Condoms, STDs, and abstinence

[thewanderer]

Rau, so, again, as I pointed out earlier our disagreement lies in the definition of “intrinsically evil acts”. You believe this refers only refers to acts whose moral object is immoral. I have a wider understanding of this term.

Let me ask you this. Would you agree that the term “intrinsically evil act” means an act that is, per se, evil, ie an act that is, by definition, an evil act?

 

[thewanderer]

Of interest is that the sin of contraception is defined to require a particular intention, but even absent that intention, such an act is intrinsically evil for other reasons as set out above.

The article above also exposes Conte’s error in deeming marital relations in the context of hormone therapy to be contraception, or indeed to be immoral in any way.

First, I want to say thank you for your detailed explanation about the nature of the marital act. That helps me see a little better how people would be able to say that the pill is licit when not intended as contraception but still say that a condom is not licit, even when not intended as contraception.

Second, however, I am really really curious how you can still say that intent cannot make an act intrinsically evil while also saying that a person taking the pill with a good intention is not committing the intrinsically evil act of contraception but a person doing the exact same thing, taking the pill, but with the intention to contracept, is now committing the intrinsically evil act of contraception? That I just do not understand. The only thing that differentiates these two actions is the intent yet one is intrinsically immoral and the other is not, so how can you say that intent can never determine whether or not an act is intrinsically evil?

 

[Rau]

Let me ask you this. Would you agree that the term “intrinsically evil act” means an act that is, per se, evil, ie an act that is, by definition, an evil act?

I recall earlier you used the expression “by definition” in what I thought was an odd way (see points 7, 8 and 9 of the list in post #113). I didn’t quibble at the time because it seemed tangential to the issue at the time. So, I’m not sure where you want to go with that formulation.

Going back to our almsgiving example, the “act” in question is the “what we do” - give money to the poor, and does not incorporate the motivation (say, to big note ourselves…). If the Act is intrinsically evil, it is “irremediably” evil. This idea relies on the Act being distinct from Intentions and Circumstances (those not intrinsic to the act), since given the Act, the latter two are the only remaining “variables” so to speak that bear on morality.

To “gross up” the Act eg. to something like “selfish almsgiving” would (at least in this example) seem to lead to one deeming all acts evil by virtue of Intention as “intrinsically evil”, which loses the point of defining the term in the first place.

 

[Rau]

First, I want to say thank you for your detailed explanation about the nature of the marital act. That helps me see a little better how people would be able to say that the pill is licit when not intended as contraception but still say that a condom is not licit, even when not intended as contraception.

It was an interesting deep dive into the subject matter.

Second, however, I am really really curious how you can still say that intent cannot make an act intrinsically evil while also saying that a person taking the pill with a good intention is not committing the intrinsically evil act of contraception but a person doing the exact same thing, taking the pill, but with the intention to contracept, is now committing the intrinsically evil act of contraception? That I just do not understand. The only thing that differentiates these two actions is the intent yet one is intrinsically immoral and the other is not, so how can you say that intent can never determine whether or not an act is intrinsically evil?

It is just an outcome of the way terms, and individual Acts, are defined.

Quoting Jimmy Akin (CAF apologist): “But not all evil acts are intrinsically evil. For that to be the case, the object of the act needs to be bad.”

Contraception seems to be one of those cases where the very definition of the act binds in an “intention”. So the “Intentions” that belong to font 1 are Intentions “over and above” those which are defined in the object. Thus - Contraception is said to be intrinsically evil, and it can’t ever be a good thing to contracept no matter what motivation (“further”) Intention you may have. Eg. Contraception is not OK even if you are doing it because you are destitute and can’t possible afford or cope with another chid, or are at grave health risk if you become pregnant. The “intention” to prevent conception is defined to be part of the Act of contraception, and the other fonts (Intentions, Circumstances) are things over and above those referred to in the object.

 

[thewanderer]

It was an interesting deep dive into the subject matter.

