Connection between free will and a known future?

[Peter_Plato]

Is your point that since God is “ultimately responsible”, that is why God became One of us to pay the price of ALL of us on the cross, so that ALL of us are, ultimately, with God, even those that take a detour or so?

God would appear “ultimately responsible” because the fall directly brought on diminished responsibility on our part. In a sense, the fall made us less capable of being responsible as a direct result, which is why God became one of us to restore us through grace bestowed. The fact that grace is available, though, does make us responsible for not taking advantage of it.

Our diminished capacity cannot serve as an excuse because grace made available through the sacrifice of Christ on the cross overcomes the effects of the fall.

 

[Peter_Plato]

**Actually, it is a “done deal”, **for us “it’s a current event”.

God has already become One of us, according to God’s Plan which God has had since before creation, and lived and died for ALL of us which is what the Good News is about which God asked us to Proclaim.

It isn’t that God has “given up on humanity”, it is that God’s “work on the cross” covers ALL, even tho it seems as if virtually no one believes this and there are many that do not want this as long as they go to the “good place”.

If it was a “done deal” we’d be with God in eternity.

There is still the no small matter of making a choice to “walk with God” instead of ignoring him. That is the “seal” that makes it “done.”

 

[oldcelt]

No he hasn’t.

He missed the nail and hit his thumb but wants to blame the maker of the nail and hammer for his pain.

But we cannot ignore a maker who with foreknowledge put a faulty product on the market, and then punishes the users, who were forced by the maker to use the product in the first place.

 

[Peter_Plato]

But we cannot ignore a maker who with foreknowledge put a faulty product on the market, and then punishes the users, who were forced by the maker to use the product in the first place.

What is the faulty product in the case of creation? Do you mean free will?

The autonomy to make choices? Why would that have been faulty, given that it came with only one stipulation, “Don’t eat from this tree!”

It is not like knowledge of rocket science was required to figure out the user’s manual which wasn’t, in any case, written in some obtuse foreign language. Follow a very clear, simple and singular instruction: “You are entirely free to do anything, anywhere at any time EXCEPT this one little thing.”

A car manufacturer makes a vehicle that goes everywhere, at any speed, avoids all obstacles and never breaks down, but comes with the singular warning to not put the vehicle in reverse when exceeding the speed of light. Is it the manufacturer’s “fault” or a “fault” of the product if the driver makes a decision to disregard the warning in order to find out what will happen?

We have radically differing views on what constitutes a “faulty product,” it appears.

 

[JamesATyler]

Regardless of the exit plan, he knew they would fail before he created them. That can’t be dismissed. It must have been his plan that they fail because he knew before he created them or he didn’t know what was going to happen. It was his choice to create them. Any foreseeable consequences are firmly on his shoulders. If I know striking a match will burn down a house am I not respomsible if I strike the match?

How does God know he would fail before he created them? That is the part of your reasoning that seems weird to me. How exactly would he look at Adam’s future if Adam doesn’t exist? If God can see Adam’s future then Adam must already exist up to that point. This where you are going into error, I think. You are thinking that God is looking into future that doesn’t exist yet but would. You think he can make a prediction about Adam’s future and decide not create him. I don’t think that’s how it really works. I think God sees the actual future. Probably, if God could simply make predictions about human beings then free-will wouldn’t be creative or real. You are talking about a speculative God. I am talking about a God that actually sees the real future.

I think the ability to predict what a free-will is going to do is right up there with creating round squares. Not quite, because you can predict very well if you know a person, but predicting a free-will that doesn’t exist? That’s a strange notion to me.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

Non sequitur.

Even given omniscience, it may have been foreseen and permitted - not intended - because possibilities then became available to omniscience and omnipotence that we cannot imagine.

“Intended” presumes no responsibility on the part of the agents - Adam and Eve - for their part in the fall. Your argument is still based on a fallacy - retrospective determinism - if it happened it had to happen, therefore God knowing it would happen determined it to. It’s "fall"acious thinking, a direct result of the fall, in fact.

Adam blames Eve, Eve blames the snake, we blame God. Excuses. Excuses. Excuses. Recognizing culpability is the first step towards undoing wrong.

