral substance of contraception.

 

[thewanderer]

Established by whom exactly?

While the licitness of the above is often quoted, be it by Apologists on this site, or even in the Q&A on the USCCB site, I am yet to read a well expressed piece of analysis that demonstrates the morality of marital relations while taking the contraceptive pill (for a medical purpose). The Conte analysis I linked above is of the right kind of analysis, but arrives at the reverse conclusion.

Only because it assumes as a premise, without explanation, that anything that is marketed as a contraceptive is inherently immoral. If you remove this premise and replace it with the premise that it is only inherently immoral when intended to be used as contraception, and then follow his argument through you arrive at the opposite conclusion. And, seeing as no one questions whether a hysterectomy when necessary to save the life of the mother is immoral it is clear that just because something reduces or removes fertility that does not make it inherently immoral. It also doesn’t make any sense to me to say that if something is “marketed” as contraception then it somehow becomes inherently immoral… In contrast, we already know that some actions that are inherently immoral, for example murder and abortion, depend very much on the intent involved. If there was no intent to kill then the action was not the inherently sinful action of murder or abortion. This is why the lifesaving operation of removing a tube with an ectopic pregnancy within it is permissible, if the same operation were performed with the intention of killing the unborn child it would be an abortion and so immoral, but when the intention is solely to save the life of the mother it is perfectly moral. So, we have clear precedent for certain intrinsically immoral actions falling into intrinsically immoral vs morally permissible based on the intention of those involved. We also have many well-known apologists and theologians who agree that things like the pill are not intrinsically immoral and only become intrinsically immoral when the intent is to use them as contraceptives. On the other hand, we have the unexplained assumption of a random person online that this is not that anything marketed as contraception is intrinsically immoral… Let’s just say I’m not going to base my moral theology off of unexplained claims of random people online.

 

[Rau]

…In contrast, we already know that some actions that are inherently immoral, for example murder and abortion, depend very much on the intent involved.

If you want to debate moral theology, you have to use the language carefully. What you write above is wrong, or at best, badly expressed. The reason (ie intent, motivation) for a “murder” or an “abortion” never matters. The Act we call “murder” or “abortion” is always wrong to choose. That is why it is called “intrinsically” evil - it means “always wrong to choose”.

This is why the lifesaving operation of removing a tube with an ectopic pregnancy within it is permissible, if the same operation were performed with the intention of killing the unborn child it would be an abortion and so immoral, but when the intention is solely to save the life of the mother it is perfectly moral.

Tube removal is moral because it is directed at the treating the mother’s body - removing that which will soon rupture and cause great harm. The act surely precipitates the earlier death of the child, but the act was not directed there.

Methotrexate injection on the other hand is a procedure directed to killing the child, which leads to recovery of the mother. That is abortion/murder.

The procedure, many years ago, of crushing the cranium of a baby that could not be born (before the days of caesarean birth) in order to save the mother’s life was not moral.

So, we have clear precedent for certain intrinsically immoral actions falling into intrinsically immoral vs morally permissible based on the **intention **of those involved.

No, we don’t at all, or at least you are expressing your idea in a way that is fundamentally at odds with moral theology. You are confusing the “observable” act (or its outcome) with the moral substance of the act. The thing which is intrinsically evil is not the pointing of a gun at a person and pulling the trigger. It is willing the person’s death. That is the murder. My “intention” (motivation) for doing that does not matter - a good one won’t relieve me of moral guilt. I can’t choose murder as a sure way of achieving “self-defence”, though I may take an action that may kill.

We also have many well-known apologists and theologians who agree that things like the pill are not intrinsically immoral and only become intrinsically immoral when the intent is to use them as contraceptives.

Apparently so, yet, as I said, I am yet to read the analysis of one of them that correctly frames the argument in terms of Catholic moral theology. Loosely speaking of “Intentions” is just unacceptable for a theologian.

Conte seeks to use the right language, and the right “theology”, but I am not convinced he gets the right answer. The issue hangs on the definition of “contraception”. As the example above illustrates, it is not sufficient to think of it as analogous to “pointing a gun and pulling the trigger”, which is the observable act, but he appears to do that.