It is just an outcome of the way terms, and individual Acts, are defined.

Quoting Jimmy Akin (CAF apologist): “But not all evil acts are intrinsically evil. For that to be the case, the object of the act needs to be bad.”

Contraception seems to be one of those cases where the very definition of the act binds in an “intention”. So the “Intentions” that belong to font 1 are Intentions “over and above” those which are defined in the object. Thus - Contraception is said to be intrinsically evil, and it can’t ever be a good thing to contracept no matter what motivation (“further”) Intention you may have. Eg. Contraception is not OK even if you are doing it because you are destitute and can’t possible afford or cope with another chid, or are at grave health risk if you become pregnant. The “intention” to prevent conception is defined to be part of the Act of contraception, and the other fonts (Intentions, Circumstances) are things over and above those referred to in the object.

So what you’re saying is essentially that intention does make the act intrinsically evil when intention is included as a part of the moral object?

Honestly, it still sounds to me as though you are equating the act with the moral object. You say if the definition of the act includes intention then there is some intention included in the moral object. Why would you assume that connection unless you are equating the moral object with the act?

 

[Rau]

So what you’re saying is essentially that intention does make the act intrinsically evil when intention is included as a part of the moral object?

Honestly, it still sounds to me as though you are equating the act with the moral object. You say if the definition of the act includes intention then there is some intention included in the moral object. Why would you assume that connection unless you are equating the moral object with the act?

The intentionality you are referring to may be part of the particular act (because it is simply defined that way). We don’t quite think of that intentionality “changing” the moral meaning of the act, because, absent some intentionality, “swallowing a pill” does not mean anything. It does not rise to the level of a moral act at all. Other acts, say, fornication, bind in no intentionality at all - they just are what they are. Intentions - the stuff of the 1st font, sit outside the Act. I suspect there is always going to be confusion in discussion in this area. I don’t know how it can be entirely removed.

I tend to use the terms object and act chosen a little interchangeably. The objective act (recall the USCCB definitions) is intrinsically ordered to its moral object. They are “tight”!

Consider a suffering patient given morphine. What is the Act?

Speaking as (amateur) theologians, rather than onlookers, we would answer - “well there isn’t one yet”. “I need to be in the doctor’s shoes, his mind, to know what is the Act”.

Now, let us say that the doctor is highly empathetic to the needs of the patient, who wants to be relieved of suffering. The doctor empathises and shares that aim. He chooses to administer a lethal dose. Now we know the Act - it is euthanasia. And we say the Intention was the good of “relieve suffering”. What is the moral object? - it is the deprivation of life of an innocent person…that is the moral object of the Act of euthanasia. The same as the moral object of murder. The same as the moral object of abortion.

 

[CaliLobo]

This idea that with condoms, the intent is closely tied to the act, seems like an arbitrary distinction. Can a use condoms with the intent to protect against diseases, with the side effect being preventing pregnancy? That way the intent is not immoral.

 

[jmcrae]

This idea that with condoms, the intent is closely tied to the act, seems like an arbitrary distinction. Can a use condoms with the intent to protect against diseases, with the side effect being preventing pregnancy? That way the intent is not immoral.

Not unless you can figure out a way for the condom to protect someone who will always be a virgin, and will never have sex.

The reason these other things can be considered medical is that virgins can and do use these methods to control the side effects of various diseases, without ever having sex.

 

[CaliLobo]

Not unless you can figure out a way for the condom to protect someone who will always be a virgin, and will never have sex.

The reason these other things can be considered medical is that virgins can and do use these methods to control the side effects of various diseases, without ever having sex.

Irrelevant since for Catholics, sex is within marriage. So virgins shouldn’t use condoms anyway.

 

[jmcrae]

Irrelevant since for Catholics, sex is within marriage. So virgins shouldn’t use condoms anyway.