No, Before they were created the fall was known, if he has knowledge of all time. By choosing to create them, the fall was created. If he didn’t intend it, he could have chosen not to create, knowing the consequences for all those involved. If the consequences are “allowed”, the question is why? If the answer is achieve a greater good, i.e. the incarnation then the fall is merely a plot device. Without the fall the incarnation isn’t necessary. We can’t get to point B without a point A. If the incarnation was intended then the fall too was intended. No fall, no need for incarnation.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

How does God know he would fail before he created them? That is the part of your reasoning that seems weird to me. How exactly would he look at Adam’s future if Adam doesn’t exist? If God can see Adam’s future then Adam must already exist up to that point. This where you are going into error, I think. You are thinking that God is looking into future that doesn’t exist yet but would. You think he can make a prediction about Adam’s future and decide not create him. I don’t think that’s how it really works. I think God sees the actual future. Probably, if God could simply make predictions about human beings then free-will wouldn’t be creative or real. You are talking about a speculative God. I am talking about a God that actually sees the real future.

I am saying the same. All events in all of time are “now” to God. Adam and I exist at the same moment outside of time from God’s perspective. All moments in time were created at the same moment. So by creating “everything” god knew everything creation would entail. Every good, every evil that ever has or will happen was created at one “moment” - we inside creation experience as unfolding, but to god it is all “now”. So by choosing to create god chose all events to happen. Any labels we put on it past, present, good or evil are just from our perspective, not gods. Our experience is just an illusion of time. Free will is an illusion of that time experience.

As you point out, how can I make a decision before I exist? If all of the moments exist to god they must exist, they just haven’t been experienced. Free will is an illusion of our experience.

 

[JamesATyler]

I am saying the same. All events in all of time are “now” to God. Adam and I exist at the same moment outside of time from God’s perspective. All moments in time were created at the same moment. So by creating “everything” god knew everything creation would entail. Every good, every evil that ever has or will happen was created at one “moment” - we inside creation experience as unfolding, but to god it is all “now”. So by choosing to create god chose all events to happen. Any labels we put on it past, present, good or evil are just from our perspective, not gods. Our experience is just an illusion of time. Free will is an illusion of that time experience.

As you point out, how can I make a decision before I exist? If all of the moments exist to god they must exist, they just haven’t been experienced. Free will is an illusion of our experience.

I know what you are saying makes sense to you. If what you are saying were true then I’d have to use the term you very loosely because I guess it’s actually God. My reply is also God. In other words God is very disagreeable with himself isn’t he. If free-will is an illusion then we don’t even actually exist as persons. When you feel pain then it’s actually God that feels it. Same for me. Is that about what you are saying reality is? (if God exists)

 

[JamesATyler]

I think we are all co-authors with God. We all have our own part. We write our own lines. We make our own marks. I don’t think God is responsible for my dialog or deeds. I think that bit is my own authoring.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

I know what you are saying makes sense to you. If what you are saying were true then I’d have to use the term you very loosely because I guess it’s actually God. My reply is also God. In other words God is very disagreeable with himself isn’t he. If free-will is an illusion then we don’t even actually exist as persons. When you feel pain then it’s actually God that feels it. Same for me. Is that about what you are saying reality is? (if God exists)

Some believe we are god experiencing ourself.

 

[tonyrey]

Non sequitur.

Even given omniscience, it may have been foreseen and permitted - not intended - because possibilities then became available to omniscience and omnipotence that we cannot imagine.

“Intended” presumes no responsibility on the part of the agents - Adam and Eve - for their part in the fall. Your argument is still based on a fallacy - retrospective determinism - if it happened it had to happen, therefore God knowing it would happen determined it to. It’s "fall"acious thinking, a direct result of the fall, in fact.

Adam blames Eve, Eve blames the snake, we blame God. Excuses. Excuses. Excuses. Recognizing culpability is the first step towards undoing wrong.

:clapping: Very neat but not sweet for the amoral elite!

 

[inocente]

Simple fallacy of affirming the consequent.

If Man P wills X, then God knows (or foreknows) it (i.e., that Man P wills X).
God knows (or foreknows) Man P wills X.
Therefore, Man P wills X.

As I said, 2,300 years of philosophical debate amongst some of the greatest minds ever.

And you put it all to bed in one post on an internet forum by quoting Wikipedia.

Thanks, I needed a laugh.

 

[Peter_Plato]

As I said, 2,300 years of philosophical debate amongst some of the greatest minds ever.

And you put it all to bed in one post on an internet forum by quoting Wikipedia.