On the other hand, we have the unexplained assumption of a random person online that -]this is not that /-]anything marketed as contraception is intrinsically immoral… Let’s just say I’m not going to base my moral theology off of unexplained claims of random people online.

Not sure which random person you are referring to. Me? Conte? Perhaps I am random, but Conte is not. He has credentials in the area, but for what it’s worth, I have issues with his reasoning in some areas.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Here is a quote from that document which I think makes clear the type of Act it is concerned about:

Any cooperation which involves the approval or consent of the hospitals to actions which are in themselves, that is, by their nature and condition, directed to a contraceptive end, namely, in order that the natural effects of sexual actions deliberately performed by the sterilized subject be impeded, is absolutely forbidden. The CDF appears to be very carefully identifying the proper moral substance of contraception.

Three fonts:

1. intended end
2. intentional (deliberate, voluntary) choice of the act itself, with its inherent moral nature, as determined by the moral object.
3. circumstances

The terms intentional, deliberate, voluntary are often used in magisterial documents to refer to the second font. In no way does this imply justification for the use of an intrinsically evil act as a means to a good intended end. The evil act is deliberately chosen, but the purpose or intended end does not affect the moral object.

Concerning the USCCB webpage with an FAQ – it’s not a magisterial document. The teachings of VS, the CCC, and the USCCB Catechism take precedence. People are quick to point out that the theological opinion of the Pope (absent an act of the Magisterium) may err. I don’t see why that webpage is being given so much weight in this discussion.

You don’t seem to understand the difference between the intentional (deliberate) choice of an act that is, in and of itself, disordered as compare to the intended end (the purpose of the choice). This misunderstanding makes you think that the same concrete act (taking the BCP while sexually active) can become not-contraception, even though it’s proximate end still thwarts procreation.

I feel that I’ve already replied to your other points, by explaining the three fonts and quoting various magisterial documents. These types of online debates tend to be endless, so I won’t continue arguing.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Only because it assumes as a premise, without explanation, that anything that is marketed as a contraceptive is inherently immoral. If you remove this premise and replace it with the premise that it is only inherently immoral when intended to be used as contraception, and then follow his argument through you arrive at the opposite conclusion.

The intended use or purpose of an act is the font of intention. The concrete act itself has it’s moral meaning determined by the moral object, which is the proximate end, in terms of morality, toward which the intentionally chosen act is inherently ordered. The moral object (or simply “object”) is a different font from intention.

As an intrinsically evil act (an act with a bad moral object) the essential definition of the sin of contraception is based on the moral object, not the intended purpose of the act. Contraception for any purpose, in any circumstance, is still contraception and still immoral.

“No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church.” EV 62

 

[Rau]

Three fonts:

1. intended end
2. intentional (deliberate, voluntary) choice of the act itself, with its inherent moral nature, as determined by the moral object.
3. circumstances

The terms intentional, deliberate, voluntary are often used in magisterial documents to refer to the second font. In no way does this imply justification for the use of an intrinsically evil act as a means to a good intended end. The evil act is deliberately chosen, but the purpose or intended end does not affect the moral object.

Correct. I did not suggest that. The question hangs on what exactly constitutes the “Act”. As I’ve stated, it is not merely the “observable actions”. If you observe a man “point a gun at another and pull the trigger causing death of the 2nd man” you cannot assert that is an instance of the concrete act of murder. Intrinsically evil acts appear to be constituted of more that just what we can observe.

Concerning the USCCB webpage with an FAQ – it’s not a magisterial document. The teachings of VS, the CCC, and the USCCB Catechism take precedence. People are quick to point out that the theological opinion of the Pope (absent an act of the Magisterium) may err. I don’t see why that webpage is being given so much weight in this discussion.

It is given weight because it is specific to the issue concerned, and comes from the highest Catholic authority in the country. I am not so quick to conclude that if the USCCB is right, the Magisterial documents are wrong. The latter express what I might call the “theory” - they need to be “applied” to real-world scenarios and error can be made in that process.