But they can use hormonal pills. That’s the difference. Condoms have only to do with the sex act itself. Pills, by contrast, can be used in a variety of ways, many of which are perfectly moral.

 

[Rau]

This idea that with condoms, the intent is closely tied to the act, seems like an arbitrary distinction. Can a use condoms with the intent to protect against diseases, with the side effect being preventing pregnancy? That way the intent is not immoral.

Read post #136 carefully, and in particular the .pdf available at the link I posted in that post. Sex with a condom is not conjugal.

 

[Rau]

But they can use hormonal pills. That’s the difference. Condoms have only to do with the sex act itself. Pills, by contrast, can be used in a variety of ways, many of which are perfectly moral.

Sex with a condom is not conjugal. It is not an act of a kind apt for generation of life.

 

[Rau]

This idea that with condoms, the intent is closely tied to the act, seems like an arbitrary distinction. Can a use condoms with the intent to protect against diseases, with the side effect being preventing pregnancy? That way the intent is not immoral.

Just to expand on my answer above, the Intention of protecting your wife from disease is a good Intention, but the problem is that the means you choose to achieve this end - “sex which is not conjugal” is a bad act.

1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). The end does not justify the means.

vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm

Marital acts are required to be “conjugal”. All are required to be of the same kind which may consummate a marriage. That is addressed in more detail in the post and linked document I referred to above.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Of interest is that the sin of contraception is defined to require a particular intention, but even absent that intention, such an act is intrinsically evil for other reasons as set out above.

The article above also exposes Conte’s error in deeming marital relations in the context of hormone therapy to be contraception, or indeed to be immoral in any way.

The free will is the source of each of the fonts of morality. The will chooses an intended end (finis agentis; the end of the person who acts). The will chooses an act, but every act has a moral nature, determined by its moral object (finis actus; the end inherent to the act). By intentionally choosing any act, the person necessarily chooses the act, its nature, and its object.

The person might propose to use a contraceptive act for the end (finis agentis) of treating a medical disorder or preventing the spread of a disease, but by intentionally choosing that type of act, the person necessarily chooses the act, the inherent ordering that constitutes its moral nature, and its object. That is why the Church teaches that contraceptive acts are immoral, as an end or as a means:

Compendium of the Catechism: “What are immoral means of birth control? Every action – for example, direct sterilization or contraception – is intrinsically immoral which (either in anticipation of the conjugal act, in its accomplishment or in the development of its natural consequences) proposes, as an end or as a means, to hinder procreation.” [n. 498]

The act (or action) of contraception proposes to hinder procreation, even when the act is used as the means to some other end.

Many commentators have fallen into the error of folding the intended end (finis agentis) into the act, as if the person could choose which object to associate with which act. When the magisterium refers to an act as “deliberately contraceptive” or “intentionally rendering” marital relations unfruitful, the meaning is that the person has deliberately (intentionally) chosen an act that has a contraceptive end (finis actus). The act itself is inherently ordered to thwart procreation.

The Magisterium condemns “actions which are in themselves (that is, by their nature and condition) ordered toward a contraceptive end” regardless of the intended purpose of the person who acts (agentis). [Quaecumque Sterilizatio, March 13, 1975, AAS 68 (1976) 738-740]

There are very many assertions in Veritatis Splendor on the doctrine of the object, that any act with an evil moral object is intrinsically evil, regardless of intention or circumstances. The confusion comes from the fact that the act is intentionally chosen, but the chosen act has its own end which is independent of the reason the person chose the act.

The idea that a particular intention (intended end; finis agentis) is part of the definition of an intrinsically evil act, is contradicted repeatedly and clearly by numerous passages in Veritatis Splendor. Every intrinsically evil act is evil solely because the act is ordered toward an evil end (finis actus). The fact that an intrinsically evil act must be intentionally chosen to be a sin does not permit us to redefine a contraceptive act, making it moral and non-contraceptive, by means of our intention.

 

[underacloud]

The act (or action) of contraception proposes to hinder procreation, even when the act is used as the means to some other end.