Thanks, I needed a laugh.

No YOUR understanding or portrayal of the debate can be put to bed in one post, that does not mean the entire philosophical debate of 2300 years is reducible to your understanding of it.

On the other hand, the ball is in your court to show that the debate isn’t reducible to a simple fallacy of affirming the consequent, since you are the one claiming that the debate is meaningful in a way that isn’t so reducible.

What is even more hilarious is that I can find numerous posts by you claiming that philosophical debate is meaningless, philosophers are simply cud chewers and any philosophical debate ill conceived to begin with precisely because 2300 years of it has gone nowhere.

This was your stated reason for dismissing the entirety of philosophy in several other forums. Now, all of a sudden, philosophy becomes important to backing your point.

Unfortunately, appeals to ad populum or authority are still fallacies even when large numbers of philosophers are those appealed to.

Either, rebut my argument that your rendition is based upon a fallacy of affirming the consequent or accept that it is.

If Man will do, then God knows.
God knows.

Therefore, Man will do.

…is precisely what you argued.

If God knows what the man will do then the man wants to do it because God knows he wants to do it. The man cannot want otherwise and so is a puppet, wanting whatever God knows he will want.

What is your argument against that?

 

[inocente]

No YOUR understanding or portrayal of the debate can be put to bed in one post, that does not mean the entire philosophical debate of 2300 years is reducible to your understanding of it.

On the other hand, the ball is in your court to show that the debate isn’t reducible to a simple fallacy of affirming the consequent, since you are the one claiming that the debate is meaningful in a way that isn’t so reducible.

What is even more hilarious is that I can find numerous posts by you claiming that philosophical debate is meaningless, philosophers are simply cud chewers and any philosophical debate ill conceived to begin with precisely because 2300 years of it has gone nowhere.

This was your stated reason for dismissing the entirety of philosophy in several other forums. Now, all of a sudden, philosophy becomes important to backing your point.

Unfortunately, appeals to ad populum or authority are still fallacies even when large numbers of philosophers are those appealed to.

Either, rebut my argument that your rendition is based upon a fallacy of affirming the consequent or accept that it is.

If Man wills, then God knows.
God knows.

Therefore, Man wills.

…is precisely what you argued.

I do remember on a thread some time back taking a position that philosophers never agree, which of course they never do. It was a lot of fun, there were a number of wannabe philosophers who got apoplectic, but of course no real philosophers were harmed. But that was another thread, and the stickies say you are not allowed to cross threads. Your comments about me have no bearing on anything and would be an ad hominem fallacy except that I have not even made an argument yet.

You thought I was making an argument before, when all I was doing was quoting from an encyclopedia (post #4). Even then I was only quoting part of an introduction, laying out the problem. It wasn’t even making an argument yet you accused it of fallacious reasoning.

All I wanted to do was point out that the problem requires more than a superficial glance. Any trigger happy guy on an internet forum who thinks he’s solved it probably hasn’t given it enough thought to perceive the deep problem.

That’s been my only point. There is real philosophy and there is what passes for philosophy. They are not the same.

Here again are the two articles:

iep.utm.edu/foreknow/
plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/

 

[Peter_Plato]

It wasn’t even making an argument yet you accused it of fallacious reasoning.

Well, call me confused, then, because …

What is your argument against that?

… asking for a counterargument in rebuttal would seem to imply that an argument was offered.

In any case, accepting that you didn’t attempt an argument then, what is NOW your argument that God “knowing” necessarily entails some causal connection to what is known by him?

 

[JamesATyler]

I read through some of the article.

Logical Determinism
If a proposition about some future action you undertake (let’s say tomorrow) is true, then it is true now. But if it is true now, then tomorrow you must undertake that action, that action must occur, you are powerless to prevent yourself from undertaking that action.

and Epistemic Determinism
If a proposition about some future action you undertake is known (in advance), then (when the time comes) you must undertake that action, that action must occur, you are powerless to prevent yourself from undertaking that action.

Casual Determinism
If whatever one does is the result of Laws of Nature and of one’s physical and genetic makeup and one’s personal history, then – since all these ‘factors’ are ‘set’ (or ‘in place’) at the moment of one’s acting – you must undertake the action you perform, that action must occur, you are powerless to prevent yourself from undertaking that action.

