Condoms, STDs, and abstinence

[thewanderer]

Wanderer, I’m not picking you up over the same instance of this issue, but over repeated instances of it.

Post #74: “My issue is with his premise that it is sinful whether or not the intention is to avoid conception.”

This is an accurate description of my problem with Ron Conte’s argument and in no way contradicts the fact that an intrinsically immoral act can not be justified by good intentions.

Post #88: “If you remove this premise and replace it with the premise that it is only inherently immoral when intended to be used as contraception, and then follow his argument through you arrive at the opposite conclusion.” …" In contrast, we already know that some actions that are inherently immoral, for example murder and abortion, depend very much on the intent involved."

Again, neither of these statements contradict the fact that an intrinsically immoral act can never be justified by good intentions.

#88 was the one you agreed was poorly expressed…] but just after that, you said the same thing again!

Post #93 “what I meant is that whether or not an action is intrinsically immoral can depend on the intention…”

No, this is not the same thing at all. You are clearly misunderstanding what I am saying. What I am saying in no way contradicts the fact that if an action is intrinsically immoral it can never be justifiable, even if it has the best of circumstances.

I do understand what you are trying to say however, but you will get sharp rebuke from anyone practiced in moral theology if you keep speaking of Intentions in a ‘loose’ way.

I’m sorry, but this entire post from you makes it very clear that you do not understand what I am saying.

Nevertheless, the idea you are seeking to express is also expressed by a CAF Apologist, Jimmy Akin (see: jimmyakin.com/2006/11/intrinsic_evil.html). What he says (and Conte disagrees violently by the way) is that Acts have a built-in degree of intention and circumstance, and given those, it is either moral or not. If not, then no further consideration of Intentions or Circumstances will make it moral. Here is Conte’s rejection of Akin’s argument: ronconte.wordpress.com/2011/01/01/jimmy-akins-heresy-on-intrinsic-evil/

In our scenario, Conte is saying that the Act (sex while on a medication preventing ovulation) is a wrong (contraceptive) act; he agrees that you are not performing it in order to contracept (ie. with the Intention to contracept), but that nevertheless, that is the inherent nature of the Act. To challenge him, you need to say what the Act is, and it must be distinguished from contraceptive sex. And you need to avoid referring to “good intentions”, because - under the conventional understanding of that expression - that doesn’t make the difference.

Reading through both of these it seems to me that Conte’s argument fails because he assumes that Jimmy Akin is saying that the intrinsically evil moral object has reference to intention and circumstance, when, in fact that is not what Jimmy Akin is saying. Instead he is saying that the intrinsically evil act can have reference to intention and circumstance, which, when you consider the fact that the morality of an act depends not just on the moral object but, as Conte himself so rightly points out, on all three fonts of morality, the moral object, the intention and and the circumstances is just plain common sense. And, is essentially what I have been saying as well.

 

[Rau]

Post #74: “My issue is with his premise that it is sinful whether or not the intention is to avoid conception.”

Correction - I shouldn’t have referenced the above as problematic in my previous post. I misread it. This simply states a view that the Act in question is not the intrinsic evil of contraception - which is the matter in debate.

 

[thewanderer]

Wanderer, I’m not picking you up over the same instance of this issue, but over repeated instances of it.

Post #74: “My issue is with his premise that it is sinful whether or not the intention is to avoid conception.”

Post #88: “If you remove this premise and replace it with the premise that it is only inherently immoral when intended to be used as contraception, and then follow his argument through you arrive at the opposite conclusion.” …" In contrast, we already know that some actions that are inherently immoral, for example murder and abortion, depend very much on the intent involved."

#88 was the one you agreed was poorly expressed…] but just after that, you said the same thing again!

Post #93 “what I meant is that whether or not an action is intrinsically immoral can depend on the intention…”

I do understand what you are trying to say however, but you will get sharp rebuke from anyone practiced in moral theology if you keep speaking of Intentions in a ‘loose’ way.

I’m sorry, but none of those statements contradict the fact that an intrinsically immoral act is always immoral. The fact that you think they do shows that you do not, in fact, understand what I am saying, despite your claims.