This is correct.

But a woman who is taking medication to treat a condition is not proposing to hinder procreation, either as a means or an end in itself. She is not commiting an act of contraception.

Many commentators have fallen into the error of folding the intended end (finis agentis) into the act, as if the person could choose which object to associate with which act. When the magisterium refers to an act as “deliberately contraceptive” or “intentionally rendering” marital relations unfruitful, the **meaning is that the person has deliberately (intentionally) chosen an act that has a contraceptive end **(finis actus). The act itself is inherently ordered to thwart procreation.

This is incorrect (my bolding).

You need to brush up on your undertanding of double effect. A person can choose an act this is morally good or neutral (eg taking medication) that may also have an unintended and unavoidable secondary effect (inhibiting fertility).

A person can deliberately chose an act that has a contraceptive end, as long as that end is not directly intended, not the means to the good end, and there is proportionate reasons to do so.

Which brings us directly back to HV: “…the Church does not consider at all illicit the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should result there from—provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever.”

This is all about double effect and whether contraception is directly intended or merely an unintended secondary effect.

 

[Ron_Conte]

But a woman who is taking medication to treat a condition is not proposing to hinder procreation, either as a means or an end in itself. She is not commiting an act of contraception.

The end proposed by the person is the finis agentis (first font: intention). VS is very clear that intention does not justify any intrinsically evil act. CCC explicitly teaches that legitimate intentions do not justify contraception. If contraception were defined by the intention of the person, it would be justified by a non-contraceptive intention.

The intentionally-chosen act also has its own end, the finis actus (second font: moral object). By choosing an act inherently ordered toward a contraceptive end, the person intentionally contracepts. And this is true even if the contraceptive is a means to a good end.

The same analysis applies to direct abortion to save the life of the mother. The person does not intend the death of the prenatal (finis agentis), but by intentionally choosing an act ordered to that proximate end (finis actus), the person necessarily chooses the act, its ordination, and its end.

The example of euthanasia is quite definitive in the distinction between intention and object. Euthanasia by definition (Evangelium Vitae) is murder with the medical purpose of relieving all suffering. EV states that this purpose is the good intention of the act, and yet the act is intrinsically evil. So it is not possible to claim that a good intention, including a good medical purpose, redefines an act as not intrinsically evil.

You need to brush up on your undertanding of double effect. A person can choose an act this is morally good or neutral (eg taking medication) that may also have an unintended and unavoidable secondary effect (inhibiting fertility).

A person can deliberately chose an act that has a contraceptive end, as long as that end is not directly intended, not the means to the good end, and there is proportionate reasons to do so.

Which brings us directly back to HV: “…the Church does not consider at all illicit the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should result there from—provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever.”

This is all about double effect and whether contraception is directly intended or merely an unintended secondary effect.

The therapeutic interventions spoken of in HV are cases of indirect sterilization. The term “directly intended” refers to the font of the object (finis actus). To intentionally choose an act directly ordered toward a contraceptive end is the definition of intrinsic evil. The term “any motive whatever” refers to the intention or purpose chosen by the person (finis agentis). So HV 15 is saying that, to be moral, such an act must not be intrinsically evil (not directly intended) and that intrinsically evil acts are never justified by any motive.

You are saying the opposite of HV 15, that the motive to treat a disorder justifies the deliberate choice of an act with a contraceptive end (finis actus). Such a choice defines the term “directly intended”.

The principle of double effect NEVER justifies an intrinsically evil act. And intrinsically evil acts are never defined by intention (finis agentis). Every intrinsically evil act is intentionally chosen (deliberately chosen), but in choosing the act, the person necessarily chooses its nature and its object. The term “directly intended” refers to the intentional choice of an act directly ordered toward its object, and when the object is evil, the act is intrinsically evil.

The chosen act is never morally neutral; to make such a claim nullifies the font called moral object.