You don’t seem to understand the difference between the intentional (deliberate) choice of an act -]that is, in and of itself, disordered/-] as compared to the intended end (the purpose of the choice).

I do understand this (though whether or not the act is disordered is not relevant to understanding the distinction you mention).

This misunderstanding makes you think that the same concrete act (taking the BCP while sexually active) can become not-contraception, even though it’s proximate end still thwarts procreation.

As explained above, the same observable concrete act may or may not be Murder. And I hasten to add that it is not the Intention or Circumstances that determines this. It is all in font 2.

I feel that I’ve already replied to your other points, by explaining the three fonts and quoting various magisterial documents.

The debate is actually about the definition of the Act. Taking necessary medication (for right intention) is not immoral. The medication is therapeutic, so that it has the good of the human person as its proximate end (the moral object). The question is whether a couple should partake or abstain from marital relations when a side-effect of the medication is the prevention of ovulation. You argue that to partake is - “on the facts” - to commit an act of contraception - to separate the procreative and unitive aspects.

Yet if a couple, one of whom has had a hysterectomy, partake, no one would suggest that that is a contraceptive act.

Was either of the Acts discussed above an attempt to “thwart conception”?

BTW - I have no doubt that some couples may jump at the chance to take a medication with contraceptive effect (perhaps for a minor ailment, or when there were alternatives) because, in their heart, the consequences appeal to them. That is wrong.

 

[thewanderer]

If you want to debate moral theology, you have to use the language carefully. What you write above is wrong, or at best, badly expressed. The reason (ie intent, motivation) for a “murder” or an “abortion” never matters. The Act we call “murder” or “abortion” is always wrong to choose. That is why it is called “intrinsically” evil - it means “always wrong to choose”.

Yes, I know, and yes I phrased it poorly because I was tired and didn’t have much time, so, just to clarify, what I meant is that whether or not an action is intrinsicall immoral can depend on the intention and desired end of the object. And, while, yes, as you point out the abortion aspect I brought up has other confusing aspects that also need to be taken into account murder vs self-defense is a very clear and we’ll meet a blushed example of this. Shooting someone who is threatening you or your family can be either self defense or murder. If you shoot solely for the sake of preventing harm to you and your family with no intention or desire to kill the aggressor it is self-defense, if you shoot to protect you or your family with the intention and desire of killing the aggressor then it is an act of murder and intrinsically immoral. A very clear example of a case when the intention of an action determines whether or not it is an intrinsically immoral action.

Tube removal is moral because it is directed at the treating the mother’s body - removing that which will soon rupture and cause great harm. The act surely precipitates the earlier death of the child, but the act was not directed there.

Methotrexate injection on the other hand is a procedure directed to killing the child, which leads to recovery of the mother. That is abortion/murder.

The procedure, many years ago, of crushing the cranium of a baby that could not be born (before the days of caesarean birth) in order to save the mother’s life was not moral.

Yes, I am well aware of these important distinctions, however, if you removed the tube with the intention of and desire for the death of the child then yes, you would be guilty of abortion. The action to remove the tube is not intrinsically immoral seeing as you are not directly killing the unborn child. However, I you desire or intend the death of the child then it is automatically immoral. That is the only aspect I was trying to compare with the current discussion as it is the only aspect which is relevant.

No, we don’t at all, or at least you are expressing your idea in a way that is fundamentally at odds with moral theology. You are confusing the “observable” act (or its outcome) with the moral substance of the act. The thing which is intrinsically evil is not the pointing of a gun at a person and pulling the trigger. It is willing the person’s death. That is the murder. My “intention” (motivation) for doing that does not matter - a good one won’t relieve me of moral guilt. I can’t choose murder as a sure way of achieving “self-defence”, though I may take an action that may kill.

Actually, this is exactly the point I m making and in fact shows exactly what I am claiming, that there are time when the intention is what determines whether or not an action is intrinsically immoral.

Apparently so, yet, as I said, I am yet to read the analysis of one of them that correctly frames the argument in terms of Catholic moral theology. Loosely speaking of “Intentions” is just unacceptable for a theologian.