Nevertheless, the idea you are seeking to express is also expressed by a CAF Apologist, Jimmy Akin (see: jimmyakin.com/2006/11/intrinsic_evil.html). What he says (and Conte disagrees violently by the way) is that Acts have a built-in degree of intention and circumstance, and given those, it is either moral or not. If not, then no further consideration of Intentions or Circumstances will make it moral. Here is Conte’s rejection of Akin’s argument: ronconte.wordpress.com/2011/01/01/jimmy-akins-heresy-on-intrinsic-evil/

In our scenario, Conte is saying that the Act (sex while on a medication preventing ovulation) is a wrong (contraceptive) act; he agrees that you are not performing it in order to contracept (ie. with the Intention to contracept), but that nevertheless, that is the inherent nature of the Act. To challenge him, you need to say what the Act is, and it must be distinguished from contraceptive sex. And you need to avoid referring to “good intentions”, because - under the conventional understanding of that expression - that doesn’t make the difference.

It seems to me that what is really in question in all the debate surrounding this is what is meant by an intrinsically evil act. Ron Conte’s interpretation is that an intrinsically evil act refers only to an intrinsically evil moral object. Whereas my understanding, and, from what I’ve read I would assume is also Jimmy akin’s understanding is that an intrinsically evil act can be made evil by any of the three fonts of the morality of an act, namely, by moral object, intent, or circumstance.

I know, I know, you’re going to bring up the quote from JPII about intrinsically evil acts relying on the object not on the circumstances or intention. However, it is my understanding that that passage is only speaking of one kind of intrinsically evil act. And, if you are throwing your hands up in the air saying “now this random person is just looking for ways to read into things her interpretation” I would direct your attention to the fact that Conte does the exact same thing in his argument. We both point to a definition in an official passage of Church teaching and say it is incomplete. Conte points to the catechism’s definition of masturbation and claims that it is an incomplete definition. If he is allowed to do that and still have his argument be respected then there should be nothing wrong with me pointing out that his “clinching” paragraph makes perfect sense without contradicting what I’m saying if you just recognize that it is not referring to every kind of intrinsically evil act, but only to those that are deemed intrinsically evil because of their moral object.

Here’s another way of looking at it. What is the definition of an intrinsically evil act? Is it not “an action which is always immoral”?

If this is an accurate definition, and, since the morality of an act is determined by its three fonts it is clear that an act can be made intrinsically evil by either its moral object, its intention, or its circumstances. Once it is made immoral by one of those, none of the others can make it moral.

So, you can have an intrinsically immoral act even without the moral object being intrinsically evil because one of the other fonts of morality, such as intention, can come into play to make the act be always and everywhere evil.

 

[Rau]

I’m sorry, but none of those statements contradict the fact that an intrinsically immoral act is always immoral. The fact that you think they do shows that you do not, in fact, understand what I am saying, despite your claims.

As you wish. I’ve explained the deficiency in the language you used, and it is the identical issue that Conte pinged you on. Confusion between Intentions and Moral Object is commonplace in moral theology discussions - I’m not saying you are confused, but if you use the language the way you did, others may assume you are.

It seems to me that what is really in question in all the debate surrounding this is what is meant by an intrinsically evil act. Ron Conte’s interpretation is that an intrinsically evil act refers only to an intrinsically evil moral object. Whereas my understanding, and, from what I’ve read I would assume is also Jimmy akin’s understanding is that an intrinsically evil act can be made evil by any of the three fonts of the morality of an act, namely, by moral object, intent, or circumstance.

No - that is false. An Act may have a good moral object, and thus it cannot be intrinsically evil, but the Act (in the real world) may be immoral. That Act may be immoral when done, say, for wrong Intentions. Eg. Giving money to the poor in order to attract praise. The Moral Object is good, the Intention is bad → the Act is immoral (but not intrinsically evil).

Here’s another way of looking at it. What is the definition of an intrinsically evil act? Is it not “an action which is always immoral”?

Always immoral, regardless of Intentions and Circumstances. Thus, always wrong to choose. It is the Moral Object of a human act that determines whether it is Intrinsically Evil.

If this is an accurate definition, and, since the morality of an act is determined by its three fonts it is clear that an act can be made intrinsically evil by either its moral object, its intention, or its circumstances. Once it is made immoral by one of those, none of the others can make it moral.

An act can be made IMMORAL by evil in any of the 3 fonts, but only if its moral object is evil do we say that the act is Intrinsically Evil.