“A person can deliberately chose an act that has a contraceptive end, as long as that end is not directly intended, not the means to the good end, and there is proportionate reasons to do so.”

The deliberate choice of an act that has a contraceptive end has been condemned by the Magisterium. The Church condemns “actions which are in themselves (that is, by their nature and condition) ordered toward a contraceptive end” regardless of the intended purpose of the person who acts (agentis). [Quaecumque Sterilizatio, March 13, 1975, AAS 68 (1976) 738-740]

The choice of an act with a contraceptive end (finis actus; the moral object) is what the Church means by “directly intended”. The intentional choice of the act, directed toward an evil end, is an intrinsically evil act by definition.

I should also point out that the type of medication considered here is abortifacient, and if the couple remains sexually active, some actual abortions may occur. The fact that some prenatals die as a result of this choice effectively refutes the unintended side effect argument. The medication could be taken while avoiding sexual relations, thereby making the choice neither contraceptive nor abortive.

 

[underacloud]

Ron,

You are confusing the moral object (finis actus) with any foreseeable end of an act. This is your fundamental mistake and why you cannot come to the conclusions that every moral theologian I know of does in this matter.

The moral object (finis actus) of taking medication is to treat a medical condition. The unintended ends may include inhibited fertility, but this is not the moral object, and neither is it the means by which the good effect is acheived.

 

[Rau]

The person might propose to **use a contraceptive act **for the end (finis agentis) of treating a medical disorder or preventing the spread of a disease, but by intentionally choosing that type of act, the person necessarily chooses the act, the inherent ordering that constitutes its moral nature, and its object.

Is taking drug X - which might also be prescribed for contraception - a contraceptive act as the Catechism defines contraception?

The Catechism states (shortened for relevance): “every action which, … in anticipation of the conjugal act… proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible” is intrinsically evil".

Medication may render procreation impossible but is that what the action in question (taking of the drug) “proposes”? Or is that a side-effect?

 

[jacktilde]

Good for you! WebMD is no one’s friend after a one a night stand, am I right? We’ve all been there! Well. Maybe not.

Either way, I suppose you could use that anti-HIV lubricant they recently developed instead of condoms to bypass the contraception dealy. Since it’s only for the use of preventing HIV

 

[Ron_Conte]

The moral object (finis actus) of taking medication is to treat a medical condition. The unintended ends may include inhibited fertility, but this is not the moral object, and neither is it the means by which the good effect is acheived.

Consider a medication to treat cancer (chemotherapy) that would kill any developing prenatal. The patient can take the medication and refrain from sexual relations. So the act has only the treatment of the condition as its object.

But if the same patient decides to engage in sexual relations, introducing the possibility of pregnancy, that additional choice is a sin. The choice to have sexual relations while taking an abortifacient has an evil moral object, an abortifacient end. So it is not a case of a simple decision to use a medication or not. The couple is also deciding whether or not to have sexual relations. And doing so implies the possibility of conception and abortion.

Therefore, it is not true in the case of abortifacient contraception as a medical treatment that the act is merely the taking of a medication. There is also a decision whether or not to have marital relations.

The intended end is the font of intention (finis agentis). The anticipated effects are in the font of circumstances. Neither implies anything about the moral object (finis actus). So the common claim that an end is “unintended” does not imply that such an end cannot be the object.

The will is the source of all three fonts. In the first font, the will chooses an intended end, the purpose or reason for acting (finis agentis). In the second font, the will chooses an act, which is ordered toward its own end (finis actus). The intentional choice of any act includes – at least implicitly (like it or not) – the choice of the act, its ordering, and its object. So even if the end of the act is “unintended”, the intentional choice of an act with an evil end is sinful.

You cannot intentionally choose an act – sexual relations while taking an abortifacient – ordered toward an abortive end (finis actus), and then deny moral responsibility for the choice by saying that you do not intend (finis agentis) the death of the prenatal.