Conte seeks to use the right language, and the right “theology”, but I am not convinced he gets the right answer. The issue hangs on the definition of “contraception”. As the example above illustrates, it is not sufficient to think of it as analogous to “pointing a gun and pulling the trigger”, which is the observable act, but he appears to do that.

Not sure which random person you are referring to. Me? Conte? Perhaps I am random, but Conte is not. He has credentials in the area, but for what it’s worth, I have issues with his reasoning in some areas.

Conte, and so far as I am concerned, he is just a random person on the internet. Yes, he is a self-proclaimed theologian, and is very knowledgeable And has very logical arguments correctly applying church teaching for determining morality, the problem is that he also makes a ton of unbacked up assumptions which when put through the logical framework for determining morlity that he has leads to wacked out results at odds with pretty much all major and accepted theologians that I have ever heard of or read. The fact that his arguments are logical and sound only makes his writings all the more dangerous.

 

[thewanderer]

The intended use or purpose of an act is the font of intention. The concrete act itself has it’s moral meaning determined by the moral object, which is the proximate end, in terms of morality, toward which the intentionally chosen act is inherently ordered. The moral object (or simply “object”) is a different font from intention.

As an intrinsically evil act (an act with a bad moral object) the essential definition of the sin of contraception is based on the moral object, not the intended purpose of the act. Contraception for any purpose, in any circumstance, is still contraception and still immoral.

“No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church.” EV 62

Again, you assume without any official backup from Church teaching that things considered to be contraceptives are intrinsically immoral regardless of itention . Then, you use official teaching which nobody disagrees with to say that intrinsically immoral actions are always immoral regardless of intention. So, you are actually proving my point about your personal moral teachings. They are not the official opinion of the Church, they contradict the mainstream thinking of well respected official theologians, and are dangerous in that they appear to reflect official church teaching because of your methods yet ultimately they rely upon your own personal assumptions.

 

[Rau]

Conte…makes a ton of unbacked up assumptions which when put through the logical framework for determining morlity that he has leads to wacked out results at odds with pretty much all major and accepted theologians that I have ever heard of or read. The fact that his arguments are logical and sound only makes his writings all the more dangerous.

I would be interested to read the writing of any other theologian that formally analyses the same subject. I am yet to find one. Some writings, like the USCCB site simply state an answer.

 

[Rau]

Again, you assume without any official backup from Church teaching that things considered to be contraceptives are intrinsically immoral regardless of intention.

The “Church” cannot pontificate on every conceivable case in point. Conte properly references Church teaching in applying it to this scenario. The only question is whether or not he has applied it correctly.

Then, you use official teaching which nobody disagrees with to say that intrinsically immoral actions are always immoral regardless of intention.

But this is a true statement and should not be disputed! For example, from the CCC:
*1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.*or this:

*[1755] The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil. *If sound medical opinion recommended therapy with a sexual surrogate, could we say that to partake is not fornication because of its medical intent?

Is masturbation as a means to produce a sample of semen for a medical test moral?

If prostitution were undertaken to lift the living standards of the prostitute’s child out of poverty, does prostitution in this instance become moral?

If the good Intention could make the act moral, then sexual surrogacy therapy, self-stimulation to produce a semen sample and engaging in sex for money for certain purposes could all be moral.

No - invoking “intentions” (motivation) will not get you there.

 

[thewanderer]

The “Church” cannot pontificate on every conceivable case in point. Conte properly references Church teaching in applying it to this scenario. The only question is whether or not he has applied it correctly.

But this is a true statement and should not be disputed! For example, from the CCC:
*1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.*or this:

*[1755] The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil. *If sound medical opinion recommended therapy with a sexual surrogate, could we say that to partake is not fornication because of its medical intent?

Is masturbation as a means to produce a sample of semen for a medical test moral?

If prostitution were undertaken to lift the living standards of the prostitute’s child out of poverty, does prostitution in this instance become moral?

If the good Intention could make the act moral, then sexual surrogacy therapy, self-stimulation to produce a semen sample and engaging in sex for money for certain purposes could all be moral.