So, you can have an intrinsically immoral act even without the moral object being intrinsically evil because one of the other fonts of morality, such as intention, can come into play to make the act be always and everywhere evil.

No. You are inventing your own moral theology here!

vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm

 

[thewanderer]

As you wish. I’ve explained the deficiency in the l byanguage you used, and it is the identical issue that Conte pinged you on. Confusion between Intentions and Moral Object is commonplace in moral theology discussions - I’m not saying you are confused, but if you use the language the way you did, others may assume you are.

No - that is false. An Act may have a good moral object, and thus it cannot be intrinsically evil, but the Act (in the real world) may be immoral. That Act may be immoral when done, say, for wrong Intentions. Eg. Giving money to the poor in order to attract praise. The Moral Object is good, the Intention is bad → the Act is immoral (but not intrinsically evil).

Always immoral, regardless of Intentions and Circumstances. Thus, always wrong to choose. It is the Moral Object of a human act that determines whether it is Intrinsically Evil.

An act can be made IMMORAL by evil in any of the 3 fonts, but only if its moral object is evil do we say that the act is Intrinsically Evil.

No. You are inventing your own moral theology here!

vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm

I do not anywhere see the claim you are making that we can only call an act intrinsically evil if the moral object is evil. I do see mentioned that the object determines the morality of the act according to the will, but that is not the same thing as saying that we can only call an act intrinsically evil if the moral object is evil.

 

[Rau]

I do not anywhere see the claim you are making that we can only call an act intrinsically evil if the moral object is evil. I do see mentioned that the object determines the morality of the act according to the will, but that is not the same thing as saying that we can only call an act intrinsically evil if the moral object is evil.

Take the specific act I proposed - giving money to the poor. Consider all the Intentions one might have to do this:

• feed the hungry
• educate their children
• etc.
• attract praise and notoriety.

Now the “act” we judge to be intrinsically evil or not is the act itself, viz. “giving money to the poor”. Clearly there is nothing evil in this very act. But such a human act is immoral if done to “attract praise”, and moral if done to “feed the hungry”. So the same act can be moral, or it can be immoral. For this reason, it is not “intrinsically evil”.

That exemplifies my statement that intrinsically evil act are those where the evil is in the 2nd font (the act itself). The following statement from Jimmy Akin states the same thing:

*But not all evil acts are intrinsically evil. For that to be the case, the object of the act needs to be bad. *jimmyakin.com/2006/11/intrinsic_evil.html

 

[CaliLobo]

What about a faithful couple where one spouse becomes infected due to an accident working in a hospital with contaminated bodily fluids? The couple is already married, and having marital relations is a positive good. The only way they can attain that good end while also preventing further spread of the disease is through condom use. So, when I look at how the principle of double effect works and compare it to this situation I see a good effect and a bad effect, building up and supporting the marriage through marital relations without spreading disease vs lack of fertility. The good effect does not rely on the bad effect and the good effect is proportional to the bad effect. And, since we know from the pill that so called “contraceptives” are only considered to be contraceptives according to Catholic moral theology if the contraceptive effect is intended and desired we know that the means is not inherently immoral so long as the contraceptive effect is not desired or intended. So I still just have a hard time seeing why this would be wrong according to Catholic moral theology.

Whoa, this thread exploded. I’m glad it’s getting people thinking.

I know for a fact that the pill is allowed for another medical reason not related to contraception. And it seems that Catholic priests do allow for exceptions in exceptional cases like that above.

Could we agree that Catholic teaching on contraception is not as clear as we thought? Or rather, that it’s not the law of hearsay evidence–more exceptions than rules?

 

[thewanderer]

Take the specific act I proposed - giving money to the poor. Consider all the Intentions one might have to do this:

• feed the hungry
• educate their children
• etc.
• attract praise and notoriety.

Now the “act” we judge to be intrinsically evil or not is the act itself, viz. “giving money to the poor”. Clearly there is nothing evil in this very act. But such a human act is immoral if done to “attract praise”, and moral if done to “feed the hungry”. So the same act can be moral, or it can be immoral. For this reason, it is not “intrinsically evil”.

That exemplifies my statement that intrinsically evil act are those where the evil is in the 2nd font (the act itself). The following statement from Jimmy Akin states the same thing:

*But not all evil acts are intrinsically evil. For that to be the case, the object of the act needs to be bad. *jimmyakin.com/2006/11/intrinsic_evil.html

You know what’s funny? I was going to use this exact example to show you exactly why intention can determine the morality of an act. Selfish almsgiving is an act that is always immoral, why is selfish almsgiving always immoral? Because, by its very definition, it has an intrinsically immoral intention which renders the whole act itself immoral. So, the moral object of almsgiving is not always immoral, however selfish almsgiving is always immoral, regardless of how good the moral object or circumstances are, because the intention is intrinsically immoral and so the entire act is always and everywhere immoral because of what that action is, selfish almsgiving, ie, it is per se immoral or intrinsically immoral.

 

[Rau]

You know what’s funny? I was going to use this exact example to show you exactly why intention can determine the morality of an act. Selfish almsgiving is an act that is always immoral, why is selfish almsgiving always immoral? Because, by its very definition, it has an intrinsically immoral intention which renders the whole act itself immoral. So, the moral object of almsgiving is not always immoral, however selfish almsgiving is always immoral, regardless of how good the moral object or circumstances are, because the intention is intrinsically immoral and so the entire act is always and everywhere immoral because of what that action is, selfish almsgiving, ie, it is per se immoral or intrinsically immoral.

Do you not realise that you have simply defined the act to be broad enough to incorporate the ill Intention, and thus produced your sought after result! The act itself (2nd font) is alms giving and that is a good. The intention, that which prompts the act, is an evil, and thus renders the thing done immoral! The Intention is not part of the Act, but is a factor in determining its morality.

The moral object of alms giving is inherently good. Add an ill Intention, and the act becomes immoral.

 

[thewanderer]

Do you not realise that you have simply defined the act to be broad enough to incorporate the ill Intention, and thus produced your sought after result! The act itself (2nd font) is alms giving and that is a good. The intention, that which prompts the act, is an evil, and thus renders the thing done immoral! The Intention is not part of the Act, but is a factor in determining its morality.

The moral object of alms giving is inherently good. Add an ill Intention, and the act becomes immoral.

I am well aware of what I am saying. Yes I disagree with you that the intention is not part of the act. In the quote from the CCC you posted earlier it specifically said that the moral object of the act, which you want to equate with the act itself, is only the matter of the act, which means there is more to the act than just the moral object. In other words, you are failing to make an important distinction between the act and the matter of the act, which is only a part of the act.

 

[Rau]

I am well aware of what I am saying. Yes I disagree with you that the intention is not part of the act. In the quote from the CCC you posted earlier it specifically said that the moral object of the act, which you want to equate with the act itself, is only the matter of the act, which means there is more to the act than just the moral object. In other words, you are failing to make an important distinction between the act and the matter of the act, which is only a part of the act.

The 3 fonts or sources of morality for an act are Intention, Moral Object, Circumstances. The moral object is a tightly bound attribute of what is actually done, and is sometimes referred to as “the act itself”.

Sometimes the name or description of an “act” binds in intentions or circumstances. Eg. Euthanasia (of humans) is generally understood to be the ending of a life with the Intention to end suffering. Abortion is the direct killing of a person in the circumstance that they are a pre-natal. Critically, the binding in of these Intentions and Circumstances in the description of the Act makes not a jot of difference to the Moral Object (the 2nd font), or the assessment of morality. If the same act as occurs in Euthanasia is done to win an inheritance, the Moral Object is EXACTLY the same. And because that moral object is evil, the Church terms the act Intrinsically Evil [see the quote below labelled (80) ].

I note as a practical matter that expanding the description of a “good” Act (almsgiving) to include its Intention (ie. the motivation that gives rise to the act) has no bearing on how one ultimately assesses the morality of the Act. Either way, the Act will be found good or bad according to the Intention.

However, if the Act itself has an evil moral object - such as abortion (the direct killing of an unborn), the Intention will have no bearing on morality. The Intention might be a good or an Evil:

• Protect the Mother’s Life (eg. ectopic pregnancy);
• Selfishly preserve the mother’s option for an overseas holiday.

Do we speak of a “selfish abortion” and a “life-saving abortion” when we identify and assess the moral object of the Act? No. Could such acts possible have a different moral object? No. Does the Intention here have any bearing on the moral object? No.

So why do you suggest binding in the Intention in the case where the moral object (as in almsgiving) is good? The moral object of an act described as “almsgiving for a selfish purpose” is good, and is just the same as “almsgiving to feed the poor” because the moral object of the “Act itself” (almsgiving) is good. The Act will be immoral or immoral depending on the Intention.

What sense can be made of the statement in the Catechism [1759] “The end [Intention] does not justify the means [Act]” if you have combined Intention into the Act?

Some Extracts from Veritatis Splendor:

• (74) But on what does the moral assessment of man’s free acts depend? What is it that ensures this ordering of human acts to God? Is it the intention of the acting subject, the circumstances – and in particular the consequences – of his action, or the object itself of his act?*

*(79) One must therefore reject the thesis, characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species – its “object” – the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behaviour or specific acts, **apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act *for all persons concerned.
(80) Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature “incapable of being ordered” to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral
tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece alum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances.

 

[thewanderer]

The 3 fonts or sources of morality for an act are Intention, Moral Object, Circumstances. The moral object is a tightly bound attribute of what is actually done, and is sometimes referred to as “the act itself”.

Just because it is sometimes referred to as “the act itself” does not mean it actually is the exact same thing as the act. Catholic theology is based very much on Aristotle and St. Thomas’s idea of matter and form. When you say that the moral object is the “matter” of the act that automatically means that it cannot be the exact same thing as the act itself. It is a part of the act, but not the act itself in its entirety. It is very important in theology to make distinctions. The fact is that the moral object is not the same thing as the act.

Sometimes the name or description of an “act” binds in intentions or circumstances. Eg. Euthanasia (of humans) is generally understood to be the ending of a life with the Intention to end suffering. Abortion is the direct killing of a person in the circumstance that they are a pre-natal. Critically, the binding in of these Intentions and Circumstances in the description of the Act makes not a jot of difference to the Moral Object (the 2nd font), or the assessment of morality. If the same act as occurs in Euthanasia is done to win an inheritance, the Moral Object is EXACTLY the same. And because that moral object is evil, the Church terms the act Intrinsically Evil [see the quote below labelled (80) ].

I never claimed it changes the morality of the moral object, I claimed that it can, in certain instances, change the morality of the act. Which is a given fact seeing as the intention is one of the fonts of the morality of the act. Which is just another proof that the act is not the same thing as the moral object.

I note as a practical matter that expanding the description of a “good” Act (almsgiving) to include its Intention (ie. the motivation that gives rise to the act) has no bearing on how one ultimately assesses the morality of the Act. Either way, the Act will be found good or bad according to the Intention.

However, if the Act itself has an evil moral object - such as abortion (the direct killing of an unborn), the Intention will have no bearing on morality. The Intention might be a good or an Evil:

• Protect the Mother’s Life (eg. ectopic pregnancy);
• Selfishly preserve the mother’s option for an overseas holiday.

I have not disputed this point. Of course a good intention can never make an immoral act good. That is a given and is not up for debate.

Do we speak of a “selfish abortion” and a “life-saving abortion” when we identify and assess the moral object of the Act? No. Could such acts possible have a different moral object? No. Does the Intention here have any bearing on the moral object? No.

Again, I have never claimed the intention has any bearing on the moral object, I have claimed it has a bearing on the morality of the act itself, which is kind of a given in Catholic moral theology. In fact, that is very clearly stated to be the case in the passage you posted earlier from the CCC. You are again confusing the moral object with the act itself.

So why do you suggest binding in the Intention in the case where the moral object (as in almsgiving) is good? The moral object of an act described as “almsgiving for a selfish purpose” is good, and is just the same as “almsgiving to feed the poor” because the moral object of the “Act itself” (almsgiving) is good. The Act will be immoral or immoral depending on the Intention.

Because it is a basic tenet of Catholic moral theology that an immoral intention makes the act immoral regardless of how good the moral object or circumstances are?

What sense can be made of the statement in the Catechism [1759] “The end [Intention] does not justify the means [Act]” if you have combined Intention into the Act?

I am honestly confused as to why you think that is hard to make sense of? It is Catholic moral theology 101 that if either the moral object or the intention is immoral the act itself is immoral. This means both that an immoral intention joined with a moral object will result in an immoral action as well as that a moral intention joined with an immoral object will result in an immoral object. I’m not claiming that a good intention can make an action with an immoral moral object good, only that an immoral intention can make an action with a good moral action immoral. Again, this is Catholic moral theology 101 and is clearly stated in the passage from the CCC which you pointed me to earlier.

Cont…

 

[thewanderer]

…cont

Some Extracts from Veritatis Splendor:

• (74) But on what does the moral assessment of man’s free acts depend? What is it that ensures this ordering of human acts to God? Is it the intention* of the acting subject, the circumstances – and in particular the consequences – of his action, or the object itself of his act?

*(79) One must therefore reject the thesis, characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species – its “object” – the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behaviour or specific acts, **apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act ***for all persons concerned.
(80) Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature “incapable of being ordered” to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral
tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece alum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances.

Again, I agree entirely and completely with the above and it in no way contradicts anything that I have been saying in this thread. Just because an immoral intention can make an action with a good moral object immoral does not mean that a good intention can make an action with an immoral moral object good.

Honestly, it really does not seem like you understand what I am saying at all since you keep throwing accusations at me which make no sense whatsoever as they in no way apply to the points I have been making. I would appreciate it if you would try to actually understand what I am saying before insisting I am wrong by bringing up strawmen that have nothing to do with what I am saying.

 

[thewanderer]

Rau, maybe I should try a different angle.

Which of the following statements do you disagree with.

1. The intention can never change the morality of the moral object.
2. The intention can never make an action with an immoral moral object into a good act.
3. The intention can change the morality of the act itself.
4. An immoral intention automatically makes an otherwise moral act immoral.
5. Because of statements 1 and 3 it is impossible for the moral object to be the same thing as the act itself.
6. Selfish almsgiving is a possible act.
7. By definition, the act of selfish almsgiving has a good moral object.
8. By definition the act of selfish almsgiving has an immoral intention.
9. Selfish almsgiving is an immoral act by definition because of statements 4 and 8. ie, selfish almsgiving is, per se, an immoral act (otherwise known as an intrinsically immoral action) by virtue of its immoral intention.

Maybe if you make it a little more clear exactly what it is that I am saying that you disagree with we can try to actually get somewhere in this discussion.

 

[Rau]

…I never claimed it [Intention] changes the morality of the moral object, I claimed that it can, in certain instances, change the morality of the act. Which is a given fact seeing as the intention is one of the fonts of the morality of the act. Which is just another proof that the act is not the same thing as the moral object.

Good. We agree.

…Of course a good intention can never make an immoral act good. That is a given and is not up for debate.

Good. We agree.

Again, I have never claimed the intention has any bearing on the moral object, I have claimed it has a bearing on the morality of the act itself, which is kind of a given in Catholic moral theology. In fact, that is very clearly stated to be the case in the passage you posted earlier from the CCC.

Good, we agree.

 

[thewanderer]

Also, just throwing it out there, but this is Ron Conte’s argument about contraception.

1. May a married couple use barrier contraceptives to prevent disease transmission?

No. The use of contraception deprives the sexual act of the procreative meaning and is therefore intrinsically evil and always gravely immoral.

(I will not link to his site for fear it will lead more people into error)

Which means it is Ron Conte’s personal opinion that any act which deprives the sexual act of its procreative meaning is intrinsically evil, and so, always gravely immoral. However, this is in direct contradiction with this passage from Humanae Vitae which makes it clear that there are acts which deprive the sexual act of its procreative meaning while still remaining moral.

1. On the other hand, the Church does not consider at all illicit the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should result there from—provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever.

vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html

If an action causes an impediment to procreation then that action deprives the sexual act of its procreative meaning. Ron Conte claims, simply on his own authority that all such acts are intrinsically evil. However, as can be seen from the quote from HV this directly contradicts official Church teaching.

I am only pointing this out seeing as Ron Conte and his theology has been brought up earlier in this thread as though he were a respected theologian in line with Church teaching. He is not. His teachings are extremely dangerous because he mixes a very large amount of sound Catholic moral theology and logic with a sprinkling of false premises. The false premises lead to erroneous conclusions, however, because so much of what he says is true and he follows a very logical form of argument it is very easy for the average lay person reading his writings to be mislead by the truth and logic that does exist in his writings and so to become convinced that his erroneous conclusions must be true. The most dangerous falsehoods are those that are mixed in with truth.

 

[thewanderer]

Good. We agree.

Good. We agree.

Good, we agree.

Of course we agree on that point.

Does this mean you also agree that it is possible for an action to be intrinsically immoral by virtue of its intention rather than by virtue of its moral object?

 

[Rau]

Rau, maybe I should try a different angle.

Which of the following statements do you disagree with.

The red text below is mine. So, if each point below, with any clarification I’ve provided in read, is agreed, then we are in violent agreement.

1. The intention -]can never change the morality of/-] has no bearing on the moral object.
2. The intention can never make an action with an immoral moral object into a good act.
3. The intention can change the morality of the act itself. [The Intention can render the Act Immoral, but cannot of itself render the act Moral.]
4. An immoral intention automatically makes an otherwise moral act immoral.
5. Because of statements 1 and 3 it is impossible for the moral object to be the same thing as the act itself. It’s not a question of possibilities - they are different ideas. But if you read more moral theology, you will note the Moral Object and the “Act itself” are very tightly related, eg:

USCCB Catechism: “Every moral act consists of three elements: the objective act (what we do), the subjective goal or intention (why we do the act), and the concrete situation or circumstances in which we perform the act… All three aspects must be good – the objective act, the subjective intention, and the circumstances – in order to have a morally good act.” (United States Catholic Catechism for Adults, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, July 2006, p. 311-312.)

You see, although it is strictly the “moral object” that must be good, it is commonly referred to (as in the above Catechism) as the “objective act” - or “what we do”.

1. Selfish almsgiving is a possible act. It describes almsgiving with a selfish Intention.
2. By definition, the acts of selfish almsgiving and selfless almsgiving both have a good moral object.
3. By definition the act of selfish almsgiving has an immoral intention.
4. Selfish almsgiving is an immoral act by definition because of statements 4 and 8. ie, selfish almsgiving is, per se, an immoral act by virtue of its immoral intention.
5. Selfish almsgiving is not “intrinsically evil” as the Church uses the term. Acts described as Intrinsically Evil are so described purely on the basis of their evil Moral Object. I make this point because it was an area of disagreement, as per your statement in post #102, as follows:

thewanderer: It seems to me that what is really in question in all the debate surrounding this is what is meant by an intrinsically evil act. Ron Conte’s interpretation is that an intrinsically evil act refers only to an intrinsically evil moral object. Whereas my understanding, … is that an intrinsically evil act can be made evil by any of the three fonts of the morality of an act, namely, by moral object, intent, or circumstance. My response to that (as per post #103) remains:

Rau: An Act may have a good moral object, and thus it cannot be intrinsically evil, but the Act (in the real world) may be immoral. That Act may be immoral when done, say, for wrong Intentions. Eg. Giving money to the poor in order to attract praise. The Moral Object is good, the Intention is bad → the Act is immoral (but not intrinsically evil).

 

[Rau]

Does this mean you also agree that it is possible for an action to be intrinsically immoral by virtue of its intention rather than by virtue of its moral object?

I’ve never seen the term “intrinsically immoral” in some years of reading theology and it does not appear in the Catechism. The term the church uses is intrinsically evil to describe acts with an evil moral object.

Acts may be “immoral” by virtue of evil in any one of the fonts. [On this there has been no debate.]

 

[Rau]

Whoa, this thread exploded. I’m glad it’s getting people thinking.

I know for a fact that the pill is allowed for another medical reason not related to contraception. And it seems that Catholic priests do allow for exceptions in exceptional cases like that above.

Could we agree that Catholic teaching on contraception is not as clear as we thought? Or rather, that it’s not the law of hearsay evidence–more exceptions than rules?

There are no exceptions. The right to self-defence, even when it may lead to killing someone, is not an exception to the teaching against murder. That it is moral to treat an ectopic pregnancy in a manner which unintentionally kills the child is not an exception to the teaching against abortion (murder). These moral acts are not moral because they come with good Intentions - they are moral because the Act itself - or more formally - its moral object is not the same as the immoral act.

The same will be the case in the topic area of this thread. If the Acts concerned are not immoral, it will be because they are not the Act of contraception.