I guess my problem is with the conclusion, “you are powerless to prevent yourself from undertaking that action.” I think there is truth in this but I don’t think that the conclusion, “free will is an illusion” necessarily follows. Where does the “power” to prevent yourself from taking an action come from? It comes from the will. We know you are “powerless” so drawing the conclusion, “There is no free will” is logical. But I think there is an alternate conclusion. The reason why you are “powerless” is because your will is free but it does not want to prevent the action. I think that conclusion is just as valid.

 

[belorg]

It’s really simple. If a decison is really free in the libertarian sense, then it cannot be known in advance. That is because in order for something to be known it must be true.
If you don’t think perfect foreknwoledge means you are powerless to prevent an action, then suppose this foreknowledge is revealed to you. God (or some other omniscient entity) tells you you will have tea for breakfast tomorrow. If you truly have the power to prevent this, then have coffee tomorrow. But then, it turns out that the foreknowledge wasn’t perfect after all.
Now, if you truly have free will, this situation must be possible. Hence, free will and perfect foreknowledge are incompatible.

 

[Peter_Plato]

It’s really simple. If a decison is really free in the libertarian sense, then it cannot be known in advance. That is because in order for something to be known it must be true.
If you don’t think perfect foreknwoledge means you are powerless to prevent an action, then suppose this foreknowledge is revealed to you. God (or some other omniscient entity) tells you you will have tea for breakfast tomorrow. If you truly have the power to prevent this, then have coffee tomorrow. But then, it turns out that the foreknowledge wasn’t perfect after all.
Now, if you truly have free will, this situation must be possible. Hence, free will and perfect foreknowledge are incompatible.

This is the same as arguing that because what you choose is what you have determined is to happen, therefore it must be true that it will happen. Therefore, you cannot have been free to choose it because by choosing it you have made it necessary to happen. If necessary, then not free.

Fallacious thinking all the way around.

Part of the problem lies in an ambiguous use of the word determined.

By choosing one particular option, an agent determines that option in time.
If a choice is “determined” it can be known and cannot be free.
Therefore, by freely choosing (and determining) an option the agent is not “freely” making a choice even when it has been freely made because by choosing one option s/he has “determined” the choice.

A free choice becomes a determined choice by being THE choice of a free agent, which is nonsense.

The reason it can be known outside of time is because the agent finally made a choice - a distinctively free one even if by choosing it, the agent “determined” that the choice then could provide certainty for a knower outside of time.

 

[JamesATyler]

It’s really simple. If a decison is really free in the libertarian sense, then it cannot be known in advance. That is because in order for something to be known it must be true.
If you don’t think perfect foreknwoledge means you are powerless to prevent an action, then suppose this foreknowledge is revealed to you. God (or some other omniscient entity) tells you you will have tea for breakfast tomorrow. If you truly have the power to prevent this, then have coffee tomorrow. But then, it turns out that the foreknowledge wasn’t perfect after all.
Now, if you truly have free will, this situation must be possible. Hence, free will and perfect foreknowledge are incompatible.

I don’t see why though, that I should completely rule out the possibility that even if a person is given knowledge of the future and he doubts that he will do that thing, that when the time comes he does choose to do that thing because perhaps the circumstances become known to him.

The problem is very simple, I agree, and so is the conclusion. It does seem simple to then decide that there must be no free will but I can’t help thinking that the whole idea of it is based around the assumption that the person would at some point want to change his future. I think that if the person really didn’t want to do a particular action(and didn’t) then that wouldn’t be the future that God knows. But I do understand the difficulty that the problem presents for someone trying to believe in God, as the Catholic Church describes him.

 

[Bahman]

I don’t see why though, that I should completely rule out the possibility that even if a person is given knowledge of the future and he doubts that he will do that thing, that when the time comes he does choose to do that thing because perhaps the circumstances become known to him.

The problem is very simple, I agree, and so is the conclusion. It does seem simple to then decide that there must be no free will but I can’t help thinking that the whole idea of it is based around the assumption that the person would at some point want to change his future. I think that if the person really didn’t want to do a particular action(and didn’t) then that wouldn’t be the future that God knows. But I do understand the difficulty that the problem presents for someone trying to believe in God, as the Catholic Church describes him.

The problem arises when an agent with free has access to foreknowledge since it could do opposite of what is known and put foreknowledge on jeopardy. In another word, the truness of foreknowledge is subject to secrecy.