No - invoking “intentions” (motivation) will not get you there.

Of course not, if the action is intrinsically immoral ** of course** no amount of good intentions will ever make it moral. I have already agreed to this, and, in fact, in the post of mine you just responded to I specifically said this is a teaching no one disagrees with, so why are you acting as though it is something I disagree with?

 

[Rau]

Of course not, if the action is intrinsically immoral ** of course** no amount of good intentions will ever make it moral. I have already agreed to this, and, in fact, in the post of mine you just responded to I specifically said this is a teaching no one disagrees with, so why are you acting as though it is something I disagree with?

Because you also made this statement in Post #93:
*
“what I meant is that whether or not an action is intrinsically immoral can depend on the intention and desired end”*

Do you see the conflict (at least in language)?

 

[thewanderer]

Because you also made this statement in Post #93:
*
“what I meant is that whether or not an action is intrinsically immoral can depend on the intention and desired end”*

Do you see the conflict (at least in language)?

Yes, I do, however, if you read my prior posts on this thread you will see that I have already admitted that that is an incorrect statement, that I misspoke due to being tired and rushed, and that I meant no such thing. It is frustrating that you keep assuming I must have meant that as written despite multiple posts on my part claryfing what I actually think and I would appre mate it if you would stop acting as though I think an intrinsically evil action can be made moral because of good intentions. What I think is that a neutral action can be made intrinsically evil because of intentions, as I have clarified multiple times. And, so, that when the church refers to contraception as an intrinsic evil their definition of contraception includes the intention to contraception just as the Churches definition of murder as an intri sic evil includes the intention to kill.

 

[Rau]

Yes, I do, however, if you read my prior posts on this thread you will see that I have already admitted that that is an incorrect statement, that I misspoke due to being tired and rushed, and that I meant no such thing. It is frustrating that you keep assuming I must have meant that as written despite multiple posts on my part claryfing what I actually think and I would appre mate it if you would stop acting as though I think an intrinsically evil action can be made moral because of good intentions. What I think is that a neutral action can be made intrinsically evil because of intentions, as I have clarified multiple times. And, so, that when the church refers to contraception as an intrinsic evil their definition of contraception includes the intention to contraception just as the Churches definition of murder as an intri sic evil includes the intention to kill.

Wanderer, I’m not picking you up over the same instance of this issue, but over repeated instances of it.

Post #74: “My issue is with his premise that it is sinful whether or not the intention is to avoid conception.”

Post #88: “If you remove this premise and replace it with the premise that it is only inherently immoral when intended to be used as contraception, and then follow his argument through you arrive at the opposite conclusion.” …" In contrast, we already know that some actions that are inherently immoral, for example murder and abortion, depend very much on the intent involved."

#88 was the one you agreed was poorly expressed…] but just after that, you said the same thing again!

Post #93 “what I meant is that whether or not an action is intrinsically immoral can depend on the intention…”

I do understand what you are trying to say however, but you will get sharp rebuke from anyone practiced in moral theology if you keep speaking of Intentions in a ‘loose’ way.

Nevertheless, the idea you are seeking to express is also expressed by a CAF Apologist, Jimmy Akin (see: jimmyakin.com/2006/11/intrinsic_evil.html). What he says (and Conte disagrees violently by the way) is that Acts have a built-in degree of intention and circumstance, and given those, it is either moral or not. If not, then no further consideration of Intentions or Circumstances will make it moral. Here is Conte’s rejection of Akin’s argument: ronconte.wordpress.com/2011/01/01/jimmy-akins-heresy-on-intrinsic-evil/

In our scenario, Conte is saying that the Act (sex while on a medication preventing ovulation) is a wrong (contraceptive) act; he agrees that you are not performing it in order to contracept (ie. with the Intention to contracept), but that nevertheless, that is the inherent nature of the Act. To challenge him, you need to say what the Act is, and it must be distinguished from contraceptive sex. And you need to avoid referring to “good intentions”, because - under the conventional understanding of that expression - that doesn’t make the